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ways to preserve their lands and cultures while simultaneously attempting to redefine
their relationship with their former British allies. Specifically, the project compares
British-Indian interaction and diplomacy in three regions throughout Upper Canada and
the Old Northwest. These three locales correspond roughly to the areas served by
Britain's three principal Indian agencies in Upper Canada at the time -namely Fort St.
Joseph, Fort Amherstburg, and Fort George. The Natives of each of these three areas
developed unique relationships with the British, and as a result, Britain could not
establish a single Indian policy that applied everywhere in its North American
borderlands. Government leaders and Indian agents in Canada and the Great Lakes were
forced to adapt Whitehall's policies to conditions and circumstances that were prevalent
in each of the sectors in which British agents and leaders dealt w ith indigenous peoples.
Several factors affected the evolution of British-Indian relations from region to region.
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geographical position, the influence of British-Indian agents, intertribal relations between
various Native groups, the degree of Indian acculturation with whites, Native cultural
revitalization, and the constitutional issues of Native sovereignty and legal status. As a
result, Britain was unable to preserve the unity among its confederated tribal allies that it
had enjoyed during the American Revolution, and by the War of 1812, the old "Chain of
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The latter years of the eighteenth century marked a period of change and
uncertainty in both Europe and North America. Nowhere was this more so than along the
American frontier, where Native Americans struggled to preserve their lands and cultures
against the rapidly expanding United States. The ongoing struggle in the West
represented a continuing phase of the American Revolution that did not cease when Euro-
American powers made peace at Paris in 1783. Consequently, Great Britain's frontier
policy and the Crown's relations with its Native allies underwent several changes during
these postwar years. This study focuses specifically on British Indian relations in the
Great Lakes and Upper Canada (present-day Ontario) between 1783 and 1812. The
period begins with Britain's involvement among the Indians of the Ohio Valley during
the latter's attempt to retain possession of the Old Northwest,' and it ends at the outset of
the final British-American war, a struggle which virtually ended Native resistance to
American expansion in the Great Lakes.
This crucial twenty-nine-year period had three distinct phases. The first, 1783-
1795, saw Britain enjoy its greatest influence over the confederated tribes of the Ohio
Valley, as this quasi-alliance inflicted two significant defeats on American forces before
suffering its own demise against Anthony Wayne's victorious United States Legion in
1794, followed by the Treaty of Greenville in 1795. Then, between 1796 and 1807
British-Indian policy was wholly transformed, and British officials, both in Canada and at
Whitehall in London, implemented a policy of retrenchment in an effort to vastly reduce
the government's financial obligations and diplomatic ties to their former allies,
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particularly those Natives dwelling in United States territory. During this decade of
relative calm, Anglo-American relations appeared stable, and the former British-Indian
wartime coalition tended to fade. Finally, from 1807 to 1812 close Bntish-Indian
relations were in part revived as the United States expansionist policy continued to alarm
and provoke the Natives and as Britain's relations with the Americans continued to
deteriorate as a by-product of British maritime policies pnmarily aimed at crippling
Napoleonic France. In other words, when Great Britain and the Natives of the Old
Northwest again became allies, this restored relationship was formed more in the context
of sharing a common enemy than out of a sense of devotion and respect for traditional
allegiances. Thus, after 1807, when British agents attempted to restore their
government's former "Chain of Friendship" or past alliance with the Indians of the Great
Lakes, the Native responses were often varied and lukewarm. The British-Indian alliance
which was reformed on the immediate eve of the War of 1812 was a matter of necessity
for both Britishers and Natives alike.
A handful of scholars have touched upon aspects of this subject. A few of them
have written diplomatic studies pertaining to the American frontier directly after the
American Revolution, including Samuel F. Bemis, of whose well-known monograph,
Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy , was originally published in 1923
and revised in 1962. Bemis highlighted the significance of the frontier in influencing
British policy, linking the latter to events in Europe. Although he handled British-Indian
relations crudely and failed to elucidate any of the nuances of that relationship, Bemis at
least acknowledged the common interest that the British and Indians had in protecting the
' The Old Northwest encompassed the present-day states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin,
and parts of Minnesota.
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Old Northwest from the Amencans, and the importance of a potential Native buffer state
between British and .Ajnencan temtonal possessions. This alone greatly affected
Whitehall's policy. Throughout this period the British always viewed their Indian allies
as vital for the protection ofUpper Canada and Britain's interest in the Great Lakes. Yet
in spite of his recognizing the vital importance of the western countr>^ during the postwar
years, Bemis failed to appreciate the Indians' right to theu" homelands, which they had
successfully defended dunng the Amencan Revolution. The author further maintained
that the Cro\^'n's retention of the British posts on Amencan soil afler the war was a gross
violation of the Anglo-Amencan peace, and that Bntam, not the Umted States, stood as
the pnncipal belligerent in threatemng diplomatic relations between the t\*'o countries and
between the United States and the Indians who dwelled in its western territories.
Bemis's interpretation was indicative of a broader paradigm that held sway in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, one which tended to portray Native Americans
as savage impediments to the enlightened expansion of the tledgling American republic.
In this vem, Jeffersoman Repubhcans were depicted as the defenders of true liberty, and
the Jeffersonians' anti-British sentiments said to represent the proper diplomatic
philosophy. With this understandmg, all of Britain's activities pertainmg to North
America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century were deemed potentially
nefarious, and AngIo-.\merican disputes of that era were seen as the principal threat to
the survival of .American democracy. Such a skewed perception justified .American
expansiomst prmciples and disregarded Native Amencan territorial and cultural claims; it
also demed the Bntish government the right to protect its trade, temtonal mterests, and
Britain's right to insure .\mencan treaty comphance after the war. Fmally, and most
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importantly for the purposes of this study, this view does not acknowledge the necessity
for a continuation of British-hidian relations in the Great Lakes, and it fails to understand
the complexities of that relationship.
More recently, other diplomatic studies have countered this paradigm, taking a
new look at the frontier, its inhabitants, and the British role there. Charles R. Ritcheson,
in his Aftermath of Revolution: British Pohcy Toward the United States, 1783-1795
(1969), directly challenges the older interpretation of Bemis. Ritcheson not only views
the American Jeffersonian perspective as flawed, but he blames this mentality among
early American leaders for the persistence of the nation's poor relations with Great
Britain, and for its continued frontier difficulties. Arguing that it was in Britain's best
interests to maintain peace in the Old Northwest between the Americans and the hidians,
the author largely legitimizes Britain's frontier role, implicitly suggesting that British-
Indian relations in the Great Lakes were far more complex than an American nationalist
interpretation would allow.
In another work, Britain and the American Frontier, 1783-1815 (1975), J. Leitch
Wright, Jr. expands on the subject of British policy and activity on the frontier, making it
the central focus of his monograph. This work encompasses the entire time frame
covered in this project, and Wright successfully demonstrates that British Indian policy in
North America tliroughout this period, while inconsistent at times, was principally based
on Bntain's greater concern to defeat France and Spain. Although its policy was not
directly aimed at fomenting strife with the Americans, Whitehall, often as a byproduct of
its efforts to thwart its European rivals, usually sought to limit American expansion and
at times would even have welcomed an opportunity to dismember the new republic.
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Wright's interpretation, then, while presenting a British perspective for the necessity of
the Crown's involvement with the Indians, simultaneously demonstrates that Jeffersonian
fears of British intrigue on the frontier were not completely unfounded. However,
contrary to American claims, British policy makers never devised a consistent, overall
plan for the Crown's frontier role, nor was America their primary concern. The lack of a
clear, comprehensive frontier policy from Whitehall tended to heighten the significance
and influence of the activities of the numerous independent loyalists, agents, and pro-
British mixed-bloods who continued to attempt to rally and unite the Natives under the
British standard, while claiming to represent the King. Therefore, while numerous
Indians, loyalists, and even Americans believed that partisan British activity on the
frontier represented direct instructions from home, such was often not the case,
particularly at a time when Whitehall was noncommittal in forming a specific policy.
Wright emphasizes the importance of the loyalist activities, demonstrating how much
their interests at times diverged from that of the home government.
These diplomatic studies, while shedding light on British motives behind the
Crown's frontier policy, do not adequately inform the reader on prevailing frontier
conditions at the time, nor do they sufficiently convey Native American perspectives. In
her classic work. The British Regime in Wisconsin and the Northwest (1935), Louise
Phelps Kellogg provided a rich narrative history of the Great Lakes and the Upper
Mississippi Valley, making the activity of key figures there, rather than government
policy, her central focus. Kellogg's story unfolds as traders, agents, Indians, and field
officers established a diplomatic landscape ofcommon interests, based on the fur trade
and military alliances. People of multiple ethnicities and nationalities formed
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connections in order to achieve their community of interests; by paying homage to Native
customs and conventional diplomacy in the northern country, the British managed to
maintain Indian allegiance throughout the War of 1812. hi a sense, Kellogg's study was
an early form of Richard White's later ethnohistorical monograph. The Middle Ground:
Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region. 1650-1815 (1992), a
benchmark work that emphasized an intercultural society based on mutual interests
between indigenous peoples and Euro-Americans in the eighteenth century. According to
White, neither Indians nor Europeans could fully impose their customs and ideologies on
other peoples in the region of the Old Northwest, but instead, an entirely new cultural
milieu emerged. The effects of this cultural interplay is seen on a personal level when
studying the lives of British Indian agents who served and fought on the frontier, living
among their adopted Native kinsmen and often taking Indian wives. The best scholarly
biographies in this area include Reginald Horsman's Matthew Elliott, British Indian
Agent (1964) and Larry L. Nelson's A Man of Distinction Among Them: Alexander
McKee and British-Indian Affairs along the Ohio Country Frontier, 1754-1799 (1999).
Two other related works are worthy of mention, since they focus primarily on
British-Indian relations in the Great Lakes during the era covered by this study. In
Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815 (1987), Colin Calloway
provides an ethnohistorical approach to understanding both British and Native
perspectives of this relationship as these cultures interacted in the contexts of trade, war,
and diplomacy. Calloway deemphasizes policy history, concentrating more on issues of
cultural and racial conceptions and misunderstandings. More pertinent and useftil to this
dissertation is Robert S. Allen's His Majesty's Indian Allies: British hidian Policy in the
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Defence of Canada, 1774-1815 ( 1 993), a policy history that lucidly demonstrates how
Britain's Indian policy effectively slowed American expansion and saved Upper Canada,
but failed to preserve Native lands and cultures.
The present study is also a policy history, though it takes into account the fact
that, as it made its way down from Whitehall to the actual setting in which it was applied,
British policy became elastic and even protean in virtually every respect save one, the
issue of Native sovereignty. In other respects, the rational coherence and long-term
stability seemingly implicit in the term "policy" was frequently lacking in Britain's
relations with its Native allies on both sides of the Canadian-United States border. At the
center of policy-making in Whitehall relations with indigenous peoples on the Empire's
North American periphery was at best a tertiary concern compared to the imperial
bureaucracy's primary focus on Britain's powerful European rivals, especially
Revolutionary France, and to a secondary focus on whether the United States would take
an antagonistic or a neutral posture toward British interests. Whitehall officials,
distracted by these more pressing crises, often issued directives to their North American
subordinates without devoting the necessary time and energy needed to constmct a
cohesive long-term plan for imperial relations with Britain's Native allies in Canada and
the United States.
By acknowledging and illustrating this protean aspect of the term "policy" when
applied to British-Native diplomacy, the present study makes an important contribution to
understanding precisely how British-Indian relations evolved in North America between
1783 and 1815. This dissertation incorporates more Native perspectives than previous
monographs on Euro-American frontier policy, whether British or American.
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Furthermore, this study emphasizes the fact that Whitehall for the most part did not
achieve a unified, long-term hidian policy, and that Bntain's diplomatic mitiatives did
not have a uniform effect when implemented in different regions of the Empire's North
American borderlands. In practice, British Indian agents were compelled to tailor
Whitehall's directives to conform to the unique circumstances and conditions of each of
the separate geographical areas in which Britain conducted its affairs with indigenous
peoples. Moreover, the Native peoples in each of these regions, with their diverse
histories and varied political and military goals, often played key roles in shaping local
variations in British policies. Factors affecting these bonds included: the fur trade,
geographical position, Indian relations and warfare with the United States, the influence
of British-Indian agents, intertribal relations between various Native groups, degree of
Indian acculturation, and the constitutional issues of Native sovereignty and legal status.
This study specifically compares British relations with Indians living in both the United
States and Canada from the Crown's three principal Indian agencies in Upper Canada at
Forts Amherstburg (i.e., Maiden), St. Joseph, and George between 1783 and 1812.'^
Prior to 1796, these three agencies were located at adjacent sites on the American side of the border at
Forts Detroit, Mackinac, and Niagara, respectively.
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CHAPTER 1
THE QUEST FOR A JUST PEACE: BRITISH-INDIAN RELATIONS, 1783-1795
The twelve years immediately after the United States and Great Britain signed the
Treaty of Paris in 1783 were marked by great volatility in British relations with the
Crown's wartime Native allies in North America. British officials in western territories,
Quebec, and London struggled to find a balance between competing and often
contradictory aims: restoring the Indians' faith in British friendship and maintaining
strong trade ties with them, while avoiding a general conflict between the U. S. and
western tribes that might draw Britain into another unwanted war with its former
colonies. Meanwhile, Indians who lived in parts of western New York, the upper Ohio
River Valley, and the Great Lakes region that Britain had ceded to the United States
labored to construct military, cultural, and political alliances that would enable them to
retain their lands and their sovereignty in the face of expansionist pressure from the
newly established United States.
This chapter traces how these themes played out in three brief periods between
the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Greenville (1795), the latter negotiated between the
United States and the Ohio Valley tribes. The first period, 1783-1789, saw Britain retain
possession of its forts in the trans-Appalachian west and witnessed Native efforts to build
an intertribal coalition capable of resisting U. S. expansion. The second period, 1789-
1 792, produced a number of successes for the Natives as they developed, with
encouragement from the Bntish, intertribal village communities along the Maumee River
and dealt defeats to two major American military expeditions. The third and final secfion
covers the years from 1793-1795, a period during which Brifish diplomatic and military
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leaders largely stood aside as their Native allies went down to defeat at the hands of the
United Slates.
Growth of the Intertribal Confederacy, 1783-1789
After having ceded most of the territory south of the Great Lakes to the United
States in the Treaty of Paris of 1783, Britain continued to maintain a presence within the
northern borders of the new republic by garrisoning eight posts on American soil.
Moreover, the Indian inhabitants continued to defy the exaggerated American claims of
conquest over their homelands. Nevertheless, many long-term policy choices remained
unsettled. Evacuation of the upper country' was still a possibility, but if that step was
taken, how would it affect the British fur trade and the future of the British-Indian
alliance? Furthermore, Whitehall also pondered the security of its possessions north of
the Lakes, the region soon to be partitioned off as the Province of Upper Canada.^
Eventually Britain would have to demonstrate the extent of its resolve to defend these
interests.
These issues arose due to the terms of the Treaty of Paris. The British
government had been so eager to extricate itself from its problems in North America that
it signed an agreement that neither restored British honor nor protected the sovereign
territory of its Indian allies. When the French commissioner Count de Vergennes
realized the full extent of the proposed British territorial cession, he remarked, "You will
' The term '"upper country" was used to collectively describe the region of higher altitude which
encompassed the area of the Great Lakes, the Old Northwest, and the region of Upper Canada, or present-
day Ontario. At the highest elevations of this upper region, a natural watershed south of the Great Lakes
separated the two principal river systems which either flowed southwest toward the Mississippi River, or
northeast, emptying into the Great Lakes.
^ Parliament created the Province of Upper Canada in 1791.
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notice that the Enghsh buy the peace more than they make it. Their concessions.
. .exceed
all that I should have thought possible."^ Realistically, Britain merely needed to grant
political independence to its thirteen rebelling colonies, without making further territorial
concessions. By retaining possession of the Upper Country and Great Lakes, the British
government could have better protected the rights of its Native allies and its Canadian
possessions north of the Great Lakes. A majority in Pariiament also thought the treaty far
more generous than anything they had imagined. When news of the terms reached them,
the government of Lord Shelbume and his liberal ministry collapsed under a storm of
protest.
As a result of this diplomatic snafu, British leaders in Canada and officers in the
British Indian Department faced the difficult assignment of simultaneously withdrawing
from the war while somehow convincing their Native allies that the peace was honorable
rather than disastrous. The unenviable task of actually addressing Britain's Iroquois
allies fell upon John Johnson, the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, while
Alexander McKee, the Department's second-highest ranking officer, was to acquaint the
western nations with the news. In May 1783, Sir Frederick Haldimand, Governor-
General of Quebec, ordered Johnson to "repair immediately to [Fort] Niagara" to address
the Six Nations and other tribes of the Covenant Chain regarding the peace.'* Johnson
and McKee would need to strike a fine balance between truth and grace in their crucial
addresses. They must convince their late allies that the King had not abandoned them,
^ Vergennes to Raymond, 4 December 1782, in Francis Wharton, ed., The Revolutionary Diplomatic
Correspondence of the United States . 6 vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), VI: 107.
" Haldimand to Johnson, 22 May 1783, Canadian National Archives (hereafter CNA), Haldimand Papers,
MG 21, Bl 15, 106; Earle Thomas, Sir John Johnson. Loyalist Baronet (Toronto: Dundum Press, Ltd.,
1986), 105-07.
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that the treaty was just, that the Americans would recognize their rights, and that the King
in the future would continue in his role as their protector.
Johnson, known as "Owassighsishon" ("He Who Makes the Roof to Tremble")
among his h-oquois brethren, delivered his long-awaited speech on 23 July. He reassured
the Six Nations' leaders that nothing had changed in their relationship to the King, who
still regarded them "as his children" and "faithful allies," and "should the Americans
molest, or claim any part of our country, we shall then ask assistance of the King our
father." But Johnson "could not harbor the idea that the United States [would ever] act so
unjustly or unpolitically as to endeavour to deprive [them] of any part of [their] country
under the pretense of having conquered it." Finally, the Superintendent affirmed "the
boundary line agreed upon.
.
.to be just."^ Johnson's reassurances were generally well
received.^ Similarly, McKee, an adopted Shawnee knov^'n as White Elk, reiterated these
sentiments when he later addressed the nations further west, hi an effort to preserve
British interests in the Upper Country, McKee gathered representatives from the western
nations and tribes from the northern Lakes and addressed them at a council held at Lower
Sandusky in August and September of 1783. Like Johnson, McKee argued that the
Americans would recognize fridian sovereignty north of the Ohio River, and promised
that the King "will continue to promote your happiness by his protection."
*
"Johnson's Speech at Niagara, July, 1783," in A. L. Burt, The United States. Great Britain, and British
North America: From the Revolution to the Estabhshment of Peace after the War of 1812 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1940), 89-90; speech ongmally taken fi-om CNA, MG 1 1, Q21, 433-35.
^
It must be remembered that Johnson, like his Iroquois friends and allies, also lost his home and
inheritance as a result of the war. This included die mansions at Johnson Hall and Fort Johnson, and the
vast land holdmgs stretching throughout much of the Mohawk River Valley.
^
"Transactions with the Indians at Sandusky, 26 August to 8 September," Histoncal Collections of the
Michigan Pioneer and Histoncal Society (hereafter MPHC), XX: 174-83. Also see Larry B. Nelson. A
Man of Distinction among Them: Alexander McKee and British-Indian Affairs along the Ohio Country
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Allhough leery ol the proposed peace setlleiueiU and ils ranufieatioiis, the huhans
ap|)earetl less shaken aller Johiisoifs aiul MeKec's cahning reassurances. I Incertain
about rmure relations witii whites, the hulians certainly had no reason to suspect thai the
United States would attempt to extend its sovereignty over then hinds, particularly aller
their intertribal alliances had achieved a string of victories against American armies in the
past three years alone: Mohawk Valley ( 1 7S() and 1 78 1 ), Schoharie Valley ( 1 780),
Lochry's Defeat (1781), Sandusky ( 1 782), and lilue Licks ( 1 782).** Thus, based on then
wartime feats and an a|)parent continuation in then relationship with then ^Miritish
Ivither," the Natives nutially had no reason to interpret the war\s end as anything more
than a truce, and certainly did not believe themselves bound by a treaty they had not
signed to relinquish territories that they had defended so successfully/^
Shortly aller Johnson and McKcc delivered their respective speeches, (lovernor
(icneral lialdimand made two crucial decisions to help bolster Native confidence in
liritish fidelity towards them, f irst, he del'icil the terms of the peace by refusing to
evacuate the northern posts within American territory.'** The Ciovernor General made
this determination on ins own, belore knowing that the Americans wouUi renege on then
l ioalici, I /^-l I /W (Kent, Oil; Kent State* I liuvt isily l*u'ss, IW>), l.U-32. A tew lioquois also attended
llie MeKee's council hekl at l.owci Saiulusky.
" Koheit S Allen, Ilis Majesty's Indian Allies Hntish Indian l\>liey in the Deleiue t)l ( anaila, I //l ISl^
( roionlo: Duiuluin l*iess, 1*>'>3), 54. Ciood accounts ol'these actions are lounil scattered in several
puhlicalions, including',: l. A. Cruikshank, Hullers Rani;,eis: The Revolutionary Peruul (Wellaiui. ON,
1S^)3; .V'' repiint, Niagara l*alls, ON: Renown Pnntmg Co l td., I^)KH); Harbaia (irayinonl. The lioquois in
llie Aineiican Revolution (Syracuse; Syracuse Uiuveisily Riess, 1^)72); William I l\>ltei, "Redcoats on
the l iontici The King's Regiment m the Revoluluinaiy War/' in Robert J llohlen, ed . Selected Rapeis
liom the l ust ami Second (ieoige Rogeis ( laik I lans Appalachian l ionliei llistoiy Conleiences
(Vincennes Vincennes Univeisily Riess, l*>K>), -11 00, and Chailes I. Walkei, " I he Noithvvest Duiing the
Revolution," in MIMIC, III: 12-36.
" Richaiii White, The Middle (iiound: hulians, l-mpues, ami Republics in the (iieat I akes Region, l()^()
JUnI.S (Cambiidge, UK: Cainbrulge University Press, IWI), 434.
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part of the treaty.** Haldimand's decision aimed at achieving multiple goals: to placate
the Indians, protect British fur trade interests, reduce the threat of a general Indian war
against the Americans, and hamper American expansion into lands west of the
Appalachians. To the degree that Haldimand simply sought to maintain a status quo in
the western country, his actions were consistent with Britain's wartime Indian policies,
but he also initiated policy changes in response to postwar conditions. At the request of
John Johnson and Mohawk leader Joseph Brant, the Governor General moved to set aside
lands in Canada along the Grand River, specifically for the British-allied Six Nations (i.e.
Iroquois) and their dependencies who had lost their homelands during the war.'^
Haldimand's actions temporarily brought about the desired continuity he sought,
bolstering the confidence of both the Iroquois and western tribes that had fought for the
Crown.
The Governor General's pivotal decision to resettle the loyal Iroquois in Canada
indicated that the British leaders there would attempt to act in good faith toward their
indigenous allies, regardless of the home government's betrayal at Paris the year before.'"^
Haldimand to North, 27 November 1783, CNA, MG 1 1, CO 42, 46.
A full compliance with the terms of the Treaty of Paris would have required the American government to
pay its nation's outstandmg prewar debts to British merchants, and the separate state governments needed
to cither restore confiscated loyalist property to its owoiers, or to at least compensate these loyal refugees
for their losses. Far from regaining their property, most loyalists still suffered harassment, ridicule,
physical harm, and sometimes even death when attempting to collect their property in the former American
colonies after the war. These violations represented breaches of Articles V & VI of the Treaty of Paris.
Burt, 95-98; Charles R. Ritcheson, Aftermath of Revolution: British Policy Toward the United States,
1783-1795 (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1969; reprint. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.,
1971), 59-69, 80-87. The entire Treaty of Paris, 1783, including a non-ratified article of the Treaty, is
found in Samuel F. Bemis, The Diplomacy of the American Revolution 3'"* ed. (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1957), Appendix, 259-64.
"Haldimand Grant," in Graymont, Appendix B, 299; Isabel Thompson Kelsay, Joseph Brant , 1743-1807:
Man ofTwo Worlds (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 363.
Lord Shelbume, Prime Minister during the preliminary peace negotiations in Paris, defended his
government's actions arguing, *'the Indian nations were not abandoned to their enemies; they were remitted
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Moreover, by receiving Crown lands, the refugee Iroquois would be encouraged to
believe that their British Father cared for them as much as he did for his white children,
the American Loyalists who also received new tracts of land in Canada, Nova Scotia, and
the Bahamas. The motivations underiying both the Haldimand Grant and the retention of
Britain's western posts seemed parallel. The two measures sought to protect the rights
and preserve the sovereignty of both the western Indians and Britam's Iroquois allies.^"^
British postwar Indian policy, a basis for continuity and unity among the allied
tribes, contained another traditional feature. As primary architect of that policy,
Haldimand made his decisions compatible with past British policy, which attempted to
utilize the Iroquois League's alleged supremacy over the western tribes as the key to
controlling the nations throughout the Great Lakes. This rationale was in keeping with
the frontier diplomacy practiced by English colonial leaders since 1677, when the
colonial government ofNew York established a loose alliance with Iroquois League
known as the Covenant Chain. In 1761, after the British conquest of Canada and
to the care of neighbors, whose interests it was as much ours to cultivate friendship with them, and who
were certainly the best qualified for softening and humanizing their hearts." Quoted in Graymont, 262;
Colin G. Calloway also alludes to this excerpt in Crown and Calumet: British-Indian Relations, 1783-181 5
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 8.
The reader can compare the "Haldimand Grant" in Graymont, 299, to Haldimand's initial intention to
retain the posts in the Upper Country in his letter to North, 27 November 1783, CNA, MG 11, CO 42, 46.
In his attempts to protect the Indians by preventing "such a disastrous event as an Indian war," the
Governor saw the necessity in "allowing the posts in the upper country to remain as they are for sometime.'
The Iroquois League consisted of the Mohawk, Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, Seneca, and Tuscarora
nations.
Francis Jennings cleverly disassembles the myth of a perpetual Iroquois empire in The Ambiguous
Iroquois Empire: The Covenant Chain Confederation of Indian Tribes with English Colonies from its
beginnings to the Lancaster Treatv of 1744 (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1984), especially chapter 2.
Jennings also provides an overview of the history of the Covenant Chain in "Iroquois Alliances in
American History," in The History and Culture of Iroquois Diplomacy , eds. Jennings, William N. Fenton,
Mary A. Druke, and David R. Miller (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 37-65. An important
eighteenth-century perspective supporting the notion of Iroquois dominance over their western neighbors is
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eviction of French civil authority, Sir Wilham Johnson, Supenntendent of Indian Affairs
in the North, continued to recognize Iroquois leadership over the western tribes in an
extended "Chain of Friendship" which included the nations of the Great Lakes and upper
country.
Despite the tumultuous changes brought by the American Revolution, Haldimand
saw no need to abandon the Covenant Chain approach, and the Governor General
continued to envision a general Indian policy carried out under the auspices of the
Iroquois, particularly the Mohawks, who most ardently favored British interests. Late in
1783 he reassured Indian agent Daniel Claus, son-in-law to the late William Johnson, "I
have always considered the Mohawks as the first Nation deserving of the attention of
Government and I have been particularly interested for their Welfare and
reestablishment."'^ The Governor also saw little need for a separate Indian policy
tailored specifically to the interests of the Great Lakes nations. Haldimand predicted,
[t]he conduct of the Western Indians (tho' infinitely a more numerous people) will
always be governed by that of the Six Nations, so nice a management of them
may not, therefore, be necessary -some presents and marks of ftiendship are
nevertheless due to them for their past services, and should ft^om time to time be
dispersed among them.'^
By naming Sir William Johnson's son John as Superintendent of Indian Affairs in 1782,
followed by the declaration of the Haldimand Grant two years later, the Governor
Cadwallader Colden's History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada which are Dependent upon the
Province ofNew York... 2 vols. (1727-1747; reprint, New York: Williams-Barker Co. 1904).
Haldimand to Claus, 17 December 1783, CNA, MG 19 F 1, Claus Papers, III: 277.
"Memorandum Respecting the Public Matters in the Province of Quebec submitted for the consideration
of the Right Honourable Lord Sydney by General Haldimand," 16 March 1785, CNA, MG 1 1, CO 42, 48,
251.
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General hoped to recreate the prewar British Indian pohcy that would assure a
continuation of British imperial interests among the nations of the interior.
Haldimand's continuation of the fonner Indian policy had little chance of
succeeding in the confused geo-political setting of the post-Revolution years. After
losing most of their homeland during the war, and witnessing the extinguishing of the
League's council fire at Onondaga in 1777, the Iroquois were m no position to wield the
sort of influence that Haldimand and William Johnson had once imagmed. Two of the
League's six nations, the Tuscaroras and Oneidas, had sided with the Americans in the
war, and before the League could recover and reunite at the war's conclusion, American
commissioners quickly negotiated a new treaty with the Iroquois in 1784 at Fort Stanwix.
The commissioners demanded Iroquois compliance based on a claim of conquest. All
Six Nations were present, and all grudgingly acquiesced in the American demands for
cession of virtually all Iroquois territory on American soil (acknowledged by the Treaty
of Paris) outside of the state ofNew York.'*^ In contrast to the British strategy, the
American govemment attempted to reduce Iroquois prestige, hoping to terminate
whatever vestige of Iroquois suzerainty remained over the western tribes.
In spite of the Six Nations' decline after the Revolution, Mohawk leader Joseph
Brant attempted to assume a position of intertribal leadership over the confederated tribes
in the Great Lakes that continued to resist American expansion. Without any hereditary
authority among his own people, Brant's claim to authority rested on his record as a war
" Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political Anomaly (Berkeley:
Uniyersity of California Press, 1994), 46-48.
^° The most important western nations that continued to resist American expansion after the Revolution
included the Shawnees, Wyandots, Delawares, Miamis, Ottawas, Ojibwas, and Potawatomis. The latter
three are thought to have a common origin, and are sometimes collectively referred to as the Three Fires.
17
leader. Warriors in the West recalled Brant's participation in key frontier actions during
their recent struggle against the Americans. The Mohawk sachem had led them to a
brilliant victory over a sizable portion of George Roger Clark's army on the Ohio River
m the summer of 1 78 1 , and his presence a year later at the overwhelming defeat of
William Crawford's American forces along the Sandusky marked Brant as a leader who
always fought for the western confederacy's best interests. In addition to these feats, the
Mohawk warrior also held additional influence by virtue of his status as the late Sir
William Johnson's brother-in-law and his rank as a Captain in the British Indian
Department.
Although Brant, Haldimand, John Johnson, and others shared the expectation of
future Iroquois leadership among the Great Lakes tribes, several developments worked
against this policy. Guy Carleton (recently named Lord Dorchester), who replaced
Haldimand as Governor General of Quebec late in 1786, did not attempt to sustain
Haldimand's outdated theory of Iroquois leadership over the western nations. Moreover,
when Dorchester arrived in 1786, only a year after Haldimand predicted permanent
Iroquois hegemony, occurrences in the West foreshadowed a new era and a separate path
for the western nations. Brant, hoping to reestablish the old wartime alliance, traveled to
the principal Shawnee villages of Mackachak and Wapatomica in southwestern Ohio late
in 1 786. Shortly after his arrival there, a Kentucky militia under the command of
Benjamin Logan invaded the region, destroying both villages.^^ Although Brant and
^' Lochry's Defeat; Kelsay, 312-13.
" Wiley Sword, President Washington's Indian War: The Strueele for the Old Northwest. 1790-1795
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 37-40; White, The Middle Ground, 433. This
expeditionary force included Daniel Boone and Simon Kenton. John Mack Faragher covers their
involvement in the campaign in Daniel Boone: The Life and Legend of an American Pioneer (New York:
Henry Hoh & Co., 1992), 251-55.
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numerous others were absent hunting when the Kentuckians attacked, the raid prompted
all of the tribal delegations to seek a new site for a general council fire. They agreed to
hold a council at the Wyandot village known as Brownstown, situated along the Huron
River at the west end of Lake Erie, roughly sixteen miles south of Detroit.
The move to Brownstown marked a key turning point in kidian affairs m the Old
Northwest. On Christmas Eve, 1786, the leaders of the newly established Confederacy at
Brownstown formally met with the Bntish at Detroit and requested direct intervention
and continuing support." From their location close to Detroit, the intertribal councils
would now come more heavily under the influence of the British army and Indian
Department, and especially Alexander McKee. American Indian agent Thomas Forsyth
later asserted that the British led the Confederacy at Brownstown, which drew its Native
members ft-om among the "Shawanoes, Delawars, Mingoes, Wyandots, Miamies,
Chipeways, Ottawas and Pottawatimies." According to Forsyth, there existed an
official belt ofwanipum that symbolized all of the nations in the Confederacy and placed
the British at the head. At Brownstown, Forsyth continued, 'The British government is
always represented by their Indian Agent, and most generally accompanied by a military
officer."^^ Forsyth's information was based on his contact with numerous Indians during
his long career in the Great Lakes. He compared the new western Confederacy's meeting
Kelsay, 404.
Emma Helen Blair, ed., Indian Tribes of the Upper Mississippi Valley and Region of the Great Lakes , 2
vols. (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1912), II: 188.
Ibid., 189. Histonan Richard White contradicts Forsyth, arguing, "official Bntish representatives were
not present at Brownstovra." In The Middle Ground , 434. In spite of this disagreement between White and
Forsyth (and probably an oversight by White), White agrees that the Confederacy leaders at Brownstown
maintained close ties with the British at Detroit and that the Confederacy grew increasingly dependent upon
the British after the initial council at Brownstown in 1 786.
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place at Brownstown to the old Iroquois League's gathering place "on the Mohawk River
at Sir William Johnston's [Johnson's] place of residence."^^ The geographical shift
paralleled a shift in leadership, since the Brownstown Confederacy's resistance to United
States hegemony depended on British assistance rather than on military cooperation with
the Six Nations. The host Wyandot nation, nominally the Confederacy's Native leaders,
were in fact largely under British influence.
The growing importance of the British in the Confederacy's reconfiguration was
also attributable to other factors. The Wyandots were led by a pro-British chief, Adam
Brown, whose life and origins remain largely a mystery. Some sources suggest that he
was probably not even a full-blooded Wyandot, but either a mixed-blood or "an English
boy" from Virginia captured in 1755." His very obscurity partially hints at why the
British would so soon wield so much influence among the Confederacy at his council
fire. Lacking the stature of Brant, or of other war leaders such as Blue Jacket, Little
Turtle, Red Jacket, or Buckongahelas, Adam Brown was merely a village chief who
gained what influence he did have by consistently supporting British interests in the
West. The appeal to the British of working with a relatively weak leader like Brov/n was
that they were ensured a key position in the Confederacy.
Britain's new relationship with the Brownstown Confederacy had its risks. First,
it might involve the British government in a renewed conflict with the Americans. Also,
Blair, II: 188.
" E. A. Cruikshank, a late nineteenth-century, and early twentieth-century historian, described Brown as
"[a] half-breed chief of the Wyandots," in Cruikshank, ed., The Correspondence of Lieut. Governor .lobji
Graves Simcoe. with Allied Documents Relating to His Administration of the Government of Upper
Canada , 5 Vols. (Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1923-1931), III: 183, footnote 1. However, Emma
Helen Blair, a contemporary of Cruikshank, noted Brown's English colonial origins in Vugmia, in Blair II:
189, footnote 67. According to Blair, Brown died sometime after the War of 1812. ibid.
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1785 to 1K15. Policies fonmilalcd at Wlutcliall ollcn sounded very dilTereiU when agents
described them in council to the Indians."^'
Fiiulnig it unsafe to remain in the region of the Great Miami Kiver alter Logan's
raid, Shawnee reliigees began nngrating to new homes along the Maumee River, situated
in the far northwestern portion of present-day Ohio, a region over which the Miami,
Wyandot, and Delaware nations also held claims. The move to the Maumee River Valley
made it convenient for the Indian Department from Detroit to maintain contact with these
villagers; several <lepartmental onicers and fur traders once again made their homes
among their clientele and adopted families, furtliei contributing to the formation of
diverse intertribal enclaves along the Maumee. These sites included Kekionga at the
headwaters of the Maumee, the (ilai/e, located at the conlluence of the Auglai/e and
Maumee Rivers; Roche de Hout; and the Foot of the Rapids.
In Ihc latter l7K()s Kekionga became the most im|M)rtanl of these intcrli ibal
communities. Miami, Delaware, and Shawnee villages thronged the banks of the
Maumee, St. Joseph's, and St Mary's Rivers at what was probably the most important
confluence and portage in the Old Northwest. Little Turtle, one of the Miami leaders
who lived near this site, once referred to Kekionga as "that glorious gate. . .through which
all the giuul words of our chiefs had to pass from the north to the south, and from the east
RcginaKmoisnian, '' Vhc UuUsh Iiulian IVpailinnil ami tlic Resistance lo Ccncrol Anlhony Wayne,
1793-1795/' Mississippi Valley llisloiieal Review 49(2) ( l%2): 270-7 L Calloway. Ciown and ( aluinet.
5L 70-74.
KekionjM was the site of pieseni ilay Tori Wayne, liuliana; Ihc (ilai/e, piesenl-day Defiance, Ohio; and
Ihe l oo( ol Ihe Ranids, l oledo, Ohio. Roche dc Bout sat a shoM dislancc upslicain from
Ihe Rapids.
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to the west." At no time was Kekionga more important to the Confederacy's interests
than those years (1 786-90) during which it existed as an intertribal community. In
addition to Little Turtle, other prominent Miami and Shawnee leaders
-Le Gros, Pacanne,
Blue Jacket, Snake, and Captain Johnny- lived in Kekionga's proximity at the time.^"* As
the military activities of these war leaders escalated, Kekionga became a primary center
of operations. In one six-month period during 1 786 no fewer than twenty-six war parties
embarked from this cluster of villages.^^
The nations that gathered at Kekionga did not need to alter their customs and
beliefs when they consolidated their communities. During the 1820s C. C. Trowbridge,
Secretary to Michigan territorial Governor Lewis Cass, carried out ethnographic field
studies among the Miamis, Delawares, and Shawnees, conducting interviews with a few
of the former militant leaders who had resided in the Maumee Valley during the 1 780s
and 1790s, including Lc Gros (Miami), Black Hoof (Shawnee), and Captain Pipe
(Delaware). Trowbridge found that these tribes spoke similar Algonquin dialects.^^
Furthermore, all three groups generally observed some form of patrilineal, hereditary
succession when determining chiefs and, according to Trowbridge, the Miamis
Excerpt from Little Turtle's speech at the Treaty proceedings of Greenville, August, 1795, quoted in
Charles Poinsatte, Outpost in the Wilderness: Fort Wayne. 1706-1828 (Fort Wayne: Allen County
Historical Society, 1976), 1.
^* Le Gros and Pacanne were Miami leaders, and the other three, Shawnee.
Leonard Helderman, "Danger on the Wabash, Vmcennes Letters of 1786-87," Indiana Magazine of
History XXXIV(4) (December 1938): 459.
Bert Anson, The Miami Indians (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1970), 12; C. C. Trowbridge,
ShawTiese Traditions , eds. Vernon Kinietz and Erminie W. Voegelin; Occasional Contributions from the
Museum of Anthropology of the University of Michigan, No. 9 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
1939), 67. A good study pertaining to the intertribal communities along the Maumee at this time is Helen
Hombeck Tanner's "The Glaize in 1792: A Composite Indian Community," Ethnohistory 25(1) (Winter
1978): 15-39.
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established both war and village chiefs by patrilineal descent.^^ In the case of the
Shawnees, Trowbridge indicated that the village chiefs also descended patrilineally, and
in matters of war, Shawnees based leadership qualifications on merit, requiring a
prospective war chief to "have led at least 4 war parties into the enemies country
successively, that he should at each time take one or more scalps & that he should return
his followers unhurt to their villages.""**^ The Delawares practiced a tradition closely
paralleling that of the Shawnees, choosing leaders who possessed valuable experience
and leadership skills."''^
Trowbridge's findings and more modem studies indicate that these three tribal
groups also shared similar clan and kinship systems. Shawnee and Miami children
always belonged to their father's clan, but in spite of patrician identification, Miami
children developed stronger ties to their mother's family, indicating a matrilocal
community/^ Later in the nineteenth century, the Shawnees also developed matrilocal
kinship systems, but possibly not until after their final defeat and removal. However, the
Delaware nation consisted of clans, or phratries, that were both matrilineal and
matrilocal."^' Consequently, the women of all three societies occupied key positions in
Trowbridge, Meearmeear Traditions , ed. Vernon Kinietz; Occasional Contributions from the Museum of
Anthropology of the University of Michigan, No. 7 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1938), 13-
14.
Trowbridge, Shawnese Traditions , 11-12.
Delaware Manuscripts (MS/14d), Trowbridge Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public
Library.
Anson, 18-19; Stewart Rafert, The Miami Indians of Indiana: A Persistent People. 1654-1994
(Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, 1996), 17-18; James H. Howard, Shawnee!: The Ceremonialism
of a Native American Tribe and its Cultural Background (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981), 87-90.
^' James Howard, 100-01; For Delaware social organization, see Goddard, "Delaware" in Bruce Trigger,
ed. Handbook of North American Indians, vol. 15 (Washington: Smithsonian Institution, 1978), 225.
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the social organizations of their respective tribes, notwithstanding patrician structures in
two of them and patrilineal leadership in all three. Furthermore, Trowbridge
acknowledged rare occasions on which the Shawnees and Miamis appointed women
leaders."*^
Perhaps most importantly, the Shawnees, Miamis, and Delawares adhered to
similar spiritual convictions and cosmological beliefs. The three nations along the
Maumee considered sacred power to be ofparamount importance, and they strove to
attain this through similar methods of ritual and ceremony. A pantheon of deities or
manitous loomed as either a potential source of power, or a labyrinth of destruction. In
1 824 and 1 825, the Shawnee Prophet (Tecumseh's brother) and Captain Pipe,
respectively, both explained to Trowbridge ''that we live upon an island," under which
lies "a vast body of water, and that the earth [i.e. the "island"] is supported by a great
Turtle, swimming in it, and placed there for that purpose by the Great Spirit." If anyone
questioned a Delaware, asking, "What supports this Turtle?/' Captain Pipe explained that
"they shrewdly answer, 'The Turtle is a Monaatwau [manitou, or deity] and requires no
resting place."' The aged Delaware leader also ascribed "earthquakes to the moving of
this supporter, and. . .suppose[d] that he [the Turtle] will one day dive so deeply as to sink
the earth and destroy its inhabitants.
''^'^
James Howard, 109; Trowbridge, Shawnese Traditions , 12-13; Trowbridge, Meearmeear Traditions , 14-
15, 26. According to Trowbridge, the Delawares have "[n]o female Chiefs;" Delaware Manuscnpts
(MS/I4d), Trowbndge Papers, Burton Histoncal Collection.
Trowbridge, Shawnese Traditions , 37; Delaware Manuscripts (MS/I4d), Trowbridge Papers, Burton
Histoncal Collection; Howard, 182. The Wyandots, an integral member of this Confederacy, also
subscribed to the legend of the giant Turtle. See Elisabeth Tooker, "Wyandot," in Trigger, ed. Handbook
of North American Indians, vol. 15, 402.
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In the depths of this watery underworld there existed a number of powerful
manitous and evil spirits that were believed to frequently ascend to the earth's surface by
way of rivers, lakes, and springs. The most powerful of these evil manitous took the
form of great homed serpents, and tribal shamans constantly attempted to harness the
sacred power of these beings."^"* The most potent medicine bags were thought to contain
small fragments taken from the body of one of these serpents; such concentrated power
could guarantee victory over one's enemies and unlimited success in the hunt."*^ The
Shawnee Prophet informed Trowbridge, "On the eve of a battle which is expected to be
severely contested," Shawnee warriors "address their prayers to Motshee Monitoo [the
supreme evil spirit]" and "[w]ar parties sometimes leave a small quantity of tobacco by
the side of a Spring.
.
.praying at the same time to the deity inhabiting it." Le Gros noted
a similar practice among the Miamis."^ Thus, the militant nations that gathered in the
Maumee Valley in order to resist American encroachments enjoyed similar patterns in
language, government, and kinship, and they practiced like methods of gaining sacred
power.
These common traits fostered a large degree of cooperation among the Ohio
nations of the western Confederacy. By 1 790 the communities along the Maumee, when
supported by groups from Brownstown, could muster more than two thousand warriors.
This concourse of nations cohabiting the same region began to alter Native conceptions
Gregory Dowd, A Spinted Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity. 1745-1815
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkms University Press, 1992), 10-1 1; James Howard, 176-78.
*^ James Howard explains that the legend of the Giant Homed Snake is a dual myth shared by the
Shawnees and Delawares, and he relates the Delaware account of how that tribe managed to kill one of
these deities; James Howard, 1 89-90. For the Miamis, this most feared underwater manitou took the form
of a panther, called Lennipinja; Rafert, 15.
Trowbridge, Shawnese Traditions , 42; Trowbridge, Meearmeear Traditions, 56.
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of tribal possession and sovereignty. The various nations consciously attempted to speak
with one voice and were not tolerant of an individual nation seeking to cede territory that
all of the Confederacy's members now deemed common property. The last known
instance (prior to 1795) in which a member of the Confederacy attempted to assert its
territorial sovereignty to the exclusion of another member came at the end of 1789, when
a land dispute occurred between some Miamis and Delawares, during which the
Delaware faction Ihrcalcncd to delect from the Confederacy and join the Spanish in the
Mississippi Valley.''^ No records indicate that this group of Delawares carried out its
threat to defect, hi fact, just the opposite occurred, as additional factions of Shawnees
and Delawares continued to settle at the intertribal community.^" In the winter of 1 789-
90, the Confederacy's leaders met in council and affimied pan-tribal unity, declaring their
plight ''a public grievance, in which all were concerned that therefore every able bodied
man, ought and should turn out, to assist in repelling the enemy, who had come into their
country, to take their land from them.""**^ Keenly aware of the threat they laced from the
United States, the Confederacy recognized the need for mutual tribal support and joint
land possession as essential if they were to avoid future debacles such as those on the
Mad River in 1786, when Logan's raiders easily destroyed the principal Shawnee villages
of Mackachak and Wapatomica.
Milo M. Quaife, ed. "A Narrative of Life on the Old Frontier; Henry Hay's Journal from Detroit to the
Miami River," m Proccedmgs of the Wisconsin Historical Society (Madison, 1915), 226.
Ibid., 225.
"^ John Heckewelder, A Narrative of the Mission of the United Brethren among the Delaware and Mohcgan
Indians. From its Commencement in the Year 1740. to the Close of the Year 1808 (Philadelphia: McCarty
& Davis, 1820), 396-97.
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The continued development of intertribal unity at Kekionga and along the
Maumee was facilitated by the pro-British sentiments shared by these commumties'
inhabitants. The presence of white traders and Indian agents, namely George Ironsides,
Alexander McKee, the Girty brothers, John Kinzie, and a number of loyal French traders
all helped to cultivate these ties.^^ As a result, the British sphere of influence from
Detroit and Brownstown remained strong along Maumee during the period from 1786 to
1794, and most of the inhabitants near Kekionga were British partisans. When Henry
Hay, a British trader from Detroit, wintered at Kekionga in 1789-90, he noted that one of
the leading French traders, Antoine Lasselle, "is a good loyalist and is always for
supporting his King."^'
The group of traders with whom Hay lodged dealt constantly with the more
prominent war leaders, including Le Gris (not to be confused with Le Gros), Little Turtle,
Blue Jacket, Captain Johnny, and Snake. When the Shawnee leader "the Wolfe" sought
to move his people to a site near Kekionga, Snake solicited the opinion of "the Principal
Traders & Inhabitants of the place" to aid in determining whether or not to invite the
Shawnee newcomers.^^ Furthermore, when the disaffected Delawares threatened to move
to Spanish territory in 1 789, it was most likely Alexander McKee who prevented their
defection. George Girty had informed Hay that if "Capt. McKee would Immediately
'° The three Girty brothers -Simon, James, and George- were captured as youths and adopted into Indian
families, and all three later served as agents and interpreters in the British Indian Department. They gamed
infamous reputations among white Americans who viewed them, especially Simon, as savage renegades.
Yet, Jonathan Alder, a young captive among the ShawTiees, had a high regard for Simon Girty, who at
times interceded on behalf of captives. See Larry L. Nelson, ed., A History of Jonathan Alder: His
Captivity and Life with the Indians (Akron, OH: University of Akron Press, 2002), 52-55, 171-76; Colin
G. Calloway, "Simon Girty: Interpreter and Intermediary," in Being and Becoming Indian: Biographical
Studies of North American Frontiers , ed. James A. Clifton (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1989), 38-58.
Quaife, "Hay Journal," 237.
" Ibid., 255.
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send in a String ofwampum to hinder them from taking such a step it would no doubt
immediately stop them."" Girty's brief statement speaks volumes, for it suggests that in
the minds of the Natives living at Kekionga, the British agents, especially McKee, had
become influential in the reconstructed Confederacy as eariy as 1789.
As the British influence rose to new heights within the multi-tribal community at
Kekionga, Hay and his cohorts showed little concern over the possible consequences of
their growing involvement m the escalating war between the Confederacy and the
Americans. War parties went out regulariy, often returning with prisoners and scalps; of
one such occasion Hay wrote:
I was shown this morning the heart of the white Prisoner I mentioned the
Indians had killed some time ago. . .it was quite drye, like a piece of dryed
venison, with a small stick run from one end of it to the other & fastened behind
the fellows bundle that killed him, with also his scalp.
The whites living in Kekionga, both British and French, often hosted these Indian guests
and even "billetted" members of war parties "like soldiers." When "[a]nother party came
in from war" the same day, they "danced with a stick in. . .hand & scalp flying," before
"[s]ome of the warriors came over in the evening, to our [Hay's] House."^^
The position of the British traders and agents at Kekionga in the period following
the American Revolution reflects the ambiguity of British-Indian relations in general at
the time. The intertribal residents at Kekionga considered the British as brethren and a
leading member of the Confederacy, particularly after 1 786. Yet Governor General
Frederick Haldimand and his successor Lord Dorchester never intended to increase the
" Ibid., 226.
Ibid., 222-23.
" Ibid., 221-22, 223.
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British presence among the tribes within tlie tenitorial boundaries of the newly fornied
United States, whether at Brownstown or on the Maumee. For example, in 1787
Dorchester issued a set of orders to the Indian Department, hoping "to diminish the
enormous expense" of the government's Indian budget, while simultaneously
demonstrating "the King's paternal care and regard" for Britain's former allies.
Dorchester's instructions included a restrictive clause, stating, "No persons belonging to,
or employed in the Indian Department, is to be permitted to trade, directly or indirectly,
or to have any share profit, or concern thcrin."'^^' Apparently the injunction did not faze
such trader/agents along the Maumee as Ironsides and the Girty brothers, all ofwhom
continued to participate in the British fur trade during this period. Lord Dorchester had
recognized the potential dangers of unmonitored trade, authorizing post commandants to
intervene: "In all matters of trade where the Indians are concerned. . .at any time the
interference of the Officer commanding may be necessary." Lord Dorchester sought "the
utmost .histice" for the Indians, but he also worried that anything less could undermine
"the safety of the Post, and the security of the Trade/'*
Althougli Dorchester's fears were not unfounded, Britain was compelled to rely
on the fur trade in order to maintain strong ties with the hidians. After withdrawing from
the American wai and ceding much hidian land, the British had to turn to the fur trade as
"Dorchester's Instructions for the good Government of the Indian Department. To Sir John Johnson.
Baronet, Supenntendant (sic.] General and Inspector General of Indian Affairs, 27 March 1787," CNA, RG
10, 789, 6759-01.
" In 1792, the British traders and Indian agents shared living quarters at the Glaize, the new location of the
intertribal collection of villages that replaced those at Kekionga. See Helen Hombeck Tanner, "The Glaize
in 1792," 30.
Dorchester's histructions, 27 March 1787, CNA, RG 10, 789, 6760-61.
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the only means available to soothe Native discontent.^^ Moreover, the North West
Company was organized immediately after the close of the American Revolution (1783-
84) and represented British efforts to bring greater structure and stability to both the fur
trade and the Crown's frontier Indian relations. The company enhanced the careers of the
McGillivray family and the famed Alexander Mackenzie. More importantly, such a
pooling of resources among the traders and merchants brought about greater cooperation
among men who had once been bitter rivals. The company's sales escalated dramatically
in the first two years of operation, and the reported overall revenues remamed high
throughout the 1780s.^^
The expansion of the British fiir trade and the activities of the North West
Company throughout this period brought about vast changes in Indian communities. The
expanding fur trade not only bolstered the traders' influence, but it accelerated the
process of limited acculturation for the Indians and a growing interdependence between
traders and Indians. When the trade grew, Natives became ever more reliant on
manufactured goods, which in turn compelled them to continue to engage in a market
economy and augment their bounties still further.^' Moreover, the fiir trade fostered
liquor abuse among the Indians and probably hastened the spread of disease. Such a
destabilization of tribal social infrastructures, coupled with a rapid depletion of game,
Colin G. Calloway, "Foundations of Sand: The Fur Trade and British-Indian Relations, 1783-1815" in
Le Castor Fait Tout: Selected Papers of the Fifth North Amencan Fur Trade Conference. 1985 . ed. Bruce
G. Tngger, Toby Morantz, and Louise Dechene (Montreal; St. Louis Historical Society, 1987), 147-49.
*° Charles Gordon Davidson, The North West Company (New York: Russell & Russell, 1967), 17-18, 272.
*' Calloway, "Foundations of Sand," 157-58.
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eventually led to a greater economic, political, and military reliance on Britain.^^ Yet
Whitehall and leaders in Canada certainly did not want the close attachment to the
Indians that the fur trade would bring, particularly at a time when Indians were preparing
for war with the Americans.
Considering this inherent contradiction, Britain could not indefinitely employ the
fur trade as a means of cultivating good relations with the Crown's former hidian allies
while simultaneously trying to keep them at arm's length." As long as these conditions
persisted, Whitehall could never develop a sound and consistent hidian policy that would
fully satisfy the tribes in the Great Lakes and upper country, and also maintain amiable
Anglo-American relations and peace on the frontier. Dorchester's orders to the Indian
Department reflected this ambiguity. In striving to reduce expenses and decrease the
Indian budget, the Governor General regarded the Indians as "free and Independent
people," but he simiultaneously instructed the agents to inform the Indians that they would
continue to "merit" the King's friendship only "by acting as good and obedient Children
ought to do."^'' In seeking to pacify the Indians, cut costs, and prevent the potential
threats to the upper province, Dorchester's policy reflected the sentiments of his superiors
at Whitehall; in theory, the measure encouraged greater Indian autonomy, while in
actuality it fostered heavier Native reliance on British support. British leaders could not
vacillate indefinitely, and with the Confederacy already in a state of intermittent war with
the United States, the British government would be forced to determine the extent of its
resolve to support its former allies with both material and militarily assistance.
Calloway, Crown and Calumet , 160, 188. Calloway refers to the fur trade as a "Trojan horse" to the
Indians, "unleashing catastrophic forces at the same time as it delivered desirable gifts."
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The Confederacy's Zenith. 1789-1792
The Native and British residents of Kekionga thought little of the long-term
repercussions of Bntish-lndian trade relations as the continued British presence made the
community's infrastructure even more complex. In some cases, Indians chose to handle
matters internally, but on other occasions tribal leaders sought the advice and dnect
intervention of British traders and agents. For instance, when a Shawnee leader, "the
Wolfe," wished to move his entire village near to the other villages at Kekionga in 1790,
Captain Snake called a meeting "of the Principal Traders & Inhabitants of the place,"
seeking their advice and support in order to determine whether or not to welcome the
potential newcomers to Kekionga; the Shawnee leader addressed the traders and other
village inhabitants as "Fathers & Brothers."^^
Snake's courtesy on this occasion did not entitle the traders to the privilege of
permanent participation in Kekionga's councils, nor was it an indication of Native
deference to British authority. In asking the advice of "Fathers & Brothers," Snake
considered the whites at Kekionga as his own relations, but an acknowledgement of
familial ties did not concede authority to the white residents. In stark contrast to the
courtesy shown white traders in 1790, captive Thomas Ridout's harrowing experience in
1 788 demonstrated the traders' limited influence at Kekionga. During his brief captivity,
Ridout sat before an Indian tribunal that excluded all traders, and with the exception of
the interpreter Simon Girty, probably barred all whites. Ridout recalled, "The Indian
traders who lived on the other side of a river. . .had long expected me, but dared not
Dorchester's Instructions, 27 March 1787, CNA, RG 10, 789, 6759.
Quaife, "Hay Journal," 255.
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intercede for me whilst my life was at issue."^' The traders' exclusion in Ridout's case,
after having sat in council on previous occasions, indicates much about how the tribes at
Kekionga and along the Maumee understood their relationship to Britam. They viewed
their British friends as brothers in commerce and allies in war, but certamly not as
possessing sovereign authority in Native councils.
The Natives' belief in their own sovereignty at Kekionga would not go
unchallenged for long. Existing in a local community that lacked complete unanimity
and in a confederacy that had no clear leader, the tribes at Kekionga were vulnerable to
attack. When a poorly-trained and ill-equipped American army commanded by Josiah
Harmar marched to Kekionga in the autumn of 1790, the leaders there could not even
muster enough warriors to defend their homes or protect their crops from the invaders'
torch, despite knowing of Harmar's advance from the outset.^^ The inhabitants burned
the primary Miami town themselves and evacuated shortly before the army's vanguard
arrived on the same day, October 15'^. ]n the ensuing days, the regular army and militia
proceeded to bum and destroy any of the remaining Indian towns and all of the crops they
could find. Despite suffering the loss of their homes and crops, the warriors of Kekionga
dealt Harmar a serious drubbing, as Miami war chief Little Turtle successfully
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orchestrated multiple ambushes against Harmar's ill-prepared army.
Little Turtle's successes notwithstanding, Harmar's raid was a psychological blow
to Kekionga's inhabitants. Unable to defend their homes and crops against a poorly
Matilda Edgar, ed., Ten Years of Upper Canada in Peace and War, 1805-1815; Being the Ridout Letters




disciplined army, the Confederacy's warriors pondered the future, realizing they would
face more capable adversaries. Moreover, tribal differences and disagreements among
Confederacy leaders caused them to squander an opportunity to crush Harmar's battered
army. While Blue Jacket and the Shawnees wanted to deliver the coup de grace against
the retreating Americans, a total lunar eclipse of a full moon caused much constemation
among some of the allied warriors preparing to pursue Harmar's men. Several
interpreted the phenomenon as an ominous warning of certain disaster if they attempted
to pursue the Americans. The Ottawas simply packed up and left, and to Blue Jacket's
chagrin, other groups soon followed.^^ The Confederacy could not hope to win a war
against the Americans until they became a united force.
Still smarting from the lost opportunity to destroy Harmar's amiy. Blue Jacket
understood all too well that he needed British aid if the Indians were to achieve the unity
he sought. Losing no time, the Shawnee leader journeyed to Detroit to plead for direct
support, arriving there even before the remnants of Harmar's amiy had completed their
march back to Cincinnati. On November 4^^, with McKee as translator, Blue Jacket
addressed Major John Smith, commandant at Detroit, arguing that Britain and the
confederated tribes held a common cause against the Americans, and that the ''Great
Father" was indebted to the Shawnee people, who had faithfully served their Father, the
King. Blue Jacket also appealed to Britain's vested interest in protecting trade v/ith her
Ibid., 117-19. According to Trowbridge, the Shawnees and Ojibwas held differing cosmological views
regarding eclipses. The Ojibwas interpreted eclipses as calamitous, while the Shawnees understood them
as ^'precursors of war." See Trowbridge, Shawnese Traditions , 37; Chippewa Manuscripts, MS/I4C, Col.
Boyd's Account, Trowbridge Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library. The Ottawas
who withdrew from the battle against Harmar most likely interpreted the eclipse as the Ojibwas generally
did. The two tribes shared a number of common links; they and the Potawatomis form what was known as
the alliance of the Three Fires, and the three nations are thought to have a common origin.
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former allies, asserting that that trade was the common bond, as he put it, "which Imks us
together in amity and interest."^^
Though not wanting another American war, the British officers at Detroit also did
not wish to completely spurn Blue Jacket's pleas for support. The Shawnee war leader
was one of the most influential chiefs among the intertribal coalition developing along
the Maumee, and, as son-in-law to Jacques Baby, a Detroit-based British Indian agent,
Blue Jacket was also a British partisan. The British authorities had previously honored
the Shawnee leader with an officer's commission, which, according to white captive
Oliver M. Spencer, entailed "the half pay of a brigadier general from the British crown."
Spencer also recalled an occasion when Snake and Simon Girty visited the illustrious
Shawnee, whom the captive youth described as
dressed in a scarlet frock coat, richly laced with gold and confined around his
waist with a party-colored sash, and in red leggings and moccasins ornamented in
the highest style of Indian fashion. On his shoulders he wore a pair of gold
epaulets, and on his anns broad silver bracelets; while from his neck hung a
massive silver gorget and a large medallion of His Majesty, George III.^'
The British influence on Blue Jacket and, conversely, the latter's reliance on Britain's aid
reached their zeniths about the time the Shawnee war chief had gained his maximum
influence within the coalition's leadership ranks.
In council at Detroit, British commandant Major Smith listened attentively to
Blue Jacket's pleas, and responded with assurances of friendship and words of
compassion, but he promised nothing other than to seek his superiors' counsel on the
matter. He immediately wrote to Lord Dorchester, and in the meantime he did his best to
™ Speech of Blue Jacket, 4 November 1790; quoted in John Sugden, Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 106-07.
36
supply his Shawnee delegation with gifts and food. Smith's gifts helped temporarily
sustain the homeless inhabitants of Kekionga, and his promises to place the Natives'
appeals before Lord Dorchester gave Blue Jacket, Little Turtle, and Kekionga's other
refugees a glimmer of hope. But in truth, neither Smith nor Lord Dorchester could do
much to offer further protection to the hidians, and all that McKee could could later
suggest was that the intertribal villagers who lost their homes in Harmar's raid move
further down the Maumee, which would place them nearer to Detroit and shorten the
supply line of the Indian Department.^^ Early in 1 79 1 , therefore, many refugees from
Kekionga began doing just that, relocating at "the Glaize" (present-day Defiance, Ohio).
By the summer of 1 791 , the community at the Glaize included almost all of the
prominent figures ofwhom Hay had written during his stay at Kekionga a little more than
a year earlier. Blue Jacket, Captain Johnny, Snake, Little Turtle, Buckongahelas, and
those in their villages all built new homes at or near the Glaize. Nearly 2,000 people
resided at the Glaize by 17927^
Oliver M. Spencer's memoir of his captivity at the Glaize during the early 1790s
offers a glimpse into life in this intertribal community, especially into the role that
spirituality played in Native resistance to U. S. expansion at the time. Upon his arrival at
the Glaize, Spencer was placed in the household of his captor's mother, Coocoochee, a
Mohawk prophetess. Though she was not a member of any of the tribes -Shawnee,
Miami, and Delaware—that predominated numerically at the Glaize, Coocoochee
^' Quaife, ed.. The Indian Captivity of O. M. Spencer . (New York: Citadel Press, 1968), 90-1. Blue Jacket
was even thought to have worn a red coat in the action against St. Clair. See Sword, 179, and Sugden, Blue
Jacket . 123.
Ibid., 108.
" Tanner, "The Glaize in 1792," 16.
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nevertheless was treated as a revered member of the intertribal village community. Her
respected position was based on her reputation as a medicine woman who conversed with
numerous spirits and accurately forecast the results of raids7^ For example, when more
than fifty Shawnee warriors from the villages of Blue Jacket and Snake sought her out in
1792, she prophesied the success of their raid, and after they subsequently won a
significant victory, they returned to the Glaize with much plunder and honored
Coocoochee by giving her a share of their spoils.^^
Although Coocoochee was respected by her fellow refugees, she, and doubtless
many of them, experienced her refugee condition as an uprooted and unsettled status.
Among the spirits with whom she conversed was that of her husband, Cokuridiawsaw, a
Mohawk war chief who had migrated into the Ohio region to join the Shawnees and
Mingoes already living there, only to lose his life against Harmar's army at Kekionga.^^
On the occasion of the Feast of the Dead in the spring of 1792, a little more than a year
after Cokundiawsaw's death, his widow removed his remains to the site of her new
dwelling at the Glaize. Buried in a sitting position with his weapons, blanket, and
moccasins, Cokundiawsaw's body faced the West, his spirit's final destination. Yet
Coocoochee's ongoing conversations with her husband's spirit and the manner in which
his friends tended his grave suggest that they believed that Cokundiawsaw's spirit still
lingered and was not prepared for its final journey.
Quaife, The Indian Captivity of O. M. Spencer , 78, 117.
" Ibid., 116.
Ibid., 78-80. Also see Helen Hombeck Tanner, "Coocoochee: Mohawk Medicine Woman," .American
Indian Culture and Research Journal 3(3) (1979): 24-25,28. The Ohio Iroquois, known as Mmgoes, began
migrating into Ohio in the 1740s and 1750s; Coocoochee's family relocated to Ohio sometime after 1768,
the year in which the fu-st Treaty of Fort Stanwix supposedly made the Ohio River a permanent boundary
and acknowledged that the country north of the River belonged solely to the Indians.
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The general belief in the lingering presence of Cokundiawsaw's spirit and the
confidence the warriors placed in Coocoochee indicates much about the community at the
Glaize. After sustaining considerable losses in the fight against Harmar, the warriors
from Kekionga, though victorious, sought a new home at the Glaize. Without food after
Harmar's destructive raid, much of the surviving remnant of Kekioiiga's populace relied
heavily on the British at Detroit to supply their wants in the upcoming winter, and this
caused a sudden evacuation of their former villages. Under ordinary circumstances,
Cokundiawsaw, a distinguished war chief of the Mohawks, would have received a funeral
replete with a full Condolence Ceremony, intended to reinvigorate his mourning
relatives, prevent calamities from evil spirits, assist Cokundiawsaw's spirit on his
journey, and install another leader as the fallen chiefs successor.'''' As it was, due to
Coocoochee's move to the Glaize, Cokundiawsaw's grave remained unattended for more
than a year until his widow re-interred his remains, though still without a Condolence
Ceremony. Thus Cokundiawsaw's spirit remained restless.
The absence of a Condolence Ceremony for Cokundiawsaw could also indicate
that Coocoochee and her family had begun to live more like their Shawnee hosts, who did
75!
not perform the Condolence ritual. Furthermore, Coocoochee's observance of the Feast
of the Dead closely mirrored the similar Shawnee custom, but they differed in that
A good analysis of the Condolence Ceremony is found in William N. Fenton and J. N. B. Hewitt, "The
Requickening Address of the Iroquois Condolence Council." Journal of the Washmgton Academy of
Sciences 34(3) (March 15, 1944), 65-85. Also see William N. Fenton, The Great Law and the Longhouse:
A Political History of the Iroquois Confederacy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 136-37,
178-79.
Erminie Wheeler Voegelin did an entire study on Shawnee death and burial customs, spanning the period
from the late seventeenth century through 1938. The author also compared the differences in the practices
of the five separate Shawnee divisions. Beginning in the nineteenth century, Shawnees began to practice a
form of the condolence ceremony; Voegelin, Mortuary Customs of the Shawnee and Other Eastern Tnbes ,
Prehistory Research Series, 11(4) (Indianapolis: Indiana Historical Society, March, 1944), 243-319.
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Coocoochcc's Ir()(|ti()is version of the Feast of the Dead was supposed to lake phiee ten
(lays ancr the mourned indivickial's death, while Shawnees held their Death Feasl only
onee a year, just after the Green Corn Ceremony in summertime.^'' in both eases, the
Death I-easl was intended to nourish the spirit of the deceased, helping to prepare it for its
linal journey. I he feast held for Cokundiawsaw's spirit occurred much later than it
should have l)y both hoquois and Shawnee standards; both groups believed a spirit kept
restless for so long was dangerous.*^" Yet by conferring with the dead and prophesying to
departing war parties at the Cilaize, Coocoochee, if not directly assuaging the passions of
the lingering ghosts, could perhaps at least foretell of calamities they might cause. I he
medicine woman was in effect fulfilling a role that Shawnee and Miami shamans would
have performed for their own peoples in more ordinary times.
As Coocoochcc's presence became more vital to those living at the Glaize, she
also developed closer ties with the British traders and agents living there. In her
household she raised a mixed-blood grandson, thought to be Simon (lirty's son, and
Coocoochee's daughter married George Ironsides, one of the traders who had migrated to
the Glai/.e from Kekioiiga after llarmar's raid. This couple lived directly across the
Maumee River from Coocoochee.
I he marriage between Ironsides and Coocoochee's daughter suggests an
increasing interdependence between the British and the Indians living at the Glaize.
Ironsides had married into a prominent family; his mother-in-law's power and his
brothers-in-laws' status as warriors insured him a position of respect. Ironsides' new
" James Howard, 286-87; Arthur C. Parker, Parker on (he Iroquois: Hook Two; edited wilh an inlrochiction
by William N l enton (Syracuse: Syracuse Dniveisily Press, 1<H)K), S7; Aiitlioiiy !. C. Wallai c, I lic I H ath
and Kchiilli of llie Seiu-c a (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1970), 98-9.
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(IwulliMg al (he ( was s.l.iakd m, iI,c ccnlcr of the combined villa,',cs. Instead ol
livm;. <„, iIk- iKiiphuy as he and Ihe other traders had done al Kekionj-a, he and his
Icllow tiaders and aj'.cnls were now silnated al the hnb of interaction al the (llai/.e.
Moreover, like Ironsides, the Indian aj',ents at the (ilai/e, namely Matthew Idhott,
Alexandei McKee, and Ihe dirty brothers, also had Native wives and lainilies. These
men had become integrated members ol this iiilertribal comimiiiity."' Near Ironsides'
house and Ihe Aiiglai/e Kiver sat a small palisaded |)eiimetei Miiioiiiidin)- two linlish
Indian Deparlmeiit buildings, one ol Iheni a |)ei inaneni lesidence lot lames ( inly, an
mleipietei within Indian I )epaitinent who had oik e lived al Kekionga, the other a supply
depot and pail time residence lor I'.lliotI and McKee."' This storehouse enabled the
Indian Department's branch al Detroit to more quickly Iced and arm the warriors at the
(ilai/e, giving the Department a more active role in dealing with Ihe iiilei tribal groups
(here (ban (he Hri(ish had previously underlaken a( Kekioiiga/*'
Direct British involvement along the Maiimee became nu)rc appaient late in 17V I,
when Ihe liulian Deparlincnl assisted (he ( onledeiac y m planning, and caiiying oul the
ambush lhal destroyed Aithiii St ( 'laii 's American army moic than lilly miles Irom
cillu i (Ik- ( ilai/c or Kckioii};;!. In addition lo providing arms and intelligence, a nufnhcr
ol tlir Indian I )cpatinicnl\s officers also took pari in the action Simon (iirly led a group
""TrowbridKc. Sliiiwiirsr 'Inulitions, 42; Hd^Nu. IM; Wallace. OH 101; Parker. Hook Two. !?6
(,)iiailr, I lie IikImm < aplivily ul ( ). M, SpciiccK 95-6; liiimn. *' I he ( ilai/c ui 1/02/' l7,2S-27.
llml.





of Wyandots in the battle, and Matthew EUiott was also present;''^ many other officers of
the Department also probably fought against St. Clair that day, but they did so using
extreme discretion, since the act was a violation of Britain's official neutral status in the
ongoing war between the United States and the Indians of the Northwest. In all, the
American army suffered more than 1000 casualties, over 600 of them fatalities.^^ Only a
few dozen army personnel and civilians returned to Fort Washington (i.e. Cincinnati)
unscathed.
Although certainly one of the greatest victories ever for Native Americans over
Euro-Americans, St. Clair's defeat ironically exposed the Confederacy's weakness,
showing a heightened dependence on the British.^^ While the kidian victory marked the
high tide of the fortunes of the northwestern Native Confederacy in its stmggles to thwart
American expansion, it also tended to weave Indian and British interests together more
lightly in the Great Lakes and upper country. Furthermore, since the U.S. government
remained steadfast in refusing to acknowledge Native sovereignty in the Old Northwest,
the war would continue. Confidence soared at the Glaize; the Confederacy and its
leaders saw no reason why their overwhelming success against American arms should not
continue, particularly with support from their supposedly neutral British confederates.
Consequently, in the years immediately following St. Clair's defeat the British Indian
Sword, 182, 188; Horsman, Matthew Elliott. British Indian Agent . 69.
White, The Middle Ground
,
454; Allen, His Majesty's Indian Allies , 74-76. This excerpt from Allen
contains a contemporary British account of the battle and its implications, found in an anonymous letter
from Niagara three weeks later, 24 November 1791, CNA, MG 1 1, CO 42, 88. The general engagement
known as St. Clair's Defeat is best detailed in Sword, chapter 17. Only Edward Braddock's defeat near the
banks of the Monongahela in 1755 nvaled the magnittide of St. Clair's Defeat 36 years later.
White, The Middle Ground . 454.
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Department enjoyed its strongest inniience ever among the intertribal communities at the
Glaize and along the Maumee.
During the brief period 1791 to 1794, events at the Glaize tended to dcfme
British-Indian relations overall. Despite the British government's proclamations of
neutrality and its urging the leaders in Canada to reduce Indian expenditures, actual tics
and relations with the Indians in the upper country were primarily shaped and carried out
by those Indian agents on site, Alexander McKee and his staff '^'^ Within this nebulous
situation, McKce's position became particularly delicate. As the war wore on. Blue
Jacket, Little Turtle, Buckongahelas, Captain Johnny, Snake, and other leaders near the
Glaize trusted the British more heavily, and they viewed McKee as their lifeline to this
support.
John Graves Simcoc, the Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada, also relied
heavily on McKee, expecting him to maintain British interests within the Confederacy,
both in matters of trade and war. Simcoe and other British leaders had grown
increasingly concerned about the activity of the traders in the Ohio Valley and its
potential to undermine government policy. If the British fur trade became the sole
element in developing ties between the British and Indians, Whitehall could find itself
bound to the traders' diplomacy, conducted by profit-seeking individuals on the frontier.
Simcoe wrote to McKcc, complaining that the "self-interested & Venal Traders" would
lead the Indians to believe "that G. Britain will sooner or later engage in a War with the
States in the defence of the Western Indians [those Indians within the borders of the
United States]," and that if the traders should find it in their own interest, they would not
** White, The Middle Ground . 455; Horsman, "The British Indian Department and the Resistance to
General Anthony Wayne, 1793-1795," 270-71; Calloway, Crown and Calumet . 51, 64-65, 70-74.
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hesitate to "counteract the general Instructions & Conduct of his Majesty's Servants, &
buoy up the hidians by that false hope."'^'^ A year later Simcoe defended the practice of
distributing Indian gifts at a distance farther from the posts, partly to "rescue the Savage
from.
.
.the rapacity of Our Traders."'" Thus, British leaders depended on the handful of
agents such as McKee, who did not have personal vested interests in the trade, to
maintain a status quo in British-Indian diplomacy, particularly at a time when the traders'
influence was significant throughout Indian country.
When it came to war and diplomacy, Simcoe also relied on McKee to influence
the Confederacy's leaders in Britain's favor, but again without making any permanent
commitments on the government's part. Late in the summer of 1 792 Simcoe sent careful
instructions to McKee, indicating the specific goals and policy he wanted carried out in
the Confederacy's upcoming general council to be held at the Glaizc that fall. McKee
was told to work toward a peace settlement that would encourage the continued
development of "so numerous a Confederacy" among the Natives, and to preserve the
Indians' territory by creating his proposed "extensive. . .Barrier" lying between American
territory and British possessions. In addition to preserving the integrity of Indian
possessions, Simcoe also hoped that such a buffer occupied by a militant Confederacy
would pemianently protect Upper Canada's sparsely settled loyalist communities from
American expansion.
" John Graves Simcoe to Alexander McKee, 24 September 1792; Simcoe to McKee, 10 November 1792,
in Cruik.sliank, Simcoe Correspondence , V: 23, 25.
^ Simcoe to George Hammond. 21 January 1793, in MPHC, 25: 522.
" John Graves Simcoe to Alexander McKee, 30 August 1792, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence. I:
208.
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In order to best carry out Simcoe's instructions without either alienating the
Indians, damaging the unity of the Confederacy, or igniting a war between Britain and the
United States, McKee remained purposefully vague in his communications with the
primary Native leaders along the Maumee. Although he obeyed Simcoe by not
promising the King's intervention, no record exists that McKee ever expressly told the
Indians that this would never happen. In fact, the subsequent words and actions of the
Confederacy's leaders indicate that they contmued to harbor hopes that their British
Father would defend their interests. After lengthy deliberations in the October council at
the Glaize, a deputation, primarily under militant Shawnee influence, addressed McKee
as Simcoe's representative. Painted Pole, a war leader from the Foot of the Rapids near
McKee 's residence, served as spokesperson, and the chiefmade it clear that he and the
rest of the Confederacy's delegation expected the British to protect Indian interests:
Father; At this Council fire which is in the center of our Country/, is placed the
Heart of the Indian Confederacy to which we have always considered our father
to be joined, therefore we hope on this great occasion, that he will exert himself to
see justice done to us, as it must be through his power & mediation that we can
expect an end to our troubles.
Knowing that Native hopes hung on every word he spoke, McKee remained
evasive; he merely passed the speech on to Simcoe, allowing the latter to draft a
response. Simcoe, in his answer, adopted a well-established practice in Euro-Indian
diplomacy, seizing upon the Indians' own rhetoric as he implied the King's goodwill
towards them:
Children & Brothers,
You say "at this Council fire, which is in the centre of your country, is
placed the heart of all the Indian Confederacy, to which you have always
considered your Father to be joined." The King your Father fi-om the earliest
92 Confederacy's Address to Lieutenant Governor Simcoe, 9 October 1792, ibid., I: 229.
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moment of his reign, has beUeved this union to be necessary for your welfare &
no less so to that of the neighbounng countries; and. . .your late supenntendan't
general, Sir William Johnson, in all his Councils inculcated its propriety.^^
Simcoe's diplomatic endeavors mirrored those of the Confederacy's leaders. These
leaders viewed themselves as using the Bntish to compel the Amencans to agree to a just
peace, a peace that would preserve their intertribal territorial claims. Similarly, Simcoe
hoped to use the strength of a united Confederacy to bring about a peace that would
protect Upper Canada against the United States by threatening the use of continued
Native warfare to compel the Americans to seek terms favorable to Britain. Although
both Simcoe and the Indian leaders may have acted in self-interest and tried to
manipulate the other, both probably believed that their interests were intertwined. In
Simcoe's case this took the form of urging Britain's Native allies to strengthen the
Confederacy, arguing to the leaders at the Glaize that it was "necessary for your
welfare."*^^
The council at the Glaize addressed three principal issues, namely the
Confederacy's territorial goals, their reactions to recent revelations that the United States
government intended to impose agricultural reforms upon them, and the extent to which
the Confederacy should rely on British support. While most tribal leaders in the Ohio
country advocated the notion of unity and strength within the Confederacy, these issues at
the Glaize exposed the fact that the Confederacy lacked clear leadership and its members
were divided on the objectives for which they were fighting. Moreover, the council also
indicated a decline in Iroquois influence among the western nations.
93 Speech from Lieutenant Governor Simcoe to the Western Indians, October 1792, ibid., I: 230.
Ibid.
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Tensions over leadership and goals were immediately evident when the Shawnee
leaders, whose influence within the coalition was rising, challenged the influence and
authority of the Six Nations.''^ Shawnee spokesman Painted Pole opened the sessions by
upbraiding the delegates of the Six Nations for aniving late, and by revealing his
suspicion that the Iroquois lacked genuine loyalty to the Confederacy. Painted Pole
sarcastically concluded, "We suppose you have been constantly trying to do us some
good, and that was the reason of your not coming sooner to join us."'^'' Buckongahelas,
the most important Delaware leader, agreed, exclaiming.
Don't think because the Shawanoes only have spoke[n] to you, that it was
their sentiments alone, they have spoke the sentiments of all the Nations.
All of us are animated by one Mind, one Head and one Heart and we are
resolved to stick close by each other & defend ourselves to the last.^^
The militant leaders directed these statements at the Iroquois faction led by the
Seneca chief Red Jacket, who arrived at the Glaize with a peace proposal from the United
States. The question regarding the Six Nations' lack of fidelity to the Confederacy's
goals seemed confirmed when Red Jacket encouraged a negotiated peace with the
Americans, stating, "Brothers, we know that the Americans have held out their hands to
offer you peace. Don't be too proud Spirited and reject it."^^ The next day Painted Pole
heatedly responded to Red Jacket, accusing him of selling out to the Americans:
I can see what you are about from this place. Brother of the 6 Nations, you are
still talking to the Americans your head is now towards them, and you are now
talking to them. When you left your village to come here, you had a bundle of
John Norton later mentioned that the Shawnees became leaders of the intertribal alliance prior to the
action against St. Clair. See Carl F. Klinck and James J. Talman, eds., The Journal of Major John Norton,
1816 (Toronto: The Champlain Society), 177-78.
Proceedings at the Glaize, 2 October 1792, in Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence . I: 220.
Ibid.
" Proceedings at the Glaize, 4 October 1792, ibid., 1: 222.
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to the Americans and left the council promising to show unity with the rest of the
Confederacy at the anticipated Sandusky conference with U. S. commissioners in
1793.'^' In the meantime the Shawnees and Delawares continued to ignore the speeches
that the Americans sent to them, and they merely passed them on to the officers in the
British Indian Department, arguing, "They [the Americans] mean to dupe us as usual, but
we mean to be ready to receive [i.e. fight] them."'"''
Soon after Red Jacket's departure, Joseph Brant belatedly made his way to the
Glaize. Like Red Jacket, Brant came with peace proposals from the American
government, having just come from the U. S. capitol at Philadelphia. By the time Brant
reached the mouth of the Maumee River, several of the western Indians met him,
informing him that the Council at the Glaize had ended, but they briefly held a smaller
council with the Mohawk sachem. Learning the determinations made at the prior
council. Brant did not even bother to present the American proposals. Instead, the
Mohawk representative sat and listened to the words of the Shawnee leader Snake, who
reiterated the Native position, exclaiming, "General Washington has always been sending
to us for peace. Now if he is true and wants peace, the Ohio [River] must be the boundary
line, as we long ago agreed upon, and we will meet him at Sandusky."'"^ Hence, Brant
had no chance to present the American overtures for peace even if he had wanted to, and
he probably knew how roughly Painted Pole and the other leaders had handled Red
'"^ Proceedings at the Glaize, 7 October 1792, ibid., 227-28.
Speech of the Shawanoes and Delawares at the Grand Glaize, 1 1 June 1792, recorded by Thomas
Duggan, Clerk, British Indian Department, Native American Collection, Clements Historical Library, Ann
Arbor, Michigan.
Snake's Speech at the Foot of the Miami Rapids, 28 October 1792, Cruikshank, Simcoe
Correspondence , 242.
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the possible exception of McKee, British leaders had not foreseen this growing rift in the
Confederacy. Only seven years earlier Haldimand had predicted perpetual Iroquois
hegemony over the western Indians, and as late as summer's end 1792, John Graves
Simcoe, unaware of the growing anti-Iroquois sentiment within the Confederacy,
continued to envision such a role for the Six Nations.'^^ Less than a year later, by the
time of the general council at the Foot of the Miami Rapids (1793), Simcoe better
understood Brant's declining status and threw British support behind the more militant
faction of the Confederacy.
Division and Defeat. 1793-1795
The gulf between the Six Nations and the western Confederacy widened the
following summer, when the Confederacy's leaders met in a council held at the Miami
Rapids. '^'^ Brant's reception there in late May 1793 confirmed his plummeting status and
the Six Nations' declining position among the western tribes. In his journal, the Mohawk
leader recalled that the Shawnees accused him of being "a Traitor, & that I only came
there to receive Money and that they would have nothing to do with me."' Brant strove
for unity within the Confederacy, but he advocated a renegotiated boundary line with the
American commissioners, one that would produce a lasting peace. He envisioned a
compromise based on the Muskingum River, which would have given the United States
some territory northwest of the Ohio River, but it would also have required the American
108 Simcoe to McKee, 30 August 1792, ibid., I: 208-09.
Reginald Horsman offers a good analysis of the proceedings at this council in "The British Indian
Department and the Abortive Treaty of Lower Sandusky, 1793," The Ohio Historical Quarterly 70(3) (July
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Captain Brant's Journal of the Proceedings at the General Council held at the Foot of the Rapids of the
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government to relinquish some of the lands it had acquired in the Fort Harmar Treaty -
thus a true compromise. Though Brant and his supporters did not realize it, this proposal
was doomed from the start because the American commissioners were not authonzed to
make any concessions remotely resembling Brant's plan."
'
In spite of Brant's declining influence among the Maumee tribes, he managed to
temporarily gain some support at the council from other factions present. The Ottawas,
Ojibwas, and Potawatomis, or the Three Fires, began to follow a course more
independent of the Confederacy. Their future interests would lie more in the North, and
with closer ties geographically to the Lakes region and economically to the British fur
trade there than to the tribes of the Maumee and Wabash Valleys. It should also be noted
that the Three Fires, like the Six Nations, had little to lose by endorsing the Muskingum
boundary and relinquishing part of southeastern Ohio, a chunk of territory distant from
their own country. In the midst of the proceedings at the Miami Rapids the Three Fires
supported Brant's proposal, thus opting for a peacefully negotiated boundary. On behalf
of the Three Fires, the Ottawa Chief Egushwa graciously acknowledged Brant's past
services and placed his trust in any settlement that the Mohawk leader thought most
proper. The Ottawa leader stated, "You were the Promoter of this Confederacy and from
your knowledge of the English, of the Americans, & the Indians, you are able to judge of
1 1 7
our true Interest, we therefore place full Confidence in You." The dispute over this
boundary widened the division in the Confederacy; henceforth the British could never
again fully unite the tribes of the Old Northwest and Upper Canada.
Simcoe to George Hammond, 8 September 1793, MPHC, XXIV: 608; Sword, 247.
''^ Brant Journal, 24 July 1793, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence , 8.
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At one point during the council, it appeared that Brant might have garnered
general support for his Muskingum compromise, but Alexander McKee took matters into
his own hands and privately met with the leaders of the militant faction at midnight on
August 9'^ After this meeting these leaders, with the Shawnee war chief Captain Johnny
as their spokesman, issued without further discussion their "final Resolution" in favor of
a boundary set at the Ohio River. When Brant protested this maneuver, Delaware leader
Buckongahelas responded by "pointing at Col. McKee, [saying] that is the Person who
advises us to insist on the Ohio River for the line.""^ Moravian missionary John
Heckewelder later recalled that the message sent from the Foot of the Rapids to the
American commissioners "was both hnpertinent & hisolent" and used "Language.
. that
no Person having knowledge of Indians, would believe it an Indian Speech."
Heckewelder added, "We saw quite plainly that the Indians were not allowed to act freely
and independently, but under the influence of evil advisers."""*
McKee probably believed that he had merely followed orders by asserting his
influence in the general council, since Simcoe reminded him during the proceedings "to
exert your ascendency over the Indians in inclining them to accede to those [American]
offers, if they be consistent with their safety, and benefit, or to reject them if they seem
likely to prove injurious to their real Interests.""^ Furthermore, the British Indian
Department had its closest ties to the Indians of the Maumee Valley, most ofwhom
113
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belonged to the militant nativistic faction, and beginning with Harmar's Defeat, the
backbone of the resistance came from that quarter. Consequently, it made sense to build
a confederacy around this core of resistance. Therefore, British leaders probably
believed, albeit mistakenly, that the optimum degree of unity in the Confederacy would
have to come through those nations that had most heartily participated in the recent
victories over the Americans. Simcoe knew that any American army sent against Detroit
would have to traverse this region of entrenched Native resistance. Finally, McKee was
linked by marriage and kinship to the Shawnecs, and he tended to favor their interests.
Simcoe approved of McKee's actions because he, like the western Native leaders,
questioned Brant's loyalty and no longer trusted him. The Lieutenant Governor
suspected that Brant "was pledged to [the U. S.] Congress to give it as his opinion to the
Council, that the Indian Nations should give up part of the territory, on the northern side
of the Ohio."'' Simcoe also believed that the United States sought "an alliance with the
Six Nations," hoping to turn "them against the Western Indians.""^ Finally, the
Governor realized that Brant probably possessed goals that would not always coincide
with British interests; he therefore wanted to reduce the Mohawk's influence. Simcoe
wrote,
He [Brant] is labouring to effect a pacification upon such terms and principles as
He shall think proper and which will eventually make him that mediator which
the United States have declined to request from His Majesty's Government....He
considers the Indian Interests as the first Object—that as a second, tho' very
inferior one, He prefers the British. . .to the people of the States, yet I. . .consider
the use He has made of his Power to be the subject ofjust alarm and that it is
1 1
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necessary by degrees and on just principles that it should be diminished.
Simcoe to Major General Alured Clarke, 10 July 1793, ibid., 569.
Same to same, 14 June 1793, ibid., 549.
Simcoe to Henry Dundas, 20 September 1793, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence , II: 59.
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Although both Simcoe and McKee wanted peace and unity, it was better to risk a
continued war with a fractured Indian confederacy than to place a stronger confederacy ii
the hands of a principal chief whose loyalties to Britain had become dubious.
Although Brant complained of McKee's interference, his protests fell on deaf
ears, and by late October 1793, he was virtually isolated. Prior to Brant's complaints,
McKee had written to Simcoe, blaming the Six Nations for the prevailing divisions
within the Confederacy and actually claiming that he himself had favored a compromise
regarding the boundary! McKee predicted,
However conscious I may be of having used no improper influence in the
Councils of the Confederacy...! nevertheless expect from the malevolent,
disappointed and ill disposed to be blamed for the opinions which the kidians
have adopted and for their Resolution which put an end to the negotiations.'^^
Simcoe swallowed it whole and assured Mckee that his conduct was "perfectly proper in
all respects." At the same time, Simcoe was inclined to accept McKee's view that
Brant was to blame for the fractured state of the Confederacy, declaring, "I suspect that
the principle of disunion arose from this Chieftain.'
Simcoe's anti-Brant explanation of the Confederacy's troubles failed to
acknowledge the schism's deeper and more complicated sources, which included old
tribal rivalries, the competing political and territorial needs of the Confederacy's various
members, and the degree of McKee's manipulative influence among tribal leaders. But
the existence of factional divisions after the council at the Foot of the Rapids was
undeniable. Moreover, the emergence of three broad subgroups -the Six Nations, the
McKee to Simcoe, 22 August 1793, MPHC, XXIV: 595-96.
Simcoe to McKee, 8 September 1793, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence , V: 72-3.
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Maumee Valley tribes, and the Three Fires (or Lakes Indians) factions-was a major
developmcnl that tlircatcned to undermine the position of relative strength the
Confederacy had previously enjoyed through its victories over Harmar and St. Clair.
After the council at the Foot of the Rapids the Confederacy continued to rely
heavily on the British. At the conclusion of the proceedings, the western nations sent a
speech to Lieutenant Governor Simcoe, with Captain .lohnny serving as spokesman:
Father,
Always considering that your Heart is placed in the center of the Indian
Confederacy, we must expect, that our great depcndance is still on you... .We
need not we hope, again repeat, the great reliance we have on you for your advice
& assistance; and altho' many have united themselves with us at this Council fire,
yet we can depend on nothing, so certainly as your protection & friendship... at no
fomier period have we stood in so much need of both.'"
In his petition to Simcoe, Captain Johnny also added that he and the other Native leaders
"look up to the Great God who is a Witness to all that passes here, for his pity & his
help," demonstrating that the nativist faction appealed not only to their British Father, but
also to the Great Spirit for deliverance and for the restoration of their country. '^^
Indeed, Captain .lohnny's concerns were well founded. Since a peace between the
western Confederacy and the United States never materialized, the Indians of the
Maumee Valley knew that renewed American invasions were imminent. Furthermore,
after St. Clair's debacle. President Washington appointed Anthony Wayne, one of the
ablest American officers of the early Republic, to lead a much larger, reorganized amy
back into Indian country. Known as "the Legion," Wayne's force numbered more than
Simcoe to Henry Dundas. 10 November 1793, ibid., II: 100; Simcoe to Lord Dorchester. 10 November
1793, ibid., II: 102.




5,000 men, and the aggressive commander had already begun constructing a chain of
forts in southwestern Ohio pnor to the Confederacy's council at the Foot of the Miami
Rapids in the summer of 1793. While the arguments in council continued to weaken and
divide the Indian coalition, Wayne's army grew stronger, ultimately gaining the initiative.
Native efforts to form a consensus with which to negotiate a peaceful resolution had
strategically benefited the Americans. Wayne immediately followed up the failed
negotiations by sending his Legion deeper into Indian country to construct Fort
Greenville (the site of today's Greenville, Ohio) in the early autumn of 1793, and in
December the army moved still further north, stopping at the site of St. Clair's defeat
where they constructed Fort Recovery.'^''
By early 1 794, Wayne's Legion was now virtually in a position in which it could
not lose an Indian war. The Confederacy's leaders understood this, but they continued to
harbor the expectation of direct British intervention. British leaders themselves
wondered if another Anglo-American war was inevitable, and Native confidence soared
when Simcoe acted on McKee's advice to fortify the country to the south of Detroit.''^
For Simcoe, the need to defend the upper province against an anticipated invasion had
temporarily superceded Whitehall's policy of fiscal retrenchment for the defense and
Indian budgets of the Canadian provinces. Therefore, in the spring, Simcoe's
redeployment consisted of constructing blockhouses along western Lake Erie at the
mouth of the River Raisin and on Turtle Island at the mouth of the Maumee. Most
'^^ Paul David Nelson, Anthony Wayne: Soldier of the Early Republic (Bloomington; Indiana University
Press, 1985), 243-44.
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importantly, the Bntish built Fort Miami, a full-sized fortress at the Foot of the Miami
Rapids, containing cannons larger than the artillery of the United States Legion.
These activities and troop movements had an electnfying effect among the
Indians; Native confidence in the British soared. Throughout the spring, remnants of the
Confederacy began to respond favorably to calls requesting them to regather at the
Glaize. Even the Three Fires, despite having differing views from the Maumee Valley
tribes regarding the Confederacy's objectives, accepted the invitation; Simcoe wrote to
Lord Dorchester, "It appears that the Chippewas [i.e. Ojibwas], in consequence of some
superstitious circumstances have unanimously determined upon War."'-^ In truth, the
Three Fires' enthusiasm was probably due more to Simcoe's decision to fortify the lower
Maumee with British troops and cannons; it did not necessarily portend a restoration of
the Confederacy's waning unity. In any case, by June 1794 the alliance numbered
approximately 1 ,500 warriors, consisting of Wyandots, Shawnees, Miamis, Delawares,
Potawatomis, Ottawas, and Ojibwas. '^^ Even Brant and the Six Nations, though not yet
themselves prepared to fight, saw the necessity for the western nations and the Lakes
Indians to continue to resist, particularly after his talks with the American authorities
ended when the Americans informed him that they could never agree to his proposed
1 28Muskingum boundary. This seeming restoration of the Confederacy's unity, while
more apparent than real, led Simcoe to believe that "[tjhere is every appearance of the
Simcoe to Dorchester, 29 April 1794, MPHC, XXIV: 660.
Larry B. Nelson, A Man of Distinction among Them, 168-69; Sword, 277-78.
Brant to McKee, 8 May 1794, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence . V: 86-87.
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most general union of the Indians, against the United States, that has yet been known."'"
Simcoe's confidence aside, the factious Confederacy would soon be put to the test.
For their part, the Natives continued to look to Britain for military assistance and
seemed to feel they had good reason to expect it. On 26 June 1794, Wayne and his staff
questioned two Shawnee prisoners who informed the General: "[T]hey [the British] told
the Indians the[y] were now come to help them to fight, & if they the Indians wou'd
generally turn out & join them they wou'd advance & fight the American Arniy."'^^
Three weeks earlier, the Americans questioned two Potawatomis who informed them that
"the British say they will have 1 500 militia," and that "Governor Simcoe had been
sending [the] Pota.[watomis] messages all previous winter."'^' Whatever basis the
Natives had for believing the British would send troops, they knew from mid-.Iune
onward that the British traders and Indian agents who shared their country, whose
destinies were therefore intertwined with their own, would fight in the Confederacy's
campaign. This at any rate was the conclusion of a council of war held near the Glaize
on 16 June 1794; a British officer recorded in his diary: "Resolved, therefore, that we
shall join the [Indian] army now in readiness to march." To seal this determination the
council leaders handed Matthew Elliott a belt of black wampum, binding him and the
"^^^ Simcoe to Lord Dorchester, 29 April 1794, MPHC, XXIV: 660.
'^'^ Examination of two Shawnee warriors, taken prisoners on the Miami of the Lake, 20 miles above Grand
Glaize, 26 June 1794; at Greeneville, by Anthony Wayne; Glenn A. Black Laboratory of Archaeology
(hereafter (lABLA), Shawnee File, January-June, 1794, Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana.
' Examination of two Potawatomis, 5 June 1794, GABLA, Shawnee File, January-June, 1794. Accorduig
to another Potawatomi prisoner on 21 July, "The British told all the Indian Nations to bring on all their
Warriors & that then the British would bring more than all of them put together." The latter quote is taken
from. The Examination of a Patawatime [sic] Warrior who was in the Attack upon Fort Recovery on the
30'^ Ultimo, 23 July 1794, GABLA, Shawnee File, July-December, 1794.
Cruikshank, E. A., ed., "The Diary of an Officer in the Indian Country in 1794," The American
Historical Magazine 3 (1908): 640.
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other whites to assist in the upcoming hattlc. All white personnel dwelling in the
Maumee Valley, whether traders, agents, or officers, were compelled to fight.
The apparent restoration of unity within the Confederacy proved to be a mirage.
After waiting at the Glaize for last-mmute reinforcements on 18 June, Shawnee chief
Blue Jacket learned that a group of 127 Ottawas and Ojibwas from Mackinac and
Saginaw had raped women and pillaged the villages along the lower Maumee while the
men of those villages were absent, preparing to fight the Americans. (There existed some
previous antagonism between the nations of the Maumee Valley and the Lakes
Indians.)' " The intra-Confederacy conflict remained unresolved twelve days later, when
the Natives launched a poorly conceived attack on U. S. forces at Fort Recovery. Not
only did the attackers have to lift their siege when their ammunition ran low, but durmg
the course of the battle some of the Shawnee and Delaware warriors, still angry about the
Ottawa-Ojibwa raid on their villages, fired on a contingent of northern Lakes Indians. ''"^
As a result, the Ottawas and Ojibwas withdrew, returning to their homes in the
North, even though McKee and Elliott tried in vain to prevent their departure. McKee
feared that this defection would spread, predicting that "the Indians in this part of the
country will feel a sensible diminution of their strength by the example they [the Ottawas
and OjibwasJ shew all the other Lakes Indians as well as those who are here as those who
are expected and whom they must meet on their way home."'"'^ McKee's concerns were
well founded, as the militant faction of Maumee tribes were left alone to defend
themselves against Wayne's advancing Legion later in the summer.
Cruikshank, ibid., 641; Sugden, Bluejacket: Warrior of the Shawnees . 162.
Larry B. Nelson, A Man of Distinction among Them, 169; Sword, 278.
60
After the failed attack on Fort Recovery the Miami war leader Little Turtle sensed
that adequate Bntish support would never be forthcoming. Realizing that the problem lay
less with the officers in the Indian Department and more the with British government's
refusal to go to war, Little Turtle bypassed McKee and went straight to the highest-
ranking British army officer in the West, Colonel Richard England at Detroit. Little
Turtle requested soldiers and artillery, and he informed the Colonel that if the Native
alliance remained unassisted by the English "they would be obliged to desist in their plan
of attempting to stop the progress of the American Army."'-*^ Colonel England gave no
satisfaction and Little Turtle, as a consequence, abdicated his position as war leader.
Unlike McKee, Elliott, the Girtys, and other Britishers who lived with Natives
along the Maumee River and who worked to keep the intertribal coalition together.
Colonel England and his superiors in Quebec and London reflected a policy of
nonintervention and withdrawal that would soon result of the signing of the so-called Jay
Treaty. In June 1794, Britain had opened negotiations with U.S. diplomat John Jay,
hoping to resolve several issues left over from the American Revolution, one of which
was the withdrawal of all British posts from American soil.'"'^ Among others, these
included Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Niagara, all lifelines to Indians who lived within
the borders of the United States but who looked to the British for aid and sustenance.
Britain, at war with revolutionary France since January 1793, could not afford to go to
McKee to Joseph Chew, 7 July 1794, MPHC, XX: 364.
Colonel Richard England to Simcoe, 22 July 1794, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence . II: 334.
An account of the Jay Treaty proceedings and how these related to events on the frontier can be found in
Samuel F. Bemis's Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy (Knights of Columbus, 1923; rev.
ed.. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1962; 2"'' printing, 1965), particularly chapters 1, 8-
10, and 12. Also see Burt, 82-165.
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war to protect the Indians, especially for a part of the Empire that administrators and
policymakers at home regarded to be of secondary importance.
Knowledge of these ongoing peace efforts made leaders in Canada and army
personnel even more hesitant to support their former allies, and this became painfully
clear to the Indians on 20 August 1794 at Fallen Timbers, when Anthony Wayne's
Legion routed the remnants of the confederated tribes and chased them for miles. The
American dragoons pursued the fleeing warriors virtually to the gates of the British Fort
Miami, located near the Foot of the Rapids, where just a year earlier the divided
Confederacy had bickered about what kind of boundary ultimatum they should present to
the American peace Commissioners. Major William Campbell ordered the gates closed,
denying any refuge to the routed warriors. Stunned by this betrayal, the Indians
continued their flight towards Lake Erie. In this brief skirmish they became keenly aware
of the full significance of this act of British isolation. Even in the midst of a battle, their
British Father had refused to aid them. Thus, the most stinging aspect of the defeat was
psychological. In a few short years during the early 1790s the Natives in the Ohio and
Lakes regions had come to rely on Britain for military and material support. '^^ Now,
with the exception of some sixty or so Canadian and Loyalist militia who had fought in
the battle dressed in Indian garb, the Confederacy's leaders found that they were fighting
the Americans alone. The Indians would never forget this betrayal. One Shawnee
messenger informed the Indian Department that according to Blue Jacket and many
White, The Middle Ground . 467.
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others, "the English were [now] thought nothing of.">^^ Blue Jacket had come to the
same conclusion that Little Turtle had reached one battle earlier.
In the ensuing peace proceedings at Fort Greenville in August 1795, the
Americans would have their way with the leaders of the former Confederacy. Those who
came to treat with Wayne were now completely isolated; the lone British agent (John
Askin, Jr.) who attempted to attend the peace council at Greenville ran afoul of Wayne
and found himself treated as a spy, and ultimately locked in confinement at Fort
Jefferson."*" Not only had the British abandoned them, but the Great Spirit now
seemingly favored the Americans. Apparently Little Turtle once prophesied on the eve
of the battle at Fallen Timbers "that the Great Spirit would hide his face in a cloud,
should his red children not talk of peace with the great chief Wayne." After the battle
"many of our young men knew the Great Spirit was angry, and would not help them."'"*'
Thus, believing that even the Master of Life now opposed them, the Indians conducted
themselves at the treaty processions with much grace and humility; one author has even
marveled at how "they handled themselves with extreme dignity."''*^ In the end the
Thomas Smith to McKee, 1 1 October 1794, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence. V: 1 13.
John Askin, Jr.'s Report to Colonel England on His Mission to Greenville, 19 August 1795, in Miio M.
Quaife, ed., The John Askin Papers , 2 Vols. (Detroit: Detroit Librar>' Commission, 1928), I: 564.
Dresden W. H. Howard, "The Battle of Fallen Timbers as Told by Chief Kin-Jo-I-No," Northwest Ohio
Ouarterlv 20(1948): 45-47; Sword, 306.
'"^ Andrew R. L. Cayton, '"Noble Actors' upon 'the Theatre of Honour': Power and Civility in the Treaty
of Greenville," in Contact Points: American Frontiers from the Mohawk Vallev to the Mississippi, 1750-
1830 , ed. Andrew R. L. Cayton and Fredrika J. Teute (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press,
1998), 266. The treaty proceedings at Greenville, replete with Native speeches, are found in ASP, Indian
Affairs, 1: 564-83.
63
Natives accepted the (lirficult terms which Wayne meted out, not only because they truly
desired peace, but because they now knew "that there must be peace for ever."'^'
The Treaty ofCireenville represented a pivotal turning point in the history of the
Old Northwest for all groups, whether for the American, British, or indigenous
mhabitants residing there. Of the former Maumee confederates, a number remained in
northwest Ohio, hoping to live amicably with the Americans under the treaty's tenns. A
large portion of Shawnees and Delawares migrated west to the Mississippi Valley, and a
few, choosing to maintain ties with their I^ritish Father, moved to Upper Canada. In
1 796, the F^ritish government strove to shift its foreign policy in accordance to the new
peacetime conditions brought about by Jay's freaty and the freaty of Greenville. While
British troops prepared to withdraw from their loiigtnne American possessions that
sununer. Lord Dorchester set about crafting a new set of Indian guidelines and
instructions to reflect those policy changes shortly before his retirement. These
alterations included an Indian policy that would attempt to further reduce expenses and
deal with the Indians regionally, as opposed to stressing the importance of a confederacy.
Indeed, peacetime retrenchment would bring many changes, marking the beginning of a
new era in British-Indian affairs.
Isaac Weld, Jr., Travels throueh the Sates of North America and the Provinces of Upper & Lower
Canada. Durinu the Years 1795. 1796. & 1797 . 4"' ed., (London: John Stockdalc, 1807), 2 Vols.; (reprint,
New York: Augn.slus M. Kelley Publishers, 1970), II: 216.
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CHAPTER 2
A NEW DIPLOMACY: BRITISH-INDIAN RELATIONS AT AA4HERSTBURG
1796-1803
In compliance with the terms of Jay's Treaty, British authorities relinquished the
last of the Crown's possessions within American territory during the summer of 1796.
With the British evacuation of their forts in the Old Northwest, and the creation of three
new posts on the Canadian side—Amherstburg, George, and St. Joseph—a new phase of
British-Indian relations began, the implications of which would be explored by both
parties to the old alliance in the years under consideration here, 1796-1803. During those
years British policy makers faced distinctive issues in the geographical areas within the
sphere of influence of each of their western outposts: Amherstburg in the Detroit area,
Fort George near present-day Niagara, and St. Joseph in the northern Great Lakes district.
Each of these three areas will be the subject of one of the next three chapters, beginning
here with the story of British-Indian relations in the Detroit-Amherstburg area in the
aftermath of British withdrawal from the Maumee and upper Wabash Valleys, places that
had been so hotly contested by the United States and Britain's Native allies, the Ohio
Confederacy, in the mid- 1790s.
British resources for continued good relations with the Crown's long-time Indian
allies included a number of officers of the Indian Department who removed to new
homes in the Western District of Upper Canada. These individuals included, most
notably, Alexander McKee and his son Thomas, Matthew Elliott, George Ironsides, and
the three Girty brothers -Simon, James, and George. Relocating at or near Amherstburg,
they worked to establish a British sphere of influence that eventually stretched as far west
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as the principal tributaries to the Mississippi: the Wisconsin, Rock, and lUinois
Also, most tribal groups in the region that encompasses present-day northern hidiana and
southern Michigan still sought closer ties to the Bntish in the late 1790s. However, by
1795 the British no longer held significant influence in the regions where it had
previously been greatest: the Wabash, Maumee, Sandusky, and Auglaize River valleys.
For the most part these areas now fell under United States hegemony, due not only to
American annuity payments to the hidians who lived there, but also to Wayne's strategic
placement of Forts Wayne and Defiance, which sat at the sites of the former intertribal
villages of Kekionga and the Glaize, respectively.
Just as the withdrawal of British outposts from the Old Northwest ended a direct
British presence there, so too the death throes of the old Ohio Confederacy in 1794-1795
produced significant changes among the tribes that had long considered the British their
allies. Intertribal disputes led many former coalition members to regroup in smaller
villages, and factionalism divided many tribes. While living as refugees at Swan Creek
(near the mouth of the Maumee River) fi-om 1 794 to 1 796, the former Shawnee militants
failed to come to a consensus over diplomatic strategy, and any remaining vestige of
tribal unity soon disintegrated. Typical of intratribal factionalism was the case of the
Shawnee leader Blue Jacket, once a leader of resistance to U. S. expansion, who now
made his peace with the Americans, creating a schism with other Shawnee chiefs who
felt he had usurped their peace-making authority.' Other factions fi-om Swan Creek such
as Tecumseh's, which numbered approximately 250 followers, rem.ained aloof.
' Sugden, Blue Jacket . 195-96; Speech of the Mekoche Shawnees, May, 1795, CNA. Claus Papers, MG 19,
F 1, Vol. 7, 124. The five Shawnee divisions are Chalaakaatha, Mekoche, Thawikila, Pekowi, and
Kishpoko; see James Howard, 24-30. The Mekoche division usually presided over matters of peace; Blue
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recognizing neither British nor American sovereignty.^ Among the miUtant Shawnces,
the bands of Captain Johnny and Blackbeard formed the only significant faction to
maintain close ties with the British and consequently chose to relocate with them to
Upper Canada. Like the Shawnces, Potawatomis near Fort Wayne and Detroit attempted
to abide by the terms of the Treaty of Greenville, but other Potawatomis who lived in
northern Indiana and southern Michigan held out against U. S. control.^ Among the
Miamis, Little Turtle and his adopted white son, William Wells, also shifted from a
British to an American orientation.'' These examples simply suggest why many tribes
and prominent leaders that had been bulwarks of the old Ohio Confederacy would not
figure significantly among the Indians that came into the Amherstburg sphere of
influence. Largely missing from the tribal groups that figure in this chapter, therefore,
would be Miamis and Delawares and the Shawnee factions under Blue Jacket and
Tecumseh. The tribes remaining more closely associated with the British at Amherstburg
after 1795 included the Wyandots at Brownslown, the Shawnee bands of Captain Johnny
and Blackbeard, the Potawatomis along the St. Joseph River and the southern shores of
Lake Michigan, and the Ojibwa and Ottawa peoples scattered throughout southern
Michigan and Upper Canada. The Sauks and Potawatomis of northern Illinois would also
seek closer ties to the British at Amherstburg near the turn of the nineteenth century.
Jacket was a Pekowi Shawnee, and Tecumseh and his brother, the future Shawnee Prophet, belonged to the
Kishpoko division.
- John Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life (New York: Henry Molt & Co., 1997), 94-97.
^ R. David Edmunds, The Potawatomis: The Keepers of the Fire (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press,
1978), 153-55, 159.
Rafert, 62-63. Wells had actually begun to support the Americans, scouting for them prior to Wayne's
final victory over the Ohio Confederacy at Fallen 1 imbers.
67
British Gift-Giving Policy Debates, 1796-1799
Once the agreed-upon withdrawal of their forces was completed in 1 796, British
officials had to decide what sort of relations they would attempt and be able to maintain
with their former allies of the old Ohio Confederacy. The possible choices were many. It
had never been clear in the past whether those indigenous nations who dwelt within
Britain's North American possessions should be considered the Crown's subjects or
allies. The Indians' legal status became even more ambiguous after 1796, when many of
them who lived within the temtory of the United States sought to maintain their former
ties with their "British Father" as they continued to visit His Majesty's posts in Canada.
Were the indigenous nations independent of Euro-American sovereign powers? Even if
British authorities considered these groups to have never been anything more than allies,
the question still remained whether or not future British policy should be structured in a
manner which would cultivate closer connections with the Indians who now lived under
American jurisdiction. Should Whitehall now take steps to strengthen these groups'
political and economic ties with the British government as a means of promoting Upper
Canada's stability and security? During peacetime these questions would become more
pressing, and which of these strategies represented the best interests of the Crown was
not altogether obvious. Nor were British officials unified among themselves, as the
debates among British authorities from 1796 to 1799 revealed all too clearly.
Whatever the strategy, British leaders did not know how the Natives would
respond to new policy measures. In the autumn of 1796 British traveler Isaac Weld
gained a glimpse of the disposition of Britain's Indian allies who now lived in the
Western District of Upper Canada. Weld made his visit to the township of Maiden
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(including Fort Amherstburg) and to the American post at Detroit only a short time after
McKee resettled the few remaining Indians from Swan Creek to the nearby island of Bois
Blanc. Although Weld did not name them, his Indian informants certainly would have
included those who had recently emigrated from Swan Creek, possibly even Captain
Johnny and Blackbeard. From his Indian hosts and other Natives in the vicinity of
Detroit and Maiden, Weld learned much about such recent events as the struggle in the
Maumee Valley and the battle of Fallen Timbers. According to him, the sentiments of
his Indian informants reflected a much stronger dissatisfaction and concern with the
Amencans than with the British, in spite of the acknowledged British betrayal at Fort
Miami.
^
At this stage the continued relationship between British leaders and these
remnants of Britain's former allies from the Maumee Valley lay not so much in the
Natives' love for and fidelity to the British, but in feelings of frustration due to the failure
of the United States to deliver annuity goods as promised. Weld described the Indians'
frustration, and its causes, well:
The American officers here [Detroit] have endeavoured to their utmost to
impress upon the minds of the Indians, an idea of their own superiority over the
British; but as they are very tardy in giving these people any presents, they [the
Indians] do not pay much attention to their words. General Wayne, from
continually promising them presents, but at the same time always postponing the
delivery when they come to ask for them, has significantly been nicknamed by
them. General Wabang, that is. General To-morrow.^
In addition to this grievance, Weld's account generally conveyed the relentless pressure
the Americans imposed on the refugee Indians, and it implied that the frontier struggle
^ Weld, II: 200-21; 289-91.
^Ibid., 187.
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could never be peacefully resolved. Weld also believed that the Indians received better
treatment in Canada, explaining that the "English settlers" understood the "necessity of
treating the Indians with respect and attention."^
Building on the Natives' anti-American feelings, Alexander McKee sought ways
to continue strong British-Indian relations during the postwar period. Well aware that the
British evacuation from the American side of the border in 1796 led to a loss of influence
in the British Indian Department among Natives at such traditional meetmg places as
Brownstown and the Foot of the Rapids, McKee hoped to restore the Confederacy by the
establishment of a new general council fire on the Canadian side of boundary. With
permission from Simcoe and Dorchester, McKee purchased a twelve-square-mile parcel
from the Chippewas, just north of Lake St. Clair on the Canadian side of the border at the
confluence of the Rivers St. Clair and Chenail Ecarte—the reserve took its name from the
latter river—and on 30 August 1 796, in his first speech at Chenail Ecarte, McKee
declared the site as a new location "for a General Council fire for all Nations." In
addition to the loyal bands of the recently beaten tribes from the Maumee and Detroit
regions that McKee hoped to resettle at Chenail Ecarte, the new council fire, he stated,
would include "the Six Nations, the Nations of Canada and all the Nafions of Tribes to
the Northward and the Mississippi." Indeed, McKee hoped for a grand council fire
under British auspices along the lines of Brownstown, through which he and other British
leaders could once again influence a restored Confederacy. Lord Dorchester also had
high hopes for the new reserve, anticipating an intertribal population, as he put it, of
' Ibid., 200. Weld also asserted that the Natives in Canada had the utmost "predilection... for the French"
settlers living there.
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"Two or Three Thousand."' Had these estimates ever been reahzed, the new community
would have been larger than either Kekionga or the Glaize in their heydays. Although
this was not to be—none of the pro-British Shawnee leaders such as Captain Johnny and
Blackbeard, moved to Chenail Ecarte, and very few of the militants from Swan Creek
ever accepted the invitation'"—by offering their defeated allies a refuge at Chenail
Ecarte, Great Britain attempted to demonstrate good faith.
In his speech at the site McKee tried to make the case that his government's
dealings with the Indians had been honorable. Regarding the British withdrawal from the
American posts in 1 796, McKee asserted that this was an act of "the Justice of the King"
toward the Americans, who "have at last fulfilled the Treaty of 1783." In this transfer of
power, McKee continued, the King, far from betraying his Indian allies, had always
"taken the greatest care of the rights and independance [sic] of all the Indian Nations who
by the last Treaty with America are to be perfectly free and unmolested." The veteran
Indian agent also asserted that the King's desire to resettle "all his Indian Children"
demonstrated the King's "paternal regard" for them, and that he had an equal affection
toward them and "His own people who have fought and bled with you," many ofwhom
the King had also resettled throughout southern Upper Canada. Finally, McKee promised
that the King would never "abandon" them "so long as they behave like good and
obedient children."" By his choice of rhetoric, the Indian agent attempted to make it
' Alexander McKee's Address to Indians at Chenail Ecarte, 30 August 1796, CNA. RG 10, Indian Affairs,
Vol. 9,9170.
' Dorchester to the Duke of Portland, 18 June 1796, MPHC, XXV: 126.
Sugden, Blue Jacket . 212.
" McKee's Speech at Chenail Ecarte, 30 August 1796, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 9, 9167, 9170-71.
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scciu thai Ihc Hnlisli government IkuI always aclul with consistency and in good faith,
and that il Rritish huhan relations had been altered, it was due to the Indians having
drifted away from then" British h'ather, not vice versa. I Inder these eireumslanees,
therefore, MeKee argued that future British Indian interaction would depend solely on
the Natives' attitude and coiuUict.
Despite his confident paternalistic tone when addressing the Indians at (Micnail
Ecarte, McKee was pursuing a concept of British-Indian relations not shared by his
superiors at Montreal and (,)uebec. In an attempt to sustain close ties with the hulians,
McKee lu)|)ed to continue these former allies' dependence on the British for war materiel
and additional gifts and provisions that had characteri/ed that relationship during the
many years of intermittent warfare. Writing to his superior John U)hnson in Jaiuiary
1797, MeKee alluded to past liritish policy when requesting additicMial provisions
intended Ibr those groups moving to Chenail I^cartc:
During a long period ol (lifllculties among the Indian IVibes aiui pending
the evacuation ol the Posts aiul those parts ol the Indian (\)untry from whence
their sustenance was generally drawn, the humaiuty & Policy of (Jreat Britain
through the Commander in Chief Lord Dorchester directed their distresses to be
relieved as well in Provisions as in an extra allowance of Cloathing, untill [sic]
they sliall be enabled to plant for their own support.'''
MeKee's request did not meet with much sympathy from Johnson, who did not respond.
Johnson had recently returned from a four-year sojourn in Britain, and being keenly
aware of his country's wartime commitments in Furope, seemed to understand that
peacetime retrenchment in the liulian Dei)artment aiul the reduction of the military budget
in Upper Canada would never permit the increase in the Indian expenditures lliat McKee
McKcc I o Johnson, 20 January 1797, in E. A. Cruikshank A. V Hunter, cds., The Correspondence of
(lu- llonoiiiahk- Vcivi Kussell, 3 Vols. ( Toronto: Ontario Historical Society, 1932-1936), I: 130-31.
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proposed. Only llucc weeks prior to McKce's letter, Johnson had written to his
siiborchnate offieer, instruetnig hnii to cut costs and disapproving of McKce's intention to
add ad(htional stad to the hidian Department's payroll:
As I cannot but look upon the present Fstahlishnient of the hulian
Dcparlnient as on too great a Scale, particularly should there be no Occasion for
the Services of the Indians In the War | in I'urope, against revolutionary France]
that we arc engaged in, and of which there is little prospect at present....
I must request that you will be particularly attentive to the Necessity ofthc
Sei-vice in the expenditure of Provisions and presents, and that your Requisitions
will be made accorilmgly. '
'
As the highest-ranking onicial in the Indian Departmeiil, .lohii.son more easily understood
the need to reduce ex|)enses in the Indian budget Irom his distant and comfortable
vantage-point at Moiilical. Conversely, Johnson's ofTicers in the field, namely McKee
and his son Thomas, l-lliott. Ironsides, the Girty brothers, William Claus, and others,
realized how disillusioned their Tormer allies were with the British witlulrawal. More
(ban ever before, the British needed to act graciously if they wished to maintain a "Chain
of l-riendship" with these nations formerly allied to the Crown.
The Indian Department's ofllcers on the local level did not prevail. By the
summer of 1797 the refugee Shawnees who had moved Irom Swan Creek to the Island of
Bois Blanc began to notice a diminishing How of rations from the agency at I'ort
Amherstburg. These bands chose not to remove to Chenail Fcarte, and McKee, having
moved to a new residence on the River Thames, was no longer present to administer to
the Indians' needs on a regular basis. In council one day at Amherstburg, four Shawnee
Chiefs Blackbeard, Captain Johnny, the Boner, and the Buflaloe met with the
Commandant, William Mayne, and laid out their complaints;
" Johnson to McKee, 30 December 17%. Ibid.. 104.
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Colonel McKee who for many years had been our great friend told us that he was
still so & that he would always pay attention to us & would see that our great
Father King George would take great care of us. It appears to us friend that Col.
McKee does not now take notice of his children. We know that the greatest part
of the fine presents that our great Father sends to us he keeps behind for his own
use.
.
..[Furthermore] Capt. Elliott does not take pity on us as formerly he did."^
Ironically, these loyal Shawnee militants believed that the British government had kept
faith with them, and that the reduction of gifts could only be explained by corruption in
the Indian Department. The Shawnee delegation did not realize that the men they
accused were among the few who still advocated a return to a more liberal Indian policy
and an increase of gifts to those tribes in the old Chain of Friendship.
Indeed, the Shawnee delegation's complaints fell upon deaf ears when they
addressed Captain Mayne. Mayne and his successor. Captain Hector McLean, the two
commandants who served at Amherstburg during the years 1796-1801, both took it upon
themselves to question the practices of the Indian Department, to curb its power, and to
expose any form of corruption within its ranks. McLean imposed a rigid form of
accounting for all goods distributed to the Indians, a radical departure from wartime
practices. Since the Indian Department in Upper Canada had just come under civil
authority in 1796, theoretically this heightened pressure from the military should not have
mattered, but the military still financed the Indian budget, and Dorchester's successor as
Governor General, Sir Robert Prescott, also favored military authority over Indian affairs.
Feeling the pressure from the added scrutiny of the Indian Department and the necessity
to reduce expenses, even McKee finally recommended that his colleague Elliott urge
"these Indians. . .to cross the Lake [to the American side] & endeavour to feed
Talk between Captain William Mayne and Indian Chiefs, Amherstburg, 30 June 1797, in Historical
Archives of Fort Maiden. Jolin Marsh Papers, File 3, 151-52; MPHC, XX: 519-20; CNA, RG 8, Military C
Series, Vol. 250-1,233-38.
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themselves" in order "to lessen the quantity of Provisions required."' ^ Had Captain
Johnny, Blackbeard, and the other British Shawnees known of McKee's instructions they
certainly would have understood them as a confirmation of their suspicions when they
had gone to Mayne a few months earlier and accused the Indian agent of betraying them.
In asking Elliott to encourage entire groups of Natives to return to the American side of
the border, McKee probably had come to realize the hopelessness of his dream of a
restored Confederacy with a new council fire at Chenail Ecarte.
Yet McKee had little choice but to conform to the new standards; perhaps he
already knew that Elliott's conduct was coming under closer observation. When Hector
McLean took command at Amherstburg, the new commandant quickly asserted his
authority, determined to reduce the Indian Department to what he believed was its proper
peacetime status. McLean recognized that the Department operated more "by custom
than by any Instructions," and he resented it that Elliott and the other agents at
Amherstburg carried on their affairs independently of the garrison's army officers,
technically a violation of the regulations Dorchester issued a decade earlier in 1787.'^
Furthermore, McLean was annoyed to find that Elliott, a low-ranking Crown official with
a meager annual salary of 1,000 pounds, owned up to fifty slaves and lived lavishly on
his farm a mile south of Fort Amherstburg, supposedly at the expense of the Army, which
McKee to Elliott, 13 October 1797, MPHC, XXV: 158.
McLean to Capt. James Green, Military Secretary, 10 August 1797, CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol.
250-1, 128. For Dorchester's instructions, see "Instructions for the good Government of the Indian
Department," Dorchester to Sir John Johnson, 27 March 1787, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 789,
6759-65. Although Dorchester instructed the Indian Department to distribute Indian gifts in the presence of
the post's commandant and junior officers, the Governor-General also instructed "the Commanding
Officer... not under pretence of this regulation to interfere with the Agent in die management of the Indian
Department." Under these ambiguous orders it remained unclear as to who actually possessed die greater
authority. War years tended to favor the Indian Department, peacetime the military leaders.
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financed the Indian Department.'^ The commandant also discovered that Elhott daily
sent his slaves to the Fort's bakery to pick up twenty to twenty-five loaves on every trip,
supposedly for the Indians, but in truth as provisions for his family and plantation staff
By themselves, these abuses probably would not have merited Elliott's dismissal
from the service, but McLean's opportunity for a coup d'etat against Elliott and the
Indian Department came in October 1797, when Elliott, following McKee's orders,
submitted a requisition for goods necessary to supply the Indians wintering at Chenail
Ecarte. Elliott's order for provisions assumed that 534 Indians lived at the reserve, which
supposedly included some absent bands at the time of Elliott's rough census. McLean
sent an officer to determine the actual number of Indians living there, which resulted in a
count of only 160.'^ When the principal leader at Chenail Ecarte, the Ojibv/a Chief
Bowl, confirmed this latter figure, it seemed that Elliott had intentionally falsified his
earlier return. This discrepancy, coupled with McLean's earlier charges of iiTegularifies
against Elliott, was all that Governor General Robert Prescott needed to unceremoniously
dismiss the Indian agent in December without even the dignity of a further investigation
or public hearing.'^*^ McKee's son Thomas replaced Elliott as Indian Superintendent at
Amherstburg.
McLean to Green, 14 September 1797, MPHC, XX: 538; CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 250-1,
150-51.
Same to Same, 23 September 1797, MPHC, XX: 548.
" For the various returns for provisions requested at Chenail Ecarte, see MPHC, XX: 556, ibid., XXV:
157. Also, Lieutenant Thomas Eraser's census at Chenail Ecarte, taken 26 October 1797, is found in CNA,
RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 250-2, 339.
^° Prescott to Russell, 15 December 1797, MPHC, XX: 585; Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell
Correspondence , II: 43. Also see Russell's letter to Elliott, relaying Prescott's order, 6 February 1798,
MPHC, XXV: 165-66.
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A full retelling of the McLean-Elliott controversy is not necessary here, but for
the purposes of this study the incident's significance lies in how it represented the
changing British Indian policy at the time, and how this in turn affected British-Indian
relations in the West.^' Previously, during the years of intense frontier conflict when
Britain's continued presence in the upper country sometimes depended on the field agents
in the Indian Department, Elliott's conduct and activities would have been regarded as
necessary perquisites to the agents, but in this new era they were treated as abuses, and
Elliott's dismissal enabled McLean to reduce the peacetime power of the Indian
Department. Far more than a personal setback for Elliott, the agent's dismissal
demonstrated the diminishing importance of the entire Department, and it meant that the
Army would now exercise greater control by rigidly enforcing regulations and
monitoring the Indian budget. The firing of Elliott served as a warning to the other
agents, most ofwhom were equally guilty of engaging in the peculation and irregularities
that had caused Elliott's downfall. McKee in particular had spent an entire career
conducting Indian affairs in an informal manner, rarely accounting for his large
22
expenditures. For the remaining agents in the Western District, the consternation of
witnessing Elliott's forced departure and the Department's having to succumb to mihtar}'
and political authorities must have raised concerns about their future role as agents in His
Majesty's Indian service.
^' For further reading on the McLean-Elliott controversy, see Reginald Horsman's Matthew Elliott, British
Indian Agent , chapter 6, and Robert S. Allen's The British Indian Department and the Frontier in North
America, 1755-1830 , Canadian Historic Sites: Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History, no. 14
(Ottawa: Department of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, 1975), 60-63.
McKee had also approved Elliott's inflated order for the Indians at Chenail Ecarte, and the Deputy
Superintendent General could have also been fired for submitting this supposedly fabricated report.
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1 he agents were equally concerned with how their former Native allies would
respond to the changes, and whether or not the Indian Department could continue to
cultivate close relations with them. Already upset by the British betrayals at Fort Miami
and in Jay's Treaty, the Shawnees, in particular, reacted negatively to the firing of Elliott,
a longtime friend and adopted brother who had married into their tribe. Even McLean,
while apt to deny the far-reaching extent of Elliott's influence among the tribes that the
former agent had once served, conceded that Elliott still carried some weight with "that
comtemptible tribe called the Shawanese," with whom "[t]he whole of the officers of the
[hidian] Department are indeed in some shape connected.
. .either by Marriage or
23Concubinage." Still, McLean's bitter remarks did not acknowledge the degree of
dissatisfaction with British policy that prevailed among members of the former
Confederacy. Little more than a year after Elliott's removal, the Indian Department and
the government of Upper Canada began to notice the effects among the Indians. At the
beginning of February 1799, Lieutenant Governor Russell wrote to Prescott:
Captain [Joseph] Brant [also a paid member of the Indian Department] took me
on one side and mentioned to me in Confidence that Capt. Elliott was so
universally beloved by the Indians that his dismissal had given them great
uneasiness; and that the Shawanese had it in Contemplation to send a Deputation
to his Majesty to move the Throne in his behalf, which he prevented. -I find by
his last letter that the same uneasiness subsists among the other Tribes.'^'*
The agent's swift removal during a time of transformation and retrenchment in British-
Indian affairs could only have caused greater distrust and suspicion among the Indians in
" McLean to James Green, Military Secretary, 27 August 1799, CNA, RG 8, Military C Senes, Vol. 252,
234.
Russell to Prescott, 1 February 1799, Toronto Public Library, LI 8, Russell Papers, Letterbook of
Correspondence to Governor General Robert Prescott, 1796-1799; Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell
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Prescott could not understand why the Indians should be encouraged to visit the posts,
sometimes from great distances, and he saw no reason why "the Issues of Provisions of
the present day" should be "of equal extent with those of former years." Therefore, like
McLean, the Commander-in-Chief believed that Indian distnbutions should be vastly
reduced from the expenditures that characterized the years of frontier warfare, and that
any attempt by the Indian Department to impede this reduction was "highly
reprehensible."^^
With Elliott out of his way and with Prescott's support, McLean transformed the
system of Indian gifts distribution, strictly adhering to Lord Dorchester's regulations and
to a tighter budget. The peacetime policy of reducing Indian gifts exposed further
unsettled issues inherent in British imperial strategy involving the Indians. Did the gifts
represent compensation for the Indians' past allied services, or did they constitute a form
of rent and acknowledgement of Britain's continued presence in Indian country? Or were
Indian gifts simply the British government's method of controlling and manipulating a
dependent people, a policy that was no longer urgently needed in peacetime North
America? Dorchester's predecessor Sir Frederick Haldimand had adhered to the former
theory, that the Indians deserved compensation for past services. By contrast,
McLean's desire to some day "abohsh'' Indian gifts altogether, and Prescott's belief that
the Indian Department should not distribute provisions equal to that of previous years,
indicated a new outlook, one which no longer found it necessary to compensate the
Indians based purely on the merit of past services.
Prescott to Russell, 16 September 1798, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 1, 228.
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as a
By mid- 1797 McLean and his superiors viewed the entire system of giving
Indians gifts not as something their government owed to these past alhes, but rather
symbol of the King's goodwill and generosity. When complaining about the conduct of
the Indian Department, McLean wanted to eliminate any misunderstanding on the part of
the Natives, hoping "to Show the Indians Clearly that it is the bounty of
Government,... [and that they are] receiving it out of the King's stores, instead of getting
it from the hands of an individual, «& supposing it their Gift."^° From Whitehall the Duke
of Portland, Home Secretary, concurred. In a matter regarding a misunderstanding with
the Mississaugas of Upper Canada, Portland emphasized to Lieutenant Governor Peter
Russell the importance of making the Indians realize that the gifts were certainly not
theirs by right, nor was the British government obligated in any way to grant them.
Instead, Portland maintained, "the Messessaugues...[must be] impressed with a due sense
of the obligations they are under to His Majesty for the Presents they anually receive."^'
By 1800, Russell's successor. Lieutenant Governor Peter Hunter, also took this stance in
his dealings with Brant, informing the Mohawk leader that "[the] King's Bounty to the
Indians must not be considered merely as a reward for their past conduct but that it
entirely and absolutely depends on their endeavours to promote to the utmost of their
power the King's interests."
"Memorandum Respecting the Public Matter in the Province of Quebec submitted for the consideration
of the Right Honourable Lord Sydney by General Haldimand," 16 March 1785, CNA, MG 1 1, CO 42, Vol.
48, 251.
McLean to Captain James Green, Military Secretary, 18 August 1797, Fort Maiden Archives, John
Marsh Collection, File 3, 155-56; CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 250-1, 126.
^' Portland to Russell, 5 November 1798, P.R.O., CO 42/322, 143.5-144.
Hunter to Portland, 8 March 1800, CNA, MG 1 1, CO 42, Vol. 325, 1 10.
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This new imperial perspective of 1797-1800 was not without internal
contradictions, notably the desire to achieve more control over Natives while giving them
less in return. In order for the British administration in Upper Canada to wield the
dominance over indigenous peoples that Portland envisioned, British leaders would need
to make the Indians more aware of the latter's dependence on the Crown. Indians,
Russell wrote, would need to be instilled with "a proper sense of the Obligations they
owe to His Majesty," in return for the gifts "to which they are in no way entitled, but are
indebted for them."" In a "Secret and Confidential" letter sent to all of the Indian
Department's Superintendents in the upper province, Russell ordered them to distribute
gifts to Indians in such a manner "as.
.
.to leave the strongest impressions on their minds
of their Dependence on His Majesty's Bounty."^"* But this goal was to be implemented
simultaneously with the Russell-Portland policy of instructing field agents to reduce
Indian distributions and decrease budgets.
Such a contradictory policy could only lead to further confusion among both
British personnel and tribal leaders, particularly when Captain Hector McLean,
commandant at Britain's largest Indian agency at Amherstburg, already had made it clear
that he believed that Indian gifts should eventually be abolished. Far from wanting to
make the Indians more dependent, McLean worried that the Indians were beginning to
rely too heavily on British gifts, and that too many would settle at Chenai! Ecarte and
" Russell to Lieutenant General Count Joseph de Puisaye, 1 1 June 1799, P.R.O., CO 42/324, 169.5;
Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence . Ill: 211.
Russell to Colonel McKee, Capt. Claus, Thos. McKee, Esq., Jas. Givens, Esq., 15 June 1798, Toronto
Public Library, LI 8, Peter Russell Letterbook, Indian Affairs, 1798-1799. Also see, Portland to Russell, 4
November 1797, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence . IL 3.
McLean to Capt. James Green, Military Secretary, 14 September 1797, MPHC, XX: 536; CNA RG 8,
Military C Series, Vol. 250-1, 146-47; Fort Maiden Archives, John Marsh Papers, File 3, 178-79.
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other reserves, where they would become a permanent "burden upon Government."
Moreover, McLean predicted that if Britam contmued to dole out Indian presents, this
would cause the recipients to "turn effeminate & indolent," smce "a total dependence on
Govt, for the means of subsistence.
.
.relaxes their exertions to provide for themselves."^^
Consequently, McLean took steps to reduce this burden, entailing both a reduction in
gifts and a limited schedule as to when the presents would be distnbuted. Like Governor
General Prescott, McLean also could not understand why "Indians from so great a
distance" should be encouraged to visit the post.^ ' Furthermore, although neither
Portland nor Russell ever made a policy distinction between Britain's actions toward
Indians living within the boundaries of Upper Canada and those living without, McLean
believed that the government had virtually no obligations to those Indians living on the
American side of the border. The commandant instructed Thomas McKee that "Indians
of that description.
.
.should not be permitted to approach the Garrison until the purport of
their Visit is known," and they are "to obtain permission previous to their being admitted
to this side [of the Detroit River]." McLean justified this, arguing, "I do not conceive
that we are at present in want of their aid or alliance.""'^ From this perspective, Indian
nations outside of British territory should always be considered as sovereign
principalities and potential wartime allies, but not wards of government.
Both the Indian Department and the Natives protested McLean's reductions of
Indian provisions. Thomas McKee wrote to William Claus, his superior in the
McLean to Major James Green, Military Secretary, 18 July 1798, MPHC, XX: 613; RG 10, Indian
Affairs, Series A, Vol. 1, 230.
" McLean to Thomas McKee, 17 June 1799, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26, 15269; Prescott to
Russell, 16 September 1798, ibid.. Vol. 1, 228.
McLean to Thomas McKee, 17 June 1799, ibid.. Vol. 26, 15269.
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Department, complaining that McLean's restnctive measures were an "extraordinary
deviation from a system which has been pursued here ever since Pontiac[']s War." The
younger McKee also predicted that "this breach of so old a custom may greatly operate to
the diminution, if not the total extinction of our influence and may infinitely prejudice
His Majesty's Indian Interest in these parts."^^ Although McKee may have been prudent
in not wishing to alienate the Indians, much had changed in the years since Pontiac's War
in 1763, as the tribes in the vicinity of Detroit and Amherstburg had grown far more
dependent on British goods and were in no position to stage another revolt. When
Superintendent John Johnson visited the upper posts in the spring of 1799, Shawnees
living near Amherstburg assured him of their "steady Attachment to the King their
Father." But they then went on to complain of their poor condition. The cause, they told
Johnson, was that they were "surrounded on all sides by the White People, and their
hunting ruined. "''^ The regions of the Western District, the Detroit frontier, and
northwest Ohio no longer teemed with an overabundance of wildlife, at least not enough
to fully sustain independent Native peoples as McLean had hoped. Rather than a
reduction in provisions, the Indians needed more protection and support, but as of 1799,
British policy had moved in the opposite direction, toward reduced expenditures on gifts
and annuities for their Indian neighbors and former allies.
Thomas McKee to Claus, 5 June 1799, Fort Maiden Archives, John Marsh Papers, File 6, 291; MPHC,
XX: 573; CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 252, 163; Cmikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence .
Ill: 220-21.
Johnson to Robert Prescott, 3 June 1799, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence , III: 219.
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Realities Intrude. 1798-180.3
Despite all the discussion among British policy makers about cutting expenses for
provisioning Natives, and all the complaints from Indians about reductions in British
support, the realities of the situation were more complex. While the policy that emanated
from Whitehall was intended to gradually diminish the government's Indian burden and
to perhaps eventually terminate British-Indian relations altogether, increasing numbers of
Indians turned to Britain for aid, hardly what McLean and his superiors wanted. In fact,
figures indicate that in the years following the defeat at Fallen Timbers and the
subsequent Treaty of Greenville, the tribes in the regions of Detroit and Upper Canada's
Western District relied more heavily on British gifts and provisions than they had in the
past. During the period between 1798 and 1803, the Indian agency at Amherslburg
served a growing number of Native visitors, averaging 5,548 each year. By 1803, 6,207
Indians received provisions there, representing an increase of 1,038 over the total for
1798, a jump of more than twenty percent during the five-year period. Only once within
this stretch -1802— did the totals decrease from the previous year's numbers, but the
statistics quickly rebounded to the five-year high recorded the following year.''^
However, these statistics do not tell the whole story of British-Indian relations within the
territories that fell into Fort Maiden's (i.e., Amherstburg's) sphere of influence, for, as
will be shown in this subsection, the conflict between, on the one hand, Britain's initial
goal of reduced gift-giving and the Natives' complaints about that policy and, on the
other hand, a continuation of strong British-Indian relations, was simply a reflection of a
Indians Served at Amherstburg, 1798-1803, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 10, 9369.
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complicated game of give-and-take m which Natives of diverse tribal backgrounds and
infighting among British officials all played significant roles.
While the British continued to seek a sphere of influence in the region around
Amherstburg during this period of peace, it is important to note some key changes in the
composition of the groups seeking assistance at the time. In any given year throughout
this six-year stretch (1798-1803) at least eighty-six percent of those receiving provisions
belonged either to one of the Three Fires' nations, the Wyandots, or to the Shawnees.
Moreover, over forty percent of the totals were Ojibwas alone, and the predominantly
Ojibwa reserve at Chenail Ecarte showed no signs of a diminishing populace, as McLean
and the government might have hoped; instead the numbers increased in the years
immediately following Elliott's dismissal in 1797 for supposedly having inflated the
reserve's requisition orders. These five tribes—Ojibwas, Potawatomis, Ottawas,
Wyandots, and Shawnees
— eventually provided the backbone of the British-allied tribes
south of the Great Lakes and along the Detroit frontier in the War of 1812. Hence, just
after the turn of the nineteenth century many of those peoples who would fight for the
Crown a decade later demonstrated their confinued fidelity to the British, despite a stingy
British policy and the attitude of Captain McLean, who did not leave his post at
Amherstburg until 1801.
In spite of these indications of apparent healthy ties between Britain and the
Natives in the southern Great Lakes, a pro-British orientation was not typical of every
tribe. The Miamis and Delawares, two of the nations that had once comprised key
segments of a powerful triumvirate (with the Shawnees) in the Maumee Valley during the
For returns of numbers of Indians settled at Chenail Ecarte in 1798 & 1799, see MPHC, XX: 617-18,
641-42, respectively; CNA, RG 8 Military C Series, Vol. 251, 148, and Vol. 252, 145, respectively.
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1 790s, rarely visited Amherstburg any more. Only a few dozen Miamis still received
annual gifts from Amherstburg, and visits made by Delawares temporarily ceased in
1801. Similarly, when, in the wake of Fallen Timbers (August 1794), Alexander McKee
had invited the refugee Indians temporarily living at Swan Creek to relocate to places
further north, particulariy Chenail Ecarte and Bois Blanc Island, fragments of the
Shawnees did so, but the Miamis and Delawares generally returned home to places nearer
to the expanding American settlements.''^ The Miami and Delaware villages that dotted
the White and Wabash Rivers during the early years of the nineteenth century were
mainly under the influence of chiefs and former war leaders, such as Little Turtle,
Buckongahelas, and Captain Pipe, who now cooperated with American officials.'"' That
these villages were beyond the British sphere of influence was confirmed in a report by
Matthew Elliott in September 1797. Elliott's findings showed that the Indians who
visited his agency were from locations far north of the Wabash and its tributaries where
American influence had grown considerably."^ The limited number of Miami and
Delaware visits to Upper Canada, therefore, could be a byproduct of closer ties with the
Some Christian Delaware, primarily near the Fairfield Mission (Moravian Town), did live in Upper
Canada, but probably none of them participated in the late war agamst the Americans, nor did they
typically have dealings with the Indian agency at Amherstburg.
According to one scholar, the Miamis even moved further southward from where they had previously
lived when they returned to the Wabash River Valley after their defeat at Fallen Timbers and the Treaty of
Greenville. The new village sites not only placed them further from Amherstburg, but the American
agency at Fort Wayne now sat squarely between them and the British. See Rafert, 63.
Goods Recommended to be Given to the Indians, Fort Maiden, 20 September 1797, Fort Maiden
Archives, John Marsh Papers, File 3, 188-90; MPHC, XX: 545-47. According to Elliott's report, none of
the bands visiting Amherstburg came from villages fiirther south than the Elkhart River, a tributary to the
St. Joseph River and Lake Michigan in present-day northern Indiana. The communities who still sought
ties with the British at Amlierstburg also included some of the villages situated along the Sandusky,
Thames, and Huron Rivers, Brownstowoi being at the mouth of the latter.
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Amencans, as well as the westward migration of several Delaware bands.'^
Nevertheless, despite having, on the whole, grown distant from the British, the Miamis
and Delawares never fully severed ties with their former Father. In 1803, 162 Miamis
and sixteen Delawares visited Amherstburg. Moreover, several hundred "Monseys,"
loosely considered a component of the larger Delaware nation, still received provisions at
the post annually.''^ Consequently, after all this time, it seems that the British in Upper
Canada could count on either the support or neutrality ofmost Indians in the southern
Great Lakes, leaving open the possibility for a renewed Confederacy in the future.
The above statistics did not mean that Bntain's Indian expenditures remained
high during this period, but rather that signficant numbers of Natives continued to visit
Amherstburg in spite of receiving much smaller rations there. After the dismissal of
Elliott and the implementation of stricter guidelines. Governor General Prescott expected
post commanders to oversee and account for all distributions of provisions to Native
visitors. At Fort Amherstburg Captain McLean did so with a vengeance as he continued
his efforts to trim the power of the Indian Department while simultaneously reducing the
govenmient's obligations to the Indians. McLean hoped to accomplish this by
discouraging Indians from visiting the post, and he began to deny gifts and ftiU rations to
those who came. The commandant maintained that
Joseph Jackson, the informant Alexander McKee sent westward only days before he (McKee) died,
reported in May, 1 799 that "The Delaware.
.
.1 met on the White River informed me they were all going this
Spring to join the Shawnees on the west side of the Mississippi." See Report of Joseph Jackson sent as a
Messenger to the Mississippi by order of the late Deputy Superintendant [sic] General, 5 May 1799, CNA,
MG 19 F 1, Claus Papers, Vol. 8, 91 . Although some Delawares may have moved West, the journals of the
Moravian mission on the White River indicate that some Delawares continued to live there at least through
1 806, and probably longer. For these journals see, Lawrence Henry Gipson, ed.. The Moravian Indian
Mission on the White River: Diaries and Letters, May 5, 1799 to November 12, 1806 (Indianapolis:
Indiana Historical Bureau, 1938).
47
Indians served at Amherstburg, 1798-1803, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 10, 9369.
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all llici. |ll,c Natives'
I
whims and uiircasonahlc desires ouglil not to be so much
allcndcd to as hitherto, when (he best reason that coud [sie| olten be assigned (or
giving them any unnecessary article was, that they ask'd (or it. IT all the
Curiosities and l,uxuries that [Ihel human heart can invent were deposited in the
Indian Store and that they saw them, they would ask for them, but it does not
follow that they are nece.s.sary or that they ought to be gralily'd |sic|. They may
indeed address us emphatically with the term l-alher, as they arthilly do (or we
certainly humor them like little children in all ol their unrea.sonable reciuests.''"
Con,se(|uently, in May 1 709, Mcl .can instructed agent Thomas McKee that each Indian
.should have a "Relly full" and nothing else "exceeding two days Provisions." This
amount was intended merely to provide a little food lor the visitors' homeward lourneys.
Moreover, no gilts were ever to be distributed, except once a year when the shipmeiil of
Indian stores arrived in October.'''
Behind McLean's attitude lay the complex is.sue of the Natives' ambiguous status
in Mrilain's ever-evolving frontier policy. Were the Indians subjects or allies? Some
military officers and civil officials maintained that the Indians were both. William Dunn,
CivW Administrator in Quebec in 1807, implied this dual understanding when he wrote,
"I have always understood that the Indians were not considered by the [CJrown merely as
subjects, but as Military allies." Dunn further argued that this was why "all the expenses
attending" the Indians were "to be paid out olThe I-^xtraordinaries ol the Aimy."
McLean also adhered to this logic as he developed his own rationale in supporting his
actions at Amherstburg. Though previously having been considered both subjects and
allies, the Indians who now lived on the American side of the boundary no longer
McLean to Sir John Johnson, 24 May 1799, MIMIC, XX: 634; l-ort Maiden Archives, John Marsh
Papers, i ilc 5. 290.
McLean to Thomas MtKcc, 10 May 1799, Cruikshank ^ lluiitc-i, Rir.'.cll ( oitcspcinldi. t-, III: 193-94
William Dunn to William Winclliam. Secretary at War, 6 June 1X07, ( NA, M(i I 1, CO 42, Vol. 132,
286.
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qualified as subjects, and McLean believed that there was no reason to retain those
Indians as allies. Why keep an alliance during peacetime? The commandant reasoned
that His Majesty's government had "[n]othing ever to fear from the Indians while at
peace with America." McLean's confidence was partly due to the good relations that
prevailed at the time between his government and a Federalist-led United States, but in
the unlikely event of another British-Amencan war, the Captain argued that whenever
necessary the British could easily restore a Native alliance, inasmuch as "the Indians
being totally guarded by Interests & not principal will side with the best bidder."^'
In applying this rationale, the rigid commandant carried his policy as far as he
could before his superiors intervened. Russell and his administration in Upper Canada
were not prepared to go as far as McLean in severing ties with their former allies. Agents
Thomas McKee and William Claus, fearing the repercussions of McLean's restrictive
measures, warned Russell of the danger. McKee claimed that the commandant's
tampering with "a system [of gift distribution] which has been pursued here ever since
Pontiacs War" had caused "great dissatisfaction" among the Indians, and he predicted the
possible "extinction of our influence" and loss of the "friendship of the Indian nations. "^^
Claus concurred, claiming "that Captain McLean is going too far with us."^^ Not yet
willing to greatly alter Britain's Indian relations, Russell heeded these warnings and
ordered McLean to "immediately suspend" his "plan of withholding Provisions from the
Remarks Submitted to the Commander In Chief, by Hector McLean, 10 November 1797, Fort Maiden
Archives, John Marsh Papers, File 4, 221; MPHC, XX: 573.
" Thomas McKee to Claus, 5 June 1799, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence . Ill: 219-20;
MPHC, XX: 637; Fort Maiden Archives, John Marsh Papers, File 6, 291-92; CNA, RG 8, Military C
Series, 252, 163.
" Claus to Russell, 6 June 1799, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence , III: 221.
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Indians" lest this lead to "consequences not only injurious but dangerous to the safety of
this Province."^^ Russell's crucial decision, coming near the end of his term as
Lieutenant Governor, helped prevent the eventual dissolution of British-Indian relations
in the Great Lakes and Upper Canada. On the brink of a new century and dunng a penod
of relative calm in Canada, McLean and the military had seemmgly gained the upper
hand over the Indian Department, making the latter powerless apart from Russell's or
Prescott's intervention. However, the aging Russell, a former soldier and lackluster
administrator, prevented further extreme reductions, a policy that would remain in force
until a successor administration once agam actively prepared for war in 1807.^^
Russell's interference in Indian affairs should not be construed as a shift in policy,
despite the fact that McLean believed that he had merely been efficiently following
orders by attempting to restrict Indian presents and provisions. While Russell advocated
a reduction in expenditures, he also sought to preserve the age-old Chain of Fnendship
with the Natives who visited the posts. The issue then was not whether or not the British
should follow a policy of retrenchment, but rather how and to what degree should such a
policy be implemented? Considering the weak state of the upper province at the time and
the Indians' nebulous status (whether subjects, allies, or both), it was not clear exactly
what peacetime retrenchment should entail.
Like Russell, other leaders in Canada ultimately took the view that the policy of
retrenchment merely meant a continuation of former ties with the Indians, but on a
Russell to McLean, 19 June 1799, Toronto Public Library, L 18, Peter Russell Letterbook, Indian Affairs,
1798-1799; CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 252, 165.
" Russell served on the ill-fated expedition with General Braddock in 1755, and he assisted Sir Henry
Clinton with his history of the American Revolution, but this work remained unpublished until 1954. See
Edith G. Firth, "The Administration of Peter Russell, 1796-1799," Ontario History 48(4) (1956): 163.
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reduced budget. The Executive Council of the Upper province agreed with this
interpretation, advising Russell "to take such steps as he [Russell] shall Judge proper (by
writing to Captn. McLean or otherwise) for the purpose of preventing any change in the
old system until the Pleasure of the Commander in Chief [Prescott] is known." A
month later Prescott made his "pleasure known" when he supported Russell, ordering
McLean "to issue Presents and Provisions to the Indians in the manner customary at the
Post" previous to his alterations in May 1799, "and in conformity to the existing
regulations." Prescott also later informed the Captain that he was not to "interfere.
. .as to
the mode or manner of conducting the business of the [Indian] Department."" Such
language coming from the man who sacked Elliott and who also wanted to discourage
excessive Native visitors at Amherstburg indicated that leaders in Canada still considered
the value of maintaining relations with the Indians. To these leaders, then, retrenchment
was not intended as a means to phase out Britain's Indian relations, but rather as a way of
preserving ties with the Crown's former allies during a time of fiscal cuts.^^
Prescott, who had earlier supported McLean in the latter's feud with Elliott and
the Indian Department, understood the necessity of retaining some diplomatic ties with
the Indians. The Governor General's concerns about the treatment of Indians at
Amherstburg probably also stemmed from a letter he had received from John Johnson
Minute of the Executive Council, York, 17 June 1799, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence .
Ill: 236.
" Prescott to Russell, 18 July 1799, ibid., 277.
In fact, the Indian budgets continued their downward trend, and late in 1802, when John Chew, the
Indian Department's Storekeeper General, submitted his budget request for 1803, Lieutenant Governor
Peter Hunter slashed Chew's request by more than twenty percent before approving the budget.
Remarkably, Hunter's stiff reductions came after the war in Europe had temporarily ceased, albeit briefly,
with the short-lived Peace of Amiens. James Green, Military Secretary to John Chew, 17 December 1802,
CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 1210, 240-4 1
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only weeks pnor to Russell's injunctions against McLean. Johnson informed Prescott of
the discontent among the Indians he had encountered there while on his visit to the post
in the spnng of 1799. The bands who lived near Amherstburg at the time, primarily
Shawnees, Ottawas, Delawares, and Wyandots, once the nucleus of the Confederacy m
the late war against the Americans, now wintered near the post at Amherstburg, where
they could continue to receive at least a fraction of the aid the Bntish had once given
them when they lived at Kekionga and the Glaize.^^
During Johnson's 1799 tour of the Western District the leaders of these bands
reaffirmed their loyalty to Britain, but did so as a preface to informing the Superintendent
of their needs. The Shawnees even asked Johnson to help them secure passage to
England, where they could present their case directly to the government, in order "to find
out what they had to depend on."^° The Shawnees also informed Johnson that the
Spanish had offered them a place to reside west of the Mississippi, where numerous
Shawnees already dwelt, and that the tribe also intended to send a delegation to the
Spanish King to further consider the offer. The Shawnees, realizing that Spain and
Britain were presently at war, probably hoped that the threat of their defection to the
Spanish would stir Johnson, McLean, and other British leaders out of their complacent
attitudes toward them. Although the Natives near Amherstburg most likely understood
the extent of their dependence on the British, and consequently probably never
considered rebellion as their fathers had done in 1763, they did, however, seem to
understand their value as potential allies, or at least the formidable threat they still posed
For the Indians wintering near the fort, see John Johnson to Robert Prescott, 3 June 1799, Cruikshank &
Hunter, Russell Correspondence , III: 219.
60 Johnson to Prescott, 3 June 1 799, ibid.
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when allied to an enemy. Johnson, not wishing to lose the longstanding relationship
between the British and the Indians of the upper country, tried to reinforce the idea that
the Indians still had only one "Father," and the Superintendent ordered Thomas McKee
and the other agents "to point out [to the Indians] the Impropriety" of "sendmg a
Deputation to Spain."^' Thus, the possibility of the Shawnee defection, in spite of
McLean's assurances of Native weakness and military impotence, is most likely what
grabbed Prescott's attention and led him to order a continuation of gifts to the Indians.
For a time the Bntish, especially the officers in the Indian Department, seriously
considered this threat. Logistically, they knew that a Franco-Spanish invasion up the
Mississippi Valley was possible, particularly with Indian support. During the American
Revolution less than twenty years earlier, a mixed British-Indian force set out from
Mackinac and raided the Spanish territory near St. Louis, albeit with only moderate
success. The elder McKee was also aware of the importance of the passage through
present-day Wisconsin via the Wisconsin and Fox Rivers, but he believed "[t]he Sakies
and Fox's" were sympathetic to British interests, and thus could be "induced to resist any
attempt of the French[,] Spanish or unfriendly Indians to pass through their Country."^''
British agents understood the need to maintain ties with these distant tribes, and McKee
believed that French and Spanish agents regularly circulated war-belts among the Indians
of the Mississippi and western Great Lakes; only days before his death on 15 January
1799, the ailing agent dispatched an informant, Joseph Jackson, to the lower Mississippi.
Ibid.
" Louise Phelps Kellogg, The British Regime m Wisconsin and the Northwest (Madison; State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, 1935; reprint, New York: De Capo Press, 1971), 163-69.
" Prideaux Selby to Peter Russell, forwarding the instructions of the late Alexander McKee, 23 January
1799 Cniikshank & Hunter. Russell Correspondence . Ill: 61;MPHC, XXV: 186.
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Bui Jackson Ibund lilllc evidence of any potential nn asion biewuig ni that region; the
Indians inronned Jackson that neither l-iench nor Spanish agents had sohcited their
service within the previous two years. However. Jackson did believe that although "very
large Bodies ol Indians of the Creekt.] Cherokee & Choctaw Nations are under Spanish
innucncc;' the Natives would only participate in an invasion if the Spaniards were to
produce a substantial army in the lower Mississippi; such a force never appeared/"'
True or not, the reports were of special interest to those who wished to see a
restoration of the Indian Depai tnient s wartime status, and perhaps a revival of Britain's
Indian alliance. Writing to Russell, Mohawk leader Joseph Brant firmly believed that
"the French are busy among the liulians. and they will (if possible) Invade the Country."
Brant feared that a renewed French inlluence might shake the western nations from their
longtime allegiance to the British. The Mohawk leader also ascribed some of the
disillusionment among the Indians to "some new arrangements.
. .in the Indian
nepaitnient. which they are not acquainted with." adding, "they seem to be jealous."^^
The "new anangements" to which Brant alluded most likely referred to both the
reduction in the Indian budget and to Hlliott's dismissal. With the possibility of either the
French or the Spanish having become active among the Indians. Brant could not think of
a worse time for Britain to reduce its Indian commitments. Moreover, the Mohawk chief.
Report of Joseph Jackson. May 1799. Cniikshank Hunter. Russell Conespoiidcnce. Ill; 188; CNA.
MCi 19, ! 1, Vol. S. 90, .lackson s report con oborated tliat of another uiformant. .lames Day, who had
previously traveled to tlie lower Mississippi Valley in 1797 According to Pay. the Shawiiees and
Delawarcs liying there professed loyalty to Britain and claimed that they could "never forget the friendship
of Col. McKee & Capt. Elliott and (hat they will always keep it in their minds in whatever sit\iation they
may be." Information of James Day. 10 October 1797. CNA, MG 19, F 1, Clans Papers. Vol. 8. 35-37;
Cniikshank I'C: Hunter, Russell Correspondence . I: 300-01.
Riant to Russell. 27 January 1799, Cniiksliank i^- Hunter, Russell Correspondence . Ill: 69-70; MPHC.
\\V: 188.
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who for several years had clamored to gain exclusive territorial rights and sovereignty for
the Natives living at the Grand River Reserve, could enhance the Six Nations' sovereign
status and possibly even improve his own position if the British were to once again
acknowledge the Indians as indispensable allies. Matthew Elliott similarly predicted a
French-led invasion into the Upper Province, originating from the Upper Mississippi and
Lake Superior.^^ Like Brant, Elliott had a vested interest in these matters, and his
warnings of an invasion came at the very time that he submitted personal Memorials to
his superiors, listing his past services and hoping for reinstatement.^^
When none of the dreaded western invasions materialized, Captain McLean took
pleasure in discrediting the rumors, and the commandant pointed out that, with the
exception of Brant, all the exaggerated reports seemed to filter through what he regarded
as untrustworthy sources in the hidian Department's branch at his post. McLean charged
that "[tjhese reports have without doubt originated with the Dept. themselves," for the
purpose of adding "to their weight and influence in Upper Canada."^^ The commandant
soon became more specific in his accusations when he discovered that one of the
informants, a Shawnee chief, lived "with Mr. Elliott and is entirely under his influence,
from which it may be easily conjectured how the reports are generated and the motives
which gave rise to it."^^
Russell to Pndeaux Selby, 2 February 1799, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence , III: 90.
For the Memorials of Matthew of Elliott, see MHPC, XXV: 178-82; 210-12.
McLean to James Green, Military Secretary, 21 March 1799, CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 252,
63.
Same to same, 8 August 1799, MHPC, XX: 656; also, McLean to Commodore Grant, 23 August 1799,
CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26, 15291.
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Without knowing for certain whether or not the reports contained any truth,
McLean's haste to discount the stories tends to reveal his motives. In fact, according to
previous British informants, Indians hving on the Mississippi had already admitted that
Spanish agents had made overtures to them a few years earlier. But McLean worried that
the smallest threat of an invasion might create a wartime footing in which the officers in
the Indian Department would once again have autonomy and control over Britain's
frontier activity and Indian relations, a situation that would only increase the military
spending allocated to the Indian budget at a time when McLean's superiors wanted him
to reduce costs. In spite of his recent success against Matthew Elliott, McLean knew that
he could still lose his stmggle with the Indian Department if the Department's officials
convinced Lieutenant Governor Russell to acquiesce to their goals and to restore the
Indian Department to its previous standing. Russell did not understand Indian affairs as
well as his illustrious predecessor, John Graves Simcoe, and to a large degree the new
administrator had to rely on the information and advice of his subordinates.^^ In
McLean's mind this made the Lieutenant Governor even more susceptible to being duped
by those who wished to "impose a belief on" Russell of "the importance of the Crisis. . .of
a pretended invasion."^' When Russell eventually ordered the Captain not to withhold
gifts or provisions from the Indians, the frustrated McLean fretted at how "astonished" he
was that "Mr. President Russell has been deceived. . .by false information from this
™ Firth, 163, 167-68.
McLean to Green, 21 March 1799, CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 252, 63.
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quarter," but the Captain agreed to comply with his orders and promised "that the Indians
shall have whatever the Superintendant [sic] asks for them."^^
Whether or not the province was ever in a state of danger by 1799 as Russell and
Prescott feared is beyond knowing for certain. However, the future course of British-
Indian relations had reached a crisis point at this critical time, and unbeknownst to most
British leaders, the delicacy of Indian relations possibly even affected Britain's future
hopes of remaining in Upper Canada. Although McLean believed that the Indians no
longer had any bearing on the future of Britain's Canadian empire, higher British officials
were not so sure. In any case, although the possibility of an enemy invasion from the
West seemed remote, British leaders in Canada made the crucial decision not to let their
relationship lapse with those Natives who lived in U. S. territory, a decision that would
later pay dividends.
McLean's cooperation did not come any too soon. In eariy July 1799, barely two
weeks after Russell ordered McLean to stop turning away Indians, a large delegation of
Fox and Sauks from the upper Mississippi descended on Amherstburg. Apparently this
group of fifty warriors had discovered that the late Alexander McKee and others were
concerned about the extent of Spanish influence among them, and the Indians therefore
wished to prove their loyalty by visiting their Father in order to "brighten and strengthen
the Chain of Friendship" and to "strengthen the confederacy with our Brother Nations in
this quarter."''^ McLean particularly resented tribes from distant regions who continued
to rely on British gifts and provisions, but he must have taken some satisfaction when the
" McLean to Commodore Grant, 23 August 1799, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26, 15289; McLean to
Major James Green, Military Secretary, 7 September 1799, MPHC, XX: 659.
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Fox and Sauk delegation seemed to corroborate his repeated assertions that the invasion
rumors from the West were all unfounded. Due to the deputation's unannounced visit
and to the government's efforts to reduce expenses, Thomas McKee found little in the
storehouse to give to the loyal sojourners, and the agent was forced to send them away
"Naked" and unsatisfied, giving them only ammunition.'''*
The appearance of a large delegation at Fort Amherstburg from a distant region
was significant. It demonstrated that in spite of a reduced Indian budget and weakening
relations with the Miamis and Delawares, the British still held the fidelity of the nations
where it mattered most at the time, in the Spanish borderlands. The presence of the Fox
and Sauk visitors also indicated the effectiveness of messengers whom Alexander McKee
had sent west within the previous year. British Indian policy from Amherstburg had been
a success in that it had managed to maintain ties with groups from the southern Lakes all
the way to the Mississippi Valley. The Fox and Sauk delegation went to Amherstburg to
restore a relationship that seemed to be waning. At a time when British leaders hoped to
lessen the government's Indian obligation, the distant Fox and Sauk tribes wanted to see
a greater commitment from Britain, including a restoration of a wartime alliance.
In council with Thomas McKee, McLean, and other officers at Amherstburg, the
Fox and Sauk emissaries reminded the British leaders of their peoples' attachment to the
British cause during the American war and lamented that "our Father did not consider us
in the Peace he made." Nevertheless, the western delegation faithfully contended that
"[w]e have never considered any as our Father but one," and "should you require our
" Extract from the minutes of a Council held the 1 1* July 1799 at Amherstburg with several Chiefs of the
Saakies & Foxes, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26, 15271.
^* Thomas McKee to Claus, 28 July 1799, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26, 15278.
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services, you may seiul Idi i,s " I laidly viewing themselves as a neutral power, the chiefs
also asked spec ilirally lor hritish traders to be sent to their country, because "we desire
no benefit from the Americans, neither in presents \n]oi in the way of trade."'' llail he
sinvived, the late Alexander McKee would have taken nuieh delight in witnessing this
scene and hearinj- these words of loyalty from nations so distanl. In part, the contmued
British nilluence among them stands as a tribute to his life's work.'*' Yet his son Thomas
knew that the I'ox and Sauk professions "of then Ancient attachment to (heal Uritian"
would not continue unless his superiors saw "the proprielv and necessity of treating all
Nations as well tlistant as pieseiil wilh every mark of regard & friendship.
Others ol Britain's former Indian allies reaffirmed their friendship and loyalty at
this time, hoping to conliniie the past relationship with their Fhitish Father. Just a month
after the I'o.x anil Saiiks visited Amhcrstburg, the principal Wyandot chiefs from
lirownstown and Saiulusky also held an important council there. These leaders, while
protesting the Amhcrstburg garrison's excessive cutting of timber on Bois Blanc Islaiul
and elsewhere, used the council to atliiin a permanent bond between them and the
British. Moreover, the Wyandots, formerly the Inst nation in the western Confederacy in
times of war, claimed to still speak lor the leaders of the nations of the Three Fires,
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"those of the Otiavvas, Chippawas, and Poiifawatamies." In the name of all four
" Extract from the luimites of a Council held the 1 1'*' July 1709 at Amherslbiii g with several Chiefs of the
Saakies & boxes, CNA, Kii 10. liulian Allairs. Vol. 26, 15271-72.
One ol Ihe elder McKee*s primary deathbed concerns was to detcmiine the disposition of these very
peoples who lived on or neai Ihe Wisconsin ami ho\ Riveis and to secuie then i oiilinneil tiienilship and
lulelitv al all costs Alcxandci McKee to l*nilean\ Selhy, 10 Jaiuiaiy 1/^)9, and Selby to Russell, 23 January
I /O*), Ciuikshank lluntci, Russell Coucspondcncc , HI: 49,60-62.
" Thomas McKee to Claus, 28 July 1799, CNA, RG 10, Indian Allans, Vol. 26, 15278.
'** At a Council held at Amherslburg, 10 August 1799 with the Chiefs of the Wyandots. CNA, Rd 10.
Indian AHairs, Vol. 26, 15283.
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nations, the Wyandot leaders then offered a large gift of land lying adjacent to the town's
district, enabling the garrison to continue gathering necessary timber and firewood. The
delegation wanted the King to know of their faithfulness and generosity; as a token of
their gift, they gave four strings of black wampum, to "be seen by our Great Father
beyond the Great Lake."^^ However, like the Fox and Sauks before them, the Wyandots
also wanted evidence of continued good faith on the part of their longtime European ally,
concluding their speech with an appeal to "receive...what you have always given us."^*^
hi this context of affairs, Blue Jacket, formerly one of the most important leaders
of the western Confederacy, once again demonstrated his support for the British after
having lived quietly for several years. In August 1800, barely five years since he had
repudiated his British military commission and signed the Treaty of Greenville, the aging
Shawnee leader secretly met with Thomas McKee.^' McKee, the man who had once
threatened to kill Blue Jacket for making peace with the Americans, now listened
attentively as the old warrior disclosed private information entrusted to him by the
American commandant at Detroit, who predicted an alliance between France and the
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United States. Thomas Hunt, the American officer, apparently expected Blue Jacket to
return bearing key information fi-om his interview with McKee. Though Blue Jacket
found himself in a position to act as a double agent, his loyalties seemed to fall with the
British, for he potentially had much to lose by confiding in McKee. The Shawnee
Ibid., 15284.
*° Ibid., 15285.
^' Thomas McKee to William Claus, 15 August 1800, CNA, MG 19, F 1, Claus Papers, Vol. 8, 1 17-18;
MPHC, XV: 24-25.
Ibid.; Sugden, Blue Jacket . 194-95, 223-24.
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continued to receive annuity payments from the American government, and he had a
"Son at School among them [the Americans]."'^ Blue Jacket may have anticipated
another Anglo-American war, or, like other Natives in the southern Lakes, he may have
begun to grow dissatisfied with the Americans and thought that the British might once
again be useful if such a struggle were to occur. Thus, in a sense, Captain Hector
McLean had been right. While at peace with the Amencans, the Bntish really had
nothing to fear from the Indians, and even if another Anglo-American war should
commence, Britain's former allies, being "rather prejudiced against the Amencans,"
would once again gravitate toward the British.^''
The eighteenth century ended with the future of British-Indian relations uncertain.
Alexander McKee's death in January 1799, an irreparable loss, symbolized the state of
British-Indian affairs at the time. The illustrious leader's passing further indicated the
Indian Department's loss of status and power. Yet the kidians among whom McKee had
labored for so long demonstrated their devotion to their late adopted kinsman, just as they
continued to proclaim their loyalty to the King. In a separate ceremony several months
after McKee's extravagant funeral, hundreds of Indians wished to pay their own respects.
In a ritual conducted at the gravesite, located on the property of Thomas McKee (a couple
of miles north of the Fort), these faithful friends danced for well over twenty-four hours
in honor of their late brother, "White Elk." Thomas and several of the officers from Fort
Maiden, recognizing the supreme tribute intended by those conducting the ritual, are said
to have joined in the dancing. Simon Girty later recalled that in all of his many years
83 McKee to Claus, 15 August 1800, CNA, MG 19, F 1, Claus Papers, Vol. 8, 1 17; MPHC, XV: 24.
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among (he liulians ol Ihc Ohio hontici aiul the Wcslci n I )isli u l t>l I ippci ( anada, only
twice heloie liad he witnessed eeieinoiues thai rivaled Ihis one Giiiy also elainied that
the huhans wonld only l)estow siieh an honor on 'men ofdislinetion anionj*. Ihein."^^
In honoring Alexander MeKee, the Indians lanienteil thai they would never again
know sneh a distinguished leader or a friend who was so nnndlul oniieir inlcresls, and
they reeogni/ed this as the passing of an era. In tlie decade aller 1 7*M, these peoples saw
themselves reduced (lom a lormidahle ally ol Great Britain, a nation thai once supported
their cause, to a ihspossessed set ol lelugees who had l)ccoine wauls ofthc slate.
McLean had even tried to make them less than thai. With McKee r.one and MiioU toived
out ol service, Hiitaiirs loimei Native allies no longer knew what to expect. Yet in spite
ol'theii hardship and sullering, thousands ol Indians Trom the former alliance along the
Detroit frontier and I Ipper ('anada steadfastly clung to the idea of maintaining the old
(
'hain of l Yiendship, hoping to preserve a remnant of a passing way of life.
Some I lu uinstaiKcs t't Rcniaiks ichiling lo Ihc Iiuiian ncparlincnt (o be suliniiltoil \o tlic consideration of
(lie ( onnniuulei ni ( Inel |l>v Capliun I leeloi Mcl ean], 10 November 1797, MPHt\ XX: 57J; Fori Malilen
Archives, John Maisli I'apeis. I ile 1. 221.
John 1 1 James Noles on ( "onveisalions willi ( ieneial Snnon Krnlon. 1 ^ l ebinaiv IS ^2. Snnon Kenlon
Papeis. I)iapei Mannsei!i>ls. Vol ^ Hill IS (nmiolilm. Matlison: Wiseonsm llisloiieal Soeiely)
Kegauin»^\ ihe Hntish ollueis who pailieipaletl ni the eeremony. appaiently neithei (inly, noi Snnon
Kenton's niloimant. Solomon McCulloch. loKI Kenton Ihese men's ulcntities ( with the exception of
Thomas McKee, of course), fhe oiriecrs who danced were most likely Indian agents, or (ormerly so. ami
in addition to the younger McKce. they piobably inchuled the duty biotheis. I lliotI, George Ironside, and
William Caldwell, all ol wlu>m lived and served m Ihe vicinity of Amhcrslurg. AHei all that luul passed
between Mcl can and Ihe Indian iVpailmenl. one suspects that the conunandant and his slalToi regular
army olliceis did not participate in Ihe ceremony, but all would have alteniled the late agent's ollicial
luneral held several months eaiher.
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CHAPTER 3
RRlTlSH-INniAN RFXATIONS FN THE NORTH, 1 796- 1 802
In C(MiipIiancc with the Jay Treaty, the British withdrew from Mackinac Island in
the summer of 1 796, but they estabhshed a new post at nearby St. Joseph Island. Britain
had multiple reasons for deciding to maintain a presence in the area. Like the old post at
Mackinac, Fort St. Joseph continued to protect the British fur trade as the North West
Company and its competitors continued to expand further west and into the Mississippi
Valley. A northern military post also served diplomatic and strategic putposes. At St.
Joseph the British could continue relations with Natives who lived in the western Great
Eakes, the upper Mississippi Valley, and even the northwest regions in the direction of
Lake Winnipeg and the Red River. This vital link would enable the Crown to foster ties
with the northern Ojibwas and Ottawas, the Winnebagoes, Menominees, Fox & Sauks,
and Dakota Sioux. The first section of this chapter will describe the most distinctive
cultural and political traits of some of these groups. The evolution of British-Indian
relations in the North will be the topic of subsection two.
Like the previous post at Mackinac, Fort St. Joseph remained isolated from much
of the rest of the upper country; no sailing vessels or communication could pass to or
from these places for several months out of every year when weather and ice made
navigation impossible. Although remote and isolated, the outpost held significant
geographic importance. Since 1 763 Mackinac had served as the westernmost military
post, and later, Indian agency, in a long, thin line of communication which stretched
eastward ail the way back to Halifax, then across the Atlantic to Whitehall in London.
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Mackinac rested on the edge of an empire, and Bntain's sphere of influence north and
west of the Great Lakes depended on a continued British presence there. British control
of the Straits of Mackinac protected channels of commerce with traders, both British and
French, who lived further west in places scattered throughout the regions of present-day
Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Manitoba. Some of these key locations included Prairie du
Chien, La Baye (Green Bay), Arbre Croche (Traverse Bay), the Falls of St. Anthony
(Minneapolis), the Red River (of Lake Winnipeg), Milwaukee, and elsewhere.
Furthermore, by remaining near the Straits of Mackinac, British authorities could more
easily monitor activity to and from the key portages which separated the water networks
of the Great Lakes and the tributaries of the Mississippi.' Any potential Fiench or
Spanish invasion from the Mississippi would in all likelihood cross the Wisconsin-Fox
portage before slipping through the Mackinac corridor and attacking Upper Canada from
the rear.
British-Indian Relations in the North Prior to 1796
Prior to 1 796 British policy in the North was characterized by relative
indifference on the part of the British leaders when compared to other regions. The years
of warfare in the Ohio country and the Treaty of Greenville had liad little effect on the
northern tribes, and these groups did not rely on the annuities that the American
government distributed further south. The predominant tribes of the region, most
' I'oiir of the five primary portages separating the great water systems of the Great Lakes/St. Lawrence
seaway and the Mississippi River/Gulf of Mexico entailed travel through Lake Michigan and the Mackinac
Straits. The fifth portage, which did not require travel through Lake Michigan nor past Mackinac, had a
route from Lake line, the Mauiiiee River, then from Fort Wayne a seven-mile portage to a tributary of the
Wabash, and from the Wabasli on down to the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. See Justin Winsor, ed., A
Narrative and Critical History of America . 8 Vols. (Boston & New York. Houghton, Mifflin and Co.,
1884), IV: 200,224.
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importantly the northern elements of the Three Fires, includmg the Ottawas and Ojibwas,
continued close ties with the British at St. Joseph.' These tribes' villages dotted the
shores and tributaries of Lakes Huron, Michigan, and Superior; the Ottawas' principal
village of Arbre Croche was situated at the northeast end of Lake Michigan, near
Traverse Bay, and the Ojibwas primary village, Chequamegon,^ rested on the southwest
end of Lake Superior. Other tribal groups that less frequently visited the post at St.
Joseph included the Menommees, Winnebagoes, Sioux, and Sauks. These nations'
contact with Bntish officials and traders from St. Joseph, especially ni the case of the
Dakota Sioux who were often at war with Ottawas and Ojibwas, often occurred at
outposts run by the North West Company and other trading companies in Indian lands far
from Fort St. Joseph.
British leaders and the Indians of the northern Lakes both considered the region of
the Mackinac Straits and the surrounding area to be of vital importance. As late as the
War of 1812, Sir George Prevost, Governor-General of Canada and Commander-in-Chief
of British forces in North America, wrote to Earl Bathurst, explaining the continued
significance of holding Mackinac:
[T]he Island and Fort of Michilimackinac is of the first importance as tending to
promote our Indian connexion [sic] and secure them in our interest; its
geographical position is admirable; its influence extends and is felt among the
Indian Tribes to New Orleans and the Pacific Ocean: vast tracts of country look
to it for protection and supplies: and it gives security to the great tradmg
establishments of the North-West and Hudson's Bay Companies by supporting
the Indians in the Mississippi, the only barrier which interposes between them and
the enemy. From these observations Your Lordship will be enabled to judge how
^ The Potawatomis, the third element of the Three Fires, generally hved too far south to have dealings with
the British at Fort St. Joseph, preferring to visit Fort Amherstburg instead.
^ Chequamegon collectively refers to the Island of La Pointe and the nearby peninsula along the northern
Wisconsin coastline.
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necessary the possession of this valuable post, situated on the outskirts of these
extensive provinces, is daily becoming [for] their future security and position.^
The Governor General's remarks, while exaggerated in places, indicated the importance
the British leadership in Canada placed on possessing Mackinac and its vicinity.
Although written in 1814, Prevost's statement echoed a diplomatic perspective that had
been central to vintage British strategy in the North since the 1780s, when leaders at
Whitehall and Quebec viewed Britain's continued presence in the Northwest as essential
for both the security of Upper Canada and the control of the Mississippi Valley.^
Long before Euro-Americans ventured into the region, the Ottawa and Ojibwa
peoples in the vicinity of Mackinac regarded the area as vital to their interests, and
possibly even necessary for their survival. For them the region held spiritual,
cosmological, and historical meaning. According to one myth, the Island of
Michilimackinac became the first piece of land restored by the manitous after the Great
Flood, and consequently the home of the first peoples, or the Anishnabeg, ancestors to
the Ojibwas, Ottawas, and Potawatomis. Later, the Great Spirit, or Gitchimanitou (also
Kitche Manitou) sent an emissary, Nanabusli, to dwell among the Anishnabeg people at
Mackinac Island and to instruct them on how to live.^ The people of the Three Fires then
" Prevost to Bathurst, 10 July 1814, CNA, MG 19 E 5, Andrew Bulger Papers, Vol. 1, File 1, 15.
*
J. Leitch Wright, Jr., Britain and the American Frontier. 1783-181 5 (Athens: University of Georgia Press,
1975), 66-76, 82-85.
^ Basil Johnston, Ojibway Heritage (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 13-17; Edmund
Jefferson Danziger, Jr., The Chippewas of Lake Superior (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1978),
7,20-22. During his travels through the northern Lakes country in the 1760s, English trader Alexander
Henry alluded to Nanabush and commented that the people whom he encountered on the north shores of
Lake Superior also referred to this supernatural bemg as "The Great Hare." See Alexander Henry, Tra\'els
and Adventures in Canada and the Indian Temtories. between the Years 1760 and 1776 , with a Foreword
by James Bam, editor (New York: I. Riley, 1809; reprint, New York: Burt Franklin, 1969), 205; and
James A. Clifton, The Prairie People: Continuity and Change in Potawatomi Indian Culmre, 1665-1965
(Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 35.
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believed that the general vicinity of Mackinac was a perpetual source of power, or
metaphysical strength. Wnting a history of his people, early Ottawa historian Andrew J.
Blackbird told of a separate race of people known as the Mi-shi-ne-macki-naw-go, who
dwelt on the island, and from whom the locale took its name, apparently after the
Anishnabegs left. The Senecas then came and annihilated all but two of the
Mishinemackinawgos, a pair of young lovers who escaped and then became spirit beings
who assisted the Ottawas and Ojibwas. According to Blackbird, "[W]hoever would be sc
fortunate as to meet and see them and to talk with them, such person would always
become a prophet to his people, either Ottawa or Chippewa [Ojibwa]."^ The author
maintained that "every Ottawa and Chippewa believe to this day [1887] that they are still
in existence and roaming in the wildest part of the land."^
According to the Three Fires' traditional beliefs, Michilimackinac also marks the
core or focal point from which the three nations diverged in their separate routes of
migration. Eventually the Ojibwas, numbenng far more than the Ottawas and
Potawatomis combined, lived mainly in the regions which became northern Michigan,
northern Wisconsin, southern Canada, and northern Minnesota. The Ottawas dwelt
largely in the central part of Michigan, and the Potawatomis, further south, occupied the
regions of southern Michigan, northern Indiana, northern Illinois, and southeastern
^ Andrew J. Blackbird, History of the Ottawa and Chippewa Indians of Michigan: A Grammar of Their
Language, Personal and Family History of the Author (Ypsilanti, MI: The Ypsilantian Job Printing House,
1887), 22. For a good analysis of the Ojibwa myth of creation and its aftermath, see Christopher Vecsey,
Traditional Ojibwa Religion and its Historical Changes (Philadelphia; The American Philosophical
Society, 1983), 84-99.
* Blackbird, 21. Blackbird claimed that for a time these spirit beings continued to dwell near Pine Lake in
Charlevoix County, northern Michigan, but departed when too many whites settled in the area. Ibid., 22-
23.
108
Wisconsin.' Hy ilK- ,ni<l sixUvnIli mUm y, llus duispcia look Ihr Ophwas into noillu ,m
Mirlnj-an and \Uv au as ol I akr Supmoi, vvhnv lliry nnlially nuounlcivd stilT resistance
lioni nudliple enemies, nsually hoxes and Dakotas, and oeeasionally Iroquois war parlies
as well. 'Hiese initial eneonnters louehed oireenluries (>rhostililies between the Ojibwas
and the Dakotas, but aeeordinj'. lo William Waiien, mixed blood Opbwa historian ol lhe
nmeleenlh eenlury, his ancestors gradually prevailed, ^^^'aining loot by loot'' as they
pushed onward ' alon^; the southern shores orthe liieal Lake
|
Supei um |;'"' In about
l()N(), Irom withm tins coiujiieied It iiiloiy, the ( )pbwas established a lehj'jous and
cultural center, (oiinin)'. IIk ii piincipal villaf'.e ol ( 'luHpiamei'on and unitiiij', all of their
bands into a sinjde and distinct people.
I'rom this site llicrc arose in the late seventeenth eenlury a iclij-ious movement
anionj', the Ojibwas lliat brouj'jil about their (irand Medicine Society, also known as the
Midewiwin, an order ol' medicine men supposedly endowed with extraordinary spiritual
power and wisdom. I hc movement may have constituted a lehj'jous levitali/.ation
movement, or may have been a conservative cultural ies|)onse lo years o I warfare,
mij^'ndion, and iiulial l uiopean contact. ' ' I leni y Kowe Schoolcralt, lunetrtMilh century
clhnoloj'.ist and I imicd States Indian aj'.tMit, described this society as "an assiKiation of
men who profess the hipjiest knowled)'c known to the tril)es/' whose primary purpose '*is
to teach the hij'.hei doctrines of S|)n ilual existence, their nature ami mode of existence.
' Willi. nil W Wiiiit n. I lisloiy ol (he ( )jilway People, wilii .1 I-oicwokI l>y W. Kogci UulUilolicail (St. P.ml
Miiincsi)la liisloiiiiil Socicly I'icss. I*>K*I).SI S.'. Ve. >ey. 1 .i, I )an/igcr, 7-8.
Waiicn. H \
" llaiold IlK-kcison. I lie ( hippevva and I lien Nn^'hlnns A Sintly in ! llmolusloiy. Rrv. rd., (Piospret
lleij'hls. II Wavrlanil Piess. Inc.. I*>S/).
and the influence they exercise among men."'' These reUgious leaders could potentially
wield much power over others, and the Ojibwas both feared and revered them. The
priests of the Midewiwin generally instructed, healed, and called on the manitous for
favors and blessings, but they remained secretive regarding the full extent of their power
and actions.'^ By the mid-eighteenth century, the Midewiwin created social cohesion
among the scattered Ojibwa bands, consisting of at least 25,000 people who dweh in the
northern Lakes region prior to the British amval at Michilimackinac.''^ Though the
Ojibwas recognized no form of external authority and had no central polity,
Chequamegon, the Midewiwin 's place of origin, became a de-facto center of tribal
activity and interaction.''^ Schoolcraft later pointed out that the Midewiwin gave the
Ojibwa a sense of "national pride," and he even referred to it as a "grand national
society."'^ The Midewiwin's authority was such that one observer concluded that the
Ojibwas' civil affairs were "much mixed with their religious and medicinal practices."'^
Henry Rowe Schoolcraft, Information Respecting the History, Condition and Prospects of the Indian
Tribes of the United States
. 6 Vols. (Philadelphia: J. Lippincott & Co., 1851-1857), V; 420.
'"' For more on the Midewiwin. see Hickerson, 54-63 and Ruth Landes, Ojibwa Religion and the
Midewiwin (Madison, Milwaukee, and London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968), 89-188. and
Vecsey, 174-90.
George I. Quimby, Indian Life in the Upper Great Lakes, 1 1.000 B.C. to A.D. 1800 (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1960), 122. For the eighteenth century, Quimby "s estimate of 25,000 Ojibwas
is conservative. Robert and Pat Ritzenthaler claim that the Three Fires' population figures at this time
roughly stood at 50,000 Ojibwas, 4,000 Ottawas, and 4,000 Potawatomis. See Ritzenthaler & Ritzenthaler,
The Woodland Indians of the Western Great Lakes (Milwaukee: Milwaukee Museum, 1983), 13. Though
the Ritzenthalers' estimate might be exaggerated, their implication is well taken thai Ojibwas were
numerous and potentially dominant when united, and that their population dwarfed the combined numbers
of their allied tribes within the Three Fires.
Vecsey, 184-85; Hickerson, 55-57; Warren, 77-80.
Schoolcraft. Information Respecting. . .the Indian Tribes of the United States , V: 416. An ethnographic
field study conducted and carried out by American officials in 1824 still found the Ojibwa tribe to be
"[r]epublican in all its features." Taken from the Chippewa Manuscripts (MS/I4C) -Col. Boyd's Account,
Trowbridge Papers, 434, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library.
Warren, 99.
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The unifying effect of the Midewiwin and the resulting clusters of northern
Ojibwa communities helped to facilitate the tnbe's interaction with Europeans. The
French who amved in the late seventeenth century and the British who replaced them in
1 761 showed a keen awareness of Ojibwa society by establishing posts at the primary
sites of Ojibwa culture and commerce: Michilimackinac, Chequamegon, and La Baye
(Green Bay).'^ By the time of the British arrival, the previous century's trade and
interaction between the Indians and the French had significantly altered Ojibwa lifestyles,
making them reliant on European goods. The Ojibwa success in wiping out the British
garrison at Michilimackinac during Pontiac's Conspiracy was not a true index of the
tribe's circumstances after such a long history of contact and trade with Europeans. In
1765 when trader Alexander Henry visited Chequamegon, a place he "regarded as the
metropolis of the.
.
.O'chibbuoy," he found the people there naked, starving, and
desperate. No longer did these northerners wish to expel the British from their country;
rather, they wanted to reinstate the fur trade, and they compelled Henry to extend them
credit in goods "to the amount of three thousand beaver-skins." His Ojibwa hosts at
Chequamegon claimed that without the immediate use of Henry's merchandise, "their
wives and children would perish."''^ Eager for trade, the Ojibwas at the Island of La
Pointe, adjacent to the peninsula of Chequamegon, sent deputations in 1764 and 1765 to
William Johnson at Niagara, seeking peace and requesting a restoration of the fur trade. ^°
The British soon re-garrisoned Fort Mackinac, and numerous independent traders.
All tliree sites served as both trading posts and military foils under the French regime. Later, however,




following in Henry's path, began to barter and live among the Ojibwas and Ottawas.
This began a period dominated by individual traders in the North that lasted until 1783-
84, when the North West Company was organized.
The fur trade became even more deeply entrenched in the North by the 1790s.
The third Article of the Jay Treaty between Britain and the United States in 1794
pennitted British, Americans, and hidians "to pass and repass" to either side of the border
for the purpose of "trade and commerce," insuring that the British would continue to
dominate the fur trade and thereby maintain their nation's longtime influence and
intervention in Native communities.^' Pro-British traders enjoyed greater influence
among their clients, and the latter generally tried to maintain good faith with the traders
(i.e., make good on their credit and provide them with shelter at times) and to generally
assist the traders in every way possible, enabling them to remain in operation near their
villages. Traders also depended heavily on the hidians, who acted as crucial middlemen
in the trading process, leading to some degree of mutual interdependence.^^
Consequently, the traders came to be trusted friends and sometimes kinsmen. Most of the
traders either married Indian women or took them as mistresses, and nearly all of the men
who actively traded with the North West Company, at one time or another lived with a
Native woman in some capacity.'^^ All of these factors gave traders a certain degree of
Burt, 146.
" Calloway, Crown and Calumet . 136-47.
" The North West Company assumed financial responsibility for its traders' wives and families, and by
1806 the burden had become so great that the Company's proprietors attempted to prevent further
marriages and/or mingling between its employees and Native women. See W. Stewart Wallace, ed.,
Documents Relating to the North West Company (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1934), 210-1 1. For
more on interpersonal relations between Native peoples and the men of the North West Company, see
Jennifer S. H. Brown, Strangers in Blood: Fur Trade Company Families in Indian Country (Vancouver &
London: University of British Columbia Press, 1980), 81-110, 153-76; and Jacqueline Peterson, "Many
roads to Red River: Metis genesis in the Great Lakes region, 1680-1815." in The New Peoples: Being and
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political power among the peoples whom they served.^'* Particularly among the Ojibwas,
a nation without any central polity or unifymg element apart from its Midewiwin religion,
traders could enjoy significant de facto authority among smaller bands of followers. A
trader at times could even induce the members of his retinue to attack an enemy or a
rival.
From the Ojibwas' perspective, the fur trade benefited all parties. With virtually
no restrictions placed on fur traders in the Great Lakes during the later eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries, the Ojibwas received favored treatment from competing fur
trade interests and individuals who paid reasonable and competitive prices. During the
trade's heyday, particularly between 1790 and 181 1, traders at times even extended credit
to their clients and distributed additional alcohol among them, which the Indians
considered a valuable article in spite of its negative effects. Also, the more successful
trading groups such as the North West Company and its temporary rival (from 1798 to
1804), the XY Company, established posts nearer to hidian communities in order to
better accommodate their customers.^^ Although the trade would eventually work to
impoverish the Natives as they increasingly depended on European goods, the Ojibwas
and Ottawas briefly prospered during the trade's zenith, and at the turn of the nineteenth
Becoming Metis in North America , ed. Jacqueline Peterson and Jennifer S. H. Brown (Lincoln: University
of Nebraska Press, 1985), 37-71. For fur trade families associated with the Hudson's Bay Company, see
Sylvia Van Kirk, "Many Tender Ties": Women in Fur-Trade Society in Western Canada. 1670-1870
(Wmnipeg, MB: Watson & Dwyer Publishing Ltd., 1981).
Victor Barnouw, "Acculturation and Personality among the Wisconsin Chippewa," American
Anthropologist Association's Memoir no. 72, American Anthropologist 52: 4, part 2 (October 1950), 44-
48.
For more on the XY Company, see Davidson, chapter IV, pp. 69-91. Existing from 1798 through 1804,
the XY Company temporarily became a more formidable threat to the North West Company, when Sir
Alexander MacKenzie, formerly a key shareholder with the North West Company, took charge of the XY
cnteqirise. Ibid., 76-77.
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century they had an abundance of matenal goods, including guns, ammunition, clothes,
blankets, kettles, utensils, knives, and cloth; they sometimes demonstrated their wealth by
adorning themselves in jewelry, silver brooches, and scarlet cloth.^^
Ties through trade meant much more than an economic exchange; the Indians also
viewed it as a form of mutual reciprocity, indicating a level of trust, friendship, and
loyalty. John Tanner, the famed thirty-year captive among the Ojibwas, felt betrayed
when a lone trader denied him standard credit that he needed to procure blankets for his
wife and family before the onslaught of winter.^^ It should not have mattered that the
Ojibwas had less to offer in a material exchange; as long as they continued to profess and
demonstrate their loyalty and devotion, the traders had an obligation to meet their needs.
The Ojibwas and Ottawas extended this understanding of a two-sided, mutual obligation
far beyond their connections with the traders; they perceived all of their relations with the
British in this context. The Three Fires understood the role of a father as that of someone
who would take pity on them and care for them, regardless of how destitute or dependent
they became. The Indians believed that their condition should never alter that role, or
lessen the responsibility of their British Father. As a captive youth, John Tanner
described his relationship with his adopted Ojibwa father, "Taw-ge-we-ninne,"
Vecsey, 15; Danziger, 57, 60, 62-63. In addition to enjoying the benefit of bartering for cheaper supplies
from competing traders, the Indians also freely received goods of equal quality from Indian agents (albeit in
decreasing quantities during peacetime), and if the nortliemers were willmg to travel, they could also
cheaply trade for U. S. Government goods sold by U. S. agents under the newly formed factory system,
another institution which tended to keep the traders' prices in check; Danziger, 63-64, and Wayne E.
Stevens. The Northwest Fur Trade, 1763-1800 (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1928), 158-61 John
Tanner, a thirty-year white captive in the North, also recalled the advantage to the Indians when dealing
with rival trading companies; John Tanner, The Falcon: A Narrative of the Captivity and Adventures of
John Tanner During Thirty Years Residence Among the Indians in the Interior of North America , with an
Introduction by Louise Erdrich (New York, London, and Toronto: Penguin Books, 1994; originally
published in 1830), 172-73.
John Tanner, 173.
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explaining that the latter "was always indulgent and kind to me, treating me like an equal,
rather than as a dependant." Taw-ga-we-nmne provided for all of Tanner's hunting
needs, and when the youth failed in his attempts to construct marten traps, Tanner
recalled, "my father began to pity me.
. ..[s]o he went out and spent a day in making a
large number of traps, which he gave me, and then I was able to take as many martins
[sic] as the others." Tanner understood that his adopted parents both loved him, but his
mother bore the separate responsibility of disciplining him, while his father's role was to
protect, guide, and assist his son.
Tanner's experience hints at how his adopted family and the Ojibwa in general
viewed the Bntish. Their British Father should want to care for his children, and when
Ojibwas petitioned him they could expect his pity and assistance. Some studies have
shown that Ojibwas approached powerful and wealthy whites in the same m.anner that
they would address a manitou, doing so with a gracious and humble disposition.^^
Whether seeking a vision or a material necessity, Ojibwas always appealed to the pity of
a manitou or spirit guardian. Similarly, they could potentially share in the power of
traders and agents by petitioning them accordingly, believing that some whites held
significant influence among the manitous.^° In his memoirs, Alexander Henry recalled
that his Ojibwa captors believed that he possessed a certain foreknowledge of events and
became suspicious of him when he denied their assertion.^' Moreover, the northern
Indians looked upon British agents and traders as servants of the British King, a distant
Ibid., 16, 18-19.
Vecsey, 135-36; Bamouw, 42-48, 53-60.
^° Vecsey, 136; Bamouw, 58-59.
^' Henry, 146.
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person whom they regarded as a near-deity, one who would ahvays consider their needs
and lake pity on them. From his nnssionary work among the Ojibwas and Ottawas of
Michigan during the 1820s, Peter Jones noted:
The ideas entertained by the Indians generally of the King of England, with regard
to his power riches, and knowledge, are most extravagant, fhey imagine his
power to be absolute, and his authority unlimited; that his word is law, to which
all his subjects bow with nnplicit obedience.
. ..They also consider that' his riches
and benevolence are unbounded, the whole resources of the kingdom being at his
command, a portion of which he grants to those of his subjects who are needy.
With regard to his wisdom, they conceive that he knows everything that is go'm^
on in the world; that even the speech or talk of an Indian chief delivered to a
Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the wilds of Canada is made known to him.-*^
For their deference and devotion to British agents and authorities, the Ojibwas
and Ottawas expected much in return, and according to St. Joseph's storekeeper Thomas
Duggan, often "the sole puqwrt of their speeches was begging their Father would shew
them Charity."' ^ By reciprocating with lavish amounts of provisions, Duggan and his
cohorts then fulfilled their fatherly responsibilities. In keeping with Tanner's description
of his own foster father, the northern Indians expected the British to act as a genuine
father by providing for his children and treating them as "equal|s], rather than
as.
.
.dependant[s]," even when the power in such a relationship was skewed to one side."''*
Despite the minimal worth of the items which the northern Natives gave to the British, it
Peter Jones, History of the Ojebway Indians (London: A. W. Bennett, 1861), 207.
I hoinas Duggan Journal entries for 23 May 1798, 10 August 1797, 27 June 1799, and 13 June 1799,
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John Tanner, 1 6.
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was the actual act of exchanging gifts that was important to the Indians. It symbolized
deeper ties and commitments than that of a mere economic partnership.^^
British participants saw gift-giving fi-om a different perspective. The officers in
the North hoped to reinforce the Indians' belief that they participated as pseudo-equal
partners by using official gift-exchanges, which often took place in formal council-
settings. The British conducted these events with much solemnity and always in the
presence of the post's officers, who wore full-dress uniforms. Not really needing any
material items from the Indians, and hardly thinking themselves under any obligation to
continue to grant provisions, the British considered all distributions of gifts as an
investment of sorts in the expectation of future Native support and loyalty. This
represents a slightly different rationale than the one to which the Indians were
accustomed; the Natives would have regarded their gifts as both compensation for past
services and as a loving Father's act of benevolence. In truth, however, promises of
future Native fidelity made these exchanges more equal than the Indians' past services or
any tangible gifts fi-om them ever could. Lord Dorchester understood this principle, and
in 1787 he considered the ftiture benefits that could be derived fi-om the Indians by
psychologically making them dependent upon the British. The Governor General ordered
that on every occasion, the Indians'
requests if reasonable, are to be complied with. Should they, as is customary on
these occasions, lay down Presents of any kind, they are to be taken up with
thanks, and in return, Presents exceeding the value of theirs are to be given, in
which case the Chiefs are always to be distinguished.^^
Calloway, Crown and Calumet . 137. For the meaning of Indian gifts, the protocol of gift-giving, and a
comparison of the British and French Indian diplomacy, see Wilbur R. Jacobs, Wilderness and Indian Gifts:
The Northern Colonial Frontier. 1748-1763 (Lincoln: University Nebraska Press, 1950), chapters 1 & 2.
Dorchester's Instnictions, CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 789, 6759.
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The sobering and subtle truth in this pohcy was that, despite the guise of mutual
reciprocity, these gift distributions, and any form of British trade for that matter, could be
termmated at any moment. Among Dorchester's opening remarks in his new policy of
1787, he instructed his agents to assure "the Indian Nations. . .of the King's paternal care
and regard as long as they continue to merit them, by acting as good and obedient
Children ought to do.""
Ultimately, British-Indian relations in the North would more closely epitomize
what Dorchester envisioned, in contrast to the course of British-Indian diplomacy
elsewhere in Upper Canada. Unlike the other regions discussed in this study, the
diplomacy in the North was marked by a period of continuity between 1783 and 1812.
Although British leaders and northern Indians may have interpreted their relationship
differently, both sides, relatively unaffected by events to the south, sought a continuation
of previous ties. The continuity of the fur trade did much to maintain these relations, and
the traders benefited from these consistent diplomatic and commercial ties. However, the
British government did not view the trade itself as a reason to continue ties with the
Natives or to maintain a presence in the region. The Crown partially subsidized the fur
trade, and even at its peak, the enterprise never offset the expenses Britain incurred by
governing the region and supplying the Indians' material needs. Furthermore, the fur
trade is not what gave the Indians diplomatic leverage in their dealings with British
leaders. It was the British desire for future Native fidelity that prompted Dorchester to
Ibid.
Burt, 82-85; Stevens, The Northwest Fur Trade, 1763-1800 , 159-61
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attempt to ingratiate the Natives, and in the North the hidians' loyalty was never in
question.
British-Indian relations in the North grew stronger in spite of the two sides'
differing perspectives on the meaning of those bonds. Ojibwas and Ottawas at St. Joseph
continued to view British gifts as marks of their father's benevolence, generosity, and
rewartls for past services; the lopsided mismatch of any exchange did not matter. The
Ojibwas and Ottawas believed that by giving any small gift, and by doing so in an
attitude of humility and loyalty, they merited the gifts the British gave them. In this
sense, the Indians did not merely consider British presents as free gifts. This strong
Indian notion of reciprocity was lost on Captain Peter Drurnmond, commandant as St.
Joseph, in an incident late in 1799. After two Ottawa bands from Arbre Croche visited
his post in October, Drummond commented to his superiors, "I cannot comprehend what
they [the Ottawas] mean by saying they never receive presents at this Post, but rather
buys [sicj what they get." Yet in the same letter Drummond acknowledged that "the
Ottawas receive much larger presents in proportion to their numbers than any other
Indians, in some respects they deserve it, as they present more sugar & com for the use of
government than any other Indians. "^"^ Drummond did not grasp that the Ottawas viewed
their relationship with the British as one based on bartering and kmship.
Differences between Indian and British understandings of the gift exchange could
lead to confusion, conflict, and, in the 1780s and 1790s, corrupt dealings. The northern
Indians' insistence on a relationship of reciprocity helped to encourage a string of abuses
in the Indian Department that spanned a period of many years. Some Indian agents at
39 Drummond to James Green, Military Secretary, 28 October 1799, MPHC, XX: 668.
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Mackinac and St. Joseph's, realizing that the Indians there expected to trade something
for their gifts, attempted to profit from the situation. Once the formal councils had ended,
the poverty-ridden Natives traded for additional goods from the Indian store with packs
of furs and additional gifts of com. John Dease, cousin of Department Superintendent
John Johnson, eventually lost his position as hidian agent for receiving bartered goods
and furs from the Indians in this manner. Johnson had originally sent Dease to Mackinac
in 1 786, hoping that his cousin could negotiate a peace between the Dakotas and
Ojibwas, who were constantly at war. Dease not only failed in that difficult task, but he
came under fire for allegedly embezzling goods from the hidian store and conducting
personal trade with Ojibwas and other tnbes in the Lakes and Upper Mississippi.
Dease's activities came to light not because of Indian complaints, but because those
attempting to trade legally complained that Dease competed unfairly in this market,
underselling them by bartering stolen government goods.''" Due to inconclusive evidence
and contradictory reports, Dease gained an acquittal.'*' Yet he never regained his post in
the Indian Department, nor did his powerful cousin clamor for his reinstatement."*^
Dease's activities most likely influenced Lord Dorchester's decision in 1787 to
expressly forbid all "persons belonging to, or employed in the Indian Department" from
being "permitted to trade, directly or indirectly, or to have any share, profit, or concern
Kellogg, 201-02; Elizabeth Vincent, Fort St. Joseph: A History . Parks Canada, Manuscript Report Series
335 (Ottawa: Department of Environment Canada, 1978), 53.
MPHC, XI: 489-96, 501-506, 514-620; Collections of the Wisconsin State Historical Society (hereafter
cited as WHC), 31 vols. (Madison: 1854-1931), XII: 83-91.
*^ Dease's family link to the Johnsons probably did not hurt in helping him gain his acquittal. Furthermore,
Dease at least received the dignity of a tt-ial. A decade later, Matthew Elliott would be refused both, a
heanng and any type of formal inquiry. Elliott hounded his superiors for 1 1 years, asking for a
reinstatement, but Dease passively accepted his dismissal.
120
therein."'' Nevertheless, subsequent storekeepers Charles Gauthier and Thomas Duggan
continued to abuse the system by lending stores to traders, appropriating the goods for
their own use, and/or usmg them to barter for furs and other goods.''" Eventually
Duggan's unscrupulous behavior became excessive, causing the Indians to complain and
leading to the storekeeper's suspension in 1802.'*^ Until then, however, British army
officers at Mackinac and St. Joseph had been more lax about monitoring the distribution
of Indian goods at their post. These conditions at Fort St. Joseph dunng the closing years
of the century contrasted the rigid regulations implemented at Amherstburg at the time,
and the activities of Gauthier and Duggan were reminiscent of Elliott's peculation prior
to Captain McLean's crackdown at the latter post. The fact that the officers and agents at
St. Joseph continued to conduct hidian affairs in a loose manner is indicative of the
continuity in British-Indian relations in the North, and British-Indian ties rem^ained steady
there as the fur trade continued to expand in the 1790s. As of 1796, the trade's negative
repercussions and the corruption in the Indian Department at St. Joseph had not yet
become issues deemed worthy of scrutiny, and in the meantime neither the northern
Indians nor the British wished to alter the nature of their relationship, which had existed
for decades.
Dorchester's Instructions for the good Government of the Indian Department, to Sir John Johnson,
Baronet, Superintendant [sic] General and Inspector General of Indian Affairs, 27 March 1787, CNA, RG
8, Military C Series, Vol. 789, 6761.
For Gauthier, see Captain William Doyle to Colonel Richard England, 2 February 1793, ibid., Vol. 247,
10.
Lieutenant Robert Cowell to James Green, Military Secretary, 10 February 1802, ibid., Vol. 254, 3-4;
Cowell to Green, 29 October 1801, ibid.. Vol. 253, 341-42. Apparently Duggan also drank heavily, further
complicating his difficulties and abuses. Lt. Cowell brought formal charges against Duggan in a special
council called for that purpose, 25 January 1802. ibid., Vol. 254, 7-9. Also see Vincent, 106-07.
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Wayne. The Ojibwas and Ottawas in the North did not warmly welcome the amval of
the Amencans at Mackmac, and unless these northern bands made annual pilgrimages to
Detroit, they would not share in their tribal annuity disbursements from the Americans,
which went to those bands dwelling nearer to Detroit and the Western District of Upper
Canada. Therefore, the northern groups did not cultivate the ties with the Americans like
some of the bands living in the regions of Detroit, Brownstown, and northwest Ohio. The
tribes in the northern Lakes never considered themselves partisan to the Confederacy's
defeat at Fallen Timbers, and they no longer held a common interest with their former
allies to the south. Furthermore, the bitterness felt between the northern Indians from
Mackinac and Saginaw and the southern Maumee tribes, which had resulted from their
quarrel during the campaign against Fort Recovery in the summer of 1794, probably still
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lingered. Finally, the fur trade would continue to support the peoples living in the
North for some time, whereas the regions of Detroit and northern Ohio were experiencing
a steady decline in the fur trade that had begun decades earlier/"^ These divergent paths
would continue to shape British-Indian relations in the two regions.
The North. 1796-1802
When the British withdrew fi-om Fort Mackinac in the summer of 1796, neither
they nor the Indians of the region fully knew what to expect from these changes. Aware
For the annuity disbursements sanctioned by the Treaty of Greenville, see Treaty of Greenville,
American State Papers, Indian Affairs , 1: 563; MPHC, XX: 413.
''^ Examination of a Patawatime Warrior [Prisoner], 23 July 1794, Shawnee File, July-December, 1794,
GABLA; Cruikshank, '^Diary of an Officer in Indian Country in 1794," 641; Alexander McKee to Joseph
Chew, 7 July 1794, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence , II: 310; Diary of an Officer in the Indian
Country, ibid., V: 94; Alexander McKee to R. G. England, 10 July 1794, ibid., II: 315; Sword, 278;
Sugden, Blue Jacket , 167-68; Larry Nelson, A Man of Distinction among Them, 169.
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of how the United States had recently expanded nito the Ohio country and had attempted
to usurp Britain's role as the Indians' overseer and protector, the northern tribes were
understandably alarmed. What would become of the British? Would this signal the
decline of the British fur trade? Did these changes indicate that British innuence in
general would decline in the North? Would the area Indians now deal with two Fathers?
Despite these initial concerns, British-Indian relations in the North proved as stable as
ever during the next several years, and the North West Company had some of its best
returns during this period, hardly feeling the effect of American competition as company
men and other British traders expanded deeper into Spanish and American territory. This
section focuses on how the British and Indians in the North interacted in the years
immediately following Britain's move to Fort St. .loseph, emphasizing the enduring
friendship and lasting ties that both sides continued to cultivate.
In June 1 796, as the British prepared to evacuate Mackinac in the ensuing weeks,
the Ojibwas and Ottawas grew concerned regarding the departing officers and personnel.
These Native visitors believed that the moral obligations of a father bound him to those
who depended upon his provisions. On his final visit to Mackinac while it was yet under
British sovereignty, Amable, an Ottawa Chief, expressed his "Concern for the English
evacuating the upper Posts, and his apprehension of his Nation being abandoned by them
and left to the mercy of the Big knives.""''" Once Amable and the area Indians learned that
the British intended to maintain a presence in the North, they were no longer distressed;
they realized that their relationship with their British Father could continue as it always
Wayne E. Stevens, "Fur Trading Conipaincs of the Northwest," Proceedings of the Mississipp i Valley
Historical Association 9 (October 1918): 286.
50 Amable's Speech, 27 June 1796, Duggan Journal,
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had, and they would not be compelled to deal with the American newcomers. Yet until
the Indians knew for certain that their relations with the Bntish would remain a status
quo, the situation remained tense.
Initially, things appeared grim to the British as well, and they worried about the
local Natives' response. Major William Doyle, former commandant at Mackinac, even
wondered if the Indians would commit hostilities against British troops. In the summer
of 1 796, when Doyle and his garrison were relieved by a very small force ordered to take
command at Fort St. Joseph in June, the commandant expressed his concern to Lieutenant
Governor Russell. Doyle feared that Indian discontent in the North would increase once
the Natives realized that the Bntish intended to maintain only a token military force of a
dozen soldiers at St. Joseph, a post relatively smaller than Mackinac. Such a reduction in
strength when compared to the growing American military presence at Mackinac and the
Old Northwest would probably be interpreted as a sign of British weakness and a possible
harbinger of a complete British withdrawal from the Upper Country. Russell relayed
Doyle's concerns to Governor General Prescott, fearing that such circumstances in the
North
may lead to contempt [by the Indians], contempt to insult (for it is v/ell known
that Savages are ever influenced by appearances) and should insult once begin, no
man can say when it may end. In Short Major Doyle thinks that Ensign Brown
and his small party are in very serious danger, from the present temper of the
neighboring Indians.'"'
Prescott immediately responded to this alarming news by sending an additional
detachment of forty soldiers to reinforce the post at St. Joseph Island.
" Russell to Prescott, 29 August 1796, MPHC, XXV: 130; CNA, MG 1 1 CO 42, Colonial Office, Vol.
320, 675-76.
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Doyle's fears proved unfounded. The departing officer had most Hkely witnessed
a bnef spasm of frustration by bands visiting Mackinac Island and by groups who
probably had just learned that the British intended to leave the site. Only days poor to
the evacuation of Mackinac Island, and therefore very close to the time of Doyle's
alarming report, Storekeeper Thomas Duggan wrote, '1 was given to understand that the
Indians would be very troublesome here in the Spnng and Summer; I am happy to tell
You, that it is quite the contrary, and that They have been since last fall to this Moment
remarkably quiet."^^
Far from wanting to destroy Ensign Brown and his handful of troops, the Natives
hoped to preserve a relationship that had existed for more than a generation. As the
weather grew colder in the autumn of 1796, and with the small British garrison facing its
first winter at St. Joseph, Ogaw, an Ojibwa leader, promised the officers that "he would
protect us against any Bad people who wanted to disturb us[,] that they Imew no other
than their English Father[,] that They would never go to see the Big Knives [Americans
at Mackinac Island, or elsewhere] and would winter near us to protect us.""^ Ogaw
shrewdly implied that the British also depended on the Ojibwa, suggesting that their
relationship was one of mutual benefit. Eariy in 1797, the leader of an Ottawa delegation
at St. Joseph's picked up on the same theme, proclaiming to Duggan and the officers, "I
hold you by the hand and I'll never let it go, I shall be always near You ready to assist
you if you should want me -here is the mark ofmy Tribe presenting the Belt[.] All my
Nation seeing it will know it and assist you in time[s] of trouble." In keeping with
" Thomas Duggan to Pndeaux Selby, 20 June 1796, CNA, MG 19 F 1, Claus Papers, Vol. 7, 230,
" Ogaw's Speech at St. Joseph's, 26 October 1796, Duggan Journal.
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Dorchester's instructions, the following day the post commandant responded m council,
promismg contmued aid to the hidians but making it plain that the Bntish were the more
powerful party to the relationship.^^
By the following summer of 1797, new post commandant Captain Peter
Drummond reported that "the Indians m this Quarter, visits [sic] this Post, the same as
they formerly did at Michilimackinac, and appears [sic] to be as friendly as usual."^^
Clearly, Bntish apprehension regarding Native discontent had been exaggerated.^^ When
reporting to Storekeeper General Joseph Chew the following summer, Duggan, while
conceding that "our Indian Fnends" did not have "a favourable opinion of us at the time
of our Evacuating the Post at Michilimackinac," also reported that "they appear to be as
much attached to us as ever, & I have the pleasure of informing you that the Indians since
our coming to this Post [June, 1796] have conducted themselves entirely to our
satisfaction." If these statements were correct, then only days pnor to the British
evacuation of Mackinac Island the northern Indians were not at all displeased, and they
expressed no dissatisfaction in the immediate wake of the occupation of St. Joseph
Island."
Once both the British and their Native allies got over the apprehensions prompted
by the Jay Treaty-mandated British withdrawal from their former posts, and once both
had declared that they wished to maintain friendly after the move, a variety of issues
unique to the St. Joseph's milieu surfaced for British policy makers. Four such issues in
^'^ Mitarmnance's Speech and the British response, 12 & 13 March 1797, ibid.
Drummond to James Green, Military Secretary, 29 June 1797, MPHC, XX: 518.
Kellogg, 233-34; Russell to the Duke of Portland, 28 September 1796, ibid., XXV: 132.
" Duggan to Chew, 9 July 1797, CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 250-1, 256; ibid., XX: 522.
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which conditions at Fort St. Joseph required distinctly different poHcies from those at
Amherstburg will be discussed here in detail. First, St. Joseph's military officers
intervened in tnbal affairs to appoint chiefs, a practice the Natives in St. Joseph's sphere
of influence accepted. By contrast, it would have been unusual for Bntish officials at
Amherstburg to appoint tnbal leaders and any effort to do so would have offended Native
sensibilities. Secondly, authonty over Indian affairs, for reasons particular to the area,
shifted from officers of the Indian Department to military officers much more rapidly at
Fort St. Joseph than at Amherstburg. Thirdly, the threat of competition fVom, or m.ilitary
action by, Bntain's French and Spanish imperial rivals was greater at St. Joseph than at
Amherstburg. Finally, intertribal rivalries unique to St. Joseph's sphere of influence,
most notably hostility between the Ojibwa and the Dakota Sioux, posed a significant
challenge to the British goal of maintaining peace among its Indian trading partners and
allies.
Army officers at St. Joseph enjoyed more influence in the affairs of the
neighboring Ojibwas and Ottawas than the officers at Amherstburg exhibited in their
dealings near Detroit and even Brownstown. The northern Natives who so readily gave
their allegiance to the traders among them also extended their loyalty to the officers and
military personnel in the Upper Country. The Natives well understood that the post
commandants and Indian agents served as the King's representatives and thereby
possessed the power to remove the traders at any time. The Ojibwas and Ottawas carried
this loyalty even further. They not only demonstrated an eagerness to obey military
officers and Indian agents, but they also sought to derive their authority and political
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power over their own bands fron. the Bntish.^^ In their egahtanan society, which lacked
a poHtical infrastructure, northern Ottawas and Ojibwas grew accustomed to the notion of
Bntish-recognized leaders among them.^^ British officials installed or recognized chiefs
by giving them medals and sometimes flags or officers' gorgets. The Native leaders
appreciated these symbols of honor and authonty, and they viewed them as continuing
the practice begun by the French. One Ottawa leader, Eethsaguam, specifically asked for
a medal to replace the "one he got in the fime of the French."^^
In the same manner, the northern Nafives also looked to British officers and
Indian agents to remove a chief if necessary. On one occasion at St. Joseph's in the
summer of 1 798, during which time a group of Ottawa leaders received medals, this
delegation requested that the officers remove from authonty one of their fellow Ottawa
leaders (also present at the council) for having murdered some fellow villagers at Arbre
Croche. Significantly, the Ottawa delegation themselves did not attempt to remove the
dishonored leader, but Duggan wrote that friterpreter "Mr. Langlade" took the guilty
chiefs medal "from him at the desire of all the other Chiefs present for murdering two of
their Own Nation[,] One of them a Chief."^' Apparently, the chiefs had specifically
sought the authority of Captain Drummond, who in turn ordered Langlade to strip the
chief of his medal. Remarkably, the Ottawa leaders had permitted the murderer to
58 Bamouw, 46.
James Clifton argues that the Potawatomis, also a member of the Three Fires, never even had chiefs
among them until their contact with the French brought about the evolution of this role within their mode of
government late in the seventeenth century. See Clifton, The Praine People , 55.
Entry for 19 May 1798, Duggan Journal.
^' Entry for 14 June 1798, ibid.
^- Drummond to Major James Green, Military Secretary, 24 June 1799, MPHC, XX: 640-41.
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accompany them to St. Joseph, where he was pubhcly stnpped of his rank and status.
Apart from the anticipated revenge to be taken by the victims' famiUes, the Ottawa
delegation expected the British not only to establish authonty but to mete out justice.
Since the murderer, Shaushauguaw, had suffered much disgrace and public humiliation ir
the eyes of the Ottawas, the Bntish hoped that that would be enough for everyone's
satisfaction. Duggan and the officers advised restraint, and they distnbuted "Seven
Stnngs of Wampum.
.
.to the Chiefs to speak to the Relations of the Indians Who were
killed by Shaushauguaw to pacify them, [and] presents were also delivered to them
[presumably referring to the victims' families, since the rest of the delegation already had
received their gifts and provisions].""
By expecting the British to delegate authority and admmister justice among them,
the northern Ottawas and Ojibwas showed that they regarded their Bntish Father as an
imperial overlord. Although British-delegated authority may have been more apparent
than real. Natives who disregarded such distinctions of authority could conceivably be
cut off from receiving future British gifts. As a result, the Bntish found it a much simpler
task to manipulate and control Natives in the North than they did elsewhere. By creating
chiefs, they not only fostered loyalty, but the British also tended to gain the cooperation
of those whom they did not make chiefs. British officers expected the men they made
chiefs to wield authority and to control their people, but, most importantly, to keep their
people loyal to British interests.
On at least two occasions. Major William Doyle, the last British commandant at
Mackinac prior to the American occupation in the summer of 1 796, even issued written
" Entry for 14 June 1798, Duggan Journal
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commissions to men whom he made chiefs. On 8 May 1796, Doyle presented
Keekwitamigishcam, an Ojibwa leader, with a British commission which m part read, "In
consequence of your attachment to the English, of which you have given repeated
proofs.
.
.1 hereby constitute and appoint you a Chief of the Chippewa Indians residing at
the said Sault St. Mary [Mane]"^^ Less than two months later and in his final few days at
Mackinac, Doyle presented another wntten commission, this time to an Ottawa leader,
Nangotook, who had asked for a commission in order to assume the position of his
deceased father, "who had been made Chief in the time of the French." Doyle granted
this request, issuing the young man a commission that stated: "In consideration of the
fidelity, zeal and attachment testified by You to the British Government,.
. .1 do hereby
confirm You the said Nangotook a Chief of Kishkacon [band].
. .of the Ottawa Nation,
willing all and singular the Indians Inhabitants thereof to obey You as such."^^ With
coincidental timing, Doyle issued these commissions just as he and his men prepared to
deliver their post to the Americans; the commandant hoped to strengthen British loyalty
among these longtime allies. However, Doyle need not have been concerned about the
northern Indians' disposition, for the Ottawas and Ojibwas still drew their authority, not
to mention their trade goods, fi-om the British.
The practice of creating chiefs among the Ojibwas and Ottawas was unique to the
northern British Indian agency. In the other regions examined in this study, British
authorities ordinarily did not confer such authority on individual leaders. While British
agents on the Maumee such as Alexander McKee, Elliott, and the Girtys had all held
Entry for 9 May 1796, ibid; CNA, RG 8, Military C Senes, Vol. 249, 213
Entry for 4 July 1796, Duggan Journal.
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significant influence in the councils of the Miamis, Delawares, and Shawnees, they did so
as delegates representing their king and government; they also attended these meetings by
virtue of their status as adopted kinsmen, but this did not give them authonty over other
leaders in Indian councils. The Native leaders in the coalition formed at Brownstown,
and located at the Glaize, considered Britain a joint member of their confederacy. At no
time would any British agents on the Maumee have had the power to either install or to
remove a chief. In fact, in an incident m 1 793 a Delaware war chief upbraided Matthew
Elliott after the agent had merely inquired as to the business of a pro-American Indian
delegation sent to confer with Confederacy's leaders. The Delaware leader reprimanded
Elliott:
Did you ever see me at Detroit or Niagara, in your councils, and there to ask you
where such and such white man come[s] from or what is their Business- Can you
watch, and look all around the earth to see who come[s] to us? or is what their
Business? Do you not know that we are upon our own Business?^''
In the North clear limits to the British role in creating or confimiing tribal leaders
appear never to have been established, and the extent of British authority among the
northern Ojibwas and Ottawas remained undefined. At Mackinac when it seemed
expedient to grant commissions to Native leaders. Major Doyle did so without hesitating.
Apart from rare exceptions such as Joseph Brant's case, almost never did the British
government issue commissions to Indian leaders elsewhere.^^ The tribes in the Ohio
Quote taken from White, The Middle Ground . 455
As the virtual protege of Sir William Johnson, Brant's case was exceptional. Blue Jacket stood as
another notable exception, having received a commission from John Johnson. But even then. Blue Jacket
was already an established war chief among the Shawnees, and did not derive his authority from the
British; Sugden, Blue Jacket
. 27, 68. Furthermore, some rival Shawnee chiefs from the Mekoche tribal
division made "a great noise about Blue Jacket's Commission," and "blame[dj the English very much for
having made any chiefs among them especially the younger Brothers [referring to Blue Jacket's Piqua
division], if any were made, they say it ought to have been some of them." See George Ironside to
Alexander Mckee, 6 February 1795, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence
. Ill: 288-89; Calloway, Crown
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Valley would not recogn.ze Bnt.sh-.mposed authority or distinctions, particularly
.f these
did not conform to the proper Shawnee, Delaware, and Miami poht.cal hierarchy.
Whereas m the North, such an infrastructure did not exist among the Ojibwas and
Ottawas, and the British at Forts Mackinac and St. Joseph encountered much less
resistance to their meddling in tribal affairs.
Another distinctive feature of British-Indian relations at Fort St. Joseph, setting it
apart from circumstances at Amherstburg, was the degree of involvement of its regular
army officers in Indian affairs. When Alexander McKee first discovered that Doyle had
granted a commission to a Native leader, the "astonished" Indian agent immediately
notified his superiors. McKee, however, did not protest the actual granting of Indian
commissions per se, for he saw no danger in meddling in Indian affairs, or wielding such
an authority over them. Instead, McKee complained that Doyle, a regular army officer,
had usurped a role and privilege reserved for the Indian Department by issuing a
commission to an Indian. Doyle had prevented "ft]he Principal officers of the
Department" from fulfilling their duty and from increasing "their influence by the
Selection of proper characters for chiefs."^'^ Joseph Chew agreed, claiming that whenever
the Army commissions chiefs, it "Surely will have a Bad Effect with Regard to the
Influence the Officers of the Department ought to have with Indians."^^ For McKee and
Chew, Doyle's actions threatened the Indian Department, because they viewed the
Department's role as that of a permanent liaison between the government and a people
and Calumet
.
43. The Mekoche division of the Shawnees provided hereditary peace chiefs who presided
over affairs involving the entire nation. Blue Jacket, a war chief from a different division, had no
permanent or hereditary authority. Sugden, Blue Jacket
. 9-10,27; James Howard, 27, 38-39; Trowbridge,
Shawnese Traditions
. 8.
Alexander McKee to Joseph Chew, 19 June 1796, CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 249, 216.
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who should be kept in a state of continual dependency, and the agents viewed the Indian
Department as best suited for continuing to cultivate that sort of relationship. In his
grievance, McKee complained that Indians receiving direct commissions from army
officers would "be freed from that dependence on the Department which has hitherto
constituted all the hifluence and fnendship so happily established between the Bntish
Nation and all the Indians in this Country.
These statements show that McKee and Chew did not fully grasp the
circumstances at the northern post, nor could they foresee the imminent changes at
McKee's own Amherstburg agency. Not only did McKee think it improper for army
officers to interfere in Indian affairs, but the agent was soon ftirther dismayed when
regular army officers began to eclipse the Indian Department at Amherstburg. This, of
course, occurred when the events that led to Matthew Elliott's dismissal in 1797 left
Captain Hector McLean wielding substantial authonty over Amherstburg 's branch of the
Indian Department. The role of the military in hidian affairs theoretically should have
been reduced when Indian affairs had come under civil authority in 1 796, since this gave
the Lieutenant Governor supreme authority over the Indian Department in the upper
province. Therefore, prior to the McLean-Elliott controversy at Amherstburg, Doyle's
granting of Indian commissions in the North would have appeared as an even greater
usurpation of the Indian Department's role.
What the elder McKee did not realize was that the British military command at
Mackinac and St. Joseph in 1 796 held principal authority over the Indian agency there.
^'^ Joseph Chew to Captain James Green, Military Secretary, 14 July 1796, ibid., 218.
Alexander McKee to Chew, 19 June 1796, ibid., 216.
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Conversely, the Indian Department at Amherstburg still funetionecl in a virtually
antonomous manner until late in 1797. One reason why the military leadership at St.
Joseph extended its authority over the hulian Department there was beeause that branch
of the Department remained disorganized and siiorthanded, as it had been prior to its
move from Mackinac. McKee had appointed his own son Thomas as Deputy
Superintendent at St. Joseph, but the younger McKee never bothered to reside at his
assigned post." Except for short visits, J homas McKee never spent any time at his
agency, choosing instead to remain near his Amherstburg home. In order to cut costs,
Governor (ieneral Prescott rescinded Alexander McKee's appointment of an additional
interpreter at the post, and at one point the agency employed an interpreter who was not
even Huent enough to adecjualely communicate with the Indians.^^ Indian agent Thomas
Duggan doubled as storekeeper and clerk, but he eventually ran afoul of the post
commandant when he began drinking heavily and puiportedly expropriated and traded
Indian goods from the storehouse.^'' I-urther complicating matters, Charles Chaboillcz,
Duggan's French-speaking replacement, could not understand Fnglish.^'' Under these
conditions army personnel assumed control over Indian affairs at St. Joseph, and Major
^' Vincent, 105. In truth, Thomas McKee assumed Flliott's position at Amherstburg; upon the lattcr's
dismissal, tlieicby holding tiic assignment ofDeputy Superinteiuleiit loi both posts smuillaiieousiy between
17')7 and IXOS. It Ihereloie made sense lor lum to reside at Amlieistbuig dining that period. Nonetiieless,
McKee cho.se not to reside at his assigned post, bolli prior to lUliott's disnussal and altei the latter's
restoration. Although from a distance, McKee held the position as St. Joseph's Deputy SupcniUendent
uiilil the War of 1812.
" Vincent, 106.
" Ibid., 106-07; l ieutenant Robert Cowell to Major James Green, Military Secretary, 29 August 1801,
CNA, R(; 8, Military C Series, Vol. 2^}, .Ml-4.^; Same to same, 10 l ebiuary 1802, ibid.. Vol. 254, 3-6.
Vincent, 107 I t ("owell ordinarily had to translate instructions into I rench loi ( liaboille/.. Alter
Cowell was eventually translerred to a diHerenl assignment, ( haboille/. inlormed Ins superiors, "1 have the
greatest difl'iculty with respect to the instnictions 1 receive and hope there is no impropriety in my
requesting that in future they may be Sent in both Hnglish & French, or the latter alone, when I can have
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rare
Doyle considered himselfjustified in issuing commissions to certain Indians m
instances. He could easily justify this practice, not only because special circumstances
merited these favors, but because no person of adequate rank at the time served in the
northern branch of the hidian Department who could confer such an honor.
Perhaps the military authonties heeded Alexander McKee's complaints. For
whatever reason, it does not appear that Doyle's successors issued any additional
commissions. Nevertheless, representatives in the hidian Department at St. Joseph's,
under the auspices of post commandants, continued their practice of creating chiefs
within the small bands of Ottawas and Ojibwas that regularly visited the post. The elder
McKee had no objections, as long as the Indian Department played a key role in the
ceremonial process of establishing a chief Thus, the Department's officials at St.
Joseph's continued to present each newly-created chief with a medal and usually a Umon
Jack for the chiefs band to hang above their village, an indicafion that those receiving
these items took great pride in the disfincdve status they symbolized.
The British needed to use caution, taking care not to create more chiefs than
necessary for their purposes, nor to award too many medals. Had they carelessly
distributed numerous medals, the Indian agents might have inadvertently created a chief
whom the prospective leader's people deemed less deserving and less experienced as a
hunter and a warrior. Such a situation would only foster jealousy, having the opposite
effect of the medal's intended purpose of cultivating loyalty to a British-controlled
headman. Moreover, a distribution of too many medals would diminish the value of their
distinction and undermine the respect due those who wore them. Therefore, British
not doubts respecting their meaning." Charles Chaboillez, Storekeeper and Clerk to Prideaux Selby, 31
May 1803, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26, 15481.
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officals at Fort St. Joseph always attempted to present them to older, established
bandleaders, or to men who were acknowledged as leaders sinee "the time of the French."
In the summer of 1 797, when Eshkan, an Ottawa man from Arbre Croche, requested a
medal for his son, Duggan "thought [it] prudent to wait for Colo. McKee's further
directions with respect to giving Eshkan's Son a Medal as [neither] he nor any of his
Predecessors, Relations, were ever known to be Chiefs." In the meantime, the
storekeeper pleased the young man by giving h.m a gorget instead Duggan explained,
"The reason of my being of the opinion of giving the gorget instead of a Medal was
because Mr. Langlade who knows all the Ottowas at Arbre Croche well, said that it
would offend all the other Chiefs of that place if a Medal was given."'^
Langlade had good reason to be concerned. Arbre Croche, a cluster of villages
just north of Little Traverse Bay on the northwest shore of Michigan's Lower Peninsula,
had served as the Ottawa nation's most important community and the center of Ottawa
affairs from the 1760s.'' In May 1798, less than a year after Eshkan's band visited St.
Joseph's, a much larger Ottawa delegation arrived from Arbre Croche, this time bearing
fifteen Union Jacks! After presenting Duggan, Langlade, and the officers with "Forty
three Makaks of Sugar," the principal leader among them, Keeminichaugan, expressed
his concern that the British system of establishing chiefs was undermining tribal unity:
Father, Since our old Principal Chiefs deaths the Young Chiefs hold Councils by
themselves constantly, this is the reason We are not all come together, I am sorry
We are not all united as fomierly, there are different parties among us. It is your
fault. Father, in not following the Ancient Customs of Your Children the Ottowas,
You make too many Young Chiefs this is the Cause of the differences among us
and the reason We are not all come together, besides You received Several of
" Entry for 3 July 1797, Duggan Journal
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never
dTno?re to^ir ^ ^-''^-'^ ^'^^ -on why We
Immediately after voicing these concerns, Keeminichaugan asked for additional gifts and
ended by reaffirming his people's loyalty, stating, "Father, remember our Ancestors
behaved well and We follow their examples."^^
Keeminichaugan's remarks indicate that Langlade's previous concerns regarding
developing jealousies and factionalism at Arbre Croche were perceptive. The British-
installed leaders had indeed divided the community at Arbre Croche, and as the older
chiefs died, this allowed for a turnover in Ottawa leadership. Although Bntish
intervention may have caused temporary competition and disunity, the Ottawas had
had any form of centralized governmental authority prior to Bntish meddling, and former
Ottawa leaders held virtually no power apart from their level of influence and ability to
persuade. Since Ottawas, like their Ojibwa brethren, were politically organized in bands
and not as a single tribe or nation, British-based authority may have actually served to
unite the bands in the long run. In any case, despite Keeminichaugan's concerns over the
loss of Ottawa unity, his people later demonstrated that they could rally around a
common cause whenever necessary, as in their struggles against the Sioux. At no other
known time did the Indians in the North complain about British meddling in their affairs.
British influence among the leaders of northern Ojibwas and Ottawas insured that
any Franco-Spanish invasion force would have little chance of gaining the Indians'
loyalty and cooperation. Any army would have great difficulty in advancing up the
Mississippi Valley, across the hidian-held portages, and through the Mackinac corridor
" Entry for 23 May 1798, Duggan Journal.
Ibid.
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without (l.c suppcl or.hc nui,genot,s Rritish trading pailncs. Because ofthe Indums'
general pro-lint.sh sentiments and ties, nobody n, (he North had reason to suspeel an
invasion. (^,p,ain nnunniond seemed surprised when Russell and MU.tary Secretary
James Green warned hnn oflTeneh attempts to onl.st the Indians n, then cause prior to an
antieipaled hieneh-led atlaek. Drununond responded to (ireen, elaunu., thai he "had not
found any dissatislaction as yet among (he Indians who resort (c (h.s Post, Ihcy always
appear pleased al wha( l'resen(s (hey ge(, and Deelares |s.e| their attachment to the
Hridsh ( iovernn.e>.(."'" No( a((ack lollowed. ronsec,uently, the British Hag condn.ied to
lollow lis traders mto American and Spanish territories, and these latter governmen(s
found (hat they could not break (he s(ranglehold of Bri(ish (rade and inlluence over the
Indians of (he wes(crn Great Lakes and (he upper Mississippi Valley.""
Drummond and odier Bi Kish ollicials in die North worried less abou( a po(enlial
l-rench invasion than they worried about (he incessan( hostilKies be(weeii (he Opbwas
and (he Dakota Sioux. This, more (han odier I'uro-Ainerican |)owers, Ihrealened to
disrupt Rritish trade and inlluence in (he Nordi. A( (imes the Mcnominees and
Winnebagoes also had altercations with the Ojibwas."' The British at St. Joseph's tried in
vain to broker a permanent peace between these nations, but they merely achieved a
series of temporary truces, beginning with John Dease's diplomacy between the Sioux
and Ojibwas at Mackinac in 1787. Yet the Sioux, Menominee, Winnebago, and l<'ox &
Sauk tribes would not be manipulated by the British to the same extent as the Ojibwas
^' Dnimmond to Green. 21 Mardi 1799, MPilC, XX: 0 U).
Kellogg, 237-38, 242.
Louis Ai tluir Tohill, "Robert Dickson, Hiilish Fur Trader ou the I ipj^er Mississippi/* Ntwlli Dakiila
Historical Quarterly 3(1) (October 1028): S.
1^0
and Ottawas. Due largely to geography but also partially to their tnbal structure, the
latter two nations had much closer ties to the Bnt.sh at St. Joseph's, while the Natives ,n
Wisconsin and the upper Mississippi Valley visited St. Joseph's much less frequently.
Despite less contact with the Western groups, the British still held considerable mHuence
over them through their numerous traders along the rivers of Wisconsin and Mmnesota,
and the officers at St. Joseph could rely on traders for reconnaissance just as well as they
could the Indians. When Lieutenant (iovernor Russell initially wanted a report of any
activity on the upper Mississippi, Captain Dnimmond explained, "It will make it more
difllcult to get Intelligence from the Mississipy [sic] as the Chippawas & Ottawas are at
war with the Indians in that Quarter, having no Intercourse with one another. The Surest
Information will be by the Indian Traders. "^^
Drummond referred to the traders in a region south and west of Lake Superior, an
area that included a number of private British traders and encompassed the important
Fox-Wisconsin River portage. The traders there generally operated independently, or in
small combinations, belonging to neither the North West nor XY Companies." These
men helped to maintain a British sphere of influence by cultivating relations with those
tribes who did not often visit British posts, by encouraging them to prefer British goods,
and by preventing American and Spanish attempts to develop a trade network. One such
trader, Robert Dickson, established ties with the Dakotas and married a chiefs
84
daughter. After more than two decades of living among his wife's people, Dickson was
instrumental in recruiting his clients and kinsmen into the British cause in the War of
- Uniminond to Major James Green, Military Secretary, 21 March 1799, CNA, RG 8, Military C Scries
Vol. 252, 51-52; MPHC, XX: 630.
" Kellogg, 241;Tohill, 12-14.
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1812. In the absence of more formal ties, such as the Chain of Friendship which the
British had cuh.vated with nations further east, the informal mdividual bonds between the
traders and the Sioux are what cemented British-Dakota relations at the turn of the
nineteenth century. More importantly, as a result of these links, the Sioux recognized the
British as kinsmen, in spite of the ongomg relationship the British maintained with the
their enemies the Ojibwas, both at St. Joseph and through the North West Company.^^
John Johnson, Superintendent of Indian Affairs, had an unrealistic perception of
the nature of British relations with the Native groups further west, particularly with the
Sioux and their hostility towards the Ojibwa nation. Johnson regarded the continuing
warfare which pitted the Ojibwas and Ottawas against the Sioux "merely as a private
Quarrel," ever since Amabic, an Ottawa Chief from Arbre Croche, visited him at
Montreal, claiming that some distant traders had fomented "Hostilities...between the
Sioux and them."'^^' The Superintendent mistakenly believed that British power and
intluencc, via the Indian Department, extended to that region in the same manner that it
had evolved southwest of Detroit. On multiple occasions in the late 1790s, Johnson
naively referred to "the Peace that was Settled with them by Mr. Dease [Johnson's
cousin]" more than a decade earlier.*^^ Johnson simply could not believe that the western
nations, whom he considered under British auspices, would defy a British-mandated
peace without having been under an external and devious influence. The head agent went
'"Tohill, 14.
85 Gary Clayton Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind: Dakota-White Relations in the Upper Mississippi
(Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), 76.
John Johnson to Major James Green, Military Secretary, 3 December 1798, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs,
Series A, Vol. 1,251; Johnson to ?, 7 July 1 797, CNA, MG 1 9 F 1 , Claus Papers, Vol. 8,11.
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on to accuse "cn.r remote Traders.
.
.[of being] the Instigators of those Predatory Wars
from Interested Motives," and he instructed his Held agents and the comma.,dant at St.




when they pronnsed m the most Solenm manner never to break it, and a very
Large Helt with my name and the year upon ,1, was left w.lh the C'h.ppewas to remind
them of what was agreed upon."^« Johnson ,nust not have real./cd that hostilities
between the Ojibwas and the Sioux had continued uninterrupted for more than a dccade.«'^
The Sioux -Ojibwa wars persisted for another half-century.
Johnson erred twice. First, (he Superintendent had imagined the British regime in
the North strong enough to compel the cooperation of nations as far away as the west side
of the Mississippi; second, Johnson mistakenly blamed the traders for the continued
hostilities, hi fact, it was the activities of these very men that kept the western tribes
backing British interests. Due to the traders^ continued inHuence and the expansion of
the North West Company, the hidians who lived in the Upper Mississippi Valley, in both
Spanish and American territories, continued to Hy Union Jacks over their villages during
the early years of the nineteenth century.'"' The traders possessed .far more inOuence than
88
Johnson to Green, Military Secretary, 3 Deccmlier 1798, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Series A Vol I
252-53.
llickcrson, 83; Danziger, 61-62. Years later, Lieutenant Zebiilon Montgomery Pike, American emissary
to the I Ippcr Mississippi, commented on why the British had failed to quell the Indian wars there:
I |hc British government
.
.
often brought the chiefs of the two nations together, at Michilimackinac; made
them presents, & c. but the Sioux, still haughty and overbearing, spurned the proferred calumet (italicized
as done in original text); and returned to renew the scenes of slaughter and barbarity.
. ..the British
government, it is true, requested, recommended, and made presents; but all this at a distance; and when the
chiels returned to their bands, their thirst of blood soon obliterated from their recollection the lectures of
humanity, which they had heard in the councils of Michilimackinac." Donald H. Jackson, ed.. The Journals
of Zebu Ion MontMomery Pike, with Letters and Related Documents 2 Vols. (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1966), I: 216-17; Danziger, 64-65.
Kellogg, 258.
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the.r own government, and they certainly did not want contnu.cd nUertnbal conll.ets.
The incessant warfare between the Sioux and the Oj.bwas often hn.dered trade, and U
also threatened the hves of the traders, particularly those who worked alone and hved
near to the bands with winch they dealt.^' These men had virtually no protection. Even
(hose traders who belonged to the larger companies found that they too were vulnerable,
and a few of them lost their lives.''^ Although nvalnes oAen grew intense, traders d,d not
tend to loment wars that might endanger their own lives and fortunes; indeed, the year
before his death Michael (\irot, an agent with the North West Company, sought refuge
with his rival, before he was killed at his own post the following year.''^
Although the Sioux-Ojibwa wars persisted, the Ottawas did not always participate
in these conHicts. The Ottawa leader Amable, who initially complained to John Johnson
that distant traders planned to instigate hostilities between his people at Arbre Croche and
the Sioux, was either confused or manipulative, because he chd not represent the
sentiments of his community. Three months after Amable's visit with Johnson near
Montreal in the summer of 1 797, Captain Drummond held a council at St. Joseph's with
See "The Narrative of Peter Pond," in Five Fur Traders of the Northwest , ed. Charles M. Gates, with an
Introduction by (iracc Lcc Nulc (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society, 1965), 47. On the eve of the
American Revolution, Pond and the other traders had solicited the intervention of Mackinac's commandant,
Arent de Peyster, to negotiate a peace hciwccn the Sioii.x and Ojibwas, but the Colonel "told them it was
0[u]t of his Power to Bring the CioverniiKiil Into l.ncy I'xpcns in Sending to ihise But Desird that we
would fall on wase & Means among (Ourselves and he would Indavcr to youse his Hniluans as
CumMandin|g| Ooffiser." Even at that early date British leaders knew tiiat they did not hold the authority
necessary to impose a peace, and they expected the traders to influence the Indians for llie benefit of British
diplomacy.
hi 1806, the Sioux killed Michael Curot, a trader of the North West Company, for having .supplied
weapons to the Ojibwas; see ibid., 240. More than a dozen years earlier, the Sioux had killed David
Monin, a clerk of the North West (\impany, and his companion. See "The Diary of John MacDonell " in
ibid., 112.
'•^
.lohn Tanner's description of the raid which the Nor' westers fomented against the Hudson Bay outpost on
the Red River near Lake Winnipeg stands as a rare exception. In that incident, the traders of the North
West Company had little to fear in the way of reprisals, but one of them was sentenced to death in a court
of law. See John fanner, 209-10.
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an Ottawa delegation from Arbre Croche, confronting them directly about the rumors of
"considerable difficulties among themselves.
. .instigated by the Traders." The chiefs
resoundingly "answered they had no knowledge of any thing of the kind and were certain
no such speech had been sent by their Nation, They then begged their Father would not
listen to any bad reports, that there was no truth in them and hoped he would never think
of them again."^^ For good measure, the following June an Ottawa delegation from
Arbre Croche returned to St. Joseph on their way "to see their father Sir John Johnson."
Their leader, Keeminichaugan, "begged hard," asking Duggan to write a letter for him to
present to Johnson, stating.
Father, since We heard of the bad Bird's conduct in lower Canada We have be-n
very sorry. We thank you for wnting our father [Captain Drummond] last
fall.
.
.We were not concerned in any of that bad Bird's transactions, he makes us
very much afflicted at what he said—We shall send down in a few days a Canoe
well manned to meet him, when he sees our people he will contradict every thine
he said of us.
The Ottawas at Arbre Croche remained firmly attached, both in their loyalty to the
British, and in their dependence on the traders sent among them.
One can only speculate as to Amable's motives for fabricating stories to Johnson
regarding the actions of the traders in Indian country, but perhaps the Ottawa headman
had valid cause to resent the traders, both those at his village of Arbre Croche and those
who lived among the Sioux. Even if the traders did not actively attempt to foment a war,
Amable knew that they dealt weapons to his enemies, and the mere fact that British
Council at St. Joseph's with Ottawa delegation from Arbre Croche, October, 1797, Duggan Journal.
Captain Drummond recorded the delegations' official statement at this council, and he took the signatures
of all the chiefs present, five village chiefs and five war chiefs. These are listed in Captain Peter
Drummond to the Chiefs and their Reply, 19 October 1797, MPHC, XX: 561; CNA, RG 8, Military C
Series, Vol. 250-2, 317-18.
Entry for 7 June 1798, Duggan Journal.
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traders bartered weapons to belligerent nations already at war endangered lives on both
sides. For the Bntish had begun to cultivate relations with the Sioux similar to those that
they had established with Amable's people more than a generation earlier, and the Sioux
would now also fight to defend the Bntish traders on whom they depended. A month
prior to Amable's meeting with Johnson, Duggan reported that some British
Traders were nearly pillaged by the Sacques and Renards headed by some
[Spanish] Traders around with authonty ft-om the Spanish Commandant at St
Lewis. [Fjortunately for those interested, a party of Scioux were at La Prairie due
Chien which overawed the other Indians and the property is. . .out of danger.*^^
Amable might have perceived that the Bntish were attempting to establish s>anbiotic ties
with the Sioux as they had with his own people, and perhaps the Ottawa leader feared
that they had become the pawns of empire as they faced a debilitating future of
dependence and poverty resulting from the trade.
From 1800 until after the War of 1812, British relations with Natives in the North
and West would continue to be marked by a pattern of trade and dependence, but British
attempts to quell warring nations there would never fully succeed, because British
officials did not possess the authority and control over the Sioux to the same extent that
they managed to exert power over the Ottawas and Ojibwas. The perpetual struggle that
persisted between those groups became an accepted way of life, and by the turn of the
nineteenth century British leaders in the North no longer made seeking peace there a
pressing pnority. hi the summer of 1799, Captain Drummond wrote to Military
Secretary Major Green, cavalierly stating,
I am happy to inform you that most of the Mississipy Traders are amved at
Mackinac, and bring no news of Importance, only the old Quarrel between the
Chippawas and the Seus [sic] is still kept up as usual, but nothing of any
Entry for 12 June 1797, ibid.
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one
consequence has happened only a few Scalps taken, which is the case every
Despite the ongoing hostilities, Duggan happily reported in 1801 that all Indians in his
"quarter appear very well affected to [the Bntish] Govemrnent."^^^ Thus, British-hidiai
relations in the North continued in a unique manner in which trade and familial ties
defined British relations with indigenous nations, some of which were at war with
another. Conversely, British authorities at Amherstburg, where trade volume was much
less, strove to decrease their ties with the Natives and lessen the latter's reliance on
British support. Also, British policy elsewhere in Upper Canada at the turn of the
nineteenth century was geared toward creating intertribal division, rather than
encouraging unity of the sort that British officers, agents, and traders had attempted to
cultivate at Fort St. Joseph and in the Upper Mississippi Valley.^^
^' Drummond to Green, 24 June 1799, MPHC, XX: 640.
Duggan to Pndeaux Selby, Military Secretary, 6 July 1801, CNA, MG 19 F 1, Claus Papers, Vol. 8, 151.
See letter from The Duke of Portland to Lieutenant Governor Peter Hunter, 4 October 1799, CNA, RG 8,
Military C Series, Vol. 252, 270-71.
146
CHAPTER 4
A NEW SOCIETY ON THE GRAND RIVER, 1784-1801
A third locale of British-Indian relations after the American Revolution ended
was the Grand R, ver, a site north of Lake Erie in Upper Canada, set aside by Governor
General Sir Frederick Haldimand in 1 784 for the Six Nations and their dependencies who
had fought for the British during the war. At Amherstburg and in the North, Britain had
maintained a sphere of influence mainly through trade and Indian gifts, though in the
1790s at Amherstburg British officers reduced all gifts and annual presents to their
former Native alhes. The Grand River community was distinctive m that it was a large
grant of territory intended as a place of settlement for the loyal refugee tribes, including
Mohawks, Cayugas, Onondagas, Senecas, Tuscaroras, and Delawares, most ofwhom
were from New York.
This chapter will explore how the terms of the Haldimand Grant became a
contested subject between British authorities and the natives. The first subsection will
cover the period from 1 784 to 1 797, during which both tribal and British leaders
attempted to define the nature of the Grant on terms favorable to their respective
interests. The key issue of this period was whether the Indian residents of the Grand
River would be allowed to sell land to white settlers. British resistance to such proposals
contributed to a virtual deadlock between the British and Indians regarding land sales by
the end of this period, and the stalemate fueled a dispute over the extent of Six Nations'
sovereignty' and the Native legal status in Canada in general. The Six Nations at the
' For the purposes of this study and specifically for the context of this chapter, the term "sovereignty" is
used to describe the extent to which the Natives, specifically the Six Nations' community at the Grand
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Grand River stressed that they were the King's alHes, nothing more. They tended to view
their community as a self-sufficient, separate pohtical entity that could deal with outside
nation-states and individuals independently of Great Bntain's interference. Conversely,
for Britain Native autonomy in Upper Canada presented a potential security threat, and
Whitehall was not prepared to grant Indian demands pertaining to sovereign authonty
over land. The onginal Haldimand Grant made no provision for the Indians to alienate
any of their land, and even the subsequent amended land patents always gave the British
government the right of preemption, acknowledging only Crown sovereignty. The Grand
River case was the first internal Indian crisis in Canada that the Bntish faced after the
United States gained independence, but it would influence subsequent Bntish colonial
jurisprudence and Canadian Indian policy down to the present time.
A second secfion covers Bntish relations with the Grand River Indians and related
tribes from 1797 to 1801 and will show that a series of controversies, less broad than the
Grand River land sales issue but still significant, further undemiined friendly relations
between British officials and their former Indian allies. Again, the common thread
running through these struggles was the greater issue of Iroquois sovereignty, which
remained nebulous as both sides were compelled to compromise during these crucial
years at the Grand River. The Six Nations' legal status in Canada would remain
undefined long after the close of the period covered by this study.
River, could conduct itself as an independent nation, govern itself by its own laws, practice its own
customs, enter into agreements with foreign peoples and other indigenous tribes, and conduct land
transactions and distribute Reserve property, all without the consent of the British government.
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Response
When various bands of Ind.an refugees originally settled along the Grand R.ver in
1 784, the community was composed of a diverse set of peoples. A census taken ,n 1 785
indicated that 1 ,843 loyal Natives from mneteen different tnbes or bands had settled at
the Grand. In addition to elements of the S,x Iroquo.s Nations, other groups found at the
new reserve included Delawares, Nanticokes, Montours, Creeks, Cherokecs, Tootalies,
Oghguagas, and Canadian Iroquois from St. Reg.s.^ Nevertheless, over two-thirds of the
entire community were Iroquois, and the Mohawks alone numbered nearly a quarter of
the total populace.
These figures helped Mohawk sachem Joseph Brant maintain a greater level of
influence at the Grand River intertribal community than other Native leaders there, and
Brant soon became the community's pnncipal spokesperson and pnmary leader. His
record as a war chief during the Amencan Revolution certainly enhanced his standing as
a capable leader, but his other qualities and attributes are what made him the Six Nations'
pnncipal spokesperson during this era. As a youth, Brant had become the protege and
brother-in-law of the late Sir William Johnson (d. 1774), who had taken Brant's older
sister Molly as his mistress and eventual common-law wife. As a result of his close
connections with the Johnsons, Brant learned English, received some formal education,
joined the Anglican faith, and received a captain's commission in the British Indian
Department. By 1 786 he had twice traveled to England where he met several key figures,
including Hugh Percy (later the Second Duke of Northumbedand), Home Secretary Lord
^ A Census of the Six Nations on the Grand River, 1785, in Charles M. Johnston, ed., The Valley of the Six
Nations: A Collection of Documents on the Indian Lands of the Grand River (Toronto: The Champlain
Society, For tlie Government of Ontario, University of Toronto Press, 1964), 52.
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Sydney, Charles James Fox, K.ng George III, and the Arehb.shop of Canterbury.
Consecuently, in spite ofnever having possessed any heredUary author.ty
.„ Iroquo.s
couneils. Brant's position and experienee had nu.de hn. the most n.portant haison
between the Six Nations and the whUes when the Grand R.ver Reserve was estabhshed.^
Early in 1787, Brant and the S.x Nations' leaders made their Hrst Grand River
la.Kl transaet.ons by selhng several thousand aeres to ten Loyahst friends. Apart from the
llald.mand Grant, the Six Nations possessed no other legal title to these lands, but they
acted independently, without ineluding the government in the transaetion. For some time
(he transaet.ons went unnoticed by both the Indian Department and Governor General
Lord Dorchester. However, when Dorchester learned of these land transfers more than a
year later, he vowed to "order all the white people olTthe Lands."' The Governor
General instructed John Johnson to mform all concerned parties that "the King will never
confirm their [the while people's] Grants nor allow the individuals to keep possession."^
Brant was incensed that the British now seemed to be reneging on the stipulations
of the I laldimand (irant. Much of the confiict stemmed from the vagueness of the
1 laldimand Deed, which, while not expressly restricting the alienation of Native lands,
did not sanction the transferring of land either. According to the I laldimand Grant, the
Indians were "to take possession of and settle upon the Banks of the [GrandJ Rivcr."^'
^ For Brant's origins and position witlnn Mohawk society, Kclsay, 39-41; for the chiefs final visit lo
London, sec ibid., 380-91.
* Speech by John Dcseronto at Conncil at the Ray of Qninte (recalling events of September, 1788), 2-10
September 1800, Johnston. Valley of the Six Nations S4
' Statement by Sir John Johnson in Dorchester's Name to Aaron and i.saac Hill, Montreal 20 September
1788, ibid., 72.
*
"Ilaldimand (irant," in Graymont, Appendix B, 299; Kelsay, 363.
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Tlu>u,l, (he government's intent behind the prochnnat.on was later often debated, B.ant
assumed that by this document the Crown olTered land to the Six Nat.ons on an ec.ual
basis with any other grants of land that the government awarded to whites m Canada.
The ( Inited llmpne Loyalists, for example, had fought for the Kn.g u. the war and
subsequently settled m Upper Canada at the govern.nenCs expense; many later sold their
land to whomever they chose. In other words, the S.x Nations expected a written deed
(hat acknowledged their full ownership to the Crand River lands, or a title in fee simple,
held in common by all of the reserve's Native inhabitants.
The controversy was intertwined with the greater issue of Iroquois sovereignty.
Rrant and the Six Nations, while desiring full possession of their lands, knew that they
could not adecpialely argue their case from the perspective of the United l-mpire Loyalists
or other whites, because these settlers were acknowledged as Hrilish subjects, while the
Indians viewed themselves as autonomous Crown allies. If indepciulciu, tiien the Grand
River community could sell or lease then lands lo whomever they pleased, whether to
l iench, American, or British settlers, without the consent of Whitehall or any leaders in
Canada. Rrant believed that the Iroquois had always po.ssessed this degree of mastery
over all of Iheir affairs. In response to Dorchester's restrictions against the Six Nations'
sale of Grand River lands, the sachem argued that the Iroquois are "on the same footing
on which we stood previous" to the American war, adding, "your government well
knew... they hail no right to interfere with us as independent nations."^
'1 he Hrilish held i|uile aiiolher view. Ever since the Canadian discoveries made
by the Cabot family in iIk- latter part of the sixteenth century, overall sovereignty of
' F.xceipt Iroin Joscpli Hiaiil's speech iit Niagaia, late I /KOs, in T. G. Marquis, ed., jiuildc i.s ul ranaila
lioin ( ailici lo I .inner ( loionio: JdIiiiC. Winston Co., 1903), 202-03.
Bntish possessions m North Amenca had always rested with the Enghsh (and after 1707,
the Bntish) Monarch. Of course the Indians within these vast domains had still enjoyed
the nght, known as the nght of usufruct, to dwell upon and use the land, but this did not
give them full title. Whenever the Indians ceded their lands by treaty, the British
government maintained that the tnbes had actually surrendered their usufructuary nght to
the land, but that was all, since the Crown had already possessed sovereign authority over
those lands.^ Contrary to Brant's claims, the British had never acknowledged any
different status for the Iroquois lands in colonial New York, and the government viewed
the Indians' postwar exodus to the Grand River as a continuation of a centuries-old
understanding.^ At the new site, the Six Nations again possessed their usufructuary right,
just as before. Brant seemed to be the innovator in wanting to aher this longstanding
tradition. Furthermore, the Bntish government could not recognize Iroquois sovereignty
over the land because British leaders, when fomiing government Indian policy, did not
consider indigenous groups as political entities, but rather as separate racial classes, or
groups, that were to receive special consideration or treatment. '°
With such radically different notions of the Six Nations' legal status, conflict was
unavoidable. Although Lord Dorchester never evicted the first wave of white settlers to
move to the Grand River as he had threatened to do in 1 788, Brant would not rest until he
* Wright, 38-39.
A good example of an eighteenth-century perspective on the relationship benveen the colony ofNew
York and the Iroquois is Cadwallader Colden's The History of the Five Indian Nations of Canada which are
Dependent upon the Province of New York... 2 Vols., 1727-1747; also see Jennings, The Ambiguous
Iroquois Empire
, 1 1-17, and White, The Middle Ground . 351-54.
Bruce Clark, Native Liberty, Crown Sovereienty: The Existing Aboriginal Right of Self-Govemment in
Canada (Montreal & Kingston, London, and Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990), 19-20;
Sidney L. Harring, "Indian Law, Sovereignty, and State Law," in A Companion to American Indian
History
,
ed. Philip J. Deloria and Neal Salisbury (Maiden, MA & Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers,
2002), 453-55.
152
and the Grand River Council possessed a deed acknowledging the Six Nations' full
ownership, a title in fee sin^ple. Until that happened, the British government would never
have to concede that the Haldimand Deed meant anything more than a mere license of
occupation for the Indians dwelling at the Grand River Reserve. For several years the
matter hung in limbo and received less attention, as Canadian authonties were more
concerned with the brewing crisis on the Maumee when the advance of Wayne's army
nearly drew the British into another Amencan war. Furthermore, the Grand River
question grew more complex when the British Parliament restructured the Canadian
government in 1 791
,
creating the province of Upper Canada and thus an additional
bureaucratic layer of government with which Brant would have to contend in his efforts
to gain the land title and the Six Nations' legal status which he sought.
When John Graves Simcoe, a distinguished veteran and officer who served in the
Amencan war, became the upper province's first Lieutenant Governor in 1792, Brant
immediately petitioned Simcoe for the Grand River deed that he had persistently sought
for the previous seven years. The land issue insured that relations between the two men
would remain strained until Simcoe's departure in 1 796." Brant regularly clamored for a
proper deed, while Simcoe at the same time continued his efforts to talk Brant out of
engaging in any future land deals. The Lieutenant Governor and other Bntish leaders
feared that Brant would deal parts of the Reserve to "Land Jobbers," who would in turn
sell these tracts to any set of buyers, many of whom lacked loyalty to the Bntish
" When Brant first dined at the Simcoe residence late in 1792, Mrs. Simcoe hinted at this mistrust,
describing the Mohawk leader as possessing "a countenance of art or cunning." Entry for 9 December
1792. in Mary Quayle Innis, ed., Mrs. Simcoe's Diary (Toronto & New York; MacMillan of Canada and
St. Martin's Press, respectively, 1965), 82-83.
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govcrnmcn, o, ,o ,„„sh
.ntercsls. The stancion conHnucd, and l.ant .nlonncd Suucoe
ll.al ll.c hul.ans "were not always to be fools because they had once been such.'"^
Neither Simcoe nor Dorchester wanted to concede to the S.x Nat.ons the n,ht to
sell or lease their lands, so Simcoe Imally
.ssued a new patent to the S.x Nations in
•lanuary 1793. carelnlly delinn.g and cncunKscnbnig the Indians' rights to the land: "IT
IS OL'R ROYAL WILL AND I>IT.ASUR|.; that no t.ansler, alienation conveyance sale
gift exchange lease property or possession shall at any time be made or given ofthe said
District or Territory or any part or parcel thereof"" In spite ofthe full restrictions
preventing (he Six Nations from alienating any of their lands, Simcoe left an opening to
Brant by including a clause providing for land sales under the condition that Uiesc
"always.
.
shall be purchased for Us [the British governmentj, our Heirs and Successors
at some public meeting.
.
.to be holden lor that purpose by the Governor, Lieutenant-
Governor or person administering Our Government."" Hence, Simcoe did his best to
please everyone, including both Dorchester and Brant, by restricting any free alienation
of Iroquois lands, while simultaneously permitting the Grand River Six Nations to sell
portions of their territory to the government alone whenever it became ab.solutely
necessary. Yet the Six Nations' council believed that Simcoe had done little more than
undermine Iroquois sovereignty by giving the liritish government the sole right of
preemption over the Grand River lands. Such a policy mirrored that practiced by the
lledgling United States, and it usually iHcanl llial llic liulians would not receive a
Simcoe to Dorchester, 6 December 1793, ( Yiiikshank, Simcoe Correspondence
. 1 14.
13 Simcoe^ Patent ol the ( hand River Lands to the Six Nations, 14 January 17*)3, Johnston, Valley o( the
Six Nations, 74 Also see John A. Noon, Law and Government ol tlie (Jrand River Iroquois (New York:
The Viking huiul. Inc., 1*M9), 86-87.
Simcoe \s Patent, 14 January 1793, Johnston, Valley of the Six Nalions, 74.
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competitive pnce for the acreage, sir.ce the land was not sold on the open market; the
government also wanted to turn a profit in resellmg the land. Furthermore, S,mcoe's
patent still maintained a premise of Crown sovereignty, descnbmg the Six Nations'
Reserve as a "Tract of Land under our protection."'
^
Brant rejected the patent outright, arguing that it violated the spint, intention, and
purpose of the Haldimand Grant. From then until now, the Six Nations' Grand River
Council have always claimed that Simcoe's deed could never be binding upon them.'^ If
the Six Nations had merely wanted to sell the lands without seeking any additional legal
status, then Simcoe had technically made it possible for them to do so, but Brant wanted
more. Yet the Mohawk leader needed to use caution in seeking greater autonomy,
because his sentiments could have been construed as seditious. After rejecting Simcoe's
deed, the Chief poured out his heart to his soon-to-be estranged friend, Alexander
McKee, describing the breach between him and the British:
I am Sorry to inform you that we the Grand River Indians are.
. .greatly disapoited
[sic] of not having been able to obtain such Deeds we would have wished to have
.
.
.it hurt my pride and feelings extremely.
... I cannot hardly reconcile myself to
Live on Such Situation I never did expected [sic] that my attachment to the
English should any time Shake I am totally dispirited.'^
Knowing that Brant's loyalty to the British had been shaken, leaders in Canada
soon believed that they had further cause to question the Mohawk's fidelity. Late in
1793, Simcoe informed Lord Dorchester that the Six Nations' leader communicated
regularly with representatives in the American government, and that "Brant has said that
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-"'l<l ^'lh"'l «' ahn.alc nrani wh.k- war will, Ihc A„.crica.>,s appeared
..........uU. The
chiefs in(l„cnce over both the Six Nations and the Weste... ( onlede.aey could help to
(Idennine Hritam's (ntuic
.,, Ilppc, Canada. Yet Simcocjuslii.ahly feared that ll.cS.x
Nations' headman would exploit tins to ti.e Ind.ans' advantai-c by play..,,-, oil hmau, a.ul
tiic llniled Stales.'" I ruslrated in lus cllo.ts to ,.,a.n S.x Nal.o.is' sovereit',nly. RranI could
sill! perhaps utili/,e (his polc.t.al d. plo.ua, ic Icvcaj-c in order to play olTlhc (wo powers,
just as Ins ancestors had done, w.lh a dej'.ree of success, between the Hiitish and Ihc
French The only trouble was that in I 7'n (wo key elcinents with which HranI dealt the
Western C'onlederacy and the Americans were already at war, lessening his diplomatic
leverage in an eiroit to broker a peace lo Ihe Six Nations' advantage. Nevertheless,
Snncoe still feared that Hiant would eithei manipulate inatteis to draw Hiitam into a war
against Ihc Dniled States, or that the duel would mcidy coul..iuc alicm|)li.i)' to play oil
Britain a)',a.. IS, the- Uiulcs Slates Rt iiiaikiuido I )oiches,i-r aboul H. ant's machinations
I /
Hiaiii lo McKce, 25 February 1793, Johnston. Vallev of the Six Nations . 75
Siincoc \o DdicIicsIci, 6 December 1793, ibid.. 76.
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Simcoc explained "that he [Bran,] sees the Caiannt.es [the h.d.ans are to expeneneel
which in all probabn.ty must uhiniately attend the Conlmuanee oflhe War, unless by
some means or other Great lir.tain shall lake a dneet part on the protection ofthe
Indians"^" Si.iicoe demonstrated his suspicions ofthe chiefs disloyalty when the he
sided with McKee in the latter's dispute with Brant over a potential peace with the
American comnnssioners. Simcoe's decision to support McKee over Brant helped to
divide the Western ( 'onlederacy and ultimately proved fatal to its war effort against the
Americans. Thus, in little more than six months. Brant was twice thwarted, once by
Simcoe at the Grand River, and later by McKee, with Simcoe's support, at the Miami
Rapids.
Alarmed at Brant's growing belligerence, Simcoe considered "the use He [BrantJ
has made of his Power to be the subject ofjust alarm and that it is necessary by degrees
and on just principles that it should be diminished."'' By "just principles" Simcoe meant
that he intended to reduce Brant's authority gradually through official channels. The
Lieutenant Governor hoped to avoid an overt and permanent schism between Brant and
the British and sought legal means by which to reduce Brant's authority, including a fresh
interpretation indicating why the Six Nations could not sell or lease Grand River lands.
Having already questioned Brant's motives and loyalty to the British, Simcoe now
claimed that the chiefs land schemes were simply "illegal in respect to the Customs and
Laws of Great Britain. The Lieutenant Governor reminded Brant that, according to
Simcoe to Henry Dundas, 20 September 1793, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence. V: 59.
^° Simcoe to Dorchester, 6 December 1793, Joiin.ston, Va lley ofthe Six Nations
. 76.
^' Simcoe to Henry Dundas, 20 September 1793, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence
.
V: 59.
Simcoe to Dorchester, 6 December 1793, Joluiston, Valley of the Six Nations , 75.
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British law. if the Indians were mdeed allies, and no, subjects, then the Six Nations, no,
being subjects, could not lease or sell lands to Brittsh subjects." Th,s determination still
weighed heavily on Brant nearly three years later, when he complained about thts unique
interpretation in a speech near Fort George in 1 796." By having the ambiguous legal
status of dependent allies, the Six Nations had neither the full rights and privileges
enjoyed by British subjects, nor did they have the liberty to conduct their affa.rs as a
sovereign power.
Simcoe also delayed any determinations on the land issue for as long as possible,
infomiing Brant that any permanent decision m this matter would be made at Whitehall
by the King's ministers. The Lieutenant Governor then promised Dorchester, "In respect
to the lands on the Grand River, I shall do my utmost to procrastinate any decision on
2 5
them." Meanwhile, Simcoe took measures to appease Brant to some degree by visiting
the Grand River in 1 794 and allocating the necessary funds and resources to assist the Six
Nations in the building of a new council house. The government of Upper Canada also
promised a future pension for Brant's wife Catherine, in the event of her husband
preceding her in death, and in 1795 Simcoe even approved of a measure that granted
Brant 3,450 acres of land as personal property he had previously requested on Burlington
Bay.^^ Simcoe's concessions were significant, indicating that the government, while
Simcoe and Dorchester partially based Simcoe's argument on the rationale of the Proclamation of 1763,
which denied British subjects in North America from purchasing or settling on Indian lands.
Speech of Joseph Brant at an Indian Council, Newark, Upper Canada, 24 November 1796, Cruikshank &
Hunter, Correspondence of Peter Russell
.
I: 93; Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations. 82. Brant complained
that Simcoe had informed the Grand River nations, that, as "only Allies," the Six Nations "cannot possibly
have the King[']s Subjects to be. . .Tennants."
" Simcoe to Dorchester, 3 March 1794, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence
. II: 174.
" Same to Same, 9 October 1795, ibid., IV, 101-02.
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distrusting Brant and refusing to acknowledge Six Nations' sovereignty, thought it
important to continue amiable ties with them in an effort to secure their traditional
fidelity and support. The delicacy with which Simcoe and other Bntish leaders dealt with
Brant shows their continued respect for the Mohawk's endunng influence at the Grand
River and among American officials.
Prior to his departure from Upper Canada in the summer of 1 796, Simcoe made
one final attempt to solve the land issue by drafting yet another land patent that
incorporated a more-clearly worded provision by which the Six Nations could lease land,
albeit only to the government.^' Brant and the Six Nations rejected the new document,
because they still found it too restrictive, and the patent's wording did not necessanly
confine the leasing rights strictly to the Iroquois at the Grand River. It implied that other
remnants of Six Nations' enclaves, such as those at Buffalo Creek in New York and John
Deseronto's band at the Bay of Quinte, could also share in the revenue generated from
any leased lands at the Grand River.^^ For Brant, this would have defeated the puipose of
attempting to generate revenue specifically intended for his people's survival and
independent use at the Grand River. Still at an impasse. Brant continued to illegally lease
Native lands in hopes of one day having the legal right to sell the title to those lands.
After Simcoe's departure his successor, Peter Russell, for a time also attempted
delaying tactics regarding the Grand River lands, but unlike Simcoe, Russell was forced
to come to a more definitive resolution on the matter.^^ The new administrator, with little
" Simcoe to Brant, 2 March 1796, ibid., 206.
28
29
Brant to Joseph Chew, 17 May 1796, ibid., 268,
At the time of Simcoe's departure, he left the Province on the basis of a temporary leave of absence,
expecting to one day return. Therefore, Russell often preferred the title of "President," with the imphcation
that Simcoe would eventually return to the post of Lieutenant Governor.
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knowledge of Indian ainnrs or policy, had n,her.,e<l a chplonnU.e c.uagnnre lhal had
begnn helore Sinicoe's adnnn.s.rafon and was grownig worse. Branl nnn.echa.ely
pressured Russell (o speed.ly resolve the .ssue u, the Ind.ans' lavor. Kussell asked Bran,
to outhne in writing preeisely wh.ei, lands the Six Nations wished lo .sell or lease, and lo
whon..'" The new Lieutenant ( iovei nor then pronn.sed lo lay all of the requested
mionnatioii belore Upper ( anada's Lxeeutive ( 'ouncil fbr their consideration. Hianl
responded with lightning
.speed; he i.ssued the report to Rus.sell only two days after the
I -leutenanl ( ioveinor had re(|ueslcd it, and the Mohawk leader inloiined Russell that he
expected the entire matter to be resolved "m the course of Ten days."" Russell was not
prepared lo expedite matters in the manner that Brant expected. Due to the poor health ol
several members of the I-xeculive Council, and the fact that the legislative session had
ended, Russell did not have lo comply with lirant\s "ten days," and Ihc legislature could
not meet until spring. The delay enabled Ru.ssell to lurlher consult Whitehall,
particularly the I )uke olT'oilland, Prime Minister Pitt Ihe Younger's I lome Secretary.
While awaiting mslruetions from home and carefully pondering his response to Brant and
the Six Nations, Russell conHrmed that all of the pro.spective buyers of the Ciiand River
tracts were loyal British subjects, indicating that BianI did not wi.sh to subvert British
authority in Upper Canada.
When Brant learned that the Executive Council would not meet again during the
fall of I79(), and did not plan to reconvene until Ihe following May, he mleipieted Ihe
Ru.ssell lo Rrant, 2.1 Oc-folu-r 1796, rmikshaiik <"v llunaT, Rii sst'll ('(Mit'spondciKc, I: 75-76. All
piospcclivr |>iirchast'is ()! ( iiaiul Rivn liacls IkkI to liisl uiulnj-o a pun ess dI vci ilKalioii iii oiclcr to
conliiiM iIr-ii slalus as loyal Hiilish sul)|cx(s.
^' Hiaiil U) Russell, 24 October 1796, ihul., 76,
" Russell to the Duke ol rottiaiul, 14 Novemhei 17%, ibid.. 84.
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postponement as another intentional delaying tactic, similar to the methods Simcoe had




"^""^ "^"^^ ^''^ ^i.e. British officialsm ddJ.
.
..We cannot from their conduct towards us.
. .learn what their
Intentions are nor what we are to expect from them.
. ..It is not what we expected
nor what we deserved.
ca^ci^icu
Be assured that we have spoke[n] for the last time to the great men here onthis subject, as they have from their Conduct gave us plainly to understand that it
IS no their Intention to do any thing for us. . ..Surely our Father their Master [theKing], never intended that we were to be trifled with in this manner I repeat it
again, that is not what we deserve.-*^
Brant had come to the end of his patience, and, as he stated, he intended to never again
deal with British leaders in Canada on the issue. The frustrated leader instead resolved to
travel to Britain himself in order to secure a proper deed for his Grand River Reserve.
But, short of funds, he never made the trip, and, contrary to his declaration, he continued
to wrangle with leaders in Canada on land matters until his death a decade later.
Brant hoped to drive a wedge between Whitehall and the Canadian authorities,
and he tended to stress the Six Nations' loyalty and devotion to the King, often in
exaggerated terms. In November 1 796, Brant restated his peoples' loyalty, declaring,
[W]e pride ourselves by the losses we have suffered in the good cause of our
Great Father the King of England....and are firm in our Attachment to our Great
Father, the King of England.
.
..the ill Treatment we met with from Individuals
sent to [this] Country to rule, shall never wean our Affections form that
Government that sends them here.^''
The Mohawk leader even claimed that his peoples' fidelity and attachment exceeded that
of white Loyalists, adding, "this Disappointment in not obtaining our Grant would (were
Brant's speech at Newark, 24 November 1796, ibid., 93-94; Jolmston, Valley of the Six Nations . 82-83.
^* Brant's speech at Newark, 24 November 1796, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence
. I: 95.
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.it would leave a wound not easily to be healed. But we are hid.ans."^^
On numerous other occasions in his public statements, whether written or spoken m
council, the Mohawk leader was always careful to reaffirm this loyalty, promising that
his "affection and Loyalty to the King shall never be shaken."^'
Brant's opponents understood what was at stake. Russell's Attorney General,
John White, pinpointed the crux of the problem when he connected all of the
government's legal difficulties with the Grand River Reserve to "the Principal [difficulty,
whichj was that the Six Nations do not acknowledge the Sovereignty of the King.""
Despite all of Brant's rhetoric about loyalty, the specter of a potential Indian rebellion in
the vulnerable young province was empowering to the Indians, and Brant knew it.
Therefore, Brant played up the threat of an invasion to Upper Canada, and he did his best
to intimidate Russell. Years later, William Claus, the late Alexander McKee's successor
as Deputy Superintendent General, cynically remarked.
m a
Whoever pretends to a moderate knowledge of the 6 Nats, and their politics
War between two powers of white people which may affect their Country.
. .will
allow that their first and principal view... is to find out which of the two
contenting fsicj parties is the best able to supply them with their Necessaries in
Trade as well as best able to bribe them.
. ..During the interval of the Conflict they
make no Scruple of Conscience.
.
.
when Opportunity serves to take what they can
.. .by carrying Lies.'**
" Ibid., 94.
Brant to Russell, 1 1 June 1799, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence
. Ill: 228.
John White to Russell, 26 September 1796, Toronto Public Library, L 18, Peter Russell Letterbook. 16;
Cniikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence
. 1; 46.
William Claus, "Remarks and Observations upon Indn. Politics as to their Political Maxims in Time of
War between White People," undated, but presumably about 1804, CNA, MG 19 F 1, Claus Papers, Vol
11,65-66.
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Ciaus understood ,hat .here was a ,™„ ,o the S,x Nations' loyalty towards the Bnt.sh, as
Simcoe had previously surmised.
In 1 797, Russell personally experienced the Six Nations' diplomatic pressure.
The Governor infom^ed Portland that Brant and the Six Nations, with their patience
exhausted, "took upon themselves to conclude... the Sale of Part of these Lands without
waiting for His Majesty's Sanction."" Russell did not immediately dispute the sales,
regarding it as "impolitick [sic] in the present weak state of this Province to provoke
Insult even from an Indian Tribe."- Thus, the administrator chose not to openly reject
Brant's propositions, while st.ll maintaining that no "alienation of the lands [is]..
.valid
without the Consent of the King," and that the Six Nations "have placed themselves
under His Majesty's Protection by taking up their Residence within this Province."^'
Russell's letter to Portland hinted at the diplomatic vise beginning to tighten in
upon him. Neither Russell nor his superiors were prepared to recognize Six Nations'
sovereignty, but the weak condition of the amiy and small population of the upper
province prevented the government from flatly denying Brant's demands. Moreover, as
tensions between the government of Upper Canada and the Natives at the Grand River
escalated during the early months of 1 797, the home government at Whitehall, from its
distant vantage point, did not have a clear grasp of the seriousness of the situation. The
Duke of Portland did not think it necessary for British leaders in Canada to compromise
on the matter.
Russell to Portland, 28 January 1797, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Conespondence I: 131. This letter
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2.< II 12, I'rln Kiissrll's I rt.nhook nl iii.li.iii All.iiis. '> I! . .m<i llir I' !<,(),, ( \)
-U, I . HO K.j
K»l.al I ,,.sl„„, l.„(isl, envoy ,„ ihe , InMcl Stales; he also spoke U, a„yo„e else who
would hsien ,o h„„. WhMe i„ I-hihulelph,.-, ,he s.ehen, vo.eeci lus eo,„pl„„„s a, ,he „,„
where he lodged, purpoiledly asserting
with great resentment of the treatment he IkuI n.et w,th Iron, the Kmn'sOovernn.ent ol C "anada, and threatened, not ohunn redress tluou^,, me
I
Ilahcs are Irom "ru-kshank 's ed.ted vers.on; the phrase is underhned ,h
ongn.al letter ], that he would offer his services to the l-Yench Mnuster Adet(iTeneh envoy to the United States), and march his Moluwks to ass.st m effeeting
a Revolution, and overturning the Hnt.sh (iovernment n, the Province.
L.ston patiently listened to Bn.nl, but the Hnlish envoy wrote to Governor (ieiieral
Robert Piescott, warning him oC^the p(,ss,ble event of an Insurrection m the
1
1 )pper|
Province," hopmg "to avert so serious a danger."^" On I K June, (,iily days before the
Executive Council would meet, liranl wrote to Upper Canada's Surveyor General f). W.
(David William) Smith, exclaiming, "| WJe wish to be on the same looting w.th |the|
Government [asj we were before the |American| War... we look upon il that what we
formerly called the covenant chain is m .some danger ol getting rusty."^' The very next
day, the Six Nations' chief also sent a similar letter to Ru.s.sell, expressing his distress
that, unless the Six Nations could 'enjoy the lands here... in the same independent and
nnlimited manner |as they supposedly had done in the Mohawk Valley prior to the warj,"
then the ancient British-Iroqiiois friendship would be in peril.^'' Brant insisted upon this
point, and m late .liine three hundred angry warriors accompanied him to York, the capital
of the upper province, to forcefully demonstrate the importance of the matter while the
Ibid.. 156,
I.i.slon to Prcscoll, X April 1797, loioiilo I'lihlic l.ihiary, 1. iX, Rii.sscll I .ctlcrliook. 'H-<)4; Cruik.shank &
Hunter. Ku.sscll C'orrcsp()iKlciice
. 1: 160.
*^ Brant to Sinilli, hS June 1797, ibid., 189.
4h
Mrant to Ru.s.sell, 10 June 1797, ibid., 190; P.R.O., CO 42, 32 1 , 234,
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Indians awaited a decision.- Indeed, Brant's behavior dunng the spnng and summer of
1797 did not reflect the degree of loyaky he had proclaimed the previous autumn.
Brant's tactics brought a measure of success to the Grand River Indians'
endeavors.'''^ Acting on his own authority, but with the unanimous support of the
Executive Council, and hoping to ward off an Indian rebellion, Russell evaded his orders
from home and confirmed the land sales that Brant had already transacted. Fearing
imminent hostihties, Russell made this decision before he could receive final instructions
on the matter from Portland, even though the Home Secretary's previous correspondence
strictly forbade any alienation of Iroquois lands in Canada."' Since Russell had already
detcmiined to disobey his instructions, there was no longer cause for delay, which at that
point could only risk exacerbating the already-strained relations between his government
and the Six Nations. In addition to confirming the Six Nations' prior sales, the
Lieutenant Governor also provided a way for the Six Nations to conduct future land
transactions, but only to the King, who retained the right of preemption.^" Therefore,
Russell believed that in spite of his having neglected his orders, all parties would
ultimately be satisfied that he maintained peace and tranquility and entitled the Six
Nations to conduct future land transactions strictly with the government.
Russell's hopes were soon dashed; neither Brant nor Portland was completely
pleased. The Duke "lamented" the Lieutenant Governor's handling of the matter, and
Charles M. Johnston, "Joseph Brant, the Grand River Lands and the Northwest Crisis," Ontario History
LV(4) (1963): 275.
Ibid., 280-81.
"^ Portland to Russell, 10 March 1797, Cniikshank & Hunter, Correspondence of Peter Russell . 1: 155 -56.
'° Russell to Brant, 3 July 1797, ibid., 204.
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Portland feared that this show of British weakness might develop into "a most dangerous
tendency."^' For his part, Brant thanked Russell for his efforts thus far, but he
complained, "I am sorry the mode adopted is not yet satisfactory, because this is not the
footing we were upon before [Cruikshank's itahcs mdicatmg emphasis in original letter]."
Furthermore, the chief gave another subtle threat regarding the possible demise of
British-Six Nations relations, remarking that the government's continued intervention "is
entangling the Chain we so long kept hold of, which I should be sorry to be the case."^^
Brant's response stunned Russell, who summoned another meeting with the
Executive Council before meeting with the chief personally on 21 July 1797. Russell
nearly revoked his previous offer to Brant, explaining to the Mohawk leader that the
King's ministers would have to determine the Six Nations' legal rights regarding their
land, and that His Majesty's government would provide an annuity to meet the Six
Nations material needs in lieu of any alienation of lands, precisely what Portland had
already proposed. "Brant appeared. . .greatly affected by" this, and he passionately
explained to Russell that had his people known that "the lands on the Grand River were
given to them upon any other footing than that on which they formerly possessed those
on the Mohawk River," then they never would have accepted them, and he emphasized
that the Six Nations "were a free & independent Nation."^'* Russell, fearing that Brant
"was very capable of doing much mischief," relented and again extended the same offer
" Portland to Russell, 4 November 1797, ibid., II: 3; P.R.O., CO 42, 321, 345-49.
" Brant to Russell, 10 July 1797, Cruikshank &. Hunter, Correspondence of Peter Russell, I: 211.
" Russell to Portland, 21 July 1797, ibid., 219-21.
Ibid., 221.
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he had presented to the chief earher in the month.^^ The government of Upper Canada
therefore confirmed the land sales that the Grand River Indians had already made, but in
the future the Crown would possess the right of preemption, and the King's ministers
would serve as trustees on any further relinquishments of Grand R.ver lands. Knowing
that he had better take what he could get, Brant this time responded favorably. He
thanked Russell and said, "This Sir, is every thing we wanted, we have no desire just now
to dispose of more land, as this will be enough for our immediate wants."^^ Three days
later, Russell met in council with the leaders of the Six Nations, all ofwhom "marked
their satisfaction & Approbation in the most distinguished manner," and Brant
emphatically declared "that they would now all fight for the King to the lasi drop of their
Blood."" Russell thought that the matter was finally settled.
The acting Lieutenant Governor discovered otherwise the next day, when he was
"not a little mortified" to receive a new speech from Brant, supposedly written on behalf
of the Six Nations' leaders and expressing the Six Nations' dissatisfaction. They again
specifically requested that Russell "empower them to continue to sell at their pleasure
without waiting for His Majesty's approbation."^^ When Russell held his ground,
threatening to end all agreements regarding the confirmation of the current land sales.
Brant again backed off, explaining that the Six Nations did not expect Russell to
acquiesce, but that the Lieutenant Governor should interpret this latest written speech as a
" Ibid.. 222.
Ibid
" Russell to Portland, 29 July 1797, Ibid., 228.
Ibid.
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matter of tnbal protocol, in which the Indians needed to voice their sentiments.^^ In other
words, the Six Nations' council did not want to completely accept Russell's offers
without first officially submitting his people's objections and misgivmgs. Brant's pomt
was simply that, although his people would accept Russell's terms on this occasion, they
did so only grudgingly, and that the Six Nations still believed that the Bntish had an
ethical obligation to eventually recognize their full sovereignty.
Brant, like Russell, found himself in an impossible predicament. The Mohawk
sachem derived his non-hereditary authority from a people who still believed themselves
to be free and independent, and he was caught between them and the Bntish, who would
never grant this degree of autonomy. Brant frequently faced critics and had to deal with
quarreling factions at the Grand River, but as long as he kept the pressure on the British
regarding land matters, his leadership authority among his people would remain intact.
Thus, while facing similar plights. Brant and Russell needed each other in order to effect
a compromise that would keep the peace, permit a degree of latitude for the Iroquois,
provide a future method of meeting Six Nations' material needs, maintain provincial
security, and preserve dignity on both sides, allowing both men to retain their positions.
Russell's position was particularly delicate. The administrator understood that his
disobedience to Portland's instructions might mean his dismissal, and as Russell
anticipated, the Home Secretary was not pleased with Russell's actions. In utter disbelief
Anthropologist William Fenton makes an important point in explaining that Iroquois people
"distinguished 'talk in the bushes' when an issue might be explored or an agenda formulated from more
formal meetmgs or conferences preliminary to a treaty." This sheds light on Brant's apparent
inconsistencies durmg these public and private talks at York m the summer of 1797. See Fenton,
"Structure, Continuity, and Change in the Process of Iroquois Treaty Making," in The History and Culture
of Iroquois Diplomacy
, ed. Francis Jennings, et. al. (Syracuse; Syracuse University Press, 1985), 27.
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tlK.I Russell wcn.lcl perm,, ^'Rrant, or any other (^hief or Body of Indians, to uiterlere with
the...Government of His Majesty's Provmee," Portland wote that he considered this
a most dangerous tendency, and the necessity of giving wav to
.,, [andj allowing
such necessity to have existed, can only have arisen from not pursuing a pro-x"
.ne ol conduct towards the Indians, who, in consequence of the assistance they
<lenve and can only derive from the King's bounty, should be given explicitly toinideistand, that they owe every return, which can he expected from the warmest
gratitude, and the most unshaken fidelity.''"
Portland saw no reason why the British should have to compromise with Natives w!io
derived then malenal support from the King. The Home Secretary could only conclude
dial illhe Indians had a mistaken understanding of this relationship, then it meant that
Russell had not properly implemented sound Indian policy.
Russell knew better. Portland did not grasp the dangerous political climate in
I Ipper Canada, and he did not seem to have a full understanding of just how weak the
British position in the province was at the time. Most importantly, because the Duke
believed that British leaders m Canada could act from a position of complete hegemony,
he saw no reason to compromise, and he assumed that mandates could be unilaterally
imposed on Native people, even though the Indians still considered themselves sovereign.
Rut Russell realized that if he handled the affair in this manner, he might ignite the
rebellion that everyone hoped to avoid. The beleaguered President wrote to Governor
Cieneral Robert Prescott, explaining this
dangerous dilemma to which I am reduced: Disobedience of His Majesty's
Commands or an Indian War, and tho' I should choose the fomier, I am not
certain I shall escape the laller, for it appears.
. from the offence .loseph Brant has
PoitUiiul to Ru.sscli, 4 November 1797, Cruikshank & Iluntci, Russell Coiicspoiideiicc
. 11: T.R.C),, C O
42,321.345-49.
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taken wUhout cause that he meant to pick a German quarrel whh us and onlyseeks a feasible excuse for joining the French should they mvade this Province/"
Clearly, Russell and the British government in Canada did not have the level of
dominance and control within the upper province that Portland imagined from his
vantage point in London.
Portland's view of Indian gilts also differed sharply from that of the Six Nations.
While Portland considered the "King's bounty" a means of pacifying the Natives and
securing their future cooperation. Brant and the Six Nations always regarded British gifts
as compensation for past services, and they never felt that by receiving the King's
presents and provisions they had forfeited their independence. By accepting the gifts as
compensation for previous services rendered, the Iroquois understood the transfer of
goods as a solemn gesture symbolizing British faithfulness and indicating that the bond
of friendship, or the Covenant Chain, between the British and the Six Nations could never
be broken. Portland's narrow understanding of Indian affairs signaled further conflict
with the Grand River community.
Continuing Struggles at the Grand River, 1797-180 1
The continued existence of these diametrically opposed views regarding the legal
status of the Indians in Upper Canada meant that Russell's compromise on the land issue
produced a temporary truce only, since it failed to address the real issue of Native
sovereignty. This chapter subsection focuses on some of the other issues at the Grand
River, in which, as in the case of the land crisis. Brant and the Six Nations continued to
strive for greater autonomy. Among these issues were the Six Nations' bid for a resident
Russell to Prescott, 17 July 1797, Toronto Public Library, L 18, Russell Papers, Letterbook of
Correspondence with Governor General Robert Prescott, 1796-1799.
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clergyman, the. intertnbal dealings with the Mississaugas, a French nobleman's attempt
to settle on a land grant from the Mississaugas, and Brant's overtures to the United States
government and to tribes dwelling withm Amenca's borders.
By the mid-summer of 1797, Lieutenant Governor Russell's failure to resolve the
land grant issue was becoming increasingly evident, and Brant, frustrated but resolute,
sought new ways to strengthen his position, in hopes of one day arguing his case to the
King that his people should receive a land patent bearing a title in fee simple.
Meanwhile, Portland, troubled by Brant's machinations, sought for the rest of Russell's
administration and beyond to check at every turn Brant's seemmgly expanding power.
The Duke's main fear was that the Mohawk sachem, having extorted a compromise from
Russell, would subsequently be encouraged to seek to expand Native power even further.
Consequently, Portland wanted leaders in Canada to keep the indigenous nations of the
upper province and the Great Lakes divided and dependent upon the British, thereby
undermining all of Brant's endeavors. As the Home Secretary put it in a letter to Russell,
it was necessary to give
strict attention to every possible means of preventing connections or
confederations from taking place between the several Nations, and. . .the rendering
them dependent on your Government, and keeping them as separate and distinct
as possible from each other, should be laid down by you as a system.^^
Indeed, Portland's instructions marked a sharp departure from the policy that Simcoe had
pursued merely two and three years earlier, when the former Lieutenant Governor
attempted to encourage a vast confederacy that would theoretically serve as a buffer to
protect Upper Canada from American expansion. The difference between 1797 and 1795
was that the Americans no longer posed a threat, and, ironically, Portland and Russell
Portland to Russell, 4 November 1797, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence
. II: 3
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now bel,eved ,ha, ,he Ind.ans themselves presented the real danger to the tntemal peace
and security of Upper Canada.
Realizing that Portland had ample reason to remove him from his post should the
Duke wish to do so, Russell consciously strove to comply with every aspect of the Home
Secretary's instructions for the remainder of his administration. Consequently, Russell
now became more active than ever in attempting to curb Brant's power and influence,
and he carefully monitored all matters pertaining to the Grand River. Early in 1798, less
than a year after the heated land disputes of the previous summer, another issue arose
which brought Russell's intervention. Towards the end of 1797 Brant had petitioned
Superintendent John Johnson, requesting a pennanent resident clergyman of the Anglican
faith to serve the Six Nations on the Grand River." The Indians there had not known the
benefits of a resident minister since the Reverend John Stuart departed in 1789, and Brant
grew concerned regarding the future spiritual well being of his people.'' The Mohawk
leader had already selected a potential candidate, Davenport Phelps, a former lawyer who
had studied for the ministry and now sought ordination.
Like all of the other issues surrounding the Grand River at the time, the subject of
procuring a resident clergyman soon became linked to the question of the Six Nations'
fidelity. From the start, authorities in Canada expressed concern, not so much over
Phelps's spiritual qualifications, but regarding his political sympathies. The Bishop of
Quebec, one Jacob Mountain, emphasized the important role of an Anglican clergyman at
the Grand River, "not only in... Religious and Moral" affairs, "but [also] in a political
63






.1 v.cw;- Russell c,uestioned (he loyalty of Phelps, who had once served as an
omcer in an Ameriean militia and who, as an attorney
.n Upper Canada, had purportedly
helped rally a group of sedit.ous fanners u. a march on a provn.c.al courthouse in support
of a man accused of treason.
1 he adnnn.strator sa.d he considered
,t h.s "duty to guard
against the introduction of Persons to situations ol (hal nature (wherein they may do
misch.el) whose attachment to the British Constitution, I have the slightest cause to
suspect;""' Yet Russell also noted "that the placing of a discreet & respectable
Clergyman of, he ( hurch of l^ngland among the five [i.e. Six] Nations would be a most
iisefi.ll |sK| measure in every point of view, whether religious, moral, or Political."''^
Portland later agreed, arguing that the Grand River Indians should have a "resident
Clergyman... Rut... (hat the choice should be entirely independent of them, and lhal they
and the Clergyman should know and feel, that they neither have been, nor ever will be,
consulted on die subject."^**
Both Russell and (he Bishop were probably aware of the role the American
mi.ssionary Samuel Kiiklaiul had played in splintering (he Iroquois Confederacy by
(urning the Oneidas and Tuscaroras against the British in (he RevohKion. Kirkland iio(
only helped (o bring abou( (he ex(inguishinen( of (he League's Council fire a( Onondaga
in 1777, bu( he also succeeded in undeiininiiig (he fabric of Brilish-lrot|uois relations.
John WoKe l ydekkfi, I'he Faillilul Moliawks (New York: The Maciiiillan Co.; and Canibiidge. UK:
ranihiulgc (Jniversity l^icss, 1*).^S), lK()-87.
t>(i
Bishop of Oiiebec- to Ru.s.sell. 1 1 .laniiary 1798, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondencp, II: 63
Ru.s.scll lo (,)iic-hec, conlKlfiiliai, 22 i et^niarv !7<)8, ibid.,
Ibul,
Poi llaiul lo Rus.sell. 24 January 1799. P.R.O., CO 42, 324, 3-4.
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Even if by chance both Russell and the Bishop of Quebec had forgotten about K.kland's
influence in drawing the Indians away from the British, John Johnson certainly would
have remembered these difficulties between his late father and the politically biased
missionary.- The Bishop of Quebec demed Brant's request to orda.n Phelps, arguing
that no person is "fit to be their [the Indians'] Spintual instructor who would be disposed
to unsettle their notions of loyalty & obedience & weaken their attachment to the
Governments under which it is their happiness to live."^°
To no avail Brant, himself a staunch Anglican, complained to Russell, noting
Phelps's puiported 'Testimonials of his Moral Character and Loyalty." Brant further
reminded Russell of the assistance that the Archbishop of Canterbury had promised to
him in the King's presence twelve years earlier in London.'' The Mohawk naturally
assumed that the provincial leaders would want the Six Nations to have a resident
minister, since they had encouraged the teachings of Anglicanism among his people for
nearly a century. Despite these efforts, a suitable and willing candidate never
materialized, and the Grand River never acquired a resident minister during this period.'^
Embittered, the Mohawk chief threatened to invite "a Romish Priest" to settle at the
For a background of this schism, see Graymont, The Iroquois in the American Revolution
. 42-47.
™ Quebec to Russell, Private, 12 June 1798, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence . II; 180.
^' Brant to Russell, 8 May 1798, ibid., 148; P.R.O., CO 42, 322, 155.
Instead, the Bishop of Quebec petitioned the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (S.P.G ) for an
augmentation of Reverend Robert Addison's salary, and the Bishop directed him to make frequent itinerant
visits to the Grand River. Addison served a parish in Newark, near Niagara, and after he accepted the
additional nunistry, he managed to travel to the Grand River four times per year. In essence, this
arrangement hardly differed from what the Six Nations at the Grand River had experienced for more than a
decade, and it did not meet the demand for a resident clergyman. See Quebec to Russell, 12 June 1798,
Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence
,
180-81, and Reverend John Stuart's Report to the S.P.G.,




Grand R.ver ^ The decision to override Brant's request in this matter was another b
to the Six Nations' quest for autonomy and, more specifically, to the chiefs authority.
Preventing Phelps's appointment was actually a single measure in a much larger
secret policy through which British authorities worked to reduce Brant's power so
gradually that he and his supporters would not be alienated from loyalty to the Crown.
Robert L.ston, British emissary to the United States, believed that "every movement on
the part of Brant... must naturally give rise to suspicion." Considering the "delicate
nature" of "the crisis" of Six Nations' dissatisfaction m the face of a potential French
invasion of Upper Canada, Liston thought it best "to temporize" with Brant, believing
that the British should "damp his [Brant's] hopes by degrees, [rather] than at once to
extinguish thcm."^^ Portland concurred, and the Duke advised Russell to "temporize with
Brant, even if you have reason for thinking unfavorably of his Conduct.""
Accordingly, Russell clandestinely took measures to reduce the chiefs influence.
Portland feared the possibility of Brant "endeavouring to form a Combination of
Indians.
.
.adverse to His Majesty's Interests," and he therefore ordered Russell to follow
"the general line of Policy" that he had previously given to the administrator "in order to
defeat such Combinations."^^ In making these remarks, Portland referred to his
instructions to Russell from the previous November, when he instructed the Lieutenant
Governor to keep the Indians "as separate and distinct as possible," in order to prevent
" Reverend Robert Addison's Report to the S.P.G., 29 December 1799, Johnston, ibid., 241-42.
Liston to Lord Grenville, 4 April 1798, Craikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence
. II: 168.
" Portland to Russell, most secret, 7 June 1798, ibid., 167; P.R.O., CO 42, 322, 100-02.
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"connections or confederations."^ Russell ordered agent WHHam Claus at Fort George
(near Niagara) "to do everything in his power (without exposing the object of th.s Pohey
to Suspicion) to foment any existing Jealousy between the Chippewas [i.e. Mississaugas]
& the Six Nations; and to prevent as far as possible any Junction or good understanding
between those two Tribes."^« In addition to giving Claus these instructions, Russell had
appointed a new agent, James Givens, whom he ordered to oversee Mississauga affairs,
hoping to remove this tribe from Brant's influence.^'^ Since the Mississaugas had grown
accustomed to participating at the Six Nations' Grand River Council Fire and receiving
their gifts from the British there, Russell feared this growing intertribal connection. Thus
the administrator attempted to put a halt to this growing fraternization by ordering Givens
to move the Mississaugas' council fire to the mouth of the River Credit, away from the
Portland to Russell, 4 November 1797, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence II: 3. In a letter
two months earlier Portland had already given Russell virtually the same instructions. See Portland to
Russell, 1 1 September 1797, ibid., I: 277-78; P.R.O., CO 42, 321, 193-95.
Russell to Portland, 21 March 1798, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Conespondence
. II: 122; The
Mississaugas are actually a branch of Chippewas (or Ojibwas) who lived in the southern portion Upper
Canada, mostly along the northern shore of Lake Ontario. When Russell used the expression "Chippewas"
he is most likely using this interchangeably with "Mississaugas," because later in the letter the President
referred to them as "the Chippewas who come from the Vicinage of Lake Simcoe," who were actually
Mississaugas. Moreover, Russell also used the expression "Mississaugas" at another place in the
document. British leaders in Canada also used the names interchangeably on otlier occasions. See Donald
B. Smith, "Who are the Mississauga?," Ontario History 67(4) (December 1975): 211,221-22. Despite the
small Mississauga population, the British respected the tribe's capacity for war, knowing that the
Mississauga would probably manage to procure the assistance of their more numerous Ojibwa cousins to
the North and West. See Peter S. Schmalz, The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario (Toronto, Buffalo, & London:
University of Toronto Press, 1991), 104.
" For Givens' appointment, see Russell to Givens, 25 June 1797, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell
Correspondence . 1: 231-32.
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to
Grand River and nearer to Givens's agency at York.«° From the new site the
Mississaugas would receive their annual presents directly from the Bntish.^'
The Mississaugas realized that it was in their best interests to maintain a close
com^ection with Brant and the Grand River community at the time. When compared
the Six Nations, the Mississaugas were poorer and more migratory, dependent pnmanly
on seasonal hunting, gathenng, and fishing.^^ By contrast, the Six Nations were more
sedentary, dwelling in permanent villages and practicing a more advanced form of
horticulture than most indigenous peoples. The Iroquois m Upper Canada were also
more numerous than the Mississaugas, who had consisted of barely 1,000 individuals in
1790, a small number that continued to diminish as white settlers moved into the region
north of Lake Erie.^^ Moreover, the Six Nations had far more expenence m dealing with
the Bntish Empire, and Euro-Amencan leaders generally respected them more than they
did the Mississaugas.'' Finally, the Mississaugas had been pressured to cede most of
their lands in the southern portion of the upper province in the final quarter of the
Russell to Portland, 2 1 March 1 798, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence II: 122. The old
city of York was later renamed Toronto.
The location of the new Mississauga council fire is the site of the present-day city of Mississauga,
Ontario, situated on the northwest end of Lake Ontario.
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197; Peter S. Schmalz, The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario (Toronto, Buffalo, & London: University of
Toronto Press, 1991), 104-05.
^'^ Dean R. Snow, The Iroquois (Maiden, MA & Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1994), 141-57; Sally
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c,,h.ccn.h c cnu.ry, giving then stronger incentive to enl.st the support of the Six Nations
in an effort to retain a remnant of territory.**^
Russell aniK-.pated some ci.llkully m separating the Mississangas Iron, llu- Six
Nations. At the tnne, relations between those groups were very amiable, and, more
in.poi lanlly, the Mississaiigas had attempted lo ph.c c- (hcn.sclves under the direction and
leadership of Joseph Hrant.»" Russell Ihuclorc knew he would have to contend with the
Mississaugas' p.oicsis when he attempted l„ divide the indii-enous nations in his
province. Rc lal.ons between the British and Mississaugas had still not luily recovered
aflcr a tragic incident that had occurred late in the summer of I 7%, when, as a result of a
spontaneous misunde.standmg,, Wabakenin, the princ-pai Mississauga leader, lost his life
in a drunken scuffie with a Hntish soldier.'*' For the Mississaugas, the loss of a
competent leader sliaiiied relations with the ihilish and led Ihcm to tuin I.) HianI, whom
they ap|)oiiited "the sole guardian of our Nalioii, and as our Ag.eiil
. .
. .|and| Attorney for
us," giviii,', Brant control over all ol ihcir allairs and dealings with whites, hi their speech
lo Biaiil, Ihc Mississauga chiefs also reaffirmed "the connection between our Nations,
which we hope yon have not forgot."**"
Although Brant had not orchestrated this arrangement, his willingness lo accept
leadeiship over the Mississaugas was precisely what the British had feared. Just as Bianl
Foi Hiilisli Mississiui^Ni irhilions and llir land cessions i\uiu\y, this period, see Schmal/. 102 10, 120-30;
KoluMi
.1. Siiilcrs. Indian I and Siii i cndt i niOnlaiio, I /U \ i SO / (( )iia\va; iX'pai liucnt ol Indian AlTuirs
and N(»iilirin Drvclopnienl, ( anada, I*>H4), I U60.
Russell to I^Hlland, ?I Man h I7Q8. Tnnkshank A llnnlcr. Russell ( \ )ii(*-.p<>nd(-M^ r, I! 122.
Kelsay, SOS 0*> A ynn\\) ol Mississaugas issued a deposition re^'ardinf* the eveni lo officers near Foil
Cieor^-e. II Srplenihei 1 ( N A. K( i S. Mdilai v < Sri irs, Vol 2'!*). \U'> /O.
HK
Speech ol llie Mississaii)j.a ( luels al ihe Mohawk Village on Ihc ( nand Rivci. \ ^ Apiil I /')H, ( nnkshank
Sc llunlci. Kn .scll ( oiicspondcin c, II; 186.
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had always desired, the new position made him the pnncipal Native leader and sole
liaison between the Bntish and the Indians in Upper Canada. Furthennore, this could
potentially have given Brant significant influence with the bulk of the Ojibwas and
Ottawas of the Great Lakes. Quite simply, such developments threatened a Bntish policy
of acting unilaterally in Indian affairs. Any growth of Brant's influence with the majonty
of Indians in Upper and Lower Canada at a time when the upper province remained weak
raised the specter of Brant and the Six Nations gaining the necessary diplomatic leverage
to compel the Bntish government to meet their demands. Lieutenant Governor Russell,
alamied by these possibilities, noted to Governor General Prescott that Brant's activity
among the Mississaugas "Militates most strongly against the Policy which the Duke of
Portland recommends. "^^
Just as Simcoe and McKee five years earlier had prevented Brant from gaining
the ascendancy over the Western Confederacy, thereby blocking the chiefs attempts to
negotiate a peace between the Confederacy and the Americans at the time, Russell and
the officers in the Indian Department now took all necessary measures to bar Brant from
Mississauga affairs. As in 1793, Bntish intervention divided the hidians by overcoming
Brant's influence, but this time, the British intentionally hoped to foster the division.
Brant suspected the British motives in appointing Givens and moving the Mississauga
council fire, and in a letter to Russell the chief claimed that the new policy had made the
Mississaugas "apprehensive" and "uneasy," and "they think it done with an intent to
disunite us."*^*^
Russell to Prescott, Secret and Confidential, 15 June 1798, ibid.
Brant to Russell, 5 November 1798, ibid., 307.
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In the ensuing council the Mississauga chiefs voiced their concerns and
complaints regarding the new policy, adding that they had registered these complaints
with Brant.^' After the Mississauga leaders mentioned Brant, Claus "immediately
answered," trying to put their minds at ease regarding their concerns; without mentioning
Brant's name, he implicitly denounced the Mohawk leader, claiming that he (Claus)
could not "but believe that you have been urged to say what you have now spoke, and
that It does not come from yourselves." The agent also wanted to use this opportunity to
foster the division that Portland and Russell had ordered, so he ended the council,
exclaiming that whoever had told them these things "were bad people."'' The
Mississaugas did not seem convinced, mostly because Claus never gave them a
satisfactory explanation of why they were compelled to move their council fire. Instead,
the agent twice told them that the only reason for the change was that "the Govermnent
looked upon it to be for their good."'"*
The removal of the Mississaugas' council fire to the mouth of the Credit River did
not end the collaboration between Brant and the Mississaugas. The latter continued to
seek the Mohawk's advice in the wake of Wabakenin's death (1796), a time when the
leaders in Canada were pressuring them to make further cessions. Brant complied with
the Mississaugas' wishes, continuing to advise them on land matters, further irritating
Russell, Claus, and other British authonties. Shortly after Russell had ordered the
removal of the Mississaugas' council fire, Brant invited all of the Mississaugas to visit
the Six Nations on the Grand River, where they renewed their friendship in May 1 798.
91
Council between the Mississaugas and Claus at the head of Lake Ontario, 3 November 1798, ibid., 306.
Ib.d.
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The Mohawk leader viewed himself as the "guardian to the.r lands," cla.ming ,ha, he
assumed
.h.s role in order to fuinil a promise he had made to the late Wabaken.n and his
people.'^''
By 1799 the Mississaugas had grown very concerned over the goveniment's
intentions. According to Brant, the Mississaugas had come to beHeve that the
government wanted all of their lands and was even willing to terminate their long-
endunng friendship in order "to depnve them of it [i.e. their lands] wantonly." Brant
wrote William Claus that he would advise the Mississaugas to maintain faith in the
British, but the chief added a complaint of his own. He could not understand why his
actions should spark "[t]he jealousy of Govermnent," when he [Brant] had, as he put it,
always sought to "promote the Welfare of the Country" and its "attachment to
Government." If Bntish-Indian relations had become strained, therefore, this was in
Brant's view due to the fact that the British "in Several instances... seem[ed] to put aside
the Covenant Chain."^^
The frustrated Mohawk also complained to Claus that the British method of
dealing with the Indians had come to mirror that practiced by the American government,
and it appeared to him that the Crown would henceforth always exercise its "preemptive
right" in acquiring Native lands. The government might pay lip service to the Indians'
supposed status as "free and Independent people," but the words meant nothing as long as
the government did not allow them sole and full authority over their lands, including the
right to dispense with them as they so chose. By denying the Indians the right "to Sell or
Ibid., 305-06.
94
Brant to Claus, 4 June 1798, CNA, RG 8, Military C Senes, Vol. 251, 113.
182
"'^





'""'luci or.nir liiriKls. M, nnuly
,-osc.i,I.I,mk Mk ^
.u,k,o»|»ic.J,""- 1 1,„: III .III iiu' III';
" "' l"« "'I'- I""'. .1 M,v„...:..,M,,, „,(.•„-:;,.., I,n,„l
' "' N'"'"- I II l.u„|.. „. ,.|v. .,,,,1 „| l,i» p. .•„ „
iOVrii-i^'iily ovri llic ( ,i .iiul K' i vn l.nuls
"•-l""'^^'- <" II.. •.. Ic-Msi.,,.;, MnliNl, milluuidr.; lnn|,o,.u.lv
. r.,:,rd Hum
^^'ssis,sm.^,. h.n.h R.„|.n llMM I.I.M.Ilv n.lon,. Ii,.u,( llul
he onl.l ,.ol srrvr ns mkcmI nn.l p,.,la (o, ol ,lu- M.v..ss..,h;.s. ( iovnno. (icucn.l I'h m
"'-"f'l" " -Whh rx,,r.l,n,C- (.„ Kussdl •'nol (o ..Ih .npl U. u.ln ml..
.,nv 1 ,r.„v
wlulrvci will, ll.c McsiilMgmis" lo. .uvlnir AIiIhm.k.I. Iu" M.II ,.l...nu-.l I..
.,,.,„„,„
llU'.r MiSlillmiK.. Inillo.y
.,1 lIu- hn,.-. Ku.v.rll l..u kr.l oil I,..,., un.Mr.lii.ldv pillsiiinK
in lUTolialu.ii:. Ki,:.ncI| .„uI I',. •....|| lu.pr.l h. .h.ur.lil U,,ml in ll.o oyes ofllir
Mississiiiij-'.ii.s. (lcm..ir.ii.ii,M,. (<. ili. in ih.,| ilu ii I.iiuIn wcro NOClirc.'" I hc Diikr ol
"Ml. Miir.l. mlvisiiiK RusHoll ••.I..I I,, shrw nny.
. .ciiK.rmrss" irKauliMK. Ilwil l.ihe's
liinds "iinlil (In- M,-.,
.. ...„,^M,r..; jn.- iiiipreiied Willi .1 ,|,ir sense ol Ihc uI.Iik.iIioiis llicy aio
mi.lci lo Ihs Maic.Mv Ihr l».rsrnls I hry.
. .receive." I'..iII.uhI ;uiliu|..ilnl 'IImI nuino






M l i ,\
I'lrsi-till lo l<U!4irll. AuKiisI I m. ( niikNliaiik
.S; lliiuln. lvu-. .rll < .-iif.|...|K|riKC. II / Al ... ncc
I'icsiotI It. I'liilliiii.l, AiijiiiNl I /'>H. il.ul,. 2'I7,
on
r..illiiihl In K'lissrII. N N.ivniil.ri \ m. iLnl
.
KH). P K ( )
.
(
"0 42, 32,'. I I I
In sp.te of Portland's instructions to wait for a better opportunity to purchase
additional Mississauga lands, the matter could not be so easily set aside. A cadre of
Mississauga chiefs, with Brant as their spokesman and advisor, had already begun plans
to complete a cession, only this time one supposedly favorable to Indian interests and one
in which they were demanding exorbitant terms. Years earlier, Simcoe had considered a
land grant to an exiled French nobleman. Count Joseph de Puisaye, who had supported
the British in their struggle against Revolutionary France. Like so many of the French
noblesse emigre, de Puisaye and his people did not expect to return to their homeland any
time soon, and the Frenchman had already begun discussions with Brant and the
Mississaugas to acquire a substantial tract of land in Upper Canada. Therefore, in April
1 799, Brant gave Russell a touching proposal, arguing "it was in the Cause of Loyalty
this Nobleman and his unfortunate followers had suffered," and since the Six Nations
"had suffered in the same Cause," the Mississaugas were now willing to part with a five-
mile strip of choice lake-front terrain at the northwest end of Lake Ontario.'^ The
Mississauga chiefs, at Brant's urging, hoped to compel the British to pay the Indians'
requested price of one shilling, three pence per acre, Halifax currency,'^^ for the entire
69,120 acres. '°' Thus, in spite of his warnings to the Mississaugas regarding the Bntish
desire to expropriate their lands. Brant pushed forward with the proposal, hoping this
time to control the negotiations and manipulate them to the Indians' advantage.
Brant to Russell, 10 April 1799, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence
. Ill: 168.
'°° According to Brant's best biographer, Isabel Thompson Kelsay, this was the equivalent of three shillings
four pence sterling per acre. Hence, Halifax currency was worth nearly three times the value of Britain's
standard currency! See Kelsay, 590.
Brant to Johnson, 10 May 1799, Cruikshank cS: Hunter, Russell Correspondence
. Ill: 195.
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Russell sensed Brant's intentions, and he attempted to eireumvent the chiefs plan
by mformmg the Mohawk that ,f the British engaged in further negotiations for
Mississauga lands, these would he handled through the ageney oflnd.an Supenntendent
John Johnson. Rven if the Mississaugas had earmarked the land for the Count de
Puisaye, the government reserved the right to alter or deny this agreement. The governor
also pointed out that it was Brant and not the British in this case who had pushed for
dispossessing the Mississaugas of their land.'"'^ In truth, however, Russell simply wished
to remind Brant of protocol, realizing that the proposed transaction would not occur, and
that John Johnson's services would therefore be unnecessary in this instance. The
administrator and his Executive Council thought the Mississauga proposal absurd,
considering it "Injurious to His Majesty's Interest & consequently improper to [be]
acceded to, not to mention the extreme hidecency of their [the Mississaugas'] presuming
to shackle their cessions to the King by any condition whatsoever."'''^ Even if the
government had wanted to, it could not have paid an amount close to what Brant and the
Mississaugas demanded, particularly at a time when the Indian budget had already been
drastically slashed and when the war with France continued to drain the home
government's treasury. Russell explained the abortive agreement to the disappointed
Count de Puisaye, emphasizing the impropriety of the Mississaugas' "Innovations
derogatory from the King[']s dignity," and the administrator found it ironic "[t]hat
Indians being ever inclined to express strong attachments to old usages, ought assuredly
Russell to Brant, 25 April 1799, ibid., 183.
'"^ Russell to Prescott, 26 May 1799, ibid., 209. Also see, Russell to Portland, 26 May 1799, ibid., 205-06.
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[lo] be the last .n attempting thus to introduce new ways in then- T.ansaet.ons wUh
For the tnne bemg then, the Count and h.s followers would reman, hon.eless, and the
British still refused to reeognize Brant as a spokesperson for the Mississaugas.
Russell did not even bother to n.lonn Brant of the Exeeut.ve C ounc.Ps decision
rcgardn.g the Miss.ssauga lands. From the Bnt.sh perspective. Brant's repeated attempts
to challenge the Bnl.sh government seemed to substantiate Portland's wamings regarding
the hazards of the government's attempts to compromise with Indians. They also
demonstrated the apparent w.sdom hehmd the Home Secretary's cautioning against the
dangers of permK.mg the existence of intertribal confederacies and coalitions during this
period of peace with the Americans. When Brant dnally inquired a few weeks later, the
Lieutenant Governor curtly shot back a response the same day that he received Brant's
letter, exclaiming that "it was the Unanimous opinion of the Board thai this offer ought
not to be accepted because it is contrary to past Usages with Indian Nations who have not
before (that we have heard of) fettered their cessions of land to the King with any
Comlitions (as italicized m C'ruikshank's edition] whatsoever."'"' Moreover, as Russell
had done in his correspondence with Brant a month and a half earlier, he again insisted
that John Johnson would handle the government's future dealings with the Mississaugas.
hi his stniggles against British leaders in Upper Canada Brant had lost, and he
knew it. Throughout years of striving for the diplomatic leverage that could one day
guarantee his people their sovereignty, he found himself checkmated at every liii n.
Beginning with Alexander McKee's undermining of his inlluence and authority among
Russell to Count dc Puisaye, 26 May 1799 & 1 1 June 1799, il)i(J., 21 1
Russell lo Brant, 10 .hmc 1799. ibid., 226.
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the Western Confederacy at the Miami Rapids in 1 793, continumg with the flirther
humiHation Brant expenenced when Simcoe, Russell, Dorchester, Portland, Liston, and
Prescott all worked to deny him and his people a full title in fee simple to their lands, and
after leaders in Canada and at Whitehall combined to deny Brant a resident clergyman at
the Grand River, Brant was finally thwarted in his attempts to serve as the Mississaugas'
agent, m spite of that nation's request. After this string of defeats and humiliations. Brant
could bear it no longer. Yet when the Mohawk's anger boiled over, Russell merely
ascnbed the disgruntled chiefs behavior to either a case of too much "liquor or his
extreme Impatience of Control.
Although the crestfallen Mohawk for the time being reflised to fraternize any
further with the leaders in Upper Canada, he decided to make a last-ditch attempt to sway
Prescott's opinion. Brant again stated his grievances, complaming not only of matters
pertaining to the Mississauga lands but the Grand River case as well. The chief got
nowhere with Prescott, who told him that he would have to petition Russell on these
matters. Additionally, Prescott attempted to do Russell a favor by defusing any of
Brant's remaining hopes and explaining,
that whenever any Lands were wanted from Indians by the Government, they
would be consulted respecting them according to ancient Customs, and they
would be purchased from them in the manner prescribed by the Established
Regulations and in no other way.'°^
The Governor General's remarks dealt Brant a crushing blow, not only because the chief
had appealed to the highest authority in all of Canada, but because Prescott's words
Russell to Prescott, 22 June 1799, Toronto Public Library, LI 8, Russell Papers, Letterbook of
Correspondence with Prescott, 1796-1799.
Prescott to Russell, 18 July 1 799, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence
. HI: 278.
187
presumed Native subservience to the Bnt.sh, precisely what Brant had stnven to
overcome ever since his people's migration to Canada.
Brant returned from his visit with Prescott no less perturbed and resentful than
before. By December of 1800 he even senously entertained the notion of resettling his
people within the boundaries of the United States. Brant wrote a "secret and
confidential" letter to an American fnend, Thomas Moms, asking to make "a purchase of
the Western Indians" from within the jurisdiction of the United States in order to perhaps
"move there" where "we would desire to be under the protection" of that govemment.'°«
In this letter Brant revealed that he had not given up on his dreams of an autonomous
status for his people, and he even hinted at the possibility of gaining an authoritative role
over the western tribes within the United States.
In the summer of 1801, barely six months after his letter to Morris, Brant
addressed some of the western Indians within the boundaries of the United States, namely
the Ojibwas, Ottawas, and Potawatomis living near Detroit. In possibly his most
inflammatory public speech ever. Brant sharply denounced the British while attempting
to rally the Three Fires under his leadership. He informed the Three Fires' leaders that
they "have been misled by the advices [sic] of your [British] Father and the mistaken
Ideas of the Shawanies & Wyandotts." The Mohawk leader included these latter two
tribes in his indictment against the British because of their continued close ties to the
Brant to Thomas Morris, 26 December 1800, quoted in William L. Stone, Life of Joseph B rant
-_:
Thayendanegea, 2 Vols. (New York: Alexander V. Blake, 1838; reprint, Harrison, NY: Harbor Hill
Books, 1969), II: 405. Brant's biographer Isabel Thompson Kelsay argues that the chief had no intention
of moving from the Grand River, but that he merely wanted to turn a profit from this American land
scheme. Yet, Kelsay does not offer any better explanation indicating why Brant would not have been
sincere in stating his desire to move. See Kelsay, 620-2 1 . By this time in his career Brant had come to the
end of his patience with the British, and his subsequent speech to the western Indians at Detroit in the
summer of 1801 demonstrates his sincerity.
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latter at A.MlK-..s,„nrg and Brownstown. respectively. Us.ng
.n.cnt.onal sarcasm directed
at the Shawnees and Wyandots. Brant inforn.ed the Three F.res that he would not address
those two tribes because "they consuler themselves w.se enough .o guide their own
conduct." in truth, the clucfst.ll su.arted fron. the rcbulThe had received from those
nations when they had heeded Alexander McKee's advice in council at the Foot of the
M.anu Kap.ds c.ght years earlier. At that time McKee had urged them not to
con.pronnse w.th the American peace commissioners and to insist upon the Ohio River
as a permanent bo.mdary between the Native Confederacy and the United States. The
Shawnees and Wyandots had not only opposed Brant's proposal, but they also managed
to undermine the leader's inllueuce anu,ng the majority of the Confederacy at that tmie.
Now the angry Mohawk remmdcd the I hree Fires' headmen that "[h]ad you listened to
my advice [at the kap.ds in 1793
J mstead of attendmg to that of the English Shawanies[,]
the United States would have hail then limits more circumscribed, and you would not
have lost your country."
Brant dul not stop there, choosing to further vent his grievances against the
British, particularly the leaders in Canada. He infomied the Three Fires that they could
only blame themselves for "listening to the foolish advice of those petty Officers at the
different Posts who call themselves your Father." At this point Brant exempted the King
from his harangue against the British, assuring his Indian audience "that the King has no
confidence in them [the leaders in Canada]; they are unexperienced [sic] and do not
desei-ve attention and the British Ciovemment altogether has shewn great ingratitude to
those [Indian allies] who have rendered it the greatest services. ""^'^ Finally, Brant boldly
10')




claimed that am a greater Man than then, al,, the Con.n.ander in Chief not excepted,"
and "I n^yselfhave done more for that [British] Goven.nent than any of those whom
call Father.'" This speech represented a turning point in Brant's diplomacy. Having
grown weary of dealing with leaders in Canada, he now sought external support, whether
<lu.t he from the United States government, the tr.hes dwelhng on the Amencan side of
the border, or from the British Monarch directly.
Nevertheless, the chief st.ll wished to form a coalition of tribes that could coerce
the Euro-Amencan powers to recognize an autonomous Native state, hi this respect,
Brant considered h.s phght similar to these Indian nations that he addressed on the
American side of the border and therefore attempted to identify with them. He believed
himself dispossessed of h,s land by the British authorities, in spite of the Haldimand
Grant and his position as Grand River agent and Captain in the Indian Department. Now
he hoped to form a new confederacy and proposed to the Three Fires to meet him in
council at Buffalo Creek with the Iroquois who lived on the American side of the
boundary. ' '
'
Nothing appears to have come of this invitation, nor did the American
government respond to Brant's overtures via Morris to establish a new home for his
people in American territory. Consequently, after 1801 the Six Nations' leader
apparently abandoned his American scheme, and he resolved to formulate a strategy of
ultimately presenting his Grand River case to friends and government leaders in London.
Brant still retained a kernel of faith in the home government. Wanting to believe





of the extent that leaders m Canada had taken the. orders from Whhehall. The Duke of
Portland constantly sought ways to reduce the chiefs influence, and when Portland
regularly laid Russell's letters before the King, there is no evidence that George III,
though having met Brant personally, ever mtervened on the chiefs behalf Instead, the
home government grew more confident m its dealings with Brant as the threat of a
French invasion dissipated. Portland and other Bntish leaders at Whitehall knew that the
French would have much difficulty in transporting an ^rmy to North Amenca. Bntain's
continued naval supremacy drastically limited French strategy after the stnng of decisive
British victones at Ushant, Camperdown, Cape St. Vincent, and the Nile. As a result, m
December 1 798 Portland denied Prescott the military reinforcements that the latter had
requested, and from Philadelphia Bntish envoy Robert Liston also happily informed
Russell of the reduced threat to Canada, stating that "[njothing can be effected there [in
Canada] against His Majesty's Government without external assistance, and the late
destruction of the French Squadron by Admiral Nelson.
. .will probably damp the ardour
of the enemy for distant expeditions."' The predictions of Liston and Portland proved
prophetic, and by 1800 Bntain's naval supremacy had virtually ended France's hopes for
a restored North American empire.
The fortunes of war had also made the leaders in Canada more bold in matters
pertaining to Indian affairs. The passing of the French threat meant an end to any
diplomatic leverage that Brant had once enjoyed in his efforts to intimidate Upper
Canada's leaders. Such conditions meant that provincial leaders now had no reason to
give in to the chief s demands, as Russell had done in 1797. In 1800, for example, Peter
112
Portland to Prescott, 6 December 1798, Cruikshank & Hunter, Russell Correspondence
. Ill: 23; Liston
to Russell, 1 December 1798, ibid., 1.
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Hunter, Russe,,, successor as Lieu.enan, Governor of the upper prov.nce, used less ,ac.
than his predecessors when he ".old [Bran,] ,ha, I would not pennit h™ ,o ac, as an
Agen, for,heMiss,ssagaus."- Then rn September
.801. shortly after the Mohawk's
inflan,matoo, speech at Detro.t. Brant received a letter from his longtime friend and
nephew by mamage. S,r John Johnson, to a manner simultaneously caring and ster.. the
Supenntendent informed Brant that the government could not permit him to take on the
role he sough,, whether w,th the Miss.ssaugas or any other nation(s). Johnson instructed
him
iTJZllTr " affairs, and desist fromassembling the different nations in distant parts of the country and on'v atterdthe business of your settlement, except when called upon by
.oZTa^lZTo
otherwise; as it gives opening to the world to put unfavorable conZcdons onyour conduct which must tend to lessen your consequence in the opinion of those
at the head of affairs; and I much fear may do you senous injury."^
Deeply hurt by Johnson's words, Brant interpreted this language as a veiled
threat. Indeed, Johnson probably would not have sent such a letter four or five years
earlier, dunng a time when provincial security seemed at risk due to rumored invasions
and strained relations existed between Bntain and the United States. In his response,
Brant vehemently defended himself and his loyalty, and he complained of the
government's "change of politics," arguing that there was once a time when his efforts at
uniting the Indians "formerly gave satisfaction," but this "has now quite a different
effect."' The frustrated chief wrote two letters to Johnson m such a vein, but neither
Hunter to Portland, 8 March 1800, CNA, MG 1 1, CO 42, 325, 111.
Johnson to Brant, 1 September 1801, quoted m Stone, II: 406. Also see, Kelsay, 625.
Brant to Johnson, November 1801, quoted m Stone, II: 407-09.
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drew a response. Having endured war, dispossession, and a forced m.grat.n from the
Mohawk Valley, this friendship, after nearly fifty years, was over.
By the turn of the nineteenth century, little had changed at the Grand River
Reserve since the Six Nations' refugees had moved there m 1784. Apart from Russell'
compromise in recognizing some of Brant's land transactions with private buyers in
1 797, the British had made virtually no concessions to the Grand River community.
Consequently, the struggle for sovereignty would continue, and Brant proved himself
both resilient and relentless in this quest. The aging Mohawk never abandoned his
dreams, and in the first years of the new century he would look increasingly to his
talented protege, John Norton, and to some old fnends in London, hoping to finally




JOHN NORTON AND THE CONTINUING STRUGGLE AT THE GRAND RIVER
1801-1812
^ivcj^,
In the history of the mtertnbal community at the Grand River, the years between
1801 and 18 12 divide mto two broad periods. From 1801 until his death in November
1807, Joseph Brant, the Mohawk ehieftain, remained the dominant figure in the
community. But as will be described in the first section of this chapter, John Norton, a
younger leader whose career was promoted by Brant, came to prominence at the Grand
R.ver m this period. Together Brant and Norton attempted to defend the nghts and future
of the residents of the Grand River. Brant's passing inaugurated a new phase of the
community's history that will be covered in the second section of this chapter. From
1807 to 1812 Norton became Grand River's most prominent local leader, even though his
leadership was challenged by leading Bntish officials in Canada and also by some Native
opponents. A volatile penod that culminated with another war involving Upper Canada,
the years between 1801 and 1812 were a time when the future nature of the Grand River
community was debated and its very survival often at stake.
The Emergence of John Norton. 1 80 1 - 1 807
As described in the previous chapter, Bntish leaders in London, other officials in
Canada, and the Indian Department's agents had worked in conjunction to thwart Joseph
Brant at every turn. After briefly considenng the possibility of removing his community
to United States territory. Brant had delivered his inflammatory anti-British address to the
nations of the Three Fires gathered at Detroit. These aftempts to establish a sovereign
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Native confederacy outside ,he boundaries of British tem.ory hav.ng proved fruuless, ,he
s.ym,ed Mohawk leader continued his efforts to improve his people's eondit.on while
remaining at the Grand River.
Reahzing the Hmitations placed upon him, Brant altered his approach in dealing
with Canadian and Bntish authonties after 1801. The Mohawk leader no longer
corresponded regularly with Claus, Johnson, or any other officials in the Indian
Department, nor did he continue to file gnevances with the Lieutenant Governor's office
after Peter Hunter, who had succeeded Russell, admonished the chief about his efforts to
head the Mississaugas and illegally lease Grand River lands.' Having a clearer idea of
his opposition, he became more reserved in openly discussing matters pertaining to the
Grand River, except in formal council. Although he did not abandon the fight to gam a
proper land patent for his people at the Grand River, the chief now understood that he
could never attain this through the conventional channels of the Indian Department and
the office of Upper Canada's Lieutenant Governor. In the meantime Brant focused his
attentions on improving the internal conditions at the Six Nations Reserve and on
completing the still-outstanding land transactions involving the sales of the six large
"Blocks" of land along the Grand River that President Peter Russell and the Executive
Council had approved, albeit under duress, in the summer of 1797. If he could confirm
some of these sales. Brant believed that this would produce enough income to
temporarily alleviate the Six Nations' impoverished condition.
'Kelsay, 619, 624-26.
195
As an ally in all of these endeavors dunng the early years of the new century,
Brant came to rely heavHy on John Norton.^ Bom about 1770, th. talented nnxed-blood
of Cherokee-Scot parentage first met Brant dunng the 1790s when Norton worked for
British trader John Askm m the regions of Detroit and the Maumee Valley.^ Norton
possessed a plethora of abilities; he proved an articulate wnter and a fine orator, and he
purportedly had mastered English, French, Spanish, and Gem.an, in addition to a dozen
Native American dialects.^ While visiting England and Scotland on separate occasions,
Norton became acquainted with many significant individuals, including the Duke of
Northumberland, the Earl of Moira, the Earl of Camden, Lord Castlereagh, John Owen,
George Canning, Sir Walter Scott, William Wilberforce, and other members of the
latter's Clapham Sect. Under the direcfion of Wilberforce and with the support of Owen,
who was the Secretary for the Bntish and Foreign Bible Society, Norton translated the
Gospel of St. John into the Mohawk language. He later wrote a history of the Iroquois
League, adding his account of the League's participafion in the War of 1812.^
Brant sensed these talents many years before Norton's travels abroad. In 1796,
after the conclusion of hostilities in the Maumee Valley and the British withdrawal from
To date, the best biographical study of Norton is Carl F. Klinck's "Biographical Introduction" (pp xiii-
f« ^he Journal of Maior John Norton. 1 809- 1 S 1 that Klinck and James J. Tahnan edited and
published in 1970. Other biographical essays on Norton include: Klinck's "New Light on John Norton "
Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada IV(IV) (June 1966): 167-77, and J. McE. Murray's "John'
Norton," Ontario Historical Society Papers and Records XXYVTT (194S)- 7.I6.
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^ In 1816, Norton gave and dedicated this volume, along with a journal of his travels to Cherokee country
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governors of New \oik, (John Jay ami Cicorgc Clinton) in 1799 and 1802.
Noilon's Speech at Onoiulaivi. (iiarul Rivn, 12 IVbiuaiy IS()7, Noilon Irtlcibook, Ayci Ms, 1 19-20.
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lhe.r chiefs According to trad.tional Iroquois practice, whenever a evil chief died, top
matrons of the deceased chiefs clan would choose a successor, usually a son, to Hll the
vacated posit,on."> However, men of s.gn.Hcant bravery and skill could be named war
ehiefs, regardless of fam.ly or clan status. Therefore Norton, a Mohawk by virtue of h.s
adoption by Joseph Brant, was eligible to be selected as a war chief independent of the
clan matrons' selection process for creating civil chiefs. In a statement made in 1 805,
Norton nnphecl lhal war chiefs generally possessed more talent and held more mnuence
than c.v.l chiefs, and that only those civil leaders with the best oratorical skills could
aspire to the higher honor of becoming a war chief" Perhaps Norton chose to present
the distinction this way because of his own war-chief status, but his view was consistent
with (he great importance war chiefs had in the Six Nations' Grand River society,
initially a group of wartime refugees, the Natives living at the Grand River had always
looked to war chiefs to handle their affairs after their removal from New York. Their
principal chief, .loseph Brant, had never been named a civil chief, holding all of his
authority and inlluence by virtue of his martial feats and former connections to the
Johnsons and by his position as a captain in the Indian Department.'' fechnically both
Klinck & l alman, Joiimal of Major John No rton, xxxvii-xxxix, xl-xli.
Snow, 64-65.
" Sec Norton'.s address at Trinity College, Cambridge, 12 March 1805, quoted in Khnck & Talman,
Journal ol Maior .lohn Norton, xxxvni.
Kelsay, .18-45, 109; Despite never having formally been selected a civil chief, lirant appaieiilly had
become considered a de facto civil chief at the (iraiid River by the time of his death, ilis widow Cathe
leading matron of the Mohawk l urlle clan, took the initiative to appoint her son (and Jo.seph's) as his
successor. Sec t.ydekkcr, 1 88-89.
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Brant and Norton were war chiefs, but at the Grand Rwer they handled all of the affa.rs
that civn chiefs would have managed in the days of a umted confederacy m New York.-
Though shanng much of Brant's vision for improvements at the Grand River
community, Norton had hopes and expectations that transcended those of the elder
leader.'^ Brant had at one time imagined an autonomous and self-sustaining Six Nations
as independently allied to the British and situated at the helm of a united western
Confederacy, a position he believed his people had enjoyed for generations poor to the
American rebellion. Now with these hopes virtually dashed and his influence reduced,
Brant concentrated his efforts on gaining full control over Iroquois land for the puipose
of generating revenue through legal land sales and leases that would slow the growing
poverty at the Grand River.
Norton shared this goal, but he also envisioned much more, desiniig to wholly
transform Native society. His schemes would come to resemble the assimilationist
programs ordinarily associated with the Jeffersonian benevolence that the United States
practiced during these early years of the nineteenth century in an attempt to transform
Native cultures and lifestyles.'^ Although he was circumspect about revealing the details
of his acculturationist ideas to the community at the Grand River, the chief made no
secret of his plans when he petitioned the support of important leaders in England. In a
lengthy letter to his friend John Owen, Secretary for the British and Foreign Bible
Address of the Six Nations to William Claus, 3 September 1806, York, Norton Letterbook, Aver Ms 62-
63; Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations
. 273-74.
Kelsay, 650.
Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father; The United States Government and the American Infli.gn^ abr.
ed. (Lincoln & London: University of Nebraska Press, 1984 & 1986), 48-57; Anthony F. C. Wallace,
Jefferson and the Indians: The Tragic Fate of the First Americans (Cambndge, MA & London; The
'
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), chapters 6 & 7.
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Socty, he descnbed the S. Nations' pHght and asked the Secretary and h. colleagues
to finance nothing less than the transformation of the Grand R.er commumty. To begin
with, Norton proposed that the Society send "a Missionary or an Instructor, a Farmer, a
Blacksmith, a Wheelnght, a Spmster and Weaver, a Tanner[,] Saddle & Harness Maker"
to the Grand River Reserve.'^ From this cadre of support, he contmued,
llZtf^"^
'^'"^^ be immediately formed, sufficiently stocked with Cattle & themeans for carrying on its cultivation to perfection; the Young Men migh beemployed to work on it, & it be fon.ed into a kind of seminary for ^ Boy &
onldrst^'f^
'"^ °f ^1-- useful bLls
Norton's request also called for "some indulgence [to be] shewn their parents or relations
to encourage them to be instructed, a little bnbery used for the promotion of religion and
industry may perhaps be excused and leave us only to regret that the blindness of the bulk
of Mankind somefimes may reduce us to that necessity."'^
Norton's description of a seminary and educational farm resembled the mission
stations that the United States government encouraged among Native peoples at the time.
Norton probably knew of the activities of Quakers, Moravians, and Presbytenans who ran
government-supported missions among the Iroquois in New York, and among the
Cherokees, Shawnees, Delawares, and Muskogees."' Furthermore, in attempdng to
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convince Owen of the benefits of such programs, the ch.f even pra.sed "[t]he System of
the United States to keep friendly & contented the hidians/'^^
This praise and optimism regarding United States Indian pohcy probably
stemmed from Norton's knowledge of the successful transition toward an agncultural
economy made by his father's people, the Cherokees. Just how much the Amencan
government was responsible for these developments among the Cherokees is debatable,
but this half-Cherokee believed that the government had "sacredly observed and
guaranteed the Treaty [of Hopewell
-1785]" and with good results - After Norton's visit
to Cherokee country, he praised that nation for retaining "the appearance of
Independence," and for making vast improvements in agnculture, including both
"Cultivation" and "great herds of cattle." He also lauded Cherokee women for their skill
in spinning and weaving.^^ The mixed-blood chief hoped to duplicate these successes at
the Grand River, but he understood the fragility of developing societies, and he especially
feared the external pressure that encroaching European settlements placed on fodian
communities attempting to acculturate. Even for the mighty Cherokees, Norton predicted
that it would require at least a century of uninterrupted development before "they might
become a flourishing, civilized Nation."^"*
Norton's zeal for acculturationist reforms stemmed in large part from his genuine
Christian faith. He considered himself an Anglican, as did many Mohawks, but Norton
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was
Wherever he went, he sought opportunities to worsh.p with other Chnst.ans, and he
determined to eventually bring all Native peoples to the knowledge of the beliefs he had
adopted. Shortly after his return from his first trip to England in 1804-1805, he
distributed 500 eopies of his translated Gospel of St. John at the Grand River, and when
Norton later stopped at the Cherokee village of W.llstown m present-day northern
Alabama, he addressed the ehiefs in council there, "[l]ay[ing] before them, that which is
due from Man to God; the frailty of the one, the Great Mercy of the Other, a bnef account
of the Creation; the Fall, and the Redemption of the World by our Lord Jesus; with the
duties he inculcates, and their application in life."^^ Also along this southern journey,
Norton stopped at a Moravian mission in northern Georgia and "joined in the devotions
of these worthy people." He described them as "Missionanes, who are blest with the
feelings of true religion. May the Almighty, bless and prosper the pious labours of these
worthy Christians, who sojourn with a strange nation.""
Despite Norton's enthusiasm for transforming Indian communities into Christian
societies, a large number of Natives, both at the Grand River and elsewhere, did not
embrace his ideas. In a letter to Owen, Norton confessed that "religion does not flounsh
as might be wished
-there is too much catching at the shadow and neglecting the
26
substance." Part of the problem, as Norton later complained, was that "there is no
proper minister to instruct them in the word of God." Since the leaders of Upper Canada
and Whitehall had denied Brant's request for a resident clergyman in the late 1790s, an
Norton to an unknown recipient (probably Owen), January, 1807, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms., 142-43
For Norton's speech to Cherokee council at Willstown, see Klinck & Talman, Journal of Maior John
Norton , 72-3.
" Ibid., 68.
Norton to Owen, 12 August 1806, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 36.
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ordamed mm.ter
.s.ted them only about tw.ce a year " Norton feared that legmmate
conversions would not occur on these rare occasions, because ",t . only the ceremony
that is perceived," and he lamented that "the estabhshed Church of England do not take
upon themselves" the style of missions that the Moravians practice.^^ Rev. Clark
Kendrick, a visiting mimster from the Massachusetts Baptist Missionary Society,
corroborated Norton's fears, exclaiming, "[Y]ou may see the natives returning from the
whisky shops, when they appear and act more like incarnate devils than Chnstians."^^
The lack of a resident clergyman at Grand River may have hindered the spread of
Chnstianity, but other obstacles impeded this as well. The Grand River Reserve was an
intertnbal, multi-cultural community, contaimng a number of religious onentations. On a
visit to the Grand River villages in 1800, Rev. Samuel Kirkland encountered a Mohawk
prophet who experienced visions and prophecies from "the Upholder ofthe Skies
[italicized in Johnston]." The Mohawk holy man also had reintroduced the froquois
White Dog ceremony with considerable success at the Grand River and elsewhere. Brant
was grudgingly compelled to permit this prophet's sacrifices and rituals, because the
latter'
s
teaching had "gained almost universal credit in the settlement."^°
The State of Missions amongst the Iroquois about 1810, taken from a survey completed bv John Norton
Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations . 244.
Norton to Owen, 12 August 1806, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 36-7; State of Missions amongst the
Iroquois, 1810, Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations . 244.
^"^ The Rev. Clark Kendrick's Opinion of the Six Nations, 1809, Johnston, Valley of the Six Natiom 243-
44. For additional assessments regarding the state of Christian missions among the Indians of Upper
Canada at this time, see Report to Lord Castlereagh, enclosure in Gore to Castlereagh, 4 Septem.ber 1809,
P.R.O., CO 42, 349, 94-95. Rev. John Strachan, Rector at York durmg this period, also made a very
similar report corroborating Gore's findings. See Strachan's undated report on the Indians of Upper
Canada, Ontario Historical Archives, John Strachan Papers, F983, Vol. 9 (Ms 35, Reel 9).
The Rev. Samuel Kirkland's Account of Religious Practices on the Grand River, 26 February 1800,
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The Mohawk's prophecies and practices bore similanties to the teachings of the
Seneca prophet Handsome Lake, whose new rehgion had a significant impact throughout
all Iroquois settlements in the same penod. Handsome Lake viewed his teachmgs as a
restoration and punfication of a traditional Iroquois religion.^' His tenets denved from a
series of visions in 1799 and 1800 in which the Creator instructed Handsome Lake to
revive a number of religious ntuals that had neady lapsed among the Senecas and other
Iroquois nations. The Creator's revelations also entailed the observance of a stnct moral
code, calling for abstinence from drunkemiess, wife abuse, infidelity, promiscuity,
gambling, theft, witchcraft, bickering, and gossiping.^^ Handsome Lake's people needed
to adhere strictly to the observance and practice of this modified faith, lest the worid
come to an end. These teachings appear to have gained some adherents at the Grand
River.
Brant, Norton, and other Chnstians at the Grand River indirectly benefited from
the spread of Handsome Lake's religion of the Longhouse, for the Seneca prophet
espoused a number of the ideals regarding lifestyle and culture that the Christian
missionaries also championed. In addition to his rigid moral code, Handsome Lake
spread a message of peace, denouncing every form of conflict and warfare, and he even
announced that Iroquois men should now take up agriculture for a living." These
precepts departed radically from froquois cultural practices of merely a generation before,
when warfare had been a necessary component of Iroquois life in the ongoing struggle to
preserve the League and extend the Covenant Chain, and when agricultural pursuits were
^' Anthony F. C. Wallace, Death and Rebirth of the Seneca . 315-17.
" Ibid., 239-54, 278-85; Snow, 158-62.
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reserved s.r,c,Iy for women. Handsome Lake further struck a blow at longstanding
Iroquois tradition when he called for the formafon of male-led nuclear fam.lies, which
would mean an end to matrilocal fam.ly settings and a decreased significance of the
matrihneal clan system « While the new religion revolutionized Iroquo.s life and
resembled elements of Chnsfan culture, ,ts purpose was to preserve its community intact
against the onrush of that culture.
In light of such sweeping changes by respected religious leaders from within the
former League, Norton's own acculturationist schemes appear less radical. Like
Handsome Lake, the adopted Six Nations' leader did not believe that agncultural labor
diminished a warrior's honor and dignity. As Norton once remarked, "The most
industrious at the plough, generally shew themselves the most persevenng at the chase,
when in Winter they throw aside the hoe and take up the gun."^^ Norton also believed, as
he put it, that "possession of property is the basis of civilization," and that "little hopes
can be entertained of their [the Six Nations'] improvement either m Christianity or
agriculture" without the tribes' adoption of a private property system.^' Norton, like
Handsome Lake, was very concerned about the further loss of Native lands, and he feared
that unless the Six Nations chose to adapt and privately use the land, they would
eventually lose it to scheming people.
" Ibid., 280-81.
34
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" Norton to William Wilberforce, 1 September 1808, P.R.O., CO 42, 140, 180; Johnston, Valley of the Six
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Norton resented the pattern of white encroachments and Native land dispossession
that tended to accompany the Jefferson administration's assimilationist programs and
Christian evangeHzation. The estabhshment of mission stations and forced land cessions
always followed in the wake of Native defeats. But Norton rejected the idea that Natives
could not become Chnstians while they were still thnving cultures and independent
peoples. He believed that genuine Chnstian missions should attempt to bolster the
Natives' quality of life and independence and prevent the Indians' slide into the status of
wards. However, Norton believed that the negative white influence in undermimng
Native cultures had particularly prejudiced indigenous peoples against "the Light oithe
Gospel [as italicized in Klinck's edition]."^^ But the most staking difference beUveen the
young Mohawk chiefs ideas and those of numerous others interested in acculturation
programs was his view that the Indians should retain all of the land that they cuiTently
held, and that they should not be compelled to move.
Nevertheless, as a last resort, Norton contemplated the scheme of moving the
Grand River community farther away from the whites in an effort to retain the integrity
of the Six Nations' culture and political autonomy.^^ The prospect of building a
modernized, agriculturally-based pan-Indian state had appealed to Norton for some time,
and if positioned farther west, this intertribal community could be expanded to include
the tribes of the Three Fires. In 1 806 he wrote to John Owen, requesting that Owen and
the Bible Society "without delay secure a patent" for the Ojibwas. Ottawas, and
Potawatomis near Lake Huron in order to establish Christian schools and agricultural
Klinck & Talman, Journal of Major John Norton
. 48; Norton to Wilberforce, 1 September 1808, P.R.O.,
CO 42, 140, 180-81; Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations
. 278-79; CNA, RG 10, Vol, 27, 15825.
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m>ss,ons among .hem before whUe encroachments severely
.a.n.ed
.heir communit.es."
Norton predicted that this "attempt at cvihzing them" would "become a general benefit
to the whole" of all the Indians livmg in the Michigan peninsula and Upper Canada.
Norton also believed
.ha, the Six Nations, who relied more heav.ly on agriculture and
who were n.ore ap. .o .h,nk in terms of owning pnvate property than the Three Fires,
would play a significant role in the establishment of th.s socety."' Here, Norton argued,
the Six Nations could po.en.mlly uni.e w,.h "Chippawas, Otlawas, Pon.awattamies,
Shawanons, Wyandols, Miam.es and others from the Southward," forming a
confederated Native state." The mixed-blood leader further reasoned that hts scheme
would also benefit British mterests, arguing that the assembled tribes of .he upper country
"would be more for the good of .he Empire in case of war.""' Such .h.nkmg, though
noble and visionary, could never prevail at a time when the Crown feared Six Nafions'
sovereignty and Whitehall had taken pains to prevent any intertribal comiections, as
Brant had discovered.
Norton's ambitious scheme to create an independent confederacy of acculturated
tribes illustrated the widening gulf between his thinking and that of British officials as
both sides pondered the future role of Indians in Canada, and this gulf foreshadowed
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further conflict between Norton and the Indian Department.- The m.xed-blood leader
came to resent the Department as the pnmary obstacle preventmg the process of
acculturation and political autonomy for the Indians dwellmg in Upper Canada.
Furthermore, Norton had somehow gamed knowledge of the Department's previous
attempts to divide the Natives when Portland and Russell had issued secret orders to
William Claus and his subordinate agents to foment as much division as possible between
Upper Canada's tnbes/^ Much of the remainder of Norton's career at the Grand River
involved an ongoing conflict with the Indian Department, a struggle that would
eventually reach its climax in a leadership schism between Norton and Claus dunng the
Warof 1812.
As time passed, Norton's resentment of the Indian Department grew. He fully
grasped the one-sided and incongruous relationship between Britain and her former
Indian allies, one in which Bntish leaders strove to reduce their Indian expenses and
obligations while simultaneously continuing to assert their authority and influence in
Indian affairs and refusing to recognize any actual Native sovereignty. He was also
frustrated by the hierarchical structure of government in Upper Canada, which would not
formally hear any grievances or complaints by the hidians unless they filed them
In a council held at York in early September, 1806, William Claus raised the concern that the Six Nations
intended to destroy the Indian Department. Though a legitimate allegation. Brant denied it. See A Six
Nations" Address to William Claus, 3 September 1806, Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations . 274; Norton
Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 66.
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specifically through the official channel, the Indian Department.^ Hence, m dealing with
an organization whose best interests lay in preventing reforms of the govei^ment's hidian
policy, and without recourse for submitting appeals in Canada, Norton understandably
saw the Indian Department as the pnmary impediment to reform, regardless ofhow much
this Department merely represented an extension of the overall government's policies.
Without gaining adequate redress from officials in Canada, Norton articulately
and colorfully aired his grievances to his fnends in London. Wnting to Robert Barclay in
1 806, he descnbed the Indian Department and its measures as rumiing counter to all
forms of advancement and philanthropy. He complained that this orgamzation merely
encouraged "idleness & corruption," and "unless the system is changed & its effons be
united with yours [that of Barclay & Owen] it will resemble two men jumping into a
canoe & paddling against each other," causing the canoe "to remain in the same
position."^^ Again wnting to Barclay nearly four years later, Norton more pointedly
descnbed the Department, this time likening it to "a bad tree that not only bnngs forth
poisonous fruit, but is also of such pernicious influence that even in its shade no
wholesome plant can thnve."^^ Norton also presented these concerns to Owen, arguing
that the Department's "principal object seems to be our ruin."'' He asked the Bible
Society's Secretary to use his influence with the government in order to, if possible,
eliminate the Indian Department altogether, requesting that Owen "eradicate this
Norton to Castlereagh, 23 July 1805, CNA, MG 1 1, CO 42, 340, 123-24; Six Nations' Address to Claus
3 September 1 806, York, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 66; Norton to Owen, 28 January 1 807, ibid., 82.
Norton to Barclay, 20 October 1806, ibid., 77.
Same to same, 16 June 1810, ibid., 130.
Norton to Owen, 12 August 1806, ibid., 26-27, 30.
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opposhion at the founta.n head.'- The Mohawk leader further suggested that the
"Government.
.
.turn the vast expence [s.c] of the Indian Department towards the end.
. .of
bettering the situation of the Indians," wh.h would have entaHed rechannehng all of the
agents' current salaries mto mission programs and matenal necessities for the Indians.^
Norton's struggle with the Indian Department eventually degenerated into a
running battle between him and WilHam Claus. Previously the two had always been at
odds, and Claus had begun to evince his distaste for Norton as early as his [Claus's]
appointment to the position of Deputy Supenntendent General of Indian Affairs m
1 800." Norton had at one time worked as an interpreter under Claus at the Department's
Fort George agency, and later while Norton was still working there, Brant appointed him
his personal deputy in handling official Six Nations' affairs. This in itself must have
annoyed Claus, who, as acting agent at Fort George, was technically the liaison between
the Six Nations and the government. Norton in a rather short time gained the trust and
confidence of the majority of the Indians at the Six Nations reserve. Fluent in as many as
twelve Native languages and dialects, he functioned smoothly in multiple Native cultures,
including Cherokee, Iroquois, and Great Lakes Algonquin societies.^^
Conversely, the people who looked to the adopted Norton as their leader did not
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Reg.n.ent, who had not spent much time among the Mans the way h.s grandfather and
father had done.- Norton's meteoric nse and unexpected mfluence was a constant tl.eat
to Claus, who continued to visuahze a leadmg and significant role for the Indian
Department comparable to one it had achieved in the days of his family predecessors. By
the time Claus became the Deputy Supenntendent General in 1800, the Department had
severely suffered from the government's retrenchment and from fiscal reductions in its
Indian policy. But Norton's clamors (and Brant's) for Six Nations' sovereignty and his
desire to completely transform Bntain's Indian policy happened to come at the very time
that Claus wanted to restore the Indian Department to its past glory, and the agent
understood that Norton's schemes endangered the organization's very existence.
Shortly after his promotion in 1800, Claus warned Canadian officials of possible
Six Nations' disloyalty and treachery after Brant had allegedly made a seditious speech to
the Three Fires m Detroit. Regarding land matters, the Deputy Supenntendem General
firmly informed the Six Nations that any further sales or leases (than the six blocks
previously confirmed by Peter Russell) were "quite out of the question" and "cannot be
allowed."^^ But despite these bitter clashes between Claus and the Six Nations, the
history and role of the Indian Department and the predicament of the Grand River nations
would have probably caused a breach, regardless of who served as Deputy
Superintendent General at the time. Given this conflict of interests and Claus's inherent
bias against compromise, the Six Nations could expect few favors from him.
John Johnson and Daniel Claus, respectively.
Claus's speech at Fort George, 17 August 1803, Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations . 136; Kelsay, 631-
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By February 1 804, Norton was on his way ,o Br„a,n. where he and Uran. hoped
he would ohtain redress for all of ,he Six Nahons' grievanees. Claus and Ueu.enan,
Governor Pe.er Hunter soon learned of Norton's miss.on. and these two off.cals bitterly
resented the latter's attentpt to eireuntvent their authority. Indeed, the breach separating
Claus and the principal Grand R.ver leaders beeame v.rtually
.rreparable onee Norton
began h,s d,plo,„at,e journey to the home government. Prior to this time, Claus's refusal
to further hslen to S,x Nations' gnevanees had merely dampened relations between the
governtnent and the Inchans at the Grand River. But onee Norton departed, the Deputy
Superintendent actively interfered ,n Six Nations' affairs, overstepping h,s authonty ,n
his eagerness to thwart Norton.
In the spring of 1 805, with Norton still absent, Claus convened a meeting of
various factions and Indians from the Grand River, most ofwhom were not chiefs, and
many of whom Claus knew would relish an opportunity to challenge Norton's and
Brant's authority, hoping that the council would disavow Norton and his mission.'^' The
agent also invited dozens of Senecas from Buffalo Creek and various other Iroquois from
the American side of the border, all of whom were openly hostile to Brant's leadership at
the Grand River. Previously, Iroquois leaders still living within the United States never
held any authority in matters pertaining specifically to the Grand River, but now Claus
endeavored to use them against the Brant-Norton cadre of leadership at the Grand.'^ This
dubious delegation from Buffalo Creek included Brant's longstanding rival. Red Jacket.
Lord Castlereagh to Sir James Craig, 8 April 1809, John.ston, Valley of the Six Nations . 280; Norton
speech al Onondaga, (Jrand River, 12 Kebruary 1807, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 106. According to
Norton most Grand River chiefs never succumbed to supporting Ciaus's scheme to discredit him or his
mission.
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While en route ,o Claus's counc, in early Apnl ,805. .h,s group, temporarrly detained by
ice on the N.agara W ver, waited on the American side at For, Ntagara, where four
Atrierican officers later testified that they had heard these forty or so Senecas clatm that
"they were going into Upper Canada for the express purpose of breaking Captain
Brant Most of the chiefs who supported Brant and Norton, and who by this time
disdained Claus, refused to attend such a sham meettng, a deosion that played into the
agenfs hands because it enabled him to secure the council's disavowal of Norton that he
earnestly sought.
Claus ordinanly did not interfere so blatantly in Native councils or manipulate
their leadership to this degree. On the contrary, despite not advocating Native
sovereignty, he generally respected the integrity and independence of the Six Nations'
councils. But in this case Norton, by petitioning in person for support from powerful
individuals in London, posed a senous threat to the status quo of Upper Canada's Indian
policy and to the Indian Department itself Brant had given Norton letters of introduction
to the Duke of Northumberiand, the Earl of Moira, and Sir Evan Nepean.'° After his
arrival, Norton became acquainted with several other leading figures in the British
government, including the Earl of Camden, Lord Castlereagh, and William Wilberforce,
and Camden worked to bring Norton's Grand River case before the Pnvy Council. The
chiefs petitioning also prompted Camden to write to Lieutenant Governor Hunter,
instructing him to look into the Six Nations' affairs and to give them any redress to which
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Certificate of Captain Leonard and others, 20 October 1805, Stone, Life of Brant. IL xxxiv. Also see
Brant's letter to the Duke of Northumberland, circa 1805, explaining the events surrounding Clauses
council, ibid., 417.
Kelsay, 636; Klinck & Talman, Journal of Major John Norton
, cviii-cix.
^° Norton to Earl Camden, 20 July 1805, CNA, MG 1 1, CO 42, 340, 122.
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they were ent.tled ^ While awaiting responses, Norton met Owen and Barclay and used
his time to translate the Gospel of John into Mohawk. On Christmas Eve, 1804, he
addressed the Bath and West of England Agncultural Society.- Havmg gamed a heanng
from and approval of some of the most powerful individuals in the country, Norton
appeared on the verge of success.
Claus and Hunter sensed how close Norton was to succeeding and fought back.
Lieutenant Governor Hunter responded to Camden, reporting Norton's public disavowal
by the Six Nations' chiefs m council. When this news arrived in London in the summer
of 1 805, it raised many questions and virtually destroyed Norton's hopes of gaining the
Six Nations' coveted title to the Grand River lands. The government's leading ministers,
including Camden and the Privy Council, suddenly became more concerned with
Norton's identity and his credentials than they were with the status of the Grand River
lands. In July, Norton wrote detailed letters to Camden and Castlereagh, respectively,
defending his position and qualifications, and he submitted a full report to the Privy
Council, detailing the history of the Grand River case and the Six Nations' grievances."
Despite the chief s continued efforts, Camden and the Privy Council became evasive.
Furthermore, Norton had failed to bring a copy of the Haldimand Grant at the outset of
his journey from the Grand River, and the administrators in Britain informed him that
Kelsay, 635.
" Speech of Teyoninhokarawen The Mohawk Chief to the Bath & West England Agricultural Society
his bemg elected an Honorary Member on the 24"' December 1804, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 141;
Klinck & Talman. Journal of Major John Norton
,
li; Calloway. Crown and Calumet . 1 14.
" Norton to Camden, 20 July 1805, CNA, MG 1 1, CO 42, 340, 121-22.5; Norton to Castlereagh 23 Ju
1805, 123-24.5, ibid., 123-24.5.
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they could not make any decisions on the matter without a copy of the ongmal grant.-
With dwindhng resources, the chief was soon compelled to return to North Amenca,
amving m Quebec in mid-November 1805. The strategy of Claus and Hunter therefore
had its desired effect, preventing the possibility of Six Nations' independent status, and
indefinitely preserving the status quo of Indian Affairs in Upper Canada.
Back at the Grand River, Norton joined Brant m reasserting their authority over
the Six Nations' affairs, and they disregarded any of the claims made by the Iroquois
councils under Claus's auspices while Norton was in London. Brant, his authonty
temporarily undermined by the dozens of makeshift "chiefs" that Claus had bnefly
brought over from Buffalo Creek, now denounced these Seneca nvals for having received
pensions from the American government, which, he argued, compromised their loyalty
and disqualified them from issues pertaming to the Grand River. Claus disagreed, but
Brant had the support of the majonty of Grand River chiefs who had previously remained
silent dunng the councils held with the Buffalo Creek faction. This show of support for
Brant enabled him to continue as the Grand River's principal agent in spite of the wishes
of the Deputy Supenntendent General.^-^ But apparently Brant never again visited any of
the Six Nations at Buffalo Creek, and a permanent split developed between the t^'o
groups.
It seems odd that the British government could not produce a copy of such an important document and
one would tend to believe that they could have found a copy had they really wanted to do so. Furthennore
Simcoe and Dorchester both lived m England at the time of Norton's visit, and both men possibly had
copies of the original Grand River Grant, but no evidence indicates that either of the retired administrators
were ever specifically petitioned for the document.
Kelsay, 639; Brant's complaints against Claus in council at Fort George, 28 July 1806, Johnston Valley




Along wi,h the reconfi™a,ion of Bran, as head ch.ef and agen, a, the Grand River
came the restoration of Norton's chieftainsh.p, a necessary procedure since Claus's bogus
councils had disavowed him. In councl at York on 3 September 1 S06, S.x Nations-
leaders upbraided Claus, exclaiming, "You know that he (Norton] was made a Chief ,n a
public manner, you received the Wampum on the occasion * Five weeks earlier, in a
series of heated speeches delivered at Fort George, another leader from the Grand River.
Benjamin Okoghsenntyonte, rebuked Claus for meddling in S,x Nations' matters, and he
denied that Claus had the authonty ,o create chiefs, particularly those fron, Buflalo
Creek:
Brother
-The right of being chief according to our customs arise[sl either fromhereditary hne on the female side or from havmg d.stmgu.shed by meritorious
conduct so as to be accepted as such. This has not been the case in the last
appointments you sanctioned - one of them [Red Jacket, or "Cow Killer"
perhaps?] we know to whom you pay great regard has been distmguished in your
opinion for some things we have not been accustomed to pay that respect to/''
In addition to this support, Norton drafted a twenty- six-page memorial, defending his
qualifications, which he read as a speech during a council held at the Onondaga village,
Grand River on 1 2 February 1 807.^« In this lengthy address, he noted that when the letter
of the Six Nations' supposed disavowal of his activities in London amved at Whitehall,
he suspected "it to be some misrepresentation from Fort George [Claus's
headquarters]."^'' He went on to praise "the greater part of the Grand River people.
Six Nations' speech to Claus at York, 3 September 1806, Norton Letterbook, Aver Ms 63- Johnston
Valley of the Six Nations . 274.
Speech of Benjamin Okoghsenniyonte, 28 July 1806, Fort George, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 51.
Norton^s speech at Onondaga, Grand River, 12 February 1807, ibid., 98-123.
Norton's speech at Onondaga, Grand River, 12 February 1807, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 116.
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particularly those who were Chiefs " who "could not be led into the error" of support.ng
Claus.™
>n spite of Six Nations- leaders' repeated rebukes, Claus continued to res.st
Branfs leadership and Norton's reinstatement. By eariy Apnl 1807, shortly after
Norton's speech at Onondaga, Claus wrote to Francis Gore, the new Lieutenant Governor
of Upper Canada who had replaced the recently deceased Peter Hunter. The agent
wished to convey to Gore the identity of the man he believed was their primary
antagontst in Indian affairs, asserting that "John Norton is such a Character that any th.ng
he does will not surprise me."" Claus went on to deride all the Six Nations' leaders,
ridiculing the headmen's claims that the Indian Department refused to relay their
grievances to the Lieutenant Governor." Most tmportantly, the Deputy Superintendent
General repeated to Gore the vow he had made to an old Onondaga chief a year eariier;
"I would not take notice of any thing from them [the Six Nations] in which Norton was
concerned. "^^
Yet Claus would find it difficult to disregard Norton's claims to leadership. Only
twelve days after Claus's letter to Gore, Norton delivered another speech at the Grand
River, supporting Brant and expressing the Six Nations' grievances regarding the delays
and poor handling of several land sales that Peter Russell had approved ten years before.
Norton also admonished Claus for not recognizing the proper leaders at the Grand River,
and concluded by expressing his hope that, as he put it, "a practice so improper may be
™ Ibid., 106.




dropped for the future.'- Judging from the councU records of 1806 and 1807, and from
numerous statements made by Brant and Norton dunng these years, h is clear that the
majority of the Indians at the Grand River believed that Claus had overstepped by
manipulating their councHs, and that he had no nght to d.cred.t Norton or to discount the
latter's status as ch,ef At the time of Brant's death in November 1807, therefore, Norton
was po.sed to succeed Brant as ch.ef of the Six Nations at the Grand River, and the
majority of leaders there hoped for this succession.'^
Prelude to War^ The Grand River rnmm..n.fy^
] 80^_|8P
After Brant's death Norton became head chief at the Grand River. In May 1808,
"the chiefs & principal Warriors of all the Five [i.e. Six] Nations living on the Grand
River" appointed Norton "solely to be at the head of their Councils." Knowing that this
decision would not be popular with Canadian authorities, Norton insisted that the tribal
council "first make known to [the] Government this their determination." It was not the
most promising beginning to what proved to be a long career as the Grand River
community's leader, but it was a realistic gesture on Norton' part given, as he put it,
"how obnoxious I am to [the] Government."'^
One thing, however, was not realistically possible. Norton would not be
recognized as Brant's successor as the Six Nations' agent in the Indian Department.''
This mattered not at all to Norton because his view of the Department was so negative
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Norton's .speech, Grand River, 14 April 1807, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 27, 15699.
Brant to the Duke of Northumberland, 24 January 1806, Stone, Life of Brant
. II: 425.
'* Norton to John Owen, 10 August 1808, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 128-29.
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.ha, he had no w,sh to be associated with i,. Moreover, neither he nor C.aus could have
tolerated working with each other as fellow agents. In,.,ally, therefore, the chief did his
best to avotd further direct confrontations with et.her Claus or Gore. What Norton did do
to try to influence Bntish policy was to wnte letters to tHends in London, continuing to
petition for their support of his plan to evangelize and acculturate the residents of the
Grand River Community. Although never sufficient by themselves to bring about the
kind of Indtan socety that the chief envtsioned at the Grand River, these letters brought
the plight of the Six Nations to the attention of some of the highest-rank.ng leaders in the
Empire and thereby did much to keep the pressure on the home goventment to compel
Canada's administrators to relieve the Indians' distress.
The impact of Norton's efforts and those of his supporters ,n Britam was most
evident when Secretary of War Lord Castlereagh wrote to Governor General Sir James
Craig in April 1809, inquiring as to the status and condition of the Indians of Upper
Canada. The tenor of Castlereagh's letter indicated that he did not personally tnist
Norton, refenHng to him as someone "who calls himself an Indian," who had come to
Britain "without any regular Deputation, and without any previous Communication with
the Lieut. Governor of Upper Canada." The Secretary further alluded to Claus's report,
in which "the Indian Chiefs disavowed Mr. Norton's Journey and the objects of it."" But
in spite of his skepticism regarding Norton's identity, Castlereagh wem on to indicate that
Norton had powerful supporters in the government and that those lobbying for him were
on the verge of success. According to Castlereagh, several of the King's Ministers
wanted to investigate the Haidimand affair to determine the feasibility of implementing
78




significant refers among ,he Indians, possibly even ,o the extent that Norton and Brant
had long envisioned7^
Despite this apparently renewed interest on the Grand River case, Castlereagh's
instn^ctions to Craig contained a request that indicated his reluctance to undertake any
substantial refom^s. The War Secretary sought the opinions of the top officials in both
Upper and Lower Canada regarding the proposed reforms, indicating that the home
government was not prepared to impose radical reforms in Canadian Indian policy
the objections of their administrators there. For their part, Claus and Gore
resolutely opposed to such sweeping reforms. From their perspective Upper Canada
remained simply too weak to allow any significant degree of autonomy or umon among
the Indians. Gore predicted that if the Indians had sovereign control over their lands they
would fall victim to "an unpnncipled set of Land Jobbers, who in their um-estrained
Intercourse with the Indians, would in the first Instance, teach them to despise the
Government that protected them, and in the next, would defi-aud them of their Land."^°
With much of the populace of Upper Canada already possessing less than a lukewarm
loyalty towards Britain, and with more American immigrants constantly streaming across
the border, the government in Canada could ill afford to relinqmsh sovereign control over
Native territory.
These concerns represented only a portion of Gore's response to Castlereagh.
Since Castlereagh had asked for their opinions. Gore and Claus seized this opportunity to
Ibid., 280.
Gore to Castlereagh, 4 September 1809, P.R.O., CO 42, 349, 90-91. This important letter Gore's
response to Castlereagh, is also found m the CNA, MG 1 1, CO 42, 349, 88-92, and the Ontario Historical
Archives, John Norton Papers, F440, Ms 94. Johnston's Valley of the Six Nations contains a fragment of it
on pp. 112-13.
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runher Cscredi, Norton, ,ak,ng their revenge on hin, for reasserting his nghts as ehief
upon his return front Bntain. The prospect of piaeing the Nat.ves under the supervision
or eontrol of Norton was preeisely what Upper Canada's leaders wished to avoid.
Consequently, Gore cast Nonon as an impos.er of humble birth, stressn,g that "he is a
Scotsman by B.rth and came to Canada, a private sold.cr- In addition to attempting to
dentean Norton's ,dc„t,ty, Gore (basing his allegat.ons mainly on infonnation provided
by Claus) proceeded to suggest that Norton had corrupt motives for attempting to handle
the Grand River affairs.- Gore alleged that Norton, like the late Brant, practiced
"extensive sunts of corruption," hoping to pocket much of the revenue generated from
forthcoming land sales if the Six Nations could begin to ahenate their lands."'
Gore's allegations against both Brant and Norton were very serious. In truth.
Gore had only lived in Upper Canada for a short time, and he consequently Icnew little
about the ntallcr; he merely relayed uiformation that Claus had given h,m. The fact was
that Brant had handled h,s business affairs too poorly to have had any great chance of
succeeding at the large-scale intrigues of which he stood accused. Without adequate
education or the experience necessary to engage in the sophisticated type of business that
he had attempted to transact in the sales of the approved blocks of land at the Grand
River, the late chief often became confused and worked al odds against his appointed
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trustees. For his part, Norton exhibited even less of a desire to accumulate wealth than
*' Ibid., 89.
- hi the final sentence of his letter to Castlereagh, Gore indicated that much of his information had
from Claus. Ibid., 92.
"ibid., 89, 90,91.
Kelsay, 631-32. Like Claus, Brant was also bewildered as to where the Six Nations' land
actually went, and durnig a council held in July, 1806, he publicly blamed the agent for havuig
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revenue
Brant had, and at certain t.n.es the younger ch.f demonstrated apparent lapses of thought
m financial matters. He had previously fallen mto debt to h.s fonner employer, trader
John Askm, and he also ran up big debts dunng his tops to Great Bntain - Even when
he permanently left the Grand R.ver m 1823, he showed no concern about coUectmg his
contmuing pension payments.- Claus and Gore never understood Norton, norm they
discern his true motives. They probably remembered the cases of Matthew Elliott and
John Dease, both ofwhom embezzled Native goods, and they assumed that almost
anyone would practice such graft, or worse, if only given the opportumty. Thus, they
failed to see any difference when Brant and Norton clamored for Six Nations'
sovereignty and control over Grand River lands.
In addition to this distrust of Norton's motives and concerns for Upper Canada's
secunty, the government had another reason for being unwilling to allow Indian
autonomy or to permit any significant reforms at the Grand River, and this was their
skepticism regarding the Native capability of maintaining intertribal unity. In his letter to
Castlereagh, Gore discouraged alterations in Whitehall's Indian policy, arguing, "It is
impossible for a large body of Indians to subsist together, for any Considerable time, in
any one part of the Country
-they would soon disperse, and form themselves into small
appropriated $38,000 of the Six Nations' supposedly-missing funds. Brant's unfounded allegations agamst
Claus did more to reveal the sachem's ignorance and lack of accounting skills than it did his perfidy Upon
hearing Brant s accusation, Claus abruptly left the council. Brant's speech in council at Fort George 28
July 1806, Norton Letterbook, Ayer Ms, 45; Johnston, Valley of the Six Nation. 108; Klinck & Talman
Journal of Major John Norton , ex.
John Askm to Thomas Smith, 5 January 1793, and Smith to Askin, 3 March 1793, Quaife, John Askm
PaEers, I: 457, 466-67; Klinck & Talman, Journal of Major John Norton , xxxiv, Ixxxvi-lxxxvir Ke'sav
637; Murray, 15.
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Bands." Gore's thoughts may have contained an element of truth regarding the
Natives- reluctance to abandon their former lifestyles and take on a sedentary ex.stence.
but he showed no des.re or willingness to ever gtve Grand Rtver's res.dents a choice.
Furthermore, the tone of h.s remarks, often cy„,cal, mdicated that he had no confidence
in the Indians- ab.lity to adapt, and the Lieutenant Governor offered no sort of altemat.ve
plan to help foster Native people's firture survival. Gore's opin.on stood ,n stark contrast
.0 Norton's; the latter believed that h,s people at the Grand River, like the Cherokees,
would make any changes necessary for their future survival and integrity as a
confederacy. But the administrator derided the efforts of the philanthropists in London
and spoke condescendingly of the Indians in his province. Writing to Lord Camden's
undersecretary. Edward Cooke. M. P.. Gore complained.
I only wish Mr. Wilberforce and his benevolent associates, had a little practicalknowledge to guide them in their philanthropic views respecting these People -They would soon be satisfied, that these Gentry [i.e. the Indians] would con Werthemselves very little obliged to them for any attempt to abndge their National orPersonal Independence;
.... - To gain their Lands individually with the
unrestrained Power of Alienation would be to supply them with the means ofgratifying their Passion for Rum.'*
Gore, while resisting any significant measures of refonn, at least acknowledged
the failure of the prevailing Indian policy that Whitehall had implemented after 1796. As
discussed in eariier chapters, the peacetime policy of retrenchment, entailing a significant
reduction in Indian expenditures, simply could not strengthen British-Indian ties while
simultaneously ending British obligations to their fonner allies. The Lieutenant
Governor bluntly slated that "the System of gradually reducing the Presems to the Indians
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of Upper Canada... preceding my amval. appears to me, neuher
.o have been founded on
a sound Policy, nor agreeable ,o justice." According to Gore, Nat.ve leaders were not shy
in telling him, "You are very kind, when you want us to fight for you but when that
Service is performed, you shut the Store door ,n our Faces."" Apparently the gifts had
dwindled to such small port.ons that "very many of the most respectable and gallant
Nations" no longer even bothered to visit "the King's Posts to receive the triflmg
quantity."''"
Gore's observations about the negative consequences of the shortcomings and
inconsistencies in British Indian poHcy were made as tensions rose once again between
the United States and Britain. In 1807, the Bntish warship HMS Leopard violated
American mantime rights and nearly ignited a war in the so-called Chesapeake Affair by
violently seizing four naval deserters off of an Amencan vessel and killing three
American sailors. In December of the same year Jefferson's economic embargo was a
hard-line response to both Bntain's and France's restrictions on Amencan merchant
shipping.'' This growing international crisis led Gore to seek measures to reduce Upper
Canada's internal instability and to prepare his province for the possibility of war.
Logically, then, the Governor wished to try to appease the Indians, even if merely by
increasing their gifts, lest the latter take advantage of Bntain's weakness in a time of war
in order to secure their own sovereign independence.
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Such an outcome stood as a distinct possibihty m Upper Canada at the time. With
the bulk of the Bntish army having just begun a difficult campaign under the Duke of
Wellington in the Ibenan Pemnsula in 1807, Canada's Upper Provmce was virtually
unprotected. Fewer than 1,400 Bntish regulars remained m Upper Canada.- Judging by
such minimal troop strength, the Bntish government had obviously not given significant
forethought to the defense of the province, and as early as 1807 Governor General Sir
James Craig even considered the possibility of withdrawing the Bntish presence from
Upper Canada in the event of war, abandoning it to the Amencans. Acting on orders
from Castlereagh, Craig considered "the preservation of Quebec as the object ofmy first
and principal consideration, and that to which all others must be subordmate."
Furthermore, the Governor General predicted that "if the Americans are really
determined to attack these Provmces, and employ those means which they may so easily
command, I fear it would be vam for us to flatter ourselves with the hopes of making any
effectual defence of the open Country."^^ Having therefore conceded that any British
forces stationed in Upper Canada could not ward off an American invasion, Craig and
others concluded that the only hopes of preserving that sector would depend on Canadian
militias and, most importantly, support from Britain's former Indian allies scattered
throughout Upper Canada and the Great Lakes. Craig and Castlereagh both believed that
"[i]f a war takes place," the Indians "will not be idle -IfWe do not employ them, there
cannot exist a moment's doubt, that they will be employed against us, and in that
Distribution of the Forces in Upper Canada serving under Lieutenant General Peter Hunter 1 December
1801, CNA,RG 8, Military CSenes, Vol. 1209, 108a. Also see Allen, The Bntish Indian Department and
the Frontier in North America. 1755-1830
. 67, and Allen, His Majesty's Indian Allies . 1 19
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event...The chain of our Connexion [sic] which has subs.sted for so many years [with
them] would be broken."'^'*
Accordingly Gore, in compliance wUh Cra.g's wishes, began to make efforts to
determine the temper of the Indians throughout the Great Lakes. In add.t.on to increasing
the Crown's g.fts to the Indians m his province. Gore sought to reestablish ties to
Britain's former allies who dwelt on the American side of the border. He dispatched
Claus to Amherstburg early in 1 808 to summon leaders of the various nations to council
in hopes of reestablishing (he old Chain of Friendship that had nearly lapsed after Fallen
Timbers fourteen years earlier. Claus did not have to petition very hard; Indians
throughout the Lakes, northern Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan rapidly answered the King's
call. Throughout the spring various groups continued to filter in. In June the Shawnee
leader Tecumseh and some of his followers also visited the post where they met Claus,
opening communication between the Indian Department and the growing intertribal
confederacy at Prophetstown on the Wabash, which gave the Bntish a link to the multiple
nations living there.'^'^ The next month Gore personally held a council at Amherstburg
where he addressed approximately 1,000 warriors and 100 chiefs, including Tecumseh
who had returned with many of his followers from the Wabash.'' After Gore's meeting.
Craig to Gore, 6 December 1 807, P.R.O., CO 42, 1 36, 1 55; Castlercagh to Craig, 8 April 1 809, P.R.O.,
C^O 43, 135.
Claus Journal at Fort Maiden, & 14 June 1808, CNA, MG 19, Fl, Claus Papers, Vol. 9, 206; MPHC,
XXIll: 53. According to his journal, Claus spoke with Tecumseh for three hours during this first meeting.
Allen, The British Indian Department and the Frontier in North America. 1755-1830
. 68. For records
and speeches in this council, see CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 11, 9884-9904.
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N.,l.vc v,s„s
,„ „,c „<«, co„,i„„c,i
,„ increase
.InunaUcally, and „ca,ly 5,,KH, In.hans
arnvcd at A.nhcrstburg that aiitiinni.^^
The posit.vc response of Nat.ves l.v.ng n. the Un.ted States to I^nt.sh overtures
was not inH.ed,ately shared by those hv.ng at the Grand R.ver. An.enean expansion
seriously endangered the luture ol the tnbes beyond Canada's borders. Ry contrast, the
Six Natu,ns at the Grand R.ver dul no, ,ace an n.mediate territorial threat, and therefore
i>ad nu.eh less n.eent.ve to llgh, ,or the Crown. As Gore had eommenled in h.s lengthy
letter to Castlereagh n. I many of Upper Canada's resident Indians hardly bothered
any more to visit the posts in order to receive the King's bounty.""
Precarious conditions in Upper Canada namely the uneertauUy ol the Six
Nations' support and the c,uest.on ofthe loyalty of the md.t.as caused a cunous
aberration in Sir James Cra.g's Indian policy. Canada's administrators and agents knew
that they could rely on Indians from across the border, bu, they now needed lo be careful
that those aggressive-minded groups did not drag Britain into a war with the United
States too .soon, particularly when Canada's leaders did not have the internal support
necessary lo hold the upper provitice. As a matter of necessity, then, Craig and (iore
ended the policy of peacetime retrenchment and adopted a wartime stance in their
dealings with the Indians.
For the Natives at the Cirand River the new policy temporarily meant additional
gills, and for Norton it eventually led to a wartime commi.ssion and sigmlkant autonomy
as agent and commander ofthe Six Nations during the upcoming conflict. Though Claus
" Claus to i'nclcaiix Sclby. l8Jamiaiy I XOy, CNA, RG 8, Military C Sciics, Vol. 2S6 5- MI'IK • XXIII
66-67.
(Joic to Caslicreagh, 4 St plnnhci I S()<), I' K.O., CO 42, 349, 92,
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and Gore both desp.sed h,., they recognized that Norton continued to hold considerable
.nlluence over the S.x Nat.ons, and they te.poranly avoided provoking or alienating the
chiefany further lest he discourage those at the Grand R.vcr from supporting Bnta.n ,n
its anticipated struggle. As a result, Upper Canada's leaders avoided mterfenng
significantly in Grand River affairs between 1810and 1812.
Just how far would the British government go to gain Indian support, particularly
that of the Grand K.ver nations, in the face of the new international crisis? Certainly,
some type of fair and permanent understandmg with the Indians was desirable; British
leaders d.d not w.sh to have to periodically rely on questionable Native fidelity every
time a crisis arose. As war drew near, all hopes of compromise grew dim, and the Indian
agents in Canada reverted to their old practice of increasing Indian gifts and tenaciously
pressuring the Indians to fight for the Crown if necessary. As always, this policy tended
to blur the extent of mutual obligations in the Anglo-Native relationship. Were the
Indians subjects or allies? Craig continued to pursue the dual stance of telling the Indians
to prepare themselves for war, while informing the Americans of his country's
neutrality.'"^ These contradictory actions could only lead to further distrust on the part of
cither the Natives or the Americans, or both.
The approach of war also brought other changes in Canada. In the autumn of
1811, Norton received favorable news regarding a change in Upper Canada's leadership.
In his journal Norton stated that Major General Isaac Brock "arrived at York, to take the
Calloway, Crown and Calumet, 230. Craig not only proclaimed British neutrality to the Americans, but
early m 181
1
he attempted to make his claims even more convincing by warning the American government
of imminent Indian attacks along the country's frontiers. This crafty attempt to absolve Britain of
responsibility for an Indian war failed to convince American leaders, as seen in President Madison's
reasons for asking Congress for a declaration of war against Great Britain in June, 1812. See Wesley
Turner, The War of 1 8 1 2: The War that Both Sides Won (Toronto & Oxford: Dundurn Press, 1990), 33.
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con,™and of .he Troops ,n .he Upper Prov,„ce.-a„d also assume
.he c,v„ Goven^en,
under .he T„le of Pres.den., a. .he sa.e .in,e
.ha. Frane.s Gore Es<,r.-L,eu.. Governor,




Gore, one of Nor.on>s principal an.agonis.s.
.he ch.ef wro.e. "This change was very well
received
.hroughou.
.he Province." Fur,her emphas.z.ng ,he co„.ras. benveen Gore and
Brock, Norton added
.ha. Brock displayed
"d,scer.men., candour & rec.i.ude," quali.ies
which "confounded
.he spin, of Party, and exposed
.he Mys.ery of Calumny."'*
Brock's arr,val may have preven.ed Norton from leaving Canada. Discouraged by .he
belief .ha. his v.sion of reform would never occur under Gore's leadership, Norton had
decided, as he pu. i., ".o re.ire .o .he Sou.h Wes.. .o prepare an es.abhshmen. where we
might live undis.urbed by fac.ious disputes.""" But Brock's arrival gave Nor.on new
hope, and soon after, the General summoned the headman to York to discuss the mood of
the Indians at the Grand River and to ascertain wha. was needed .o secure their a,d should
war break out.
Norton seized this opportunity to apprise Brock of the Six Nations' history and
gnevances at the Grand River, informing him that the people there desired, above all else,
a proper land title. Though the General remained noncommittal, he mamtamed a
"favourable Disposition" towards the Grand River people, and in a subsequent letter to
Norton he expressed a "disposition to favour their requests" as much as was in his power.
Claus once again attempted to prevent the Six Nations' leaders from submitting the land
question to Brock, but Norton claimed that "this time" the agent's intrigues were
Klinck & Talman, Journal of Major John Norton . 286.
Ibid., 287.
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"without effect Perhaps for the first time smce the creation of the upper province
more than two decades earher (1 791), the Six Nations' leaders at the Grand River had the
opportunity to address a lieutenant governor who earnestly desired to hear their pleas, and
to do so without interference from the Indian Department. Norton was quite taken by
Brock's caring and thoughtful response, and upon heanng the general give his honest
assessment in interpreting the Haldimand Grant as a full, exclusive land title for the Six
Nations, the chief immediately threw his support behind the military governor. "From
the time that he made this candid avowal," Norton wrote, "I became opposed to insisting
any further on the Land Matters, until we should see the end of expected hostilities."'^^
Norton was probably a bit surprised by the officer's verbal concession on the
point of Six Nations' land rights. Brock may have been the first Bntish leader ever to
acknowledge Six Nations' sovereign rights over the Grand River lands, if that is in fact
what he intended to say when he spoke with Norton. Norton's unliesitating devotion to
Brock also rested in the fact that the General confided in the chief, looking to him to
provide key information regarding the sentiments of the nations dwelling at the Grand
River, and the General hoped that the chiefs loyalty would inspire those who continued
to waver. In choosing to deal directly with Norton and the Six Nations, Brock
circumvented the Indian Department, and Norton leapt upon this rare opportunity.
Not all residents at the Grand River shared Norton's enthusiasm for supporting
the Bntish in another conflict. A division among them became apparent in June 1812






Grand R.ver, hopmg to d.suade their northern brethren from gomg to war. Th.
delegat,on argued, "Why should we again fight, and call upon ourselves the resentment
of the Conquerors? We know that neither of these powers have any regard for us." "In
the former War," the speaker contmued, "we espoused the cause of the K.ng, We thought
it the most honourable.
... Expenence has convmced us of the. neglect, except when they
want us. Why then should we endanger.
.
.the existence of our fam.hes, to enjoy thdr
smiles only for the Day m which they need us?"'°^ The delegation then repeated the
uselessness ofjoining in the conflict on either side, since the Amencans claimed not to
need their services, and if they were to join the British, their people living m New York
would suffer repnsals from the Amencan government. "We are m their [the Amencans']
power," added the deputation's spokesmen.'^^ These arguments had a strong effect,
causing the people of the Grand River to hesitate for two days m fonning a response.
Ultimately, a majonty chose to remain idle, hoping that peace might continue.
Challenging this opposition, Norton did his best to rally the Grand River
consensus in favor of the Crown. Arguing eloquently, the mixed-blood leader
acknowledged that the Iroquois peoples living on the American side of the border should
remain at peace, but with regard to the Canadian Iroquois, he maintained, "Our situation
is very different." For those at the Grand River, it was a matter of honor and secunty to
resist an American invasion, and Norton alluded to the Americans' past treatment of
Indians, even of those who attempted to remain neutral, reminding his audience that the







Americans "have always been the Enemies of the Abongmal Nadons."'»' He added ,hat
an Amencan conquest of Upper Canada would destroy the Grand R,ver Reserve, despite
its inhabitants' claims of neutrality.
Ultimately, Norton's attempts at persuasion proved futile. Until the Bntish
government satisfactonly resolved the question of the status of the Grand River lands,
little support could be expected from the Six Nations in Upper Canada. Without a clear
title to their land, the wamors at Grand River had little incentive to fight. And, as always
in Iroquois societies, each man would individually decide whether or not to take up am.s,
based mostly on how he perceived this affecting his personal best interests, ^^^,en the
war began, Norton and a mere sixty wamors, representing only a small minority of the
Grand River's 400-plus able-bodied men, amved at Niagara in July 1812 to help repel an
anticipated Amencan attack. Cheered to see Norton, Brock eagerly inquired as to the
current general sentiments at the Grand River, but the chief could only reply: 'They are
unfortunately divided into parties, and there are some plausible men, who succeed in
retarding their coming forth,-but when they engage, I have no doubts they are not so
depraved as to be faithless."'^^ Norton's predictions would later prove correct, but until
then, neither he nor Brock could depend on the majority of the Six Nations's wamors.
When the chief and his small party of wamors departed from Niagara to assist in the
upcoming bnef siege of Detroit, his followers dwindled yet further, and by the time his






accompanied him.- The majority of .he Six Nations' leaders and wa„,ors chose to
remain neutral at the war's outset, and the Mtssissaugas followed smt, withjroldtng the.r
warriors as well/^*
Although Brock thought highly of Norton and respected his efforts, he interpreted
the Six Nations' lukewann response to Bntish overtures in a highly negative way.
Despite the loyal chiefs optimism that the bulk of the Six Nations would yet prove
faithful to Bntain, Brock remained unconvinced. Judging by the small turnout of
wamors at Niagara, the commander correctly reasoned that the Natives living m Upper
Canada had little confidence in Bntain's ability to protect the province against
./Wencan
aggression. Their unwillingness to fight infiinated Brock, who trusted neutral hidians
even less than he did the many potentially disloyal whites in his province. He, like his
predecessors, believed that Indians could never remain idle dunng warfare and assumed
that they would eventually join one side or the other. "[T]o expect that this fickle race
would remain in the midst of war in a state of neutrality," Brock wrote, "is truly
absurd."' '2 The Indians' refusal to fight ftirther complicated Brock's problems, because
most of the available white male inhabitants who lived near the Grand River refused to
join the militia once they learned that the majority of the Six Nations' warriors had
refi-ained fi-om entering the contest. The white inhabitants, like Brock, believed that the
Indians would not remain neutral for long, and that the wamors of the Grand River would
Benn, 48; Entry for 5 August 1812, Lmda Sabathy-Judd, ed., Moravians in Upper Canada: The Diary nf
the Indian Mission of Fairfield on the Thames. 1792-1813 (Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1999), 483-
"' Benn, 51.
Brock to Sir George Prevost, 26 July 1812, Cruikshank, ed., The Invasion of Canada and the Surrender
of Detroit, 1812 (Ottawa: Government Printing Bureau, 1912), 91; Benn, 46-47.
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soon take up a™s aga.ns, whichever s.de stood a. a disadvantage. The wh.es. as Brock
put it, were "unwilhng to leave the.r fa^ihes to the mercy of 400 Indians, whose conduct
affords such wide room for suspicion."' "
Brock's feelmgs stemmed from the fact that he, contrary to the Native
perspecfve, viewed al, Canadian Indians as Brr.ish subjects, rather than tndependent
people who could freely enter the conflict as the King's allies, tf and when they chose to
do so. Shortly after Norton first informed Brock of the S,x Nations' reluctance to f.ght,
the General met with Upper Canada's Execut.ve Council on 3 August 1812. request.ng
pem,ission to impose martial law. Among his reasons for seeking such a measure. Brock
included the seditious conduct of both whites and Indians, specifically claiming
"[tlhat
the Indians on the Grand River... had withdrawn from their Volunteer Services and
declared for a neutrality, which, in respect of them, was equally inadmissable [sic] as
with the King's other subjects.'" " in viewing the Indians as reneging subjects, Brock
seemed to believe that, unless they fulfilled their duty, the Natives should forfeit the
rights and protection that they possessed under the Crown. On 4 August, the day after the
Executive Council voted to suspend habeas coipus, giving Brock virtual dictatorial
powers, the General wrote to a fellow officer, suggesUng that as soon as the government
had it in its power, "the first step ought to be to expel the Indians from their present
residence and place them out of the reach of doing mischief.""*
Norton probably never knew of Brock's strong sentiments regarding the Indians,
their obligations, and perhaps most important, the military governor's conception of the
'"ibid
114
Council minutes at the Government House, York, Upper Canada, 3 August 1812, P.R.O., CO 42, 352,
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Indians' status with respect to the British Empire. Clearly, the commander believed that
the Native warriors living in Canada had a moral obligation to defend the King's
territories and interests, a duty that stemmed primanly from their hypothetical status as
British subjects. Such an interpretation of the Natives' situation indicates that Brock had
not fully grasped the meaning of the Grand River council's earlier stipulations regardi
their control and possession of land that the council proclaimed as the necessary
prerequisites needed to induce them to take up the King's cause. At that time it probably
did not occur to Brock that the Indians' request for a land title m fee simple also entailed
the distinctive free and independent status that Brant and Norton had always espoused.
But Norton's unhesitating devotion to Brock from that point forward suggests that the
chief also misunderstood British policy, insofar as he believed that Brock agreed with
him on the issues of land, sovereignty, and the Six Nations' legal status. Convinced that
Brock understood "the true Intent and meaning of General Haldimand's Grant," Norton
was content to trust the commander, and thus the Mohawk leader decided not to raise the
issue of Six Nations gnevances again, "until we should see the end of the expected
hostilities."' Due to the General's untimely death at Queenston Heights a few months
later, this misunderstanding never surfaced, and Brock went to his grave much admired
by Natives and whites alike."^
Brock to Colonel Baynes, 4 August 1812, Cruikshank, Invasion of Canada . 120.
Klinck & Talman, Journal of Major John Norton . 288.
After Brock's death, the Six Nations honored him in a traditional Condolence ceremony, recognizing the
fallen general for "his kindness towards us," and expressing hope that Brock's successor's "heart is
warmed with similar sentiments of affection and regard towards us." A General Council of Condolence
held at the Council House, Fort George, 6 November 1812, War of 1812 Collection, Folder 6a, McCord
Museum, Montreal.
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Brock's rationale m dealing with the Indians was based on several factors. While
regarding the Indians in Upper Canada as Bntish subjects, he sincerely wished to address
their grievances, but more than this, his situation was quite desperate/ Perhaps as
many as sixty percent of Upper Canada's population were either bom m the United States
or were direct Amencan offspnng.- As Brock wrote to a fellow officer, "My situation
is most cntical, not from anything the enemy can do, but from the disposition of the
people.
...
The population, believe me, is essentially bad.
. . , A full belief possess them
all that this Province must inevitably succumb."'^^ Given these dire circumstances.
Brock was extremely anxious to gain Native support, and he would have been inclined to
agree to nearly anything Norton said in council regarding the Haldimarid Grant.
Knowing that the opening phase of the war could prove pivotal, and realizing that
numerous Natives and whites alike needed to have a sense of anticipated victory before
committing themselves to the conflict. Brock boldly took the initiative. He believed that
if he could provide a psychological lift to the inhabitants of Canada, they would rally to
the King's cause. Accordingly, the immediate captures of Michilimackinac and Detroit
in the summer of 1 812, combined with the destruction of Fort Dearborn in mid-August,
provided the inspiration that Canadians sorely needed, and to Norton's relief, the Six
Nations finally lived up to his prediction that they were "not so depraved as to be
Fred Landon, Western Ontano and the Amencan Frontier (Toronto & New Haven: Ryerson Press &
Yale University Press, respectively, 1941; reprint, Toronto; McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1967), 28.
" George Sheppard, Plunder, Profit and Paroles: A Social History of the War of 1812 in Upper Canada
(Montreal & Kingston, London, Buffalo: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1994), 18; Brock to Prevost,
1 2 July 1812, William Wood, ed.. Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812 , 3 Vols.
(Toronto: The Champlain Society, 1920-1928), I: 352.
'^^ Brock to Colonel Baynes, 29 July 1812, Wood, L 396.
236
fa,.h,ess." Brock's bold strategy i^edia.e.y ga.van.ed
.he Grand Rrver ch.efs and
warriors, and by Che begi™.ng of September 1812. .he S.x Na.,ons- leaders were nearly
unanimous in rallyrng
.o .he Bri.,sh cause.'- Nothing more was sa.d about neu.rali.y,
and Brock believed that the Indians, embarrassed by their earlier refusal to fight, now
"appear ashamed of themselves, and promise to wh.pe [sic] away the disgrace into which
they have fallen by their late conduct." Barely two weeks after the Amencans had
surrendered Detroit, most of Upper Canada's Native wamors turned up at Fort George.
The Major General commented that three hundred tadians had amved at the post, and he
anticipated the arrival of two hundred more.'" These figures account for nearly all ofthe
available fighting men at the Grand River, combmed with some Mississaugas and
Moravian Indians as well.
Although Brock believed that his military successes, especially the capture of
Detroit, had shamed the Six Nations into fulfilling their duty to the King, the sudden shift
in attitude at Grand River, while remarkable, does not necessarily convey a growing
sense of obligation on the Indians' part. At no time did one hundred percent ofthe Grand
River's wamors fully embrace the King's cause.^^^ The delayed decision to fight the
Americans did not indicate that the Indians suddenly acknowledged their status as
subjects; it merely meant that the Six Nations, acting as a neutral power, needed time to
assess the fortunes of war before determining how to best safeguard their own land and
Klmck & Talman, Journal of Major John Norton. 293
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Joseph Willcocks to John MacDonnell, 1 September 1812, Johnston, Valley ofthe Six Nation. 196-97.




invasions.''^ On the former occasion Brock lost his life, but Norton
liberties. After the initial hostil.ties opened in favor of the Bnt.sh. the Six Nat,ons, stil,
regardtng themselves as an independent force, deemed it best for the.r future status and
landholdings to ally themselves to the British.
The ensuing war extmguished the Hnal glimmer of hope for the Indians ofUpper
Canada to attain an autonomous status. After the.r initial hesitation prior to the capture of
Detroit, the S,x Nations fought w,th a purpose, distinguishing themselves on multiple
occasions. These included some of the most critical moments of the war for Upper
Canada, particularly the battles of Queenston Heights in October 1812. and Beaver Dams
the following summer, in which the Indians were instramental in twice thwarting enemy
s contingent of
warriors turned the tide against a far supenor army of Amencans, leading to the
destruction or capture of the entire invading force. The famed Winfield Scott was among
the nine hundred Amencan pnsoners taken at Queenston.
The war and its inconclusive outcome mirrored the Six Nations' fonunes and
status in Canada. After a difficult struggle, little was resolved. When the .\nglo-
Amencan powers agreed to cease hostilities in accordance with terms amounting to status
quo ante bellum, the Six Nations lived under the same nebulous conditions that they had
known prior to the war. Moreover, with the advent ofpeace, the independent status and
land patent which the Grand River people had coveted for so long were now out of reach.
At war's end, the British government had less reason than ever to grant these terms. In
1816 the Crown once again placed Indian affairs in Canada under military jurisdiction, a
Klinck & Talman, Journal of Major John Norton , cvi-cxx, 299-370; Benn, 86-173; G. F. G. Stanley,





,ha, faced another peace.i„,e penod of re.rench.en.. As .he wh,.e
popu,a.,on around
.hen, grew increasingly dense,




.heircolleCvc in.cgn.y. Years la.er, in 1841. as squa..ers




.he necess,.y of consolida.,ng
.he ren,a,„ing lands of .he Hald.nrand Gran,
in order ,o pro.ec.
.he rcnnan.s of .he Reserve; by 1 848 .he Crown assigned one hundred
acres .o each male head of household among
.he Six Na.ions
.here."" The Ind.ans of
Upper Canada had effeCvely been absorbed as Bri.ish subjec.s.
.hough
.hey would
periodically con.inue lo deny
.his s.a.us.'"
Ahhough
.he Six Na.ions never realized
.he dreams of sovere.gn.y
.o ,he ex.en.
lha, Branl and Norton had so
.enaciously pursued (and believed Haldimand had
in(ended),
.hey nevertheless achieved much of wha. .hose leadcs had envisioned. In
1 827, .he Reserve finally acqu.red a resident clergyman, albei. .h.rty years after Bran.'s
reques., and ,n Ihe ensuing decades children
.here were educa.ed in missionary schools,
which certamly would have pleased Norton."" By .he early 1 820s, nearly all of .he Six
Nations .spoke English and many had achieved English li.eracy. "' Furthermore, by .he
1 830s most Indians at the Grand River thrived as fanners."" Most impor.an.ly,
.he
Grand River Six Na.ions con.inued lo operate under a counci of chiefs, which became an
Weaver, 532-33.
Ibid., 526.
By 1822 Norton had little desire to continue translating the Gospels into Mohawk since most of his




elected body after 1924. and the Indians there never rel.nqu.shed the.r sense of tdenttty
and heritage.'^' Hence, through selective assimilation, the Natives a, the Grand River
emerged from a time of traumatic change in the early nineteenth century with much of




RESTORING THE CHAIN OF FRIENDSHIP IN THE WEST AND IN THE NORTH
1801-1812
^i^^^Ki ,
After the turn of the nineteenth century, as Joseph Brant and John Norton
continued their struggle for autonomy at the Grand Rwer, Bnt,sh-Indian relations
elsewhere proceeded along different lines. As a result of their defeat and subsequent
events that occurred in the 1790s, tnbes residing m northwest Ohio and the Wabash
Valley depended less on the Bntish. The fonner Westerri Confederacy of the Maumee
Valley, including significant numbers of Shawnees, Wyandots, Miamis, and Delawares,
sought not only peace with the Americans, but in some cases also a degree of
acculturation to Euro-Amencan lifestyles. By the commencement of the War of 1 812,
very few of the Native leaders who once supported British interests m rallying the
Western Confederacy against the Amencans in the late eighteenth century could still be
counted among Bntain's supporters.' By contrast, renewed Native resistance to
Amencan expansion developed more extensively from within the ranks of tribes situated
farther west, including Potawatomis of Illinois, northern Indiana, and southern Michigan;
Kickapoos from Illinois; and Winnebagoes in Wisconsin. These were joined by militant
Ojibwas and Wyandots from the region surrounding Detroit and Brownstown, and
together they formed a new alliance that gained much of its early unity and strength from
the Shawnee Prophet's revitalization movement, between 1805 and 181 1. These changes
represented a revolution in hidian leadership along the Wabash Valley and Detroit
' The Wyandot leader Roundhead was the only signer of the Treaty of Greenville in 1795 to later join the
Native resistance movement.
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frontier, causing fonher uncertainty in .he already nebulous state of Brrtain's relations
with the Natives of that region.
Conversely, Bntish relations with the northern Oj.bwas and Ottawas dwelhng in
the northern Great Lakes, and with the Sauk, Fox, and Menommees in northern
Wisconsin and the upper Mississippi Valley, generally continued as they always had.
Hardly affected by Anthony Wayne's defeat of the Ohio tnbes in the 1790s, these nations
maintained closer ties to Bntish traders and agents in the northern country and Upper
Mississippi Valley. The expanding fur trade, conducted pnmanly by the North West
Company, the XY Company, and a handful of pnvate Bntish and French interests dunng
this penod, increased Native economic dependency without presenting an immediate
threat to the cultures and social stmctures of those nations involved. Their increasing
commercial ties to the Bntish, coupled with a greater distance between them and the
Amencans, placed these northern nations in a position nearly opposite to that of their
Native brethren to the south, who, after 1808, gathered on the Wabash in support of the
Shawnee Prophet and his brother Tecumseh. In fact, most northern Natives eventually
spumed the Shawnee brothers' revitalization movement altogether, giving Bntish-hidian
relations in the North further continuity and greater stability.
An Uncertain Alliance: Amherstburg. Rrownstown. and the Wabash Vallev. 1801-ISO^
In 1 801 the British leaders at Amherstburg continued to strictly observe the
government's Indian policy of retrenchment, attempting thereby to fiirther reduce
Britain's obligations to its fomier Native allies. Captain Hector McLean, still serving as
the post's commandant, kept a tight control over Indian affairs there, and his superiors in
Quebec and at Whitehall never wavered in their support of his control over
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An,hers.burg-s branch of .he Indian Depann,en,. Indeed, all au.hon.ies conhnued
.o
support McLean's earlier decision ,o dismiss veteran Ind.an agem Mat.hew Ellio,,. and
none gran.ed Elliol, the dignity of either a formal inquiry or a public hear,ng. this
pohtical climate, the commandant enforced a parsimonious accounting of Ind.an goods,
and. as much as possible, he discouraged Native v.sits to his post. While McLean ser^-ed
a. Amherstburg.
.he average number of Indian visitors .o the post remained steady at a
little more than 5,000 per year.^
During McLean's command the post experienced fewer visits from those tnbes
with whom the Bntish had been more closely associated poor to the Western
Confederacy's defeat at Fallen Timbers in 1 794. Very few Miamis contn.ued to receive
British gifts, and there is no record of any Delawares at Amherstburg between 1 798 and
1803.^ Moreover, the Shawnees and Wyandots had fragmented, and while several bands
still visited Amherstburg each year, most of them resided within United States terntory,
and both nations came to rely more heavily on U.S. annuity goods.^ Several of these
Shawnee groups had formed a new pro-American community at Wapakoneta, Ohio,
under the leadership of the village chief, Black Hoof ^ In addition to Black Hoofs
village, other former war leaders such as the Miami Little Turtle, the Delaware
Indians Served at Amherstburg, 1798-1803, CNA, RG 10. Indian Affairs, Vol. 10, 9369.
'ibid.
'The American government made large annuity distributions from Detroit, where the British had formerly
distributed gifts, weapons, and supplies. By replacing the British in this capacity at Detroit the U S
government hoped to further undermine the connection between Britain and her former Native allies In
1802 Miami leader Little Turtle and Five Medals, a Potawatomi, convinced President Jefferson and
Secretary of War Henry Dearborn to also begin making annuity payments at Fort Wayne See Edmunds
The Potawatomis . 160-61.
' See Edmunds, '"A Watchful Safeguard to Our Habitations': Black Hoof and the Loyal Shawnees




Buckongahelas, the Wyandot Tarhe, and the Potawatom. Five Medals had all
favor accommodation with the Amencans after 1795. Fmally, s,gmftcant numbers from
within these fonnerly confederated nations had begun migratmg west to commumties
along the Mississippi Rwer dunng the 1 780s and 1 790s, further decreasing Bntish
contact with the Crown's staunchest Native alhes of previous decades.
While these old allegiances weakened, Bntish Indian agents at Amherstburg
contmued their communication with Wyandot leaders directly across the Detroit River at
Brownstown, the symbolic center and council fire for the former confederacy. From this
site longtime Wyandot peace chief Adam Brown remained firmly attached to Bntish
agents and leaders. In September 1 803, after a year of bad crops throughout the Detroit
region, agent Thomas McKee specifically requested that additional provisions be sent to
Brown and a few others still residing at Brownstown whom he considered "deserving of
His Majesty's bounty."^ Four years later, when another Anglo-American war seemed
imminent in the wake of the Chesapeake cnsis, Adam Brown warned McKee and his
fellow agents that the Amencans intended to execute any captured member of the Bntish
Indian Department in the forthcoming conflict. Since Brown considered "Captain
McKee.
.
.a very good man" who "had always treated him in the handsomest manner, he
[Brown] would do everything in his power to have his [Mckee's] life saved."' Although
the Brownstown community would profess an official stance of neutrality as the War of
1812 approached, these enduring ties between British agents and influential leaders at
Brownstown would prove crucial to Britain's prospects of retaining Upper Canada.
" McKee to Lt. Colonel Vincent, 9 September 1803, CNA, RG 8, Military C Series, Vol. 254, 143-44.
^ Adam Brown's statement relayed to Thomas McKee, 3 December 1807, ibid.. Vol 255 139-40- MPHr
XXIII: 42. ' ' '
'
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Despite maintaining close ties with some of the bands m the region of
Brownstown, the Bntish had no way of gaugmg the degree of allegiance the Natives
would show them in the next war. Although Brownstown still served as a central
meeting place, the Brownstown confederacy no longer existed in the fonn that it once
had, and the Indians were less inclined to view their Bntish Father in the same manner
that they had when Bntain participated in that confederacy. Consequently, British Indian
agents rarely attended the councils still held at Brownstown, and British officials found
that the only remaining Native confederacy worthy of the name to be represented ai
Brownstown's councils was the one emerging among Indians who dweh further west,
usually along the Wabash, Illinois, and Mississippi Rivers, in June of 1801 Bntish agent
George Ironside infomied his superiors of a possible restoration of the Brownstown
council fire, only this time the proposed confederacy would be composed of Sauks &
Foxes, Potawatomis, Shawnees from the Wabash and Mississippi, and even a few
western Cherokees. The fomier Shawnee war leader Blue Jacket, apparently envisioning
a return to the days of his past glory, worked to bring this about.^
Although British leaders in Canada did not yet seek a restored intertribal
confederacy (an indifference which contributed to the failure of Blue Jacket's scheme),
this brief attempt at Indian unity in 1801 foreshadowed the restored Bntish-Indian
alliance of the future that would derive more from regions further west and north of the
core of the former alliance. From the late 1790s, British agents had worked to maintain
ties with the leaders of the Three Fires, which included Potawatomis who lived along
Ironside to Claus, 1 1 June 1801, and same to same, 12 June, 1801, CNA, RG 10, Indian AtYairs, Vol. 26,
15368-73; Ironside to Selby, 15 June 1801, CAN, MG 19, F 1, Claus Papers, Vol. 8, 150; White, The
Middle Ground
,




Lake Michigan's southern tributaries.^ By 1801 the Potawatomis who dwelt near
Chicago and Peona learned ofAmencan mtentions to erect a post at Chicago, and they
appealed to officials at Amherstburg for advice and support. They also requested that
their British Father "would be as indulgent to us as to those of your children who live
nearer [to you]."'° hi subsequent years Potawatomi delegations from this region
continued to appeal to their Bntish Father at Amherstburg, making allusions to past
alliance obligations and their own proven loyalty.
In the summer of 1 805 the Potawatomis from Chicago returned to
.Amherstburg,
this time accompanied by a delegation of Sauks, Fox, and northern Ottawas. A Sauk
speaker opened the council, giving the British a message from the Sioux of the Upper
Mississippi region; a symbolic war pipe accompanied the Sioux message. The Sioux
sought to unite all of the tnbes against the encroachments of "[t jhe new white Nation,"
and they informed their Bntish Father: "Your answer will govern the conduct of the
young wamors who are anxiously waiting for it."' ' The Sauk speaker then added that
their confederacy "now consists of Ten Nations," and the Potawatomis from Chicago and
Ottowas from Arbre Croche reported that their village chiefs had turned over tribal affairs
to their war leaders, who now stood poised to join with the Sioux, Sauks, and the others.
All must have been disappointed when Thomas McKee answered two days later.
Goods Recommended to be Given to the Indians, Fort Maiden [i.e. Amherstburg], 20 September 1797
Fort Maiden Archives, John Marsh Papers, File 3, 188-90; MPHC, XX; 545-47.
'° Speech Potawatomi chief Wawickasa at Amherstburg, 1 June 1801, in Ironside to Claus 1 1 June 1801
CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 26, 15369.
'
'
A meeting with the Saakies, Foxes, Northern Ottawas, Poutawatomis held at Amherstburg on the 8* June
1805, ibid.. Vol. 10, 9601-02.




"[Y]our grea, Father has strenuously recommended peace and good
neighbourhood between the Indians of this Country and the peoples of the United
States."'^
The new American presence along the Mississippi River and at Fort Dearborn
near the mouth of the Chicago River served to unite the tnbes there even as it presented
the British with an opportunity to lead a new Western Confederacy. Soon after the
Amherstburg council of 1805, trader Robert Forsyth of St. Louis wrote to Thomas
McKee, informing the agent that anti-American sentiment in the West was spreading and
that now the Kickapoos also "did not like the Amencans and. . .were determined to stnke
them."'^ The following summer a delegation of western Potawatomis again visited
Amherstburg, reminding the Bntish that they still awaited their Father's instructions,
pleading that "our eyes [are] always turned towards you."' -^ There was little of a specific
nature that McKee could say to Native delegations seeking a renewed British-led
alliance. This time the agent answered that he had indeed forwarded their request from
the previous year to Upper Canada's governor at the time (i.e. Peter Hunter), but as
McKee explained, "It has pleased.
.
.the Master of Life to remove him [Hunter] from this
worid before he had an opportunity of sending his directions and answer which you
expected."'^ McKee's creative response temporarily succeeded, but the British could not
" A meeting with the Saakies, Foxes, Northern Ottawas, Poutawatomis held at AmherstbuiE on the 8*
June, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 10, 9605.
" Robert Forsyth to Capt. McKee, 19 May 1805, ibid., 9598. For more on the mcreasing frequency of
Kickapoo depredanons at this time, see Arrell M. Gibson, The Kickapoos: Lords of the Middle Border
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963), 52-57.
Speech of the Saakies and Potawatomies at Amherstburg, 28 June 1806, CNA, RG 10 Indian Affairs
Vol. 1, series A, 417.
Answer to die Chiefs of the Saakies and Potawatomies, 28 June 1806, Ibid., 419.
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de.ur forever. They now had a growing Na.ive confederacy on .he.r hands, one
.ha. was
nearly npe for hos.ih.ies long before any of .hen, could have anHcpa.ed ano.hcr Anglo-
American war.
Bo.h ,hc nature and
.he tim.ng of .hese con.inued Na.ive visi.s
.o Amhers.burg
are significan. for several reasons. F,rs., ,hey de„,ons.ra.ed a growing an.i-An,encan
dispos,.ion among
.he Na.ives
.hroughou. Illinois. Wiscons.n. and .he Mississ.ppi Valley
long before Bn.ish leaders in Upper Canada became cognizan. ofwha. was happen.ng
.here. As of yc. Br,.ain had no, done anything
.0 encourage a renewed alhance w,.h any
of .hose nations
.0 .he wes., and agen.s and officers in Upper Canada had in fac. done
their bes. to discourage such an arrangement. When William Claus learned tha.
.he
Dakola Sioux from the upper Mississippi contemplated sendmg a delegation to
Amherstburg in 1805, the Deputy Superintendent adv.sed them "not .0 venture a visit .0
their English Father at present."" Leaders in Canada and Great Britain d,d not want any
further trouble with the Americans, particularly after the resumption of .heir wars against
Napoleon in 1803, only a year after the signing of the short-lived Peace of Amiens.
Initially, it was the Indians, not the British, who sought a renewed alliance.
American leaders, however, thought that the Bntish were the source of Na.ive
exaspera.ion and hos.ili.y. As early as 1805, Indiana's
.eni.orial Governor William
Henry Hamson, who no doub. keenly remembered Bri.ish involvemen. wi.h .he hidians
in previous wars, spoke of .he necessity of "cu..ing off .he Indians' "communication
" Claus to Pndeaux Selby, 1 February 1805, CNA, MG 19, F 1, Claus Papers, Vol. 9. 75.
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Iiam
w,.h every foreign power.-
,„ J.„e of .he foHow.ng year, U.S. ,nd,an agen. Win
Wens wro.e
.o Harbison, waging Him of a grow.ng an.-Amencan eonfederacy
.ed hy .e
Three Fires and ins.ga.ed by ,He "pert.rba.on" and "in.r.gues of Bri.,sh agen.s and o.her
misehief makers.".' Already susp,e,ous of Bn.,sh frontier ac.ivi.y, American leaders
beeame eonv.need of us ex.s.enee after ,he Chesapeake crisis in June of , 807. Coventor
Harnson pubhely warned his feUow cilizens, exclaiming,
Harrison's words deeply
.repressed numerous An^cncans, many of whorr.
.ended to
imagine Bnt.sh intrigue at the root of every Ind.an depredation eommitted on the frontier.
In subsequent years sueh Amencan poht,eal and mihtary leaders as Henry Oay, Thomas
Jefferson, James Madison, and Andrew Jaekson adopted this rhetorie in order to justify a
forced expulsion of Bnt.sh presence from North America. Theoretically, once Canada
rested safely m the hands of the new Repubhc, the Indians would live harmoniously with
its frontier inhabitants.^' Neither the Americans nor the British fully grasped the degree
and the cause of the growing Native discontent, but the Americans understood it the least.
In retrospect, the Native solicitations of British support at Amherstburg between
1 801 and 1 806 not only tend to dimmish the credibility of American allegations of British
Governor Harrison's Address to the Indiana General Assembly, 29 July 1805, Logan Esarey ed
^922X1" f53
"^'"""^ "'"^
' ('"'^--P^'- HiLncal Collssion,
W.lliam Wells to Hamson, 19 June 1806, E392. H3 1994, William Henry Harrison Collection Reel 2572, Indiana Historical Society. ' '
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.hese ea.,y ,ea., bu, are a,so s.gnifieant in o.he.
ways. The Indian councils held a, A^herstburg
,nd,ca,e
.ha. .he wes.en, na.ions, namely
.he Po,awa,on,is, Kickapoos. Sauks. Dako.a Sioux, and Winnebagoes, sough,
.o fon. a
mililan. confederacy and a Br,.ish alHance before
.he religious revi.aliza.,on n^ovemen.
of Tenskwa.awa, or .he Shawnee Prophe.. and his bro.her Tecu.seh had ga.ned „.uch
n,on,en.um. For example,
.he Amhers.burg councils of 1 805 and 1 806 occurred before
Tecumseh began his journeys .o augmen.
.he number of converts in his bro.her-s
nedghng prophcic movemen.. The wes.en, na.ions
.ha. had prev.ously begun .o discuss
a new confederacy needed only a unifying agen. .o bring ,. .o f,-ui.,on. When the Bn.ish
refused .o fulfill






.hese na.ions became fertile ground for .he
spread of .he subsequen. na.ivis.ic relig.ous movemen., and (he Prophe. gained n.any
conver.s from among .hem. A bit la.er, ,n 1 8 1 0, William Henry Harrison recognized
.he
increased devotion Iha. .he Shawnee Prophe. enjoyed among .he .ribes .o .he West The
Governor informed Secre.ary of War William Eus.is .ha. "the Prophe.'s principle,
.ha.
their lands should be considered common property, is ei.her openly avowed or seere.ly
favored by all Ihe Tribes wes. of .he Wabash."" Like Harrison,
.he Bn.ish d,d no. fully
grasp .he far-reaching ex.ent and significance of .he religious movemen.'s impac. among
the westemnalions unlil ISIOor 1811. Bu. by .hen British officials in Canada had come
.0 view the growing confederacy as a potential asse. in wartime, ra.her .han a peril to
See Bradford Perkins, ed.. The Causes of ihe War oflSI^ National Honor or National Infer^.i9 ,New
York: Holt, Rmehart, and Winston, 1963), 1 16-17; Bailey, 129-36.
~
" Harrison to Eustis, 24 December 1810, Esarey, Messai>esand l.ellers I: 497.
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continued peace, and while still cautious the Brifi.h inous, n t s no longer spumed Native pleas for
support.
While several of ,he tnbes fron, lUinois. W.sconsin, and ,he Mississippi River
Valley sough, British support in the early years of the nineteenth century. British
relations with Nattves from northwest Ohio and the Wabash Valley remained negligible.
Much of thts neglect resulted from the westward m.gration of some of those bands, but
.he primary reason for the diminishing ties between Britain and its fonner allies was the
Amencan policy of acculturation tha, followed the Treaty of Greenville and the result.ng
socal upheaval that led ,o a revolution in leadership with.n the tnbal ranks. The
American annuities were insufHcient to fully sustain even those Nat.ve commun.ties that
sought acculturation, causing further dissatisfaction. As the Indians' impoverished
condition grew worse in the Hrst years of the nineteenth century, they became
increasingly disillusioned with any leaders who seemed to benefit by cooperating with
the Americans. Tecumseh and the Shawnee Prophet successfully wooed thousands of
followers who no longer recognized the authority of such chiefs as Little Turtle. Black
Hoof Tarhe, Five Medals, and Buckongahelas.
The open rebellion against these traditional leaders crystallized in the form of the
Shawnee Prophet's nativist revilalization movement, which began with his visions along
the White River in the spnngof 1805." The Master of Life warned the Prophet of the
Indian peoples' pending destruction if they did not return to their pristine lifestyles that
^/,?t?''^''"',""''''
Shawnee Prophet (Lincoln & London: Universily of Nebraska Press 1983) 28-
29, 33-34. Tenskwalawa's first visions occurred m early April, 1805, near present-day Anderson, Indiana.
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.hey had abandoned due ,o their contac, with whites. An exphct target of this cntique
was the leadership of the chiefs who stgned the Treaty of Greenville and favored
agncuhura, development via govenunen.-sponsored
"civUizing" n„ssions. and who had
grown increasingly dependent on annuity distributions f^om the Arr,eHcan government.-
In obedience to the Great Spirit, Tenskwatawa lashed out against these government
chiefs, depicting them as wicked traitors and minions of the
.^ericarts. whom he
considered "children of the Evil Spirit.""
Several incidents between 1806 and 1810 document the rapid expansion of the
nativst prophetic movement and the Prophet's growmg influence ,„ tribal affairs and the
threat he posed to the traditional chiefs' standing, to 1806 Tenskwatawa presided over
the execution of four pro-American Indians who lived along the Whtte River and closely
fraternized with the Moravian missionaries there. One of the executed, the Delaware
leader Tatapaxsit. had signed the Treaty of Greenville and subsequently made further
land cessions to the Americans; like the other prominent government chiefs. Tatapaxsit
also favored the govermnenl's civilizing missions.'' to 1807 the Prophet determined that
the pro-American Shawnee leader Black Hoofwas a witch, and Tenskwatawa's follovvere
assassinated two of the old chiefs villagers from Wapakoneta." Similarly, other tribes
also conducted purges, and in 1810 the Wyandots executed three accused witches.
24
25
Gregory Evans Dowd, A Spirited Resi.sfanre
,
131-39,
Speech of La Maigouis, or the Trout, at Arbre Croche, 4 May 1807, CNA MG 19 F 16 AlexanderMcKee Papers, 13-15. La Maigouis acted as the Shawnee Prophet's messenger in the northern country.
A Spirited Resistance, 137; Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet 43-46; Jay Miller "The 1806 Purge
among the Indiana Delaware," Ethnohistory 41(2) (Spnng 1994): 254-62. For the Moravian nussionanes'
account of these executions, see Gipson, 41 1-21.
27
Gregory Dowd, "Thinking and Believing: Nativism and Unity in the Ages of Pontiac and Tecumseh "
Amencan Indian Quarterly 1 6(3) (Summer 1 992), 320; Dowd, A Spnited Resistance 137-38.
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including Leather Lips, a prominent peace chief who had also s.gned the Treaty of
Greenville.^^
Of all the events indicating the shift .n power away from the institutional chiefs to
the Prophet's nativists, none was more important than the bnef encounter between Little
Turtle, the most powerful pro-U. S. government chief, and Tenskwatawa near the
Mississinewa River early in ,808. Determined to prevent the Prophet's entourage from
moving to the Wabash, Little Turtle threatened to kill Tenskwatawa if he and his
followers made the proposed move.- Not the least bit intimidated, the Prophet scoffed at
Little Turtle and condemned all the "Chiefs [who] had abandoned the Interests of their
respective nations and sold all the Indians['] Land to the united States."^<> According to
Little Turtle, the Prophet added that "his plans had been.
.
.santioned[sic] by the Great
Spint and that it was not in the power of man to interrupt them.
. .nothing could stop
him."^' Little Turtle's meeting with Tenskwatawa had quite the opposite effect from
what the older chief had anticipated. It confirmed the success of the Prophet's coup
d'etau and it did nothing to slow the expansion of the revitalization movement, which
continued to eclipse the infiuence of the government chiefs for the next several years.
The nativists' revolt against conventional tribal authority reflected a rift between
the chiefs and their followers that had been widening for years. As eariy as 1801 William
For a list of the chiefs who signed the Treaty of Greenville, see MPHC, XX: 416-18
Dowd, A Spirited Resistance
,
138; Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet 69-70. The Potawatomi leader Fi
Medals accompanied Little Turtle to this meeting with the Prophet. Also see William Wells to Henry
Dearborn, Secretary of War, 2 April 1808, Clarence E. Carter, ed. The Territorial Paper. c.U\..V.J.^
States, 26 Vols. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1934-1962), VII: 541.
ve
Wells to Dearborn, 23 April 1808, ibid., 560.
Same to same, 22 April 1808, ibid., 558.
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Henry Hamson noted ,ha. ,he tribes on the lower Wabash had murdered a number of
.heir headmen, lamenting that the "Ch.efs and.
. .nearest relations fall under the strokes of
their [followers'] Tomhawks [s,c] & Kt,ives." The Govemor further emphasized that
"there is scarcely a Chief to be found amongst them.- Hamson's attempt to ren.edy the
instab,lity of the Nat.ve commun.ties entailed efforts to make the Indians more dependent
on the United States, wh.ch meant an increase of Native debts followed by a series of
rap,d goventment land acquisitions." However, the flu^ of treaties that Hamson
negotiated not only fa.led to reduce U. S. - Indian tensions but the agreements mtensified
Native frustration with their leaders.^"*
Of all of Harrison's treaties with the Natives in Indiana Temtory, his fifth and
final pact as governor proved to be the most damaging to U. S. - Indian relations.
Negotiated at Fort Wayne in the autumn of 1809, this treaty involved the Delaware,
Miami, Potawatomi, and Eel River nations, and it entailed a land cession of nearly three
million acres, a portion of which extended west of the Wabash River, cutting an
enormous swath from the remaining Native territory in Indiana and southern Illinois.
Only a year earlier, the Prophet and Tecumseh and their followers had moved to the
village of Prophetstown near the confluence of the Wabash and Tippecanoe Rivers,
new
' Harrison to the Secretary of War, 15 July 1801, Esarey, Messages & Letters 1; 29.
" Harrison's superiors also advocated this strategy. In a well-known letter. President Thomas Jefferson in
1803 instnicted the Governor to "push our trading houses, and be glad to see the good and mfluential
individuals among them run in debt, because we observe that when these debts get beyond what the
mdividuals can pay, they become willing to lop them off by a cession of lands." Jefferson to Hamson 27
February 1803, Esarey, Messages & Letters . I: 71.
For Harrison's Indian treaties, see Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties 2 Vols
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), II: 64-68,70-77,80-82,89-90,101-07 1 17-18- Francis
Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties, 1 16-23, 451-55, 456. For proceedings and Indian Responses see
Esarey, Messages & Letters, I: 117-18, 121-23, 137-39, 358-78. Also see Indiana Histoncal Societ^^ E
392. H3 1994, William Henry Hamson Collection, Reels 1-3, 10.
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.o uni.e a. ,he new loca.ion. where ".hey wou.d
.hen be
able ,o wa.ch
.he Boundry [sie] Line be.ween
.he Indians and whi.e people-and
,f a
White man pu. his foo. over
,. .ha, .he warriors could Easly [sie] pu. h„n back.- The
cession under the Treaty of Fort Wayne of such a large area that the growing na.iv.s.
confederacy spec.ncally hoped .o re.ain produced an angry response among
.he Prophc's
followers and led .he prophcic movemen.
.0 become even more mili.ant. The followmg
spnng, while in a heated discussion a. Black Hoofs vUlage, Tecumseh angrily sna.ched a
le.ter written by Harrison (addressed
.0 .he Shawnees) from .he hands of Bap.is.
missionary, Stephen Ruddell and .hrew i. in.o .he fre. The war leader
.hen declared ,ha.
he would do .he same
.0 Harrison ,f the Goverrtor were present. Alter convincing a few
of the formerly pro-Arrterican Shawnees ,0 jom .he ga.hering confederacy, Tecumseh
con.inued his recrui.ing efforts among the Wyando.s.'' Then in la.e Angus., while
speaking in council w,.h Harrison a. Vincennes, Tecumseh threatened "to kill all the
chiefs thai sold you Ihc land.""
Clearly, the Treaty of Fort Wayne had further impaired relations wilh .he Indians,
and .he na.ivis.s had no inlen.ion of honoring any agreement made by leaders whom they
considered to have abdicated. But .he aftemialh of the treaty also marked a more
significan. .uniing poin. wi.hin Native politics. 11 represen.ed
.he moment a. which .he
35
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Wells to Dearborn, 22 April 1808, Carter, Territorial Papers. VII: 558.
A f r o?. ^^r'''"' Messages & Letters. I: 430; Sugden, Tecumseh-
^_yie, 180-81; R. David Edmunds, Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership (New York- Harper
Colhns Publishers, 1984), 126-27; Edmunds, "A Watchful Safeguard: Black Hoof and the Loyal
Shawnees," 172-73; Klmck & Talman, Journal of Major John Norton . 174-75.
"Tecumseh's speech at Vincennes, 20 or 21 August 1810, Carl F. Klmck, ed., Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction
in Early Records (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1961), 71; Esarey, MessagesALetters, 466""
255
nat.v,st confederacy began to wield its m..rmum polmcal strength, and the moment at
Which the maionty of Natives throughout southern Michigan, Indiana, westeni Ohio, and
IlHnois fully rejected the authonty of the government chiefs, giving allegiance to the
Shawnee brothers and the prophetic movement on the Wabash. Poor to this time the
fiber of the confederacy had been mainly spintual, but after 1809 the prophetic
movement began to also crystallize and function as both a political and military entity. In
1810, Tecumseh, without any hereditary authonty as a village chief, boldly proclaimed to
Hamson, "I am authonzed by all the tnbes.
. ..I am the head of them all." The Shawnee
leader also explained that his nativist followers needed to "destroy [the] village [i.e.
government] chiefs," in order "to let all our affairs be transacted by [genume]
Warriors. "^^
Some scholars argue that the nativist movement became secular and political after
the Treaty of Fort Wayne, and that Tecumseh eclipsed his brother's authonty at this
point.^^ However, Gregory Dowd replies that while Tecumseh did indeed gain influence,
indicating a stronger intertnbal political stmcture within the confederacy m the aftemiath
of the Fort Wayne Treaty, this did not necessarily coincide with a decrease of either his
brother's status or the spiritual revitalization movement in general.'" In fact, Tecumseh's
increasing popularity after 1809 indicated the growing disillusionment of the younger
wamors with the government chiefs, and not so much a shift in the confederacy's
Tecumseh's speech at Vincennes, 20 or 21 August 1810, Klinck, Tecumseh: Fact and FirHnn 71-
Esarey, Messages & Letters . 465-66. ' '
Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life
,
187-89; Edmunds, Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership 124-25-
Regmald Horsman, Expansion and Amencan Indian Policy. 1783-181? (East Lansing: Michigan State
University Press, 1967), 152-53, 166-67.
Dowd, "Thinking and Believing: Nativism and Unity m the Ages of Pontiac and Tecumseh," 322-
Dowd, A Spmted Resistance . 139-40
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^dcology; Tecumseh's nse d.d not alter the Prophet's ongn.l tenets and prophecy that
dated from the movement's origins on the White River.
Since the confederacy grew out of a rel.gious rev.tahzat.on movement, its
pnncpal war chiefs were generally thought to possess the sp.ntual powers required to act
as leaders in such a movement, or, at the very least, they were loyal followers of the
Prophet, who directly foretold the.r fate. Tecumseh, while often thought of as a poht.ca.
and secular war chief, was perhaps the greatest proponent of the revitali.ation movement.
More than merely possessing talents of warfare and insp.rational rhetoric, Tecumseh also
purportedly wielded much spiritual power; those who followed him believed that the
Great Sp.nt and the manitous favored the war leader. Throughout Tecumseh's southern
journey in the autumn of 1 8 1 1 , Creeks and Seminoles claimed to have witnessed his
rituals, miracles, and even his immense "power to deal with the evil spirit."^' In the
North, the Winnebagocs also regarded Tecumseh as an invincible war leader.'*^
Other important war leaders during this era also functioned as both war chiefs and
shamans. Some of these included Main Poc and Josiah Francis, and perhaps to a lesser
extent Shabonee, Roundhead, and Black Hawk. The Potawatomi Main Poc held
y
Tustcnuckcchcc u, I.yman Draper, 22 Augiust 1883, Tecumseh Papers. Draper Ms.s Vol 4YY2- JohnJuniper to Lyman Draper, 1
1
January 1882. .bid., vol. 4YY16-16.1; Dowd, A Spirited Re.s..t.nr. 197.
Narrative of Spoon Decorah, WHC, XllI: 459. Generations after the famed Shawnee's death atMoraviantown in 1813. the older Winnebagoes still spoke often of Tecumseh, recounting h,s miraculous
Jeats. Although tecumseh's violent death might have seemingly undermined the notion of Iws
omnipotence, his followers did not view this as Tecumseh's loss of power; but rather, they int.-rpreted the
event as the Creat Spirit's wrath against them for having compromised their nativist ways The famedSauk leader Hlack Hawk, who allegedly saw l ecumseh die, later recalled. "As soon as the Indians
discovered that he was killed, a sudden fear came over them, and thinking the (Jreat Spirit was angry they
fought no longer, and were quickly put to flight." See The Death of Tecumseh: Black Hawk's Account
Tecumseh: Fact and l iction
.
209; Fienjamin Drake, Life of Tecumseh. and of His Hroi her the
Prophet; With a Historical Sketch of the Shawanoe Indians (Cincinnati: E. Morgan & Co 1 84 1 reprintNew York: Arno Press, 1 969), 202. Today the Shawnee people remember Tecumseh as one ol their
greatest prophets. James Howard. 211.
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signincan, sway over ,he Indians in Indiana and IIHno.s
,e„itories; many feared him,
since his followers claimed ,ha. their leader "was noC bom of a woman bu, ,ha, he was
go. by the Great Spirit and sprang ou, of the ground.- As a wabeno, or the most
powerful type of shaman short of be.ng a prophet, Main Poc allegedly could change the
weather." Although Ma,n Poc never joined the Shawnee Prophet's following, he invited
the Prophet, Tecumseh, and their entire entourage to move from Ohio to what became the
site of Propetstown near the conHucnce of the Wabash and Tippecanoe Rivets early ,n
1 808. At about the time that the Shawnee Prophet and his devotees made this move, U.S.
Indian agent Willia.n Wells at Fort Wayne considered Main Poc "the greatest warrior in
the west
.
the pivot on which the minds of all the Western Indians turned.
. .[he] has more
inlluencc than any other lnd,an."« Thus Wells believed that the key to good relations
between the United States and the Indians depended on the goventmenfs dealings with
Mam Poc, and that he could control the nativtsts in the Wabash prophetic movement by
controllmg Main Poc. Ultimately, the Potawatomi wabeno became an important Brit.sh
ally along the Detroit frontier in the War of 1812.
Among the other key (Igures mentioned above, the Creek prophet Josiah Francis,
also know as llildis Hadjo, led the Muskogee religious revital.^ation movement between
1811 and 1814, Known as the "Redsticks," Francis's Creek followers had initially drawn
much of their inspiration from Tecumseh, and these militant revivalists initiated a civil
43
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war among the Creek towns who did not jo,n their rehgious movement and cultural
revolt.- Francs, a m.ed-blood, became perhaps the most important Natwe prophet m
the South during not only the Creek cw.l war but also dunng the War of 1 8 1 2, when the
Redsticks ardently resisted white culture and American expansion.
In the North, Shabonee and Roundhead both became mystic war leaders within
the context of Tenskwatawa's prophetic movement. The Ottawa leader Shabonee relied
on spintual power for victory, and, like Black Hawk at the Thames in 1813, inteipreted
the Native defeat at Tippecanoe two years earlier as the will of the Great Spint.- The
Wyandot headman Roundhead, the only signer of the Treaty of Greenville to participate
in the Native resistance during the War of 1812, joined the Shawnee Prophet's movement
by 1807, even before the Prophet and his converts moved to Tippecanoe.^^ In September
1812, Roundhead, Tecumseh, and Main Poc, along with their wamors, accompanied
Major Adam Muir on the abortive Bntish expedition up the Maumee River in an attempt
to capture Fort Wayne. When Muir decided to retreat after learning of an advancing
Amencan army. Roundhead urged him and his soldiers to continue the campaign because
the divinations ofMain Poc and other "conjurers" portended success against the
Amencans.^^ Furthermore, Tecumseh respected Roundhead as the most prominent leader
9(3) (Summer 1985): 277; Martm, 126, 134; Dowd, A Spirited Resi.stance 169^70
^
"Shabonee's Account," in Battle of Tippecanoe: Conflict of n.lh.r.c ed. Alameda McCollough
(Lafayette, IN: Tippecanoe County Histoncal Association, 1973; fifth printing, 1991), 9.
Sugden Tecumseh: A Life
, 4, 132-33; Edmunds, Tecumseh and the One.t fnr TnH..n_r^^^^w|^ 95
For Roundhead s signature, see die Treaty of Greenville, MPHC: XX: 416. He is listed as "Staye tah"
under the Wyandot section of signatures. For Roundhead's support of the nativists m 1807 see his speech
agamst Black Hoof s faction; 6 June 1 807, Tecumseh Papers, Draper Mss . 3YY72-73.
" Major Muir's Official Report of the Expedition to Fort Wayne, 30 September 1812, Appendix I
Alexander C. Casselman, ed., Richardson's War of 1812 (Toronto- Historical Publishing Co 1902) 298-
99; Edmunds, "Main Poc: Potawatomi Wabeno," 29.
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ion era
in the nativis. n,ovemen,. A month earher a. the BriUsh-Ind.an capture of Detro.t
Genera, Isaac Brock demonstrated his gratitude to Tecumseh by giving h™ his persona,
scarier sash. Tecunrseh acknowledged Roundhead's rank and prestige by giving Brock's
sash
,0 the Wyandot, explaining that Roundhead was "an o,de, and.
. abler warrior than
himself."'" This cadre of leaders tended to have common goals, and they viewed
themselves as members of a un.Hed movement to restore a threatened culture and
religion. Unlike the Native leaders who sometimes acted as culture brokers for Euro-
Amencan lifestyles among their people, the nativist war chiefs of the revitaiizatr
did not accept leaders who sought compromise and accommodation."
After this radical shift in leadership among the nations in the southern Great
Lakes and Wabash Valley. British officials m Upper Canada, especially those at Fort
Maiden (i.e., Amherstburg). were compelled to cultivate ties w.th the nativist faction, or
have no relations at all with the most vital elements in Native communities. Since most
of these wamors had not served as Confederacy war leaders at the fonner Brownslown
council fire, British attempts to restore their former alliance involved the challenge of
reestablishing diplomatic ties with tribes that had ousted their institutional chiefs. From
the years of the American Revolution through the mid-1 790s all tribal factions in the Old
Northwest had generally been allied to Bntain, but after the revitalization movement had
brought about a new confederacy and new sachems, British agents really did not know
where they stood with their former allies. Furthermore, Whitehall's policy of
eat
William James, A Full and Correct Account of the Military Occurences of the T .ate War Between Gr
Britam and the Umted States of Amenca
,
2 Vols., (London: prmted for the author 1818) I- 291-92-
fji"*^^'
Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction
,
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1 80; Sugden, Tecumsh: A Life . 308, 447. —




"^P"""-"' l^^-en 1 796 and 1 807, as
,„.p,e„,en,ecl by
'
' «mccrs, had d,as.,cally cu. the praCce of gin-
giving Ih.u \m\ long sustained llndsh-lndian (les.
I laving distanced
.hcmsoivcs from (i,e Natives of Oi,io and Indiana for more than
a decade, Ur,„sh officials, no less than the Amerieans, were mysflled by the Prophet's
charismatic moventent. Late u, 1807, Wdham Claus, Deputy Superintendent General of
Bnt.sh Indmn Affans, held the op,u,on that "that Rascal the Prophet" was a French
agent " Ironically, while Claus suspected French treachery, the Americans bcheved that
the Prophet was a pawn of British inlrigue.
AhhongI, riaus haclly misread the prophetic movement, h.s suspicions of French
involvement indicate that the Deputy Supenntendent General had not iuliy dismissed
rumors of French invasions from the West. Years earher, leaders in Upper Canada had
ridiculed Joseph Brant for supposedly fabricating stories of French incursions in order to
lui Iher his own cause and perhaps gain Six Nations' sovereignty at the Grand River.
Now Claus thought it best to seriously consider the plausibility of growing French
influence among the Indians. ^ The agent was cognizant of Napoleon's stunning
successes against the allied nations of the Third Coalition durmg the years 1805 tlirough
1807. And, despite the fact that Nelson had previously demolished the enemy fleets at
Trafalgar, Claus knew that Britain's growing military commitments on the European
continent meant that Upper Canada could expect virtually no reinforcements from home
ill the event of a Franco-Indian insurrection in the Great Lakes.
" Claus to John Johnson. Superintendent General, 2 November 1807, CNA, MG 19, F 1, Claus Papers, 9,
161-62; Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet . 63.
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The mood of ,he hotheaded Americans ,n the wake of the Chesapeake affair gave
Claus an additional incentive to begin making fnendly overtures to the Prophet and other
leaders associated with him. Han,son and the Antencans were mistaken ,n their behef
that the naval tragedy was somehow hnked to British-hdian dealings on the frontier, and
although the incdent iron.cally d,d precipitate closer Bnt.sh-Ind.an ties, th.s came only
as a defensive measure after hawkish Aniencan sentiments led the countries to the bnnk
of war.'^ The changing diplomatic climate in the Great Lakes compelled Claus and his
superiors to take an assertive role in reestablishing their Chain of Friendshtp wth nations
that now fell under the influence of the Prophet, Tecumseh, Mam Poc, Roundhead, and
others. Claus, who ordinarily maintained h,s headquarters at Fort George near the mouth
of the Niagara River, spent more than five months during the first halfof 1808 at Fort
Maiden, where he attempted to ascertam the viability of a restored Native confederacy
and its fidelity to British mterests. Claus met with dozens of tadians passing through
Amherslburg, but he most earnestly desired to speak with the Prophet. The agent sent a
number of invitations to Tenskwatawa to meet with him at Fort Maiden, and afler
receiving no response, Claus finally dispatched Frederick Fisher, another Indian agent, to
journey to Prophetstown to personally deliver the invitation." Fisher returned with
favorable news, indicating that the Tenskwatawa assured the British "of his fiiendship."''
53 By May, 1 808, Governor General Sir James Craig also viewed the French as a significant threat See
Craig to Lieutenant Governor Francis Gore, 1 1 May 1808, MPHC, XXV: 245-46; P.R.O., CO 42/136
163-64. ' ' '
Harrison's Speech to the Indiana Legislature, 17 August 1807, Esarey, Messages and Letters L 235-36,
" Claus to Lieutenant Governor Francis Gore, 27 February 1808, MPHC, XV: 44; CNA, MG 19, F 1
Claus Papers, 9, 177-79; Fort Maiden Archives, John Marsh Papers, File 10, 405.
'
'
Claus to Prideaux Selby, Military Secretary, 3 May 1808, MPHC, XV: 49; Fort Maiden Archives John
Marsh Papers, File 10, 415; CNA, MG 19 F 1, Claus Papers, 9, 193; Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet 70-
71; Edmunds, Tecumseh and the Quest for Indian Leadership
. 1 13-14.
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When ,he Shawnee Prophe. s.iU d,d no. arrive after ™uch an.ic,pa.ion. C.aus sen. a Fox
runner specificaHy informing Tenshva.awa
.ha. [Cans] w,„ be ver, g,ad .o .ake you
by .he hand and as .here wi„ be several Na.ions wr.h you I wi„ be g,ad .o .ake some of
their chief young men by the hand also.""
Despite all of Claus's efforts to speak w.th the Prophet and to restore close ties
with the Natives south and west of the Great Lakes, n does not seem that the Prophet
visited Fort Maiden until after the commencement of the War of 1 812, long after his
mtertnbal influence had senously diminished. Tecumseh, however, answered Claus's
call, and the elder brother, accompanied by five Shawnees, finally traveled to Maiden,
where they met with the Deputy Supenntendent for the first time in mid-June 1808. On
this initial meeting Claus "had at least 3 hours conversation with" Tecumseh, but Claus
apparently was disappointed that the Prophet remained absent, as the agent never referred
to Tecumseh by name, but merely as "the Prophets Brother."^« No fomial commitments
were struck in this encounter, but both parties exchanged kind words, and the Shawnee
delegation came away with "a handsome Present."^^
Although both the Prophet and Tecumseh initially approached the British with
caution and reserve, they chose not to flilly reject Claus's overtures. The Shawnee
brothers' recent move to Prophetstown had brought the risk of extreme deprivation and
starvation because at the new site the nativists no longer had access to any of the benefits
that they had known in Greenville: partial annuity distributions, gifts fi-om the Shakers of
in
58
Diary of William Claus at Amherstburg, 16 May 1808, MPHC, XXIII: 50. The original of this diarvCNA, MG 19 F 1, Claus Papers, 9, 195-215.
Claus Diary, entries for 13, 14, 15 June 1808, MPHC XXIII: 53-54.
Ibid., 53,
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Turtle Creek, and stolen produce and livestock from white settlers.'" Wh.le far from
representing an immediate mil.ta,^ alliance, Tecumseh's meeting w.th Claus m 1808 was
the firs, step in reuniting Bntish leaders with nat.vist factions m the North, paving the
way for a future partnership m a common cause. The meeting also opened a new phase
in diplomacy in wh.ch the Bntish ardently pursued a wartime Indian policy, and it
marked the begimting ofTeeumseh's career as a liaison between British officers and the
nativist faction that would support them.^'
Tecumseh and the Rriti.'^h
Pnor to his meeting with Claus in 1 808, Tecumseh probably had never entered a
British or an American fort." He had never signed a treaty, nor did he possess any
hereditary claims to leadership within the Shawnee infrastructure, a deficiency of
credentials that led Black Hoof and the Shawnee council at Wapakoneta to view
Tecumseh as a usurping imposter and demagogue.^-^ Though he lacked the proper
Regarding conditions at Prophetstown, see John Conner's Statement before William Well, at FortWayne, 18 June 1808 Shawnee File, GABLA; Harrison to Henry Dearborn, 14 February 809 EsareyMessa ges cS: Lette..
,
I: 355; Carter, lemtooaiPaEers, VII: 640, 356; Wells to DearborZ 23 April 808
75 76 • ?^7S?^'T ''^ IheMlMkGi^ 509; Edmunds, The Shawnee g^^ ;.-76. For the Prophet s relationship w.th the Shakers, see J. P. MacLean, "Shaker Mission to theShawnee Indians, Ohio Archaeological and Hi.stonral Society' Puhl.c.f.nn. nu (inn, ion.)- 215.29.
" Although It can be argued that a militant BritishTndian policy had been revived a year before this
meeting with Tecumseh, Bntish leaders understood their own vulnerability if they did not gam the support
of the growing nativ.st movement. Once they had opened communication with these recalcitrants British
Indian agents knew that they could continue a wartime Indian policy, explaimng Claus s anxiety over the
Prophet s disposition.
" However, Tecumseh had previously met with white leaders, including an occasion when he made a
public speeh m the courthouse at Chillicothe in September 1807, calming the citizens by refliting
allegations that Indians had committed a recent murder m western Ohio. See Sugden, Tecumseh: A l ife
3-8. " '
" Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life
,
92-93, 96-97, 130-31. As Shawnees of the Kispoko division, Tecumseh and
Tenskwatawa held less institutional authority than Black Hook of the preeminent Mekoche division, and
war leaders were expected to defer to the prerogative of village chiefs in formal council settings. Howard.
26-27, 108-09. For Tecumseh 's rivalry with Blackhoof and the Wapakoneta council, see Ibid., 97, 131; Bil
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.,y, „„, ,„ „avc desired in.eririba, or
inlcn,,„io„..,f polifi. al power.
, ,e w.si.ed u, be free o. all ,ies ,o l.rd.sh or An.erican
leaders, and he did no, ,hn,k ,ha, he and o,he, Shawnces should y,e , ,he a ri,y of
elnefs who ha,l eon.pronnse.l wHh d,e Americans. Thns Tccumseh only beeanie a ,le
facio vdlage einel
„, M,e years lollown,,, Wayne's victory and Ihe Treaty of Greenvdle;
his lollowens consislcl nioslly
„| ,he poor and dispoMesscd Shawnees who fel, behayed
by ll,e,r lea.lers who had signed ,he Treaty of Greenville and eneonraBed as.snndahon
Willi Ihc Americans.
From the linl.sl, perspective, Tecu.nscl. was a goclsu.cl. W.ll, „u,sl oHheu
former allied cinels now cleal.n^. w,ll. ,|.c An.encans, and (he fut.ue o( Ihe H.owns.own
council fire nncerhun, Ihe Hnl.sh had hide hope ol wanhnr, oH an American invasion.
Unhke (he era ol lhe An.encan Revoh.don, du- liritish n. I Ipper Canada could no longer
cxpecl all (id)al lacdons K, supp„,| (he, cause. Now (hey would have (o rely specifically
on (he disaffecled nalivisl elemen(s, mainly (hose groups alienated by I JnKed S(a(es
fronl.e, policy. Fven so, Clat.s and the Indian Department were stunned when more than
5,000 of these Indians visited Port Maiden in (he audimii ol I KOS, only a lew months
afier Claus's departure fioni that place.''' Such a laige numhei ol polenlial intertnhal
Na(ive allies linked (o so lew leaders I ecumseh. Roundhead, and Main I'oc was
certainly more than anyone had anticipated, |)ai liculaily when considenuf, dial Hritish-
Indian ties had nearly been severed along the Maumec more than a decade earlier
(iiil)erl, (lodCJavr I)-. I In, ( <Miiiliy Irk.iinll.i .itid llir I mm Aiiu-ikjii ( ivil War (New York' Alhfiieum
I') 2.
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Although these results were due in part to the Ind.a. Department's renewed efforts to
restore the old alliance, much of the Native enthusiasm can be attributed to the
crystallization of the prophetic movement, ai.d perhaps to the fact that the proselytes
needed food as they faced their first wmter at Prophetstown.
The potential comiections with the nativist confederacy also appeared especially
advantageous to the British at^er the Chesapeake Affair in 1807, and fron. that date
onward Canadian officials strove to restore an alliance with Natives living within the
borders of the United States. But such a delicate task had to be done with discretion,
since Britain technically stood as a neutral power between the An.erican government and
the belligerent Indians in the Old Northwest. Blatant Bntish activity among the anti-
American tribes could itself precipitate another Anglo-American war. Knowing that they
could not send open overtures to their former allied chiefs who now dealt with the
Americans, Claus and his staff favored opening a dialogue with Indians who wanted
nothing to do with the Amencan government, keeping the diplomacy more discreet.
Although the Amencans suspected Bntish involvement with the Indians, Prophetstown
was so far removed ft-om both Vincennes and Fort Wayne that neither Harrison nor U. S.
agent William Wells could determine the level of British-Indian contact.^^
In the meantime, leaders in Canada pursued a dual Indian policy, one that
constantly proclaimed neutrality and another that prepared for war in case the first failed.
Governor General Sir James Craig understood the crucial necessity of a British-Indian
alliance, reasoning that Indians could never sit idle in warfare and would therefore be
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..,„ ,„ s,..ke ,he A,..a,e.ns unl.l .he, H..,.sh l...he, w.s w:., w.,h ,hc
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'n.lal S...es. The pu.su.. ul sueh a d.pl...,..,..
.ec,..„ecl experience, a.ul ( Vaig
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advantage. In July I SOS Tecun.seh re.iin.ed .., Maiden. whe, e he and dozens of chiefs,
accotnpariied by h.u.d.eds of wa.nors, lis.ened .o houis of H,..,sh
.I.e.oric regaidmg
friendship. Lieu.e.ian. (iovernor (io,e perso,ially dehveied the capstone speech.
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ren.ind.ng his hsteners of the eternal bonds between them and the King and of past
injunes done to then, by the Amencans. Gore also boldly
.fonned then, that the K.ng
still held sacred "the Treaty made at Fort Stanw.x m 1 768," wh.eh had proh.b.ted wh.te
settlement north and west of the Oh.o R.ver.- This prohibition had been flagrantly
violated by more than thirty years of Amenean expansion, U. S. mH.tary conquests in the
North, all the cess.ons made at the Treaty of Greenville, and the multiple subsequent
treaties that Harrison had negotiated 7' But Gore and his cohorts were desperate for
allies. Two days later the chiefs present formally responded, recprocatmg with
statements of fnendship, telling Gore that his speech had "bnghtened the Chain of
Friendship," and adding, "we pray the Great Spint to keep ,t bnght and lasting."^^
However, these statements were not accompanied by any bindmg commitments.
After all of the public ceremonies and pleasant exchanges during ihe Fort Maiden
council, Glaus and Elliott met pnvately with Tecumseh and a handful of other headmen.
Of the Native leaders present, Tecumseh seems to have made the strongest impression on
the agents and Lieutenant Governor Gore. The Shawnee remained friendly but
noncommittal, stressing that the growing confederacy on the Wabash did not "intend to
take part in the quarrels of the White People." However, Tecumseh affirmed that "if the
Americans encroach on them, they are resolved to strike," and "if their Father the King,
should be in earnest and appeared in sufficient force they would hold fast by Him."^^ It
Lieutenant Governor Gore's Speech to the Western Confederacy, 1 1 July 1808, CNA RG 10 Indian
Affairs, Vol. 1 1, 9886.
" Recall that in 1793 the former Confederacy, at the urging of Alexander McKee, unsuccessfully
demanded that the United States government recognize the Ohio River as the permanent boundary.
" Speech of the different Indian Nations, 13 July 1808, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 1 1, 9891.
73
Gore to Craig, 27 July 1808, ibid., 9902.
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seems that Tecumseh had achieved with regard to the Bnt.sh precisely what Gore and the
Man Department had hoped to accomphsh w.th the natmst Indians: the Shawnee clung
to an official status of neutrality for the confederacy, while he temporized on the
possibility of a Bntish-hidian alliance. Before he would make such a commitment,
Tecumseh first needed to know if war could be avoided between his nativist followers
and the Amencans. If not, only then would the Shawnee leader consider an alliance.
Tecumseh happily paid lip service to the restoration of the Chain of Friendship, which
was little more than a simple statement of goodwill. In so doing, the Shawnee scored a
diplomatic victory m which he promised nothing, gained a potential ally, and came away
with much-needed provisions for the growing intertribal community at Prophetstown. In
a tribute to Tecumseh's diplomatic skills. Gore referred to "[t]he Prophet's Brother' as "a
very shrewd, intelligent man."'''*
Tecumseh's mam purpose was to remain neutral while strengthening the V/abash
confederacy. In 1 809, a year after his initial meetings with the Indian Department
officials at Fort Maiden, Tecumseh returned to that vicinity and visited the Wyandots,
Shawnees, and members of the Three Fires, without stopping at the British post.^^
Tecumseh made it plain that he did not trust the British. During one of his early visits to
Maiden, the Shawnee headman reminded Elliott and Glaus of the British perfidy at Fallen
Timbers in 1794, and "of the number of Chiefs who fell in consequence of that Fort
[Miami] being shut against them."'^ Two years later during his first meeting with
Ibid.
Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life . 435, n. 3.
76
Gore to Craig, 27 July 1808, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 11, 9902. The Indians bitterly
complained about this incident regularly. Also see Isaac Brock to Sir George Prevost, 2 December 1811,
Wood, Select British Documents
. I: 273; Klinck, Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction. 117.
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Har^son a, Vince^es, Tecumseh again alluded
.o ",he treachery of rhc Bnhsh." He also
informed the governor
.hat the confederacy, w.thout developing further t.es with the
Bnttsh, intended to use the restored Brownstown council fire to punish those chiefs who
had sold land to the Amencan govermnent. This formal council would also seek redress
and land restoration f^om the American govenrment for those unauthorized sales." At
that moment Tecumseh sincerely believed that he could accomphsh his goals through
skillful diplomacy and without British intervention.
Hanison's reply to Tecumseh's appeal that the United States should rescnd the
Treaty of Fort Wayne led to a shatp shift in the Shawnee's deatneanor. The govemor had
begun to explain the legality and justice of the Unned States govenmtenfs Indian
policy.™ After listening for more than fifteen mtnutes. Tecumseh could bear it no longer;
he leapt to his feet and called Hamson a liar, angnly denouncing everything he had just
heard." He was furious because Harrison's legalistic statements made it all too plain that
negotiations could never recover the lost treaty lands, and that Harrison did not recognize
Tecumseh's authonty as supreme among the hidians. Given these facts, the matter would
probably come to blows, though Tecumseh did not immediately give up on defending his
position and policies. The following day he again stated to Hairtson, "I am alone the
acknowledged head of all the Indians," and he concluded by wammg that any Amencan
Tecumseh's Speech at Vincennes, 20 August 1810, Esarey, Messages & fellers I: 464, 466-67.
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Tecumseh's Speech at Vincennes, 20 August 1810, Esarey, Messages & Letters . I: 467-68.
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Although Tecuniseh had exaggerated his claims to possessing sole authonty over
"all the Indians," his remarks were not completely unfounded.^' The British already
viewed him as the confederacy's principal spokesperson, and by 1809 the remnants of the
Brownstown council entrusted Tecumseh with carrying the sacred belt of the old
confederacy to Prophetstown.^^ This suggests that the Wyandot leaders at Brownstown
viewed Tecumseh's leadership qualifications as preeminent among those living at
Prophetstown, and that his prestige had eclipsed that of the fornier members of the
Brownstown council who had since made compromises with the Americans. The
Brownstown gesture also indicated that the most influential Wyandots now approved of
the Wabash movement's goals and sought to incorporate that community into a revived
Brownstown confederacy." The Wyandot chief Roundhead may have been instrumental
in bringing about the Brownstown endorsement of the nativist movement, but the
decision would have also included the approval of both Adam Brown and Walk in the
Water, Brownstown 's principal village chief and war leader, respectively.
Harrison understood the seriousness of the Wyandots' defection. After having
been confident that they supported American interests, he lamented to his superiors that
Ibid., 468-69.
Certain other leaders, such as Main Poc for example, would not have acquiesced to Tecuinseh's clauns.
Matthew Elliott to Major Hulton, 19 May 1809, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 3, 990; While, The
Middle Ground , 514.
Harrison to William Eustis, Secretary of War, 14 June 1810, Esarey, Messages & Letters . I: 423-24.
This gesture by the Brownstown council, however, did not necessarily mean that Wyandots mtended to
become the Prophet's religious converts.
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"[.]he Prophet!.] knowing
.he great advantage he would denve from ga.ning over th,s
Tribe to his interests!,] attempted it and has succeeded." Harrison also reaUzed the
significance of "the Great Belt which was the S^bol ofUnion between the Tribes."'^
The Wyandots had previously pa,d little attention to the nativist movement, and, indeed,
their principal village of Brownstown nvaled Black Hoofs Wapakoneta to the degree
that it fostered accommodation with whites « The resistance movement's appeal to the
Wyandots grew after Michigan's temtorral Governor William Hull concluded the Treaty
of Detroit late ,n 1807, which effectively expropriated an enomious chunk of nonhwest
Ohio and southeast Michigan from the Wyandots and the Three Fires for virtually
nothing."" The Wyandots apparently did not fully understand the transaction, because
they were later troubled to learn that they no longer owned any of the tract, not even
Brownstown." The Treaty's significance was also not lost on the Indian Department at
Maiden, where William Claus informed other tribes of its terms.'* While not all of the
Wyandots joined Tecumseh and the British, most ultimately supported them.*'
84
Harrison to William Eustis, Secretary of War, 14 June 1810, ibid., I: 423.
Zlur^T^"'^'''^'^
descriptions of Brownstown, see Jacob Visgar to William Hull, 12 October 1807MHHC, XL: 239-40, and Gerard T. Hopkins, A Mission to the Indians from the Indian Comm .i:,-P of
Baltimore Yearly Meeting, to Fort Wavne. in 1 804 rPh.l.Hplph..- T. Ellwood Zell, 1862), 102-037~
Kappler, II: 92-95; Prucha, American Indian Treaties . 125-26.
Speech of [Wyandot] Indian Chiefs to Governor Hull, 30 September 1809, MPHC, XL: 304-07.




This was particularly so during the crucial opening phase of the war along the Detroit frontier in August
1812. One eyewitness reported that when the war began, the entire Brownstown commumty "evacuated
the place and crossed the [Defroit] nver to place diemselves under the British flag." Milo M. Quaife, ed..
War on the Defroit: The Chronicles of Thomas Vercheres de Boucherville and the Capitulation by an Ohio
Volunteer (Chicago; The Lakeside Press, R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 1940), 79, 101. John Norton also
later indicated that the Wyandots of Brownstown, "[wjarriors of the best character," fought in these
skirmishes, and that two Wyandot leaders. Roundhead and Walk in the Water, were mstrumental in the
capture of Detroit. See Klinck & Talman. Journal of Major John Norton . 300. For Governor Hull, the loss
of the Wyandots to the British was a crushing blow, since he believed even after die war began that they
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By the end onsiO, Tecun.seh, en.bo.dened by his support fron,
..ownstown and
annoyed w.th
1 .arnson, sought a tnll Bnt.sh a.hance fbr the first tune sn.e disaster
on the Maumee sixteen years earher. h. Noven.her he n.et wUh Matthew Hlhott and
adnntted to hun '"that at first they
f. e. hin.elfand h.s eonlederates] uUended to keep
their plan a secret even fiom their [Br.t.shJ Father " but now "Governor Harr.son has
pnshed then, to n,ake some kuid ofavowal ofthen- uUent.ons.'- Dunng th.s visit,
Teetunseh fonnally presented the offieers w.th a belt of wampun, that the Br.t.sh had
given to the Shawnee leaders nearly fifiy years before, when the British 'Maid the French
on tlieu baek" at the end of the French and Indum War/" Tecumseh chn.ned to have
stole.1 th.s beh from h.s nation's chiefs five years earher, a,ul he considered hunself
authorized to conduct the tribe's international diplomacy, cxphumng that "we the
Warriors now manage the affairs of our Nation.""^ Unhke his visits to Maiden durmg the
summer of 1 808, Tecumseh this time did not speak of past betrayals. He and the cadre of
iiativist leaders now viewed war as imminent, and they petitioned for all of the help that
they could obtain; suddenly the prospect of a mutually binding British alliance held
stronger appeal lor the Indians than it had previously. Afier three years of remaining
would rcMuun neutral. See Mull to liusfs, 14 July 1812, MPllC\ XL: 413-15; Same to same, 19 July 18P
Ibid., 4 1 8; ( ruikshaiik. 1 he Invasion of Canad^n nnH th>. Surren.ler of Detroit. 1812 ^^ Accoidmu to R
^'
David luimunds, Walk-in-the- Water later wavered m h.s support of the British. See Edmunds
"1 ecuinseh-s Native Allies; Warriors Who Fought (or the thrown." m War on the Great Lakes' Essays
Conimeniorating the 1 75 ' Aiuuversarv of the Battle of I .ake Fr.^ ed. W.llia.u Jeflrey Welsh ^ndD^d
Curtis Skaggs (Kent, OH London: Kent State University Press, 1991), 65-66.
Elliott to Claus. 18 November 1810. CNA. MG 1 1 CO 42, 351, 40.
I he Shawnees most likely received this belt from Sir William Johnson at Detroit in the summer of 1761
during the lust general council held with the western nations alter Biitam's occupation ot the former
French posts thioughoiit the Great Lakes.
Speech of Tukumthai, Brother of the Shawanoe Prophet, Fort Maiden. 15 November 1810. CNA. MG 1
1
CO 42. 351. 42; Klmck, I ci luiiseh: Fact and Fiction . 79-81.
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aloof
.0 Bnnsh overtures. ,he beIHgeren, Native coalition appeared po.sed for war and
intent on dragging Britain into a conflict prematurely."
liieNoflhernand Western Re.pnn.. ip Revi,al,..,inn i^nn^
The period of Native revitalization that culmmated in the Shawnee brothers-
movement a, Prophetstown early in the n.neteenth cemury was .ess evemful for the tnbes
livtng in the northern Great Lakes, northern Wisconsin, and the upper Mississipp, Valley.
These nations, specifcally the northern Ojibwas and Ottawas, Sauks, Menominees, and
Dakota Sioux. d,d not have to grapple with the same issues faced by the other groups
featured in th.s study. Although most lived within the territorial boundanes of the United
Stales, at this po.nt they d,d not have to defend their sovereignty as the Stx Nations did at
the Grand River. Also, the northerners had not yet experienced Amencan encroachments
.0 the degree that those south of the Great Lakes had, in part because governors Hamson
and Hull never attempted to negotiate any treaties with these northern groups. Anthony
Wayne-s conquest of Ohio had a minimal effect on the tribes of the northern Lakes, and
very few, if any, received American annuity distribmions.'" Moreover, the northern
tnbes had not experienced a revolution within their leadership ranks, and their younger
wamors were not faced with the painful decision of whether to follow an upstart nativist
leader or to remain loyal to an older pro-American headman who advocated
accommodation. Finally, the fur trade in the North continued to define British relations
93
94
^"e"' His Majesty's Indian Allies, 116; Allen, The Bntish Indian Department 69-70.
Although the Treaty of Greenville entitled both the Ojibwa and Ottawa nations to annuities amounting to$1,000 per tribe, the U. S. made these payments at Detroit, and thus to those Ojibwas and Ottawas living in
that region. By the summer of 1807 the northern Ojibwas and Ottawas had not yet received any annuity
distributions stemming from the Treaty of Greenville. Captam J. Dunham to William Hull, 18 June 1807
MPHC, XL: 143. ' '
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with the tnbes there, whereas the nativists at Prophetstown eschewed such contact,
fearing both the.r resulting economic dependence and the Master of Life's wrath.
Of all of these different regional circumstances, the fur trade was possibly the
most crucial in influencing the Indians' decisions and in shaping their diplomacy. For
example, neither the nativists on the Wabash nor the Indians of the northern Lakes cared
for the Americans, and both had previously fought against the "Long Knives," making
the nativists' added aversion to the Americans at the time merely a matter of degree. The
fur trade, however, set these groups apart and placed them on divergent paths. By the
turn of the nineteenth century, Bntish and Canadian fur companies fiercely competed
with one another in the Northwest, causing most competing interests to either expand or
eventually merge with the competition. The North West Company expanded west
through northern Wisconsin, the upper Mississippi Valley, north into Canada, and
ultimately to the Rocky mountains. They competed with several other trading interests,
including the famed Hudson Bay enterprise and a number of smaller newly formed
partnerships such as the XY Company, the Michilimackinac Company, John Jacob
Astor's American Fur Company, and scores of private traders. Unlike the situation
nearer to Detroit and the Wabash, the northern fur interests experienced a time of overall
growth, prosperity, and expansion during the first decade after the Treaty of Greenville,
and the North West Company in particular continued to be profitable for significantly
longer.^"'*
In the latter years of the eighteenth century the northern Indians had grown
increasingly dependent on the trade, and the heightened competition among the rival
Davidson, 171-72; Kellogg, 238-41, 256.
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companies accelerated this process.- By the turn of the nmeteenth century, the fur
companies held a strong influence over their Native clients, but this influence was not a
condh,on s,mply imposed by the companies. In a sp.nt of rec.proc.ty, Native participant:
m the fur trade viewed the relationship as more than a business arrangement, interpreting
the market transactions to symbolize bonds of fnendship between them and their Bntish
Father."^^ The Indians along the upper Mississippi and near Lake Superior closely
fraternized with the North West Company's traders, and they proudly wore medals of
King George and flew Union Jacks above their villages. Early in 1806, when the
Amencan officer Zebulon Pike made this discovery dunng his Mississippi expedition, he
"felt indignant."'^^ The Company agents whom Pike encoumered treated the Amencan
Lieutenant graciously, and one of them, Hugh McGillis, even apologized about the
distribution of flags and medals among the Indians, but he assured Pike that these tokens
merely symbolized commercial ties and not a political alliance.^^
Pike appreciated the hospitality shown him by the Company agents, but
McGillis's statements failed to convince him of the innocence of the northern traders'
activities among the Indians. The American officer had witnessed firsthand the devotion
the hidians accorded British traders, and he knew that it went beyond commercial ties.
Pike found it remarkable that "the Gentlemen of the N.W. Company" contented
'' Henry, 188; Calloway, Crown & Calumet, 134; Gary Clayton Anderson. Kinsmen of Another K.nH 66-
67. " '
Calloway, Crown & Calumet . 137
Pike's journal entries for 3 January 1806, 6 February 1806, & 10 February 1806, Jackson, The Journals
of Zebulon Montgomery Pike
,
I: 76,92-93. Previously on this expedition Pike met Black Hawk who
reflised to lower his village's Bntish flags at Pike's request. See Donald E. Jackson, ed., Black Hawk: An
Autobioeraphv (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1955), 52.
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McGillis to Pike, 15 February 1806, Jackson, The Journals of Zebulon Montgomery Pike. I: 260.
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.hcselves
,„ ,.,c -Wilderness for 10, ,5, and see 20 years, by .he a.,achn,c„. w,„oh
.hey imbibe for ,he Indian Women Whether or no. Pike ever realized ,he exten, of
these bonds of kinship, he sensed ,ha. Briiish-lndian
,ies would not be eas.ly severed.'"'
h. his official report on the North West Company, the Ueutenant alerted h,s superiors to
.his danger, recalling the "almost unlimited tnnuenee the traders... had acquired over the
savages" in all previous frontier struggles.
Pike's concerns were well founded. In h,s memoirs, John Tanner, a thirty-year
captive among the Oj.bwas and Ottawas, md.cated that traders could at times
spontaneously persuade Indians to take up arms for them.'«^ Similarly, Black Hawk,
afler declmmg the Shawnee Prophet's invitation fo move to the Wabash, and despite
having infomied the Americans that he and his party would remain neutral,
enthusiastically joined the British when a British-employed trader amved near Black
Hawk's village with two boatloads of goods.'^" The trader in this instance, Edward La
Guthrie, had earlier befriended Black Hawk, and had worked as an associate to Robert
Dickson, the most important British trader and Indian agent in the West. Dickson, who
was the son-in-law of a Sioux chief, became the critical link in the British alliance with
the western nations."'^ Both Major General Isaac Brock and Sir George Prevost, the
Pike's journal entry for 27 January 1806. ibid., 84.
Anderson. Kinsmen of Another Kind 88.
in
Pike's Observations on the North West Company, Jackson, The Journals of Zebulon MontgomeryPikg
l! 180. '
John Tanner. 209-10.
Jackson, Black Hawk: An Autobiopraphy 58, 60, 62-64.
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Kellogg, 292-300; Calloway, Crown and Calumet . 134; Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind . 87-88;
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sues of „,ajor Ind,™ agencies,
,„ hopes of competing wi.„ Bri.ish trade
,„.eres,s and of
.ncreas,„g Na„ve deb, and reliance on ,he American gover^nen..'"' After ,he „,any
years of over-h„n.,ng in ,he 0,d Northwes.,
.his fina, push hy ,hc govemmen, eh.ina.ed
much ofihe remaining game sou.h of ,he Grea, Lakes and funher ahena.ed





'» Cleariy, those on the Wabash d.d no. have the opportunity to
i.>.erac. with the Bntish in the sante manner ,n which the norther, nations d,d^ With
«an,e sttli plentiful
„, the North, tnbes dwelling on the upper Mississipp, and northen,
Great Lakes had less reason to consider the fur trade's potent.al for negative effects. ' '
'
Thus they continued to cultivate closer „es with the Brit.sh. wh.le those at Prophe.stown
resisted the Americans and remained an.bivalcn, towards the Brit.sh unt.l Tecmseh
directly petitioned their assistance in 1810.
The clash of ideology between the nativists and those tnbes linked to the Bntish
fur trade became increasingly manifest between 1807 and 1809. Ultimately the
northerners would have to choose between accepting the Prophet's new doctrines or
contmumg their commercial ties to white traders. In fact, the Shawnee Prophet may not
10*)
Wayne h. Stevens, The Northwest Fnr Trade. 176^-1800. 104; Thomas Jefferson to William MenrvHarrison, 27 February 1 803, Esarey, Messages & l etter. 1:71. ^
al7f87lTt ^r"^' ^''"'^ P""^^^- ^''"^P-^^" ^'-'•""g ^-'l- between 1804
gradually
^
^creasmg. I he bumper year of 1 807 stands as an exception, when the Agency recorded the
n.ce,pt ot
,0 2 deers ,ns. Nevertheless, w.th pr.ces at a mere $.44 per deerskn,. the resultn.g per ca^^ta
^80 18i ( o T'^ T""'/" '"^ faWayne.GatewatoftheWe.1802-1813Camson Orderly Bo.)ks Indian A^encY Acconnf Rook, Indiana Historical Collections Vol 15
(
ndianapohs: Historical Bureau of the Indiana Library and Historical Department 1927 rennnt New
"
Lltance 'l'r'
''''''' D^'^d A ^"-"ted
"' Calloway. "Foundations of Sand: The Fur Trade and British-Indian Relations. 1 783-18 1 s " ISS 157-
58, & 163; Calloway, Crown and Calumet . 160
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have sough, .o completely abolish ,he fur trade, but he cena.nly wanted to m.n^.ze
control all economie transactions, and prevent excessive Native dependence on Euro-
American commodities - He knew, for example, that his followers would still need
European guns and powder. However, by the time Tenskwatawa's message spread to
norther. Michigan in May 1 807. an Ottawa prophet who claimed to serve as the
Shawnee's messenger had inten^reted the message much more stringently, calling for a
total abstinence from the trade. Th,s prophet, known as La Maigouis, or the Trout,
insisted that h,s followers "kill no more animals than are necessary to feed & clothe you,"
and also encouraged all Indians to renege on their outstanding debts with traders. He
warned that if .he Indians persisted in the trade, then the Great Spirit would take the
animals "back .o .he Earth .ha. .hey may not come to you again."'" W,th the fur trade so
prevalent in the North. La Maigouis saw this as the pnmary evil and agen. of cul.ural
destruction.
The Ottawa prophet's speech presented the northern Ottawas and Ojibwas with a
dilemma. Uncertain of the prophecy's authenticity, some may have hesitated, but if La
Maigouis was correct, then the issue became a question of what the Indians feared most:
the Master of Life's judgment or the wrath of their creditors. The fact that obedience to
the Supreme Being in this case coincided with immunity from their debts may have made
the Indians' decision easier, but whatever the reason, La Maigouis began to enjoy
moderate success in spreading the revitahzation movement among his people. For a time
the movement spread rapidly in the North, and agents of the North West Company,
Prophet's tenets, Thomas Forsyth to William Clark, 15 January 1827, Forsyth Papers, Draper Mss Vol
9T52-53, Tenet no. 9; Dowd, A Spirited Resistance
. 130-31.
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know,,,, U,a, ,„e "Uocr.ne
,s.
..p.ojudica, ,„ ,he interest of the Traders." feared that ,t
m,ght even "extend to the Saulteux [,.e., northern Oj.bwa] & Crees,- n.ueh farther to the
No,thwcs..- Captatn J. Dunha™, the An,eriea„ eon„„a„dant a, Maektnae, sent a speech
.o the prineipal Ottawa village at Arbre Croehe, denounc.ng tl,e trtbe s ,ntentio„ to cheat
Ihc traders, an.l Dnnham stendy de„,a„dcd that the ind.ans "Pay then, up "" ^ The
commandant also d,spatched a party of soldiers ,n an unsuccessfnl attempt to arrest La
Maigouis."^'
There was l.tlle Dunham could have said that would have aUered the natural
evolution of the revitahzation movement or the attraction to it that led numerous
northerners to make pilgrmiages southward to visit the Shawnee Prophet. By August
1 807, just three months after La Maigouis delivered his admonitions to the Oltawas and
Ojibwas of northern Michigan, U. S. agent William Wells mlormed Harrison that
"hulians.
.
from the Lakes near Mackmac" have passed Fort Wayne as they "(lock to"
hear the Shawnee Prophet. Wells added "that all the Indians m that quarter believe in
what the Prophet tells them," and that "they appear to be deff |s,c] to everything I say to
them.""' American officials at Green Bay, Chicago, and the upper Mississippi also
alerted their superiors of mcreased activity in their sectors among the Ojibwas,
•'^ Speech of La Ma.gouis, 4 May 1807, CNA, MG 19 F 16, Alexander McKee Papers, 13 This speech i
also found m MPH(\ XI.: 127-33. inis niIS










Captan, Dunham's Speech at Arbre Croche, 20 May 1807, Ontano 1 listoncal Archives F 983 John
chan Papers, Reel MS 35, Rl.
Dunham to Hull, 20 May 1807, MPIIC, XL: 125-26.
Wells to Harrison, 20 August 1807, Esarey, Messaues & Letters . L 239.
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Potawa,om.s. W.nnebagoes. and Sauks. Charles Jouet.. agen. a. Chicago, wanted that




The hysteria, though temporarily significant, was short-hved. With the exception
of the Winnebagoes, most of the northern and Wisconsin tnbes soon abandoned the
prophetic movement. A close examination of the Winnebago society at the time reveals a
different infrastructure from that of the other Wisconsin tnbes that ultimately rejected the
Prophet's teachings. In comparison to the Ottawas, Ojibwas, and Menominees, the
Wimiebagoes' government was much more centralized. They maintained an elaborate
hierarchical clan system, which served as the basis for their nation's political
organization. Of the ten Winnebago clans, the Thunder clan was most powerful, and its
chiefs held significant authority over the entire nation. The head chief of the Thunder
clan presided over a centralized body of counselors who ruled Wimiebago affairs, with
the head Thunder chief theoretically holdmg more power than the council."^ This
centralized form of government enabled the Winnebagoes to maintain their political
independence longer than the other Wisconsin tnbes, who sought British recognifion in
the fonn of medals and flags as symbols of authority over their own bands. The
Winnebagoes remained more insular, as they did not necessarily yield to the wishes of
the traders with whom they did business on occasion. Thus, despite commercial ties
Charles Jouett to Secretary of War, 1 December 1807 & 22 August 1807, both in Carter Territorial
PaEers, VII: 496-97 & 472, respectively; Charles Reaume, Justice of the Peace at Green Bay to Captain J
Dunham, June, 1 807, Winnebago File, GABLA; William T. Hagan, The Sac and Fox Indian.' r>Jnm..n-
University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 39.
Manners, Customs, and International Laws of the Wm-nee-baa-goa nation (1823), Ms/I4Me, C. C.
Trowbndge Papers, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library. Paul Radin, The Winnebapo
Tnbe (Washington: Thirty-Seventh Annual Report of the Bureau of American Ethnology, Smithsonian
Institution, 1923; reprint, Lincoln: University of Neraska Press, 1970), 1 15, 159.
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between the Bnt.sh and the W.nnebagoes, the latter could not be manipulated poht.ca.ly
as easily as their neighbors who operated on a band level.
While the Ottawas, Ojibwas, and Menom.nees all n^aintained elan systen^s, none
of these nations' elans operated as anything more than umts of kmsh^p, and they certa.nly
did not serve as basis for a political structure. For mstance, none of the clan chiefs
possessed any authority over the greater portion of the tnbe, and despite having clans,
these tribes functioned on a village or band level.'- An ethnographic field study in 1824
hsted the Ojibwa government as "[rjepublican in all its features," without "the least
subordination known" among its warriors.'^' The same study also found that although
the Menominees had a clan system which paralleled that of the Winnebagoes, the
Winnebagoes had a much more centralized govemment.'^^ No central body of
counselors existed among the Menominees, and they, too, operated on a village and band
level of government. Like the Oj ibwas and Ottawas, then, the Menominees were much
more susceptible to the external influence of a Euro-American power such as the Bntish.
Furthermore, in comparison to these other northern nations, the Menominees did not
show an initial interest in the Shawnee Prophet, not even when their neighbors were
temporarily attracted to Tenskwatawa's teaching in 1807.'"
Kinietz, 69, 78; Danziger, 10-11.
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Colonel Boyd's Account of the Chippewa, MS/I4c, Trowbridge Papers, Burton Historical Collection.
Traditions, Manners, and Customs of the Mun-noa-min-nee nation, and Manners, Customs and
International Laws of the Win-nee-baa-goa nation (1823), Ms/I4Me, ibid.
Charles Reaume, Justice of the Peace, Green Bay, to Captain Dunham, 12 June 1807, Winnebago File,
GABLA; Felix Keesing, The Menonu ni Indians of Wisconsin
. Memoirs of the American Philosophical
Society, No. 10 (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1939; reprint, New York & London:
Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1971), 91. Also see Tomah's speech to Tecumseh, 1810, WHC, I: 53-54
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In addhion to their tnbal infrastructure, Wmnebagoes also followed the Shawnee
Prophet for cosmological and spiritual reasons. Like the Shawnees, the WuH^ebagoes
regarded Thunderbirds as an.ong the most powerful deit.es, and these supen.atural be.ngs
were thought to bless warriors with n.ost anything requested, especially victory n. war.
Powerful leaders and shamans among the Wmnebagoes claimed to be reincarnated
Thunderbirds, and the Shawnee Prophet distributed sacred slabs illustrating that the
Thunderbirds' role was to serve as gatekeepers to the Master of Lifc.'^" The Prophet's
name itself, "Tenskwatawa," was even interpreted as "the Open Door."'" According to
Winnebago cosmology, if Tenskwatawa himself were a reincamted Thunderbird, or
could at least converse with the Thunderbirds, then not only was the Prophet a direct link
to the Great Spirit, but also a potential source of immense power for Winnebago warriors.
Winnebago oral tradition indicates that their warriors who decided to visit the Prophet
believed that they would "walk as the thunderbirds do... .above the earth."'^'
Unlike the Winnebagoes, the other northern and Wisconsin tribes began to drift
away from the Prophet by 1808. In early May that year, U. S. agent Charles Jouett
reported that "those Indians from Green Bay.
. .are. . .returning home," and they now
"appear truly ashamed of their late infiituation relative to the prophet."'^^ According to
Black Hawk, the Saiiks also generally rejected the Prophet's overtures, and John Tanner
recalled that Tenskwatawa's "impression was obliterated" among the northern
Radm, 239. 391-92; James Howard, 175-76. 206. Similarly, the Winnebagoes also believed that the
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secondary deities occupied the world just below the (ircat Spirit's dwelling place.
Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet
. 34.
Radin. 21-22.
Jouett to the Secretary of War. 2 May 1808. Carter, Territorial Papers . VII: 564-65.
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Ojibwas. Why the sudden reversal and decHne of the nativist frenzy in the North7
QuUe sn.ply, the Prophet eould not provide the food and material needs for all of the
newcomers ,n a rap.dly growing intertribal society. His closest followers usually
subsisted on near-starvation diets, and when new converts amved from the North, they
could not be absorbed into the nativist communUy.- For a man who promised to end
Native suffering and restore prospenty, th.s was not a good first m.pression in the mn.ds
of the sojourners from the North. In Tanner's own northern v.llage "famine began to be
felt" among those who adhered to the Prophet's teachings, and the longtime captive
concluded, "At this day he [Tenskwatawa] is looked upon by the Indians as an imposter
and a bad man."'^^
Tanner's observation is especially significant, since it demonstrated that the
Prophet's followers both in the vicinity of and far from Prophetslown experienced the
negative effects of rcvitali/.ation. More than half a century after Tanner wrote his
recollections, Andrew J. Blackbird, an aging Ottawa, corroborated this in his personal
history. When the Prophet's message came to his people, "[a] great many Ottawas
believed and went far west," Blackbird explained, in order "to escape the habits of the




The Ottawas, as was the case with the other northern tribes, lived in areas
where the fur trade continued to fiourish. Had the fur trade in the North been farther
advanced and ncaring its demise, the Prophet's message would have probably held a
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Jackson, Black Hawk: An Autobiography
. 58; John ranncr, 147.
Edniuncis, The Shawnee Prophet
.
59-60, 66, 70, 76; Wancn, 323.
John Tanner, 146-47.
Blackbird, 29-30. For a similar episode among the Ojibwas see Warren, 323,
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slrongc. appeal,
... ,.>. „.c n.nc hcin,. the t.a.lc.s ,nc,
.hen d.cnls" needs a.u. snpp,,.,





slrcngdi o( (l,r r( on,>n,ie syslc,
,( I,;,,! d,allc„gai there.
Significantly, Tanner not only p,elened to do business w,(h ihc-
„;,de,s, but




,t eas.er for lum to reject Ihc l>,opl,efs teach.ngs. Tanner related,
I A Is was usual w,lh „,c ,n any cncgcncy oldns kind. I wc„l ,o ||,c „adc, sMM.Iy bchevnig. that
,1 the l),ety |s,cl had any co„„„„n,ca.,o.,s ,o ,nakc ,o n,entbey won d be g.ven, ,n the first
.nstance, to wh.te n.en. The .,adc.s „d,c 1
c csp.sed the nlea of a new ,evela.,on of the l),v,ne w,ll. and ,l,c .hon.h. ,1,1shouM be given to a poo, Shawnee Thus was I co„f„„,cd in my inf.dchty.'^^
Tlu.ugh Tannei, as an lnd,an,/cd wlufe, was pchaps qu,cke, than most to
.eject
Tenskwatawa's teachings, his peers soon followed, and as with Tannei, the traders played
n role in un.lc„„„„„j, ,hc l>,opl,c,-s fcadungs among othci Ojibwas. In u ,,„„p, . history
ofhis people m 1SS2, Oplnva Wilhan, Warren alluded to a,. ...cdcl .„ ISOS when „ade,
Michael C'adottc turned back a huge pa.ty of Uj.lnvas who had set out to visit the
Shawnee I'lophct. Travelling ui a cluste, of I so ,,,„ocs. the group canied a dead cluM.
hoping lhal Ihc IMophcl could resl.uc Ihc body to life. Hut when ('ad,>|,c met the paily
along the southwest shores of I akc Snpenor, the trader convinced them lhal Ihc Piophel
was a IVaud.'
"
Several ofllic no, them tribes had ahcady begun to question the veracity of the
Piophct's teachmg. but the most serious breach between Tenskwatawa and Ins „o,ll,c,„
lollowers came in the winlci of I8()8-1S0*J when an Ottawa band from Aibrc Croche lost
Jolm i aiuici.
Waticn. 323; Raniow, 67; Da,i7igci. 66
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fauh in hi.. This group had co.e .o™ ,he sa.e village as La Ma.gouis. ,he Ottawa
prophe, and U n,„s. 1,M, consis.ed of so.e ofTens.wa,awa.
.os, devoted dtsciples a.
.he t™e. Many of these Ottawas and a few of the O.bwas who had ™ade the p.lgnntage
.0 Prophetstown in 1808 attempted to remain on the Wabash for the winter, but
extraordinanly harsh weather conditions and the lack of food weakened the tnhab.tants.
When an epidemic (most hkely inHuenza, swept through the commun.ty, it selectively
earned away
,60 Ottawas and Oj.bwas; very few members of the other trrbes perished.-
Stunned at their losses and the d.sproportionate figures of casualties, the survivmg
Ottawas and Oj.bwas became suspicous of the Prophet. It seemed that either the
professing Shawnee holy man was a fraud, or that he had deliberately fomented the
sickness amongst them. Either way. these northerners concluded that .t was no. ,n their
best mterests to remain a, Prophetstown and re.umed to their villages in Mich.gan shortly
thereafter.
The breach between Tenskwatawa and these northern bands widened when the
disaffected groups decided to test the supposed shaman. Earlier he had warned that no
blood should ever be spilled at Prophetstown and promised that the Master of Life would
destroy anyone who defied this warning. Anxious to determine its truth, a war party of
Ottawas and Ojibwas secretly returned to Prophetstown, where, under cover of darkness,
they tomahawked two unsuspecting Shawnees-a woman and her child. Unable to detect
any afflictions attributable to Tenskwatawa's retaliatory power, the murderers
triumphantly returned to Michigan. The brutal expenment had succeeded; the Michigan
Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet, 76; White, The Middle Ground, 513; Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life 174-Matthew Elliott to Major Hulton, 19 May 1809, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 3, 990; William Wdls toHenry Dearborn, 31 March 1809, Shawnee File, GABLA; John Johnston to the Prophet 3 May 1809
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Indians were convinced ,ha, ,hey had exposed a charlatan and would have no further
contact with either the Prophet or his revitalization movement. When Tenskwatawa sent
messengers the following year to summon these dissidems back to Prophetstow., they
flatly refused - After this schism, only a wartime Bntish alliance could unite the
nativist faction to the tnbes of the northern Lakes, and the Ojibwas, Ottawas,
Menominees, Sioux, and Sauks all later fought the Amencans as Bntish allies, not
nativists.
Shortly after the troubling incidents along the Wabash in 1808-1809, the split
between the Prophet and the northerners nearly took a turn that could have ruined the
prospects of a future joint-Bntish alliance with both groups. With their anger not yet
appeased, the Ottawas and Ojibwas conspired to destroy Prophetstown. Ironically, had it
not been for the intervention of the Amencan government, the angry dissidents might
have carried out their plan. But when Michigan Governor William Hull learned that, as
he put it, "the Ottawas and Chippewas [i.e Ojibwas], on Lake Michigan, were preparing
to make an expedition, against the Shawanoese Prophet, and his people, residing on the
Wabash," he sent messages to the northern tribes "that the Shawanoese were under the
protection of the U. States, and we should consider hostilities against them, the same as
against us." Thus the Prophet's worst enemies—the Americans—shielded him from the
wrath of his former partisans, doing the British an enormous favor in the process. Hull
sent these messages reluctantly; the Michigan governor understood that the Prophet's
Gayle Thorabrough, ed.. Letter Book of the Indian Agency at Fort Wayne. 1809-1815 (Indianapolis-
Indiana Historical Society, 1961), 49-50.
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Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet, 82; Harrison to the Secretary of War, 26 April 1809, Esarey, Messages
ALetters, I: 342; Same to same 26 June 1810, ibid.: 433-34.
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"object has been >o form a comb,na.,on,
. .in hostility to the U. S."'» Hamson also
expressed reservations about intervening to prevent intertnbal conHicts. eons.stent though
that was with Jeffersonian peace policies.'"
The response of these western governors raises some provocative questions: If
the U. S. had not protected Prophetstown, would the vHlage have been destroyed m 1809,
making Harri.son's 181
1
campaign unnecessary'/ More important, to what extent would
this have affected British attempts to reconstruct a general intertribal alliance among all
of the tribes in the Great Lakes and the Wabash Valley on the eve of the War of 1 81 2^
Without the support of the nativist coalition from the Wabash, the British pro.spects of
successfully defending Upper Canada would have diminished significantly.
In the North, the rejection of nativist doctrine and the continued expansion of the
fur trade insured that Briti.sh-Indian relations there would continue as they had for
decades. Unlike the capricious relations between the Indian Department at Fort Maiden
and the Prophetstown commumty, northern Bntish-Indian relations maintained a steady
course in which British leaders at Fort St. Joseph's continued to play an assertive role in
the affairs of the Ottawas and Ojibwas. After 1 801 British officers in the North
continued to distribute medals and create chiefs, very much in the manner that Major
William Doyle and others had done prior to the British withdrawal from Fort Mackinac in
the 1 790s.
Doyle's successors could reduce a chief in status as well. After Major Alexander
Campbell took command at St. Joseph's in 1806, he soon heard that an influential Ottawa
Hull to William Eu.stis, Secretary of War, 16 June 1809. Potawatomi File, GABLA. Also see Hull to
Eustis, 2 August 1809, and same to same, 20 July 1810, ibid.
Hamson to Eustis, 28 August 1810, Esarey, Messages & Letters . I: 471.
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Chief from Arbre Croche, Litt.e King, had allegedly sen. his son .o .he An^encans a.
Mack,nac
.0 presen. ,hen, w,.h a s.nng ofwampu™, i„dica..ng
.ha. .he ch.ef s ^'hean was
Amencan." When
.he 0..awa headman arrived a. S.. Joseph's ,„ May ,S07, Campbell
immediacely brough. charges agains. him. bu. .he commandan. gave Li..le Krng an
oppor.uni.y
.0 reply formally
.0 .he allega.ions m council. Li..le Krng explained
.ha. his
son had only given wampum
.0 .he Amencan doc.or a. Mackinac as compensa.ion for
pulling a .oo.h for him. The chief also afHrnred his loyal.y ,0 .he Bn.ish. The matter
became so scnous
.ha. .he council even summoned
.he American commandan., Cap.ain
Dunham.
.0 .es.ify a. .he council. When Cap.a.n Dunham amved a. S.. Joseph's, he
corrobora.ed L,..le King's defense, explaining
.ha. "he had always unders.ood
.ha. the
Li..le King had been flnnly a..ached
.0 .he British government" Ye. prior .0 Dunham's
amval, Major Campbell and .he Bri.ish
.ribunal had already infonned L.nle King .ha. he
would be required ".o re.um [his] meddals [sic] & Colours, and never more trouble us
wi.h your Presence.""' Only .he Amencan officer's testimony ul.imately cleared the
Ottawa chiefof the charge of disloyalty, and Little King was fully restored.
Such an encounter goes contrary to the supposedly widespread practice in frontier
diplomacy of Indian leaders "playing off one Euro-American power against another.
True, in some cases, particularly along the Detroit frontier, Indians did possess more
diplomatic leverage, but in the North the dominance of British trade had made nations
there both economically and politically beholden to British au.hori.ies. In .heory. Little
King should have had every right to have cultivated ties with both the British and the
Americans simultaneously. The chiers village was simated in Amencan tenitory, and
) 38
Council minutes at St. Joseph's, 20 & 21 May, 8 June, and 19 June, 1807, CNA, RG 10 Indian Affairs
Vol. 2, 689-702. '
^^^''"^ ,
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.he BrUish had withdrawn fron, Mackinac more .han a decade earher. Moreover. ,he
Anglo-American powers were no, a, war. and Li.,le King and his people should have
enjoyed ,he rights of free passage and neutral diplomacy between both na.tons.
Nevertheless. Little King did not have this liberty because he and the Bntish had an
understanding that both parties would work to con.tnue the sacred bonds frs, sanctioned
by the Chain of Friendsh.p. Th,s saered Cha.n had never been broken in the North. whMe
events on the Maumee in 1 794 and 1 795 had nearly severed the Chain's links between
Britain and the Crown's alhes there.
In the North British commandants and Indian agents continued to assert their
authority over the Ottawas and Ojibwas, a pohcy that their counten^arts at Fort Maiden
could never carry out in the Detroit and Maumee regions. British officers and Indian
agents at Maiden were not in a position to bully chiefs and strip them of their medals,
particularly when British officials there virtually begged the Wabash nativists for support
after 1 807. Little King may have also perceived the difference in attitude toward Indians
at the two posts. In February 1 808, barely eight months after narrowly being cleared of
the disloyalty charges brought again.st him at St. Joseph's, the Ottawa leader arrived at
Fort Maiden to meet with William Claus. This meeting went quite differently than Little
King's ordeal at St. Jo.seph's. The Deputy Superintendent General eagerly questioned the
chief, just as Claus would later interview Tecumseh, in hopes of determining the
Ottawas' disposition in the event of a British-American war. After having promised
Major Alexander Campbell and the council at St. Joseph's the previous spring that he
would "always be faithful to the British Government," Little King now remained evasive
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and non-committal w„h Claus - Whan the agen, asked him about h,s people's
disposition, the Ottawa leader repHed. "the ground is smooth yet." Claus pressed the
issue, but Little King merely stated, "you will know when it happens ""'» Such
unforthcoming remarks a. St. Joseph's mtght well have cost the headman h,s position
with the British who would have qu.ckly sought ,o replace him at Arbre Croche with a
leader they deemed as more loyal.
Although Little King equivocated, Claus felt confident that the chief and his band
would either support the Bntish or remain neutral in the anticipated conflict, since,
according to Claus, Little King intimated "the Indians [were] decidedly opposed to the
Amencans."'^' Consequently, the question of neutrality became the key issue at that
point, and Little King considered the option of separating himself and his people from
both the British and the Americans by joining the Shawnee Prophet's nativist movement.
Perhaps Little King's rough treatment at the hands of Major Campbell and his fellow
inquisitors at St. Joseph's had compelled the chief to rethink the consequences of his
tribe's close economic and political ties with the Bntish. In any case, he and hundreds of
other Ojibwas and Ottawas resolved to join the nativists at Prophetstown during the
winter of 1808-1809.
Although several of the northern groups had rejected Tenskwatawa's teachings
the previous year, Little King remained an influential voice in his band from Arbre
Croche. Some of his followers may have been reluctant to join their chief at the
139
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Wabash, but they acquiesced due to Lutle K.ng's faith in the Prophet. The Ottawa and
Oj.bwa bands were therefore all the .ore distraught when the ep.dem.c that swept
through Prophetstown that winter not only ravaged their Icmsmen more than any other
group, but earned off their beloved leader who had brought them there No wonder
that the Ottawas from Arbre Croche and elsewhere wanted to destroy Prophetstown.
Now embittered against the nativ.ts, and always hostile to the Americans, the remnants
of Little King's band returned to their homes at Arbre Croche. Having flirted wuh
notions of Native revival, separatism, and neutrality, they reentered the only world they
really knew, one dominated by British trade and influence.
John Askin, Jr., storekeeper and interpreter at Fort St. Joseph at the time, claimed
to have played a significant role in the return of the disillusioned northern Indians from
the Wabash. In a memorial listing his past achievements in hopes of gaining a
promotion, Askin asserted that his contnbution to retneving the Ottawas and Ojibwas
was one of his most important accomplishments while serving in the Indian Department.
Wnting to Claus, the northern agent took credit for "getting back a number of Indians of
the vicinity of this Country who had followed the Shawnee Prophet & settled on the
Wabash.""*' Although an exaggeration, Askin's claim provides valuable support for the
idea that British leaders in the North typically thought it proper to intervene on a large
scale in Indian affairs, and that they viewed Tenskwatawa's prophetic movement as
anathema to the northern people's lives, commerce, and culture. However, British policy
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Mattliew Elliott to Major Hulton, 19 May 1809, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 3, 990.
John Askin, Jr. to William Claus, 26 December 1815, CNA. MG 19 F 1, Claus Papers, Vol. 10, 207
Askin regarded his combined service as agent, storekeeper, and interpreter between 1807 and 1812 as his
most important accomplishment. The Indian Department did not employ a regular Deputy Supenntendent
at St Joseph's at that time, forcing Askm to hold down several positions simultaneously, without extra pay
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on such ma„ers differed gready from region .o region and tribe .o tribe. For example
Claus. a Bn„sh official in the southenr Great Lakes, had viewed
.he nattvtst movement
a mechanism for Indian unity and the basis for a potential Bn.ish-lndian alUancc at the
very ttme that Askin. in the North, had attempted to dtssuade Indians from joming the
Prophet.
Such examples of regional differences in British-Indtan relations between 1801
and 1812 provide important windows into the complexities of the history of the time.
British diplomacy was never monolithic. It vaned by region and it always reflected the
diffenng perspectives of its participants, based on their respective positions in the
hierarchy ofcommand. Put another way, there was often a large gap in practice and
belief between cemral administrators and agents living among and even imemiarrying
with Natives.'''^
The history of the tnbal revitahzation movement also shows regional diversity.
At its zenith, Tenskwatawa's religious movement and cultural revival enjoyed its
strongest support from the Kickapoos, Potawatomis, and Wimiebagoes. The Kickapoos
and Potawatomis, geographically located throughout southern Michigan, northern
Indiana, and the expanse of Illinois, fit well within the Prophet's main geographical
sphere of influence. The Winnebagoes appear to be more of an aberration. This nation
as
Neither Gregory Dowd's Spirited Resistance nor Richard White's Middle Ground satisfactorily handles
the northern sector of Indian-White relations. Both authors allude to the prophecy of the Ottawa La
Maigouis in 1807, bnefly treating it as significant, but neither discusses the ensuing years in the North and
why the Indians there ultimately rejected revitahzation. Instead, they leave their readers with the
impression that the nativist ideals held finn in the North. Moreover, neither discusses the significance of
the northern fur trade, although the fur trade's participants resisted bodi nativism and the notion of a
common cultural middle ground with the tribes of the southern Great Lakes. (White's bnef discussion of
the trade m his fmal chapter is m a different context, one in which the author is attempting to play down the
extent of growing Native dependency.) Nor does R. David Edmunds (m The Shawnee Prophet^ discuss the
failure of revitalization in the North, and like Dowd and White, Edmunds does not adequately cover the
northern and western regions (i.e., Wisconsin & northern Michigan) after the Prophet's brief outburst of
popularity there in 1807.
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occupied portions of central eastern Wisconsin, which was situated near a major trade
route, specifically the Fox-Wisconsin rivers waterway. They, hke the. neighbors in the
North, would have also had substantial contact with Bntish traders, including pnvate
entrepreneurs and to a lesser extent men of the North West Company. Yet the
Winnebagoes became the Prophet's staunchest supporters, and they did not desert him
until many of their wamors died m the fierce action against Hamson's troops on 7
November 1811.'^^ As previously discussed, a possible explanafion is that the
Winnebago tnbal structure and clan hierarchy did much to prevent that tnbe from coming
under the full extent of Bntish economic and political influence, while the other northern
groups were drawn into the Bntish orbit by trade ties, hi any case, the Wimiebagoes
were ripe for the Prophet's revitalization.
Once the Prophet and his movement were largely discredited at Tippecanoe in
November 181 1, all of the tnbes that continued to resist American expansion dunng the
War of 1 8 1 2 did so as Bntish allies. It now meant little whether or not these allies had at
one time been members of the Wabash nativist movement, and it became more difficult
to discern the regional differences in British-Indian relations. These differences became
even less evident when eariy British-Indian successes at the war's outset tended to once
again unite disaffected factions of Natives. Nevertheless, some traces of these
distinctions remained, and the British encountered multiple Native responses to British
policy and actions as the war progressed.
Harrison to Secretary of War, 25 July 1810, Esarey, Messages & Letters . I: 449; Jackson, Black Hawk-
An Autobiography, 58; Gilbert, 271-72; Robert Breckinridge McAfee, History of the Late War in the
Western Country (Lexington, KY: Worsley & Smith, 1 8 1 6; reprint, Ann Arbor, ML- University
Microfilms, Inc., 1966), 34.
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EPILOGUE
REASSESSING THE CHAIN OF FRIENDSHIP:
.812 AND BEYOND
In 1 838, many years after the wars in the Old Northwest had ended, William
Henry Harrison completed his DisSMseoiUheA^^
study, the future president speculated as to why the Indians of the Northwest had
previously clung so t.ghtly
.0 the Bntish, and he surm.sed that His Majesty's agents had
purchased Native loyalty with "an.s and equipments, clothing and trinkets." Aecord.ng
to Hamson, the Indians had accepted these petty gifts from the British because the
Nat,ves did not grasp the "envtable distinction" between British mie and the peace and
justice that the United States offered them ' The retired general also pondered the
possible British motives for maintaining close ties with the tadtans into the I8I0s;
Harrison could only conclude that Britain, in sp.te of acknowledging the independence of
the United States, had "still indulged the hope, that...,t would be able to again reduce
them (the U. S.] to subjection." "No other reason," Hamson mused, "can be assigned for
the close connexion [sic] which they [the Bntish] continued to keep up with the tribes
within our territorial boundary, and their constant and liberal supply ,0 them of the means
ofcommitting depredations upon our settlements."^ In the near half-century smce he had
first served as a young officer in Anthony Wayne's Legion, little had changed in how
Harrison perceived the Indians and their former British allies.'
Harrison. A Discourse on the Ahnneines of tlie Ohm Valley <ri.i.,„„. Fergus Printing Co., 1838), 37.
' Ibid., 38.
' The best biography on Harrison, particularly for his later years, is Dorothy Bumc Ooebel's William
Henry Hamson: A Political Biopraphy (Indianapolis: Historical Bureau of the lndi.ina Library and
Historical Department. 1926). More recently. Reginald Horsnian provides a good biographical sketch with
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Han^son's perception resembled that ofnumerous other American statesmen and
mmtary officers of Ms generation. For example, Lewis Cass, perhaps more than any
other Amencan leader of that era, condemned the Bnt.h government for .ts dealmgs
with the Indians. Cass, who was taken prisoner by the combmed Bntish-Man force that
captured Detroit in August 1812, subsequently served as an aide-de-camp to Hamson
later dunng war; he then spent eighteen years as Michigan's temtonal Governor before
becoming Secretary of War under President Andrew Jackson and Secretary of State in
James Buchanan's administration.^ Like Hamson, Cass believed that the Bntish had
exploited the Natives. The Michigan governor summed up the relationship between the
British government and its Native allies, as one in which the Indians
-..ere useful, and
were used, in war tofight, and in peace to trade [Cass's italics]."^ Furthermore, Cass
regarded the Bntish use of Native wartime allies as tactics tantamount to terror, often
indiscrimately employed against civilians, hi his indictment against Bntain, he
passionately charged that
The nation which authonzes.
.
.[an Indian alliance], should be arraigned at the
tribunal of Chnstendom....And
'allies,' as the Indians maybe, it is an alliance to
which postenty will look back with grief and indignation, and which will tarnish
the bnghtest jewel in the crown of the Defender ofthe Faith [italicized by Cass] '
ij^e2ToOv"ll5"4T'°"'
Virginia Gentleman m the Old Northwest." Indiana Magazine of H.^tnr;^, vrvr
* For a biography on Cass, see Andrew C. McLaughlin, Lewis Cass (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1899-
repnnt, New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1980), with an introduction bv Holman Hamilton m the
reprinted edition.
^ Lewis Cass, "Service of Indians in Civilized Warfare," North Amencan Review 24 (April 1827)- 370
For more of Cass's writmgs regarding Indians, see his "Indians of North Amenca." North American
Rexiew 22 (January 1826): 53-119. Also, an earlier unpublished report by Cass, dated 1815, can be found
m the Newberry Library's (Chicago) Ayer Manuscripts, record 601, under the title, "Report on the
Formation of a System of the Regulation of Indian Affairs."
^ Cass, "Service of Indians in Civilized Warfare," 375.
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Cass also beheved that
.t was pnncipally due to the. deahngs whh the Bntish durmg the
years of mten^.ttent warfare that the Indians resisted Amencan attempts to acculturate
them/ In 1 827 Cass concluded that "[n]ot a vestige remains of any pen^anent advantage
denved by the Indians" from their years of fidehty to the Bnt.sh.^ Consequently, dunng
the 1 820s and 1 830s, Cass became one of the leadmg advocates of the federal pohcy of
Indian Removal, arguing that the scheme was the Native peoples' only hope for survival.^
Both Hamson and Cass, like so many of their peers, formulated their opinions
based on years of frontier warfare and diplomacy dunng a penod m which the Indians of
the Old Northwest demonstrated maximum resistance to all external influences that
threatened their lifestyles and cultural traditions. Native defiance and detemnnation m
resisting Amencan expansion reached its zenith shortly after the turn of the nineteenth
century, when American policy attempted to accelerate the process of expropnating
Indian lands in Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan. Comcidentally, the strongest intertribal
resistance to these measures occun-ed precisely when Anglo-Amencan relations once
again turned sour, pnmarily between 1807 and 1812, causing the United States to believe
that the Bntish were the actual source of Native discontent. Such thinking on the part of
Cass continued to suspect Bntish intrigue at work among the Indians well into the 1820s More
concerning his views dunng this penod can be found in his records of personal correspondence m the
Lewis Cass Papers at the Clements Library and the Lewis Cass Papers at the Bentley Histoncal Librai^
Though bearing the same title, these collections actually contain different sets of correspondence- both
research facilities are located at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor.
Cass, "Service of Indians in Civilized Warfare," 369.
For Cass on Indian Removal, see Cass, "Removal of the Indians." North Amencan Review 30 (January
1830): 62-121 (This has been repnnted by Amo Press, New York in 1975, under the title Considerations
on the Present State of the Indians, and Their Removal to the West of the Mississippi ) Also, McLaughlin,
159-61; Francis Paul Prucha, Lewis Cass and American Indian Policv (Detroit: Wayne State University
Press, 1967); Prucha, Amencan Indian Policv in the Fonnative Years: The Indian Trade and Intercours'e
Acts, 1790-1834 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962), 246-47, 256-57.
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.he Americans gave Che Br.tlsh
.00 ^ueh credi,; i, a.u.ed ,ha. ,he Crown
.,a,„eU
.he
inlluenee among ,he tr.bes of.he Great Lakes ,ha. i, had enjoyed pnor .0 1 794.
In irulh, Br,„sh-h,d,an relations in the Northwest had a mueh richer and more
complex history than either Harrison or Cass reahV.ed. In , 794, the old Chatn of
Friendsh,p that had onee joined Britain ,0 the nat.ons of the Great Lakes was virtually
severed by Anthony Wayne's v.e.ory over the confederated tribes a, Fallen Timbers, a
.lefea, that was confimted by the terms of the Treaty ofGrecnville the following year.
This ntarked the beginntng of a twelve-year per.od of Anglo-American cooperation in
which the trtbcs south of the Lakes deal, more directly with the Americans. Only with
great dtllicuUy after 1 807 d,d the British Indian Department manage to restore a
semblance of the Chain of Friendship as a defensive measure intended to protect Upper
Canada from an anticipated American mvasion. Yet by that time American leaders were
convinced that Britain's ties to its fomter alhes had never been broken, and only by
permanently eliminating the British menace from North America could the frontier be
made secure. In 1 810 Kentucky leader Henry Clay and his faction of"War Hawks" in
Congress clamored for an invasion of Canada, and John Harpev, a representative from
New Hampshire, argued that Providence would sanction such an undertaking, bellowing,
"The Author of Nature has marked our limits in the south, by the Gulf of Mexico; a.,d on
the north, by the regions of eternal frost."'"
American rhetoric aside, Britons and Indians had always understood their
relationship with each other quite differently. British agents, government officials, and
Dradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and the United Stales. 1 805-1 « 1 ? (Berkeley & Los
Angeles: University of California Press. 1961 ). 283-84: Speech of John A. Harper, New Hampsliire, 4
January 1812. 12 Congress, I" session, 657, in Joseph Gales, ed.. Annals ofConeress. 1789-1824 42
Vols. (Washington: Gales & Sealon, 1 834- 1 856).
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Native leaders often spoke of the Chain of Friendship as a unique understanding that had
existed between them, albeit tenusously at times, since Sir WUham Johnson's mtertnbal
councl at Detroit in the summer of 1 761
. By 1 792, the wamors of the Western
Confederacy, particularly those dwelling south of the Lakes in the mtertnbal villages of
Kekionga and the Glaize, had made it clear that they would not accept Amencan
acculturation." For Bntain to have attempted any of the cultural reforms among its allies
that Cass had accused them of neglecting would have meant an end to the Anglo-Native
entente. Moreover, the Indians viewed their Bntish Father as an allied member of the
Brownstown councl fire who would protect them from Amencan attempts to expropnate
their lands and impose new ideologies on them. Implicit within the Chain of Fnendship
agreement was an understanding that Britain would recognize and protect Native
sovereignty for those tribes living within the boundanes of the United States.
When Britain failed in this role dunng the crisis and defeat of the Western
Confederacy in 1794-1795, numerous intertribal leaders in the Ohio Valley and along the
Detroit frontier considered their Chain of Friendship with the British broken. Blue
Jacket, the Confederacy's pnncipal leader, relinquished his British commission and
hoped to replace it with a similar title under the American regime.'^ The Shawnee war
leader, along with the majority of Miami, Delaware, and Shawnee wamors, now "thought
nothing" of their British allies as the Indians made peace with the United States.'^ Within
this triumvirate of nations in the Maumee Valley, Britain never completely regained the
Indians' trust, nor was this segment of the Chain of Friendship ever flilly restored.
II





When Bntam negotiated Jay's Treaty with the Amencans in 1794 ^nce agam, .
in 1 783, acting independently of Native interests- it further weakened any remaining
semblance of the Chain of Fnendship with tnbes of the Ohio Valley and southei. Great
Lakes. When, under the terms of Jay's Treaty, the Bntish evacuated their posts in
American tem'tory in the summer of 1796, it appeared that Whitehall had played a
complicitous role in undennimng the future integnty of indegenous cultures south of the
Lakes by recognizing U. S. suzerainty in the Ohio country.
The Indians there remembered this, and only very gradually after 1808 did
elements of the former Maumee and Wabash tribes again gravitate towards the British.
However, all of the former pnncipal leaders were gone, and by 1808 the British were
forced to seek an alhance with an intertribal group of nativist hidians who were m the
process of staging a cultural revolt. Led by Tecumseh and his chansmatic brother,
Tenskwatawa, the nativists attempted to punfy their culture and religion, and at times
they even encouraged the executions of those Indians who were overtly Chnstian, or who
had supported U. S. acculturation and land-acquisition policies." The Indians
participating in this revitalization movement would not have tolerated British attempts to
reform them any more than they accepted American schemes. Extreme factions of this
movement even attempted to compel the tribes living in the northern Lakes regions to
13
14
Thomas Smith to Alexander McKee, 1 1 October 1794, Cruikshank, Simcoe Correspondence V: 1 13,
Although evidence suggests that Tecumseh might have opposed the witchhunts and purges that the
Prophet and some of his followers carried out against a handflil of pro-U. S., Chnstian Indians, Tecumseh
did threaten to kill the chiefs who made any land cessions to the Americans. See Tecumseh's speech at
Vmcennes, 20 August 1810, Esarey, Messages and Letters of William Heiir^' Harrison 1: 466; Klinck,
Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction
,
71-72. Regarding the witchhunts, see Edmunds, The Shawnee Prophet 42-
47; Edmunds, "The Thin Red Line: Tecumseh, the Prophet, and Shawnee Resistance," Tuneline 4(6)
(1987-88): 7-8; Edmunds, "Tecumseh, the Shawnee Prophet, and American History: A Reassessment "
Western Historical Quarterly 14(3) 1983: 268-69; Miller, "The 1806 Purge Among the Indiana Delaware,'
245-66. For Tecumseh's reaction to the Prophet's witchhunts see Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life. 154, 209,






cease tradmg with the Bntish and to renege on their outstanding debts.- In this Hght,
Cass's cnticisms of Bntish dealings with the Indians appear ludicrous. Pnor to the war
Tecumseh had made it clear that he did not trust the Bntish, but he, like the Bntish,
restored the Chain of Friendship out of necessity when the Shawnee leader presented the
British officers at Maiden with a belt that the King's agents had given to his people
nearly a half-century earlier.'^ Bntish relations with the nativist Wabash coalition
remained tenuous throughout the War of 1 8 1 2, and only grew worse after Tecumseh was
killed (in 1813) and the fortunes of war in the southern Lakes and the Detroit frontier
shifted in favor of the Americans.
In the North, Bntish-Indian relations proved much more stable during the interwar
penod, and thus the assessments of Cass, Harrison, and other American leaders contam a
kernel of truth when applied to the continuing influence that the Bntish enjoyed among
the Ottawas, Ojibwas, Menominees, Sioux, Sauk, and Fox. The continuity of these ties,
based primarily on trade, meant that the Chain of Friendship had never been significantly
altered with the northern groups, and those nations remained virtually unaffected by
Anthony Wayne's conquest of the Ohio country. At Mackinac and St. Joseph, British
agents continued to exercise much influence among Ottawa and Ojibwa bands, often
creating chiefs and even issuing commissions on occasion. Cass's assessment that the
Speech of La Maigouis, the Ottawa Prophet, 4 May 1807, CNA, MG 19 F 16, Alexander McKee Papers,
13; MPHC, XL: 127-33. American and British assessments of the northern phase of revitalization, are
found in Duncan McGillivray to William McGillivray, 18 June 1807, Ontario Historical Archives, F 983,
John Strachan Papers, Reel MS 35, Rl, and Captain Dunham's Speech at Arbre Croche, 20 May 1807, iiJ
ibid. Also, Dunham to William Hull, 20 May 1807, MPHC, XL: 125-26.
See Speech of Tukumthai, Brother of the Shawanoe Prophet, Fort Maiden, 15 November 1810, CNA,
MG 1 1 CO 42, 351, 42; Klinck, Tecumseh: Fact and Fiction . 79-81. Regardmg Tecumseh's distrust of the
British, see Lieutenant Governor Francis Gore to Sir James Craig, Governor General, 27 July 1808, CNA,
RG 10, Indian Affairs, Vol. 1 1, 9902; Thomas Forsyth to General William Clark, 15 January 1827, Thomas




W by the BnUsh, '7.
.ar tofi.Ht, and . peace to trad,^
[Cass's italics] to some extent describes the Chain of Friendship in the North.
Yet Cass's remarks overlook the degree of mutual reciprocity m the northern
Bntish-Indian relations. Moreover, the charge that the Bntish failed to implement
cultural innovations among their Indian allies also entailed a false presupposition that
Bntain could unilaterally impose its ideals on Native peoples. The fact that the Crown
met some of the Indians' matenal needs
-and nothing more- was the secret behind
Britain's success in maintaining its enduring friendship with the northerners. In not
attempting to compel their allies to make cultural changes, Bntish agents and traders
generally recognized the dignity and integrity of the northern tribes (with occasional
exceptions) while asking for virtually nothing in return, apart from their clients'
continued commerce and future wartime loyalty. This can be seen in the fact that
although His Majesty's agents and officers could never mediate a lasting peace be^;.een
the Ojibwas and Dakotas, they continued to trade with both belligerents. Though
enjoying their best relations with the northern Indians, the British held only limited power
among them. American officer Zebulon Pike misread the situation when he returned
from his expedition to the upper Mississippi Valley (in 1804-1805) bewildered by the
British inability to quell this ongoing struggle. Pike asserted that the United States could
bring a lasting peace to the area through a more powerful show of force. But had the
British made such a heavy-handed attempt to pacify the distant northwestern tribes, the
result probably would have been an immediate end to the Chain of Friendship there. In
the end, British-Indian relations in the North proved so strong that they weathered not
Jackson, Journals of Zebulon Montgomery Pike
. I: 216-17
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only ,f,c Sioux-Ojibwa wars. bu. aiso all ,hc eflbrts by Shawnee PropLcfs naCiv.s.s to
end the nonhcrn fur ,ra.lc. Consequcn.ly, in ,hc War of 1 8 , 2 >hc nonhcn, ,r,bcs louglu
as Crown allies, an.l only incidentally as allies ,o Teeuntselfs „at,v,s, eoali„„„ oftribes
from the WabasI, ,ha, ha.l onee partieipated n, the Shawnee Prophet's revhalization
movement.
In evaluating Bnt.sh-Ind.an relations, both ('ass and 1 larnson in.plicity assumeci
tliat the Crown maintained sovereignty over the Natives with which it dealt even those
inbes dwelling within the boundaries of the United States and that Whitehall and
Canada's leaders had therefore misused their power in treating the Natives as allies rather
than subjects. In truth, although the King's ministers argued the Crown's legal
sovereignty over Rritish North America, the Chain of Friendship could exist only ,f tiic
Crown never attempted to assert this supposed right over its Indian allies. Only after the
Six Nations at the Grand River Reserve in Upper Canada attempted to force WhitciiaH's
recognition of Native land sovereignty did the Hritish government more clearly define its
stance toward the Indians living within its Imnts. Joseph Brant and the (hand River
Council systematically rejected the land deeds offered to them by Rritish leaders in
Canada, since these ultimately gave the King final determination over the distribution of
Six Nations' land cessions.'^ The Grand River nations did not concur with the notion that
they were simullaneously British subjects and allies, and they tenaciously argued the
latter status only. Moreover, by the outset of the War of 1812 (after Brant's death), the
Grand River Council, attempting to act as a sovereign power, informed Isaac Brock,
nnlitary governor of Upper ( anada, that they would remain neutral until their land
Noon, X6-88; Weaver, 525.
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quest.on was sat.factonly resolved. Less than a few dozen warriors from the Grand
River jomed the Bnt.h at the war's outset. Hence, by the commencement of the War of
1812, it proved easier for the Bnt.h to for. alhances w,th those tnbes hvmg w,thm the
United States, smce Bntish sovereignty was no longer an issue with them.
Here lay the dilemma, and indeed the flaw in Cass's argument. Even if the
Bntish government had wished to do so, ,t could not support acculturation and at the
same time expect Native peoples to accept extended Crown sovereignty over them. One
might expect that by becoming agricultural and Chnstianized, the Indians would also
accept government sovereignty, but such was not the case. The Six Nations, the most
acculturated Native peoples of the groups featured in this study, were also the most vocal
in claiming an autonomous status, independent of Whitehall. The more John Norton
spoke of establishing a seminary and agricultural missions, the more he envisioned a
new, politically independent Native community, one distant from British influence. Cass,
who had criticized the British govermnent for not promoting the advancements of
civilization among the King's Indian allies, did not seem to grasp that such developments
among the Natives would have altered the unique relationship between Britain and the
Crown's allies, while simultaneously adding impetus to the Indians' desire for
sovereignty. Ironically, Cass would later experience this difficulty himself, when, as
Secretary of War to Andrew Jackson, he encountered the Cherokee situation; despite the
advancements of Cherokee learning, agriculture, and Christian teaching, the Secretary
ultimately opted for removal after the United States government denied the Cherokees a
sovereign status.'^ But the Crown's Indian policy was much more benign, and by the end
P^cha, Lewis Cass and American Indian Poliry 14-17. The Cherokees had developed a centralized
national government, based on a constitution, which not only proclaimed the Cherokee government as
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of the eighteenth cen.ury,
.he Bn.ish had already se, as.de ,hree Reserves in Upper
Canada.^"
Cass, Harrison. Clay, and other American leaders eould no. properly understand
British-Indian relations during the early years of the American Repubhc because they
failed to consider the various tribes and regions with which the Bntish dealt.
Furthermore. Americans did not grasp that Whitehali's Ind.an pohcy was not static, and
that the British govemtnenfs front.er measures were always subject to an overarching
foreign policy that oAcn focused on France as the ma,n concem. Moreover, memories of
border warfare, and more recent naval incidents such as the Chesapeake affair in June
1807, prevented American leaders, particularly the Jeffcrsonian faction, from discem.ng
that Britain did not desire another Anglo-American war.'' After the Chesapeake cnsts.
American suspicions of British frontier intrigue seemed to be confirmed when the King's
agents at Maiden and elsewhere earnestly attempted to restore the Chain of Friendship as
a means of protecting Upper Canada from anticipated American invasions. Such
renewed activity among the Indians was construed as offensively hostile, rather than as a
defensive measure.
The thesis put forth in this study
-that Britain's relationship with three different
groupings of Indians of the Old Northwest and Upper Canada evolved along separate
lines between 1783 and 1812, and that the nations of each of those sectors responded
sovereign over tribal lands, but claimed that the Cherokee nation did not exist apart from the land Theda
Perdue and Michael D. Green, eds., Cherokee Removal: A Brief History with Document. (Boston & New
York: Bedford Books of St. Martin's Press, 1995), 13-14.
20
21
In addition to the Grand River, these included Chenail Ecarte and the Bay of Qumte.
In the incident known as the Chesapeake affair, the HMS Leopard fired three broadsides into the USS
Chesapeake, killing or wounding several of its crew, before forcibly boarding the crippled American vessel
and removing suspected British deserters.
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differently to Brmsh policy- is borne out by the subsequent events of the War of 1812.
Of the three regions discussed, British agents and officers expenenced their greatest
difficulty in mamtainmg amiable ties with the remnants of the nat.vist faction from the
southern Great Lakes, those Indians ostensibly under the leadership of Tecumseh, the
Potawatomi chief Main Poc, and the Wyandot leaders Roundhead and Walk-in-the-
Water. British officers found that they possessed virtually no influence or control over
these wamors. Furthermore, tribal infrastructures had collapsed within the ranks of those
bands and tnbes that had once participated in the Shawnee Prophet's revitalization
movement, and after the revolution in leadership brought by Tecumseh and the Prophet a
power vacuum remained.^^ Though the above-named Indian leaders were influential,
they probably did not command the intertribal support that Brant, Blue Jacket, and Little
Turtle had enjoyed from the 1770s into the 1790s. Even Tecumseh, though popular, did
not always possess the influence that the legend suggests, and neither he nor Roundhead
could prevent the Indians from ravaging the area around Detroit in the days after the
Amencans surrendered that post in August 1812. The Bntish-allied warriors also
intimidated the Canadian populace across the Detroit River in the Western District and
even killed and scalped a man serving in an allied Canadian militia unit."
The better-documented atrocities that the Indians inflicted upon white .\mericans
during the conflict were carried out by warriors from the southern Great Lakes,
specifically, northern Ohio, southern Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois. This stnng of
22
Roundhead was the only nativist leader in the War of 1812 who had signed the Treaty of Greenville in
1795.
" Lieutenant Edward Dewar to Colonel Procter, 28 August 1812, and Major P. L. Chambers to Procter 24
August 1812, Cruikshank, The Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit. 1812 . 173-76; Entry for 20
August 1812, Journal of Charles Askin, Wood, I: 54 1
.
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actwhy incudes the actions re..embered as the Fort Dearborn Massaere (August 1812),
Pigeon Roost Massaere (September 1812), River Raisin Massaere (Jai.uary 1813),
Dudley's Defeat (May 1813), and Buffalo (December 1813); these u.e.dents are what
shaped the Amcriean postwar opinion, including the views of Cass and others, when
reassessing British mvolvement with the Indians. Yet each instance demonstrated how
little control the British actually exerted over the Indians south of the Lakes. No Bntish
personnel were present at the first two incidents, and at both the River Raisin Massacre
and Dudley's Defeat, British soldiers were killed by their Native allies while bravely
attempting to protect American prisoners from Indian vengeance.^^ After Tecumseh's
death late m 1 8 1 3, when the remnants of his former nativist confederacy had followed the
battered British army eastward towards the west end of Lake Ontario, numerous warriors
who had participated in the previous killings at the River Raisin and Dudley's Defeat
accompanied a British expedition into American territory on the Niagaia frontier. When
the British burned the towns of Black Rock and Buffalo on 30 December 1813, Ottawa
leaders from southern Michigan near Detroit began throwing live American children into
the names. After the Indians had burned three children, a detachment of British soldiers
managed to save the remaining American civilians, but only after a British officer had
been shot through his sword arm with an arrow and a significant body of cavalry had
John Strachan to Thomas Jefferson, 30 January 1813, in William F. Coffin, m2_JjieJA!MancLits
Moral: A Canadian Chronicle (Montreal: J. Lovell, 1864), 273-85; Sandy Antal, A Wampum Denied:
Procter's Warofl812 (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1997), 201-02; Larry L. Nelson Men of
Patriotism, Courage, & Lnterprise!: Fort M ems in the War of! 8 1
2
rCnninn Oh,n Daring Books 1985)
77; Casselman, Richardson's War of 1812, 153-54; Klink & Talman, Journal of Maior John Norton 32 1-'
22. John Norton ascribed the massacre of Dudley's men to "(a] Worthless Chippawa [i.e. Ojibwa] of
Detroit having with him a number of wretches like himself" Robert McAfee, American veteran of the War
of 1812 and early historian of that epoch, attributed this atrocity to the Potawatomis, while claiming that the
Miamis and Wyandots "were on the side of humamty" and attempted to grant mercy to the defenseless
Americans. McAfee, 272.
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come .o h,s aid. The ep.sode once again nearly ended ,he roeky relationship between the
British and their alhes from south of the Great Lakes "
Officers of the Bntish Right Division
-the army that was deployed along the
Detroit frontier and Upper Canada's Wester. District- dreaded the consequences of an
Indian alliance gone awry. Their overall commander, Major General Hemy Procter, also
feared his allies' instability, and what would become of the Bntish forces and His
Majesty's subjects of Upper Canada if his am.y was ever compelled to retreat. After
having witnessed the carnage following the actions at the River Raisin, Fort Meigs, and
Dudley's Defeat, Procter understood what his allies were capable of doing. At Fort
Stephenson in July 1813, when the Indians refused to commit any of their forces until the
British made a reckless frontal assault in which the latter sustained severe losses, Procter
considered the futile attack as a necessary "Sacnfice.
. .to Indian Opimon."^^ Although
Procter was not popular with his men and other officers, most shared his concerns
regarding the Indians.
At one point dunng the Right Division's ill-fated retreat in early October 1813,
the aging Indian agent Matthew Elliott, an adopted Shawnee who had lived among the
Indians for nearly fifty years, broke into tears, exclaiming that "he would not stay to be
sacrificed."" Had Procter not stopped to give battle against the pursuing Americans in
r?f.Q ' ^ ?° : '
'""""^ of A llegan County. Mirh.p.n .n tl.. ^x>,r....
of 1839 and 1840 (Niles, Michigan: Niles Mirror Office, 1889; reprint, Berrien Springs, Michigan^
Hardscrabble Books, 1 974), 1 5- 1 8. The accounts included in here were those given by the former Ottawa
war leaders from southern Michigan
-Saginaw, Noonday, and Gosa.
Procter to Sir George Prevost, 9 August 1813, Wood, II: 46; Same to same, 1 1 July 1813, ibid., 253-54
Procter's superior. Sir George Prevost, did not understand the peril of the situation, and he scorned the
General for "having allowed the clamour of the Indian Warriors to induce you to commit a part of your
valuable force." Prevost to Procter, 22 August 1813, ibid., 48.
" Testimony of Lt. Colonel Augustus Warburton, 9 December 1814, Procter Court-Martial, P.R.O., War
Office (WO) 71/243, 11. These records are also available in CNA, MG 13, WO 71/243.
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In stark contrast to those often tense moments that characterized the alhance m
the region of Detroit and the southern Great Lakes, Bnt.sh-Indian relations m the North
and in the upper Mississippi Valley progressed much more smoothly. Specifically, the
greater discipline of the Indians from the North and West stood out. When Robert
Dickson, principal Bntish agent and trader from the upper Mississippi region, amved at
Detroit with hundreds of Native reinforcements to assist Procter in the summer of 1813,
the General descnbed them as "restrainable, tractable to a Degree that I could not have
thought possible." But Procter feared that after several days they had begun to ^ow
"contaminated, by the other Indians" fi-om the Detroit region.^' Like Procter, John
Richardson, a "Gentleman Volunteer" fi-om Upper Canada, also praised Dickson and the
northwestern Indians, comparing the Sauks' "nobleness of feature" to that of the ancient
Romans.^^ More importantly, Richardson related an instance in which Dickson
prevented a Sauk chief fi-om taking the life of an .American pnsoner in order to avenge
the death of the chiefs son." But Richardson's stones ofAmencan pnsonsers captured
near Brownstown the previous year by tribes from the Detroit region demonstrated that in
those instances not even the presence of a British Indian agent nor that of army officers
could prevent the ritualized killing of pnsoners.^'^ As they had always done prior to the
War, Britain's Indian allies fi-om the North and the far West continued to look to their
traders and Indian agents for leadership and guidance. These tribes envisioned
^' Procter to Prevost, 9 August 1813, Wood, II: 44.





.n a syn.b.ot.c relat.onsh.p wah the. Bntish Father, one which would always
protect them and provide for their material needs.
In his autobiography, the Sauk leader Black Hawk spoke of h,s relationship with
the British agents m the Mississippi Valley and Wisconsm. In a meetmg with Dickson at
Green Bay, Black Hawk recalled that the agent 'Vo././ not consent to sen, tra.e men to
murder ^omen and chMren [italicized by autobiography's editor]," and therefore would
not permit the King's allies to raid defenseless settlements." Instead, Dickson insisted
that the Sauks and the other wester, nations accompany the traders and Bntish officers to
assist Procter in northern Ohio. According to the Sauk chief, he and approximately five
hundred warriors happily complied with this request. FuHherBiore, while enroute to Fort
Meigs Black Hawk demonstrated his humanity by advising other allied tnbes to treat
American prisoners well, and he credited himself with the distinction of intervening to
end the slaughter of captive Americans at Dudley's Defeat, an honor that legend has
generally bestowed upon Tecumseh. Regardless of which chief actually stopped the
killings at Dudley's Defeat, Black Hawk's cooperation with the Bntish and his respect
for the basic human dignity of his enemies was almost diametrically opposed to the
attitudes of his Indian counterparts along the Detroit frontier.^^ Bntain's ties to the Sauks
and Dakota Sioux of the Upper Mississippi, along with its ties to the Ojibwas, Ottawas,
and Mcnominees of Wisconsin and northern Michigan, provided the necessary support




for the Crown's little army ,o hold key posts in those regions until the Treaty of Ghent in
December 1814.^^
As with the other groups covered in this study, the Grand River community of
Upper Canada endured a wartime expenence reminiscent of their prewar years. With
their land question still unsettled, the Six Nations officially proclaimed neutrality at the
commencement of hostilities, ostensibly until the Bntish government would address their
gnevances. Nevertheless, after the initial Bntish successes., coupled with the relentless
urging of John Norton, most wamors from the Grand River once again allied themselves
with the King's cause.^« This time, however, they did so in hopes of receiving future
redress from the Crown, and with the understanding that it was a matter of honor to repel
an invader of their homeland. Unlike the other segments of the Chain of Friendship, the
Iroquois at the Grand River did not fight to regain lost territory, but to retain the ground
which was rightfully theirs, regardless of how the British government perceived their
status on that land.
Once again, officials in Canada were forced to temporize with the Six Nations at
the Grand River. Neither Prevost nor the military governor of Upper Canada, Isaac
Brock, could make any promises to the Six Nations, nor could they undermine the Indian
Department's position, which was still at odds with Norton and elements of the Six
Nations. Nevertheless, Prevost, realizing that it was essential to keep the Six Nations
actively employed in the war, compromised with the Grand River group by allowing
them wartime autonomy and resources and eventually granting Norton a great deal of
" Calloway, Crown and Calumet
. 204; Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind . 88-91
Benn, 36-53.
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control over the distribution of g,fts and war materiel at the Grand River." In essence,
Prevost had established a direct l,nk between Norton and the upper levels ofgovemmen,
and had given the mixed-blood leader significant control over military resources.
Prevosfs maneuver drastically undercut the power and inHuence of the todian
Department at the Fort George agency, particularly that of Norton's arch-nval and
nemesis. William Glaus, who resisted Prevosfs orders throughout the war and took every
opportunity to contmue to malign Norton. Although Norton was eventually shoved aside
by h,s adversaries at the war's end after Prevosfs recall to England, the Grand River's
wartime experience demonstrated that the British, while not prepared to fully grant Six
Nations' demands, were in a position in which they were compelled to compromise w.th
Iroquois interests.
Several aspects of the Chain of Friendship have been discussed in this study. Ties
between the British government and the Indians of the Old Northwest and Upper Canada
between 1783 and 1812 were often tenuous, and this relationship differed widely,
depending on several varying factors, such as geographical position, Native relations with
the United States, the fur trade, Indian intertribal relations, the degree of Native
acculturation, indigenous religious beliefs, the influence of British Indian agents, and the
constitutional issues of Native sovereignty and legal status. During the nineteenth
century few Americans, if any, grasped the reasons for the continuation of the Cham of
Friendship between Great Britain and its Indian allies, nor could Americans understand
the complexities of these bonds. Perhaps Henry Schoolcraft, ethnologist and U. S. hidian
39
Ibid., 142-43, 156-57; Klinck & Talman, Journal of Major John Norton . Ixxviii; Noah Freer, Military
Secretary to Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond, 1 March 1814, Johnston, Valley of the Six Nations .
219-20, and in CNA, RG 10, Indian Affau-s, Vol. 3, 1299-1301. Also see Freer to Captain Lonng 9 July
1814, ibid., 1463-64.
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agent, came the closest when, in 1 834, he pubhcly presented his study on "The
Movements of the North Western Indians Dunng the Late War" to the Histoncal Society
of Michigan. At the time of his presentation several of the Indians who had fought m the
war were still living, and the Shawnee Prophet had moved to an Indian reservation m
Kansas. While erroneous in places, Schoolcraft's study pointed out the regional
differences between the tribes of the Old Northwest, and it emphasized that the northern
nations had rejected the teachings of the Shawnee Prophet. The ethnologist also credited
"the Agents of the North West Company" and Robert Dickson as key figures in
preserving the northern alliance. Finally, rather than condemning the British for iheir
participation and involvement in Native atrocities, as his countrymen were wont to do,
Schoolcraft pointed out that the British had not kept their promises to their faithful
allies.^^ The U. S. agent, having worked among the tribes in northern Michigan for more
than a decade, also managed to incorporate a degree of Native perspective in his
scholarship, and in so doing helped to pave the way for further studies in British-Indian
relations such as this one.
Schoolcraft's study also hinted at a key point, namely the Chain of Fnendship's
frailty. The uncertain level of British commitment to their Indian allies was ftirther
brought out in the Treaty of Ghent, which did not adequately protect Indian interests.
This would have been forgivable if British officers and agents had not made promises to
Henry R. Schoolcraft, "Movements of the North Western Indian During the Late War " Discourse
Delivered Before die Histoncal Society of Michigan, Detroit, 1834, GABLA, Shawnee File 1803-1804-
Winnebago File, 1797-1806. There were also two other documents wntten by Amencans dunng the war
that acknowledged regional groupmgs and differences between the Indians, yet without applymg this to the
Bntish alliance. These are: Thomas Forsyth to John Gibson, 26 July 1812, Thomas Forsyth Collection
Box 134, Chicago Historical Society, and Duncan McArthur, "Report on the Indian tribes East of the
Mississippi River with Whom the United States are Connected by Treaty," 22 March 1814 Duncan
McArthur Papers, Vol. 1, 122-32, Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library.
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their allies rega,.,,,,..
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on; When news of the peace finally reached these distant outposts the following
month, both officers were stunned. The Treaty's terms called for the restoration of ail
conquered territones. The disillusioned McDouall could only conclude that "[o]ur
negocators [sic], as usual, have been egregiously duped.
... they have shown themselves
profoundly ignorant of the concerns of this part of the Empire."^^
The northern and western hidians who subsequently met with McDouall and the
Indian agents at Mackmac and Drummond Island between 1815 and 1817 were
thunderstruck as they began to fully grasp the implications of the peace. In the summer
of 1816 the Sioux chiefs Wabisha and Little Crow, accompanied by four hundred
wamors, visited the new Bntish post at Drummond Island to express their
dissatisfaction.^^ A Winnebago leader also made his way to the northern agency that
summer, where he complained to agent T. G. ("Tige") Anderson that "we...have always
been deceived by you."^^ Black Hawk, too, visited the post for a few consecutive
summers in an attempt to compel the Bntish to make good on their earlier promises,
exclaiming, "I many times rubbed my eyes and cleared my ears, before I could believe
what I saw or what I heard." If the Bntish did not support the Indians, Black Hawk
"Instructions to Mr. Guiilory Interpreter for the Saulk [sic] Nation," A. Bulger 8 April 1815-
"Instructions to Lieutenant Renville Interpreter for the Scoux [sic] Nation," A. Bulger 8 \pn\ 15 CNAMG 1 9 E 5, Andrew Bulger Papers, File 6, pp. 505 & 5 1 0, respectively.
McDouall to Bulger, 2 May, 1815, ibid., 573.
His Maiesty's Indian Allies, 175. At a council held at Amherstburg on 10 June 1816, a delegation
of "Principal Chiefs" of several of the refugees residing near the Western District claimed that the Bntish
had promised them that they "would get back agam the old French lines," likely meaning the Allegheny
watershed. Proceedings of a Council held at Amherstburg, 10 June 1816, CNA, RG 10, Indian Affairs,
Vol. 27, 16106. This, of course, was impossible by 1812, and the statement may have been an effort on the
part of the Indians to extract more gifts from the British. More realistically, British officers and agents may
have given the Indians hope of restoring all of their country lost since the Treaty of Greenville in 1795.
Speech of Karamanke, Winnebago leader, 1 1 June 1816, William McKay Papers, File 5, McCord
Museum, Montreal.
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co„..nued, "your red ch.ldren.
.
.win be slaves
.0 .he B,g Kn.ves." When the Sauk leader
grew aggressively angry, agen, William McKay forcefally silenced kun: "I have your
Grea, Father's orders
,0 obey and all the Indians in ,he universe will not make me dev.ate
from them. The council is Ended and you must withdraw." These remarks left Black
Hawk "crying with rage."^^
Of all the groups within the Cham of Fnendship, the tnbes m the North and West
-once the most stable segment of the Cham- were the most vocal m expressing their
anger with the Bnt.sh after the War of 1 8 1 2. This was partly due to the fact that they still
held out hope of resisting the Amencans. The nations nearer to the Detroit theater of the
conflict had either relocated or had surrendered to the "Big Kmves." Tecumseh and
Roundhead were dead, and by 1816 Main Poc was gone as well/^ Walk-m-the-Water,
one of the few surviving chiefs of the coalition from the southern Great Lakes, had begun
to cooperate with the Americans much earlier. The wamors from the Grand River
merely returned to their farms, and with the restoration of peace, they no longer stood to
lose their land. But the nations in Wisconsin and the upper Mississippi Valley were
begimiing to expenence the pressure of an expanding military presence in those regions
after 1815, causing more consternation for the Indians there. Finally, however, probably
the most signficant reason that the northern and western tribes so ardently expressed their
dissatisfaction with the British stemmed fi-om their understanding of the familial,
symbiotic ties that had subsisted between them for so long. To these groups, their Bntish
Father was far more than a mere wartime ally, and since the nations in these distant
Speeches at Drummond Island, 3 August 1817, CNA, MG 19 F 29, William McKay Papers- also in John
Strachan Papers, F983, Vol. 1, Ontario Historical Society, Toronto.
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quarters had not been greatly affected by events in ehher 1783 or 1794, they now began
to experience this disappointment for the first time.
In truth, Bntish officials and military leaders, both in Canada and m the home
government, earnestly desired to protect their allies and make good on their wartime
promises. After Tecumseh's death, the fallen wamor's sister and Tecumseh's teen-aged
son, along with nearly two dozen other Indians from the Detroit region, visited Governor
General Sir George Prevost at Quebec in March 1814. Prevost compassionately
expressed his condolences, telling the delegation of his sorrow upon previously learning
of Tecumseh's death. To console the Indians, the Governor General reminded them that
they and the Bntish shared a common cause, and that "[o]ur Great Father considers you
as his children and will not forget you or your interests at a Peace."^*^
Like Prevost, Bntish leaders in England, including Prime Minister Lord Liverpool
and his War Secretary Earl Bathurst, considered it a pnonty to negotiate a pennanent
Indian boundary and preferably a sovereign Native buffer state that would separate the
United States temtones from Bntain's Canadian possessions. Furthermore, the Bntish
peace commissioners at Ghent exceeded their government's instructions by boldly
demanding an Indian buffer state as a sine qua non of any peace agreement. The
proposal was to include nearly all of the Indian tenitory lost since the Greenville Treaty
in 1795, and both the British and American governments would theoretically be
prohibited from purchasing or acquiring any Indian lands from within its boundaries.
For Main Poc's death, see Thomas Forsyth to William Clark, 15 January 1827, Thomas Forsyth Papers,
9T53, Draper Mss.
Speech of Sir George Prevost to Indian delegation at Quebec, 15 March 1814, CNA, RG 10, Indian
Affairs, Vol. 12, 10308-12. Tecumseh's sister, still very distraught, cried on this occasion. John Norton
and his wife were also present.
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more
Such a lofty ultimatum by the Bnt.sh commissioners had no chance of
succeedmg. Any attempt to redraw the boundary separatmg Indian country from the
United States at the old Greenville line would have first required the removal of
than one hundred thousand white settlers. In addition, John Qumcy Adams, a member of
the American peace delegation, pointed out that "[n]o European power had ever
considered the Indian nations as Great Bntam appeared now to consider them.- Adams
later told Henry Goulbum, the leader of the Bnt.sh peace commission, that to "condemn"
so great a "territory to perpetual barrenness and solitude [so] that a few hundred savages
might find wild beasts to hunt upon it, was a species of game law that a nation descended
from Bntons would never endure."- When the two countries' delegations informally
met for dinner on 23 August 1814, Heny Clay, another of the Amencan commissioners,
explained to Goulbum that the Bntish proposition regarding the Indians was "equivalent
to a demand for the cession of Boston or New York."^^ Consequently, the Americans
prepared to break off negotiations. Only Clay held out hope for reaching an agreement,
but merely because he, renowned for his gambling and card-pIaying, felt certain that the
British were bluffing.^''
The Americans ultimately had the better of the argument, for they were basing
their perspective on the traditional Euro-American legal understanding that Natives were
l^f ^ "^"^"'^ "^"^ Goulbum to Earl Bathurst, same dateCNA, MG 24 A 8, Earl Bathurst Papers, 192.
" Entry for 1 September 1814, in Charles Francis Adams, ed.. Memoirs of John Quincv Adams
Compnsms Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848 17 Vol. {Ph,u^.^r.y.,^ j b Lippincott & Co
1874-1877), III: 28.
'^"u ^o.,
" Goulbum to Bathurst, 23 August 1814, CNA, MG 24 A 8, Bathurst Papers, 200.
Hickey, 292.
320
not sovereign over the lands on which they hved, but merely possessed the usufructuary
right to the temporary use of the land. Americans had regarded the reg.on of the
proposed Indian buffer state as sovereign U. S. territory ever since the Peace of Pans in
1 783. The proposal was more convenient for Britain. Since Bntam had ceded this reg.on
at that time, it was not as if the King's ministers were offenng to carve a sovereign
Native state from British territory. Certamly, the Grand River experience had
demonstrated their aversion for such a concept. In any case, the Amencans would never
agree to any compromise unless the Bnt.sh were in a pos.t.on to forcibly evict them from
Indian lands. Even then, the war would probably never end. Adams believed that even if
the United States government agreed to Britain's Indian proposal, "all its [the U. S.
government's] force, and that of Britain combined with it, would not suffice" to prevent
the American settlers from crossing the line.^^ Clay shared this view, intimating to
Goulbum that the two countnes' "united efforts would be inadequate to restrain that part
of the American population which is to the Westward of the Alleghany, from encroaching
upon the Indian Territory and gradually expelling the aboriginal inhabitants."^^ Amazed,
Goulbum later concluded, "I had till 1 came here no idea of the fixed determination which




there is nothing which the people of America would so reluctantly
abandon as what they.
.
.call their natural right to do so."" Thus, the problem stemmed
largely from the massive land cessions made in 1783 of areas that the Americans had
55
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Entry for 1 September 1814, Adams, Memoirs of John Quincv Adams
,
III: 28
Goulbum to Bathurst, 16 September 1814, CNA, MG 24 A 8, Earl Bathurst Papers, 213
" Goulbum to Bathurst, 25 November 1814, ibid., 239.
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never actually c.„u|uc,al. I„„ wl„ch ,l,cy ha<l base, ,hcir ,„l„ ,o possess o,. a ,„y,„ „r
COIKlllCSl.
Ka.hc, than dnna.ul.n, an Indian hnHb state, perhaps a w.ser shategen. to. the
i^ntish eomnnssioners to have attempted would have been to seek n.odes. ten
.tor.al gains
in Wiseonsin, Mieh.gan, New York, and Man.e, w.thout ment,onn,g the Ind.ans at the
pence talks. Then the Crown nnght have subsequently had the opt.on ofeannarking
some of the eonquered regions speeifieally lor Native reserves histead. onee President
.lames Mad.son reee.ved news ol ,he extravagant Rntish proposals lor an Ind.an buflbr
State, he released
.he substanee ol the eonlldenfal peaee talks to the Ameriean pubhe,
Imlher raising the ire and hatred ofthe popniaee agamst Bntan, and the Crown's laithlul
Indian allies.^" Onee the l^ritish commissioners had proposed the bulTer slate, the
Ameriean government and its eiti/ens were in no mood to make any ternto, ,al
concessions at all, no matter how poorly Ameriean forces had fared m the war.
Even so, lirit.sh officials contemplated a conlmual.on and an escalation ofthe war
and offered overall command of Britain's North Ameriean forces to the greatest military
mind ofthe age, the Duke of Wellington. The "Iron Duke," though expressing his
willmgness to accept the command, could not promise further territorial conquests until
(he British had gained full naval superiority on the (neat l akes. Only then could he
consider moving great numbers of troops south ofthe Lakes and dislodging the
Americans from their remaining forts scattered throughout northern Ohio aiul Indiana,
key locations that Procter's former Right Division had failed to capture Without control
ol the Lakes, Wellington firmly maintained, "you have no right... to demand any
"r^ailcy, 149; Mickey, 291.
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.0 proseeu,e ,„e war. For,„„a,e,y for „„,h eo. es, We„i„„o„ re.a„,ed ,„
Europe ,o mee, the rev,ved Preneh threa, ancr Napoleon's eseape fron, h,s
.en,p„ra,y
exile at HIba.
Wdhngton's opinion represented only a smgle factor
.nfluene.ng Bntan. to end
hostdities in North Ameriea. After n.ore than two deeades of f.ghting Franee, a
continued war w„h the Un.ted States would require add.t.onal loans and property taxes/
Furthermore, Europe's instab.l.ty at the t.n.e and growing European sympathy for the
United States made peaee des.rable. Years later, Henry Goulbum reflected on the final
months of 1814, reeallmg that "the discussions at Vienna assumed a character wh.ch
made ,t possible that there m.ght be a renewal of hostdities in Europe & part.es there
speculated upon the embarrassment which a,i American war would cause to England."^'
Therefore, Rrifsh cc.mmissioners relented to American pressure for a peace based on the
principle of .v/.;/„v cjuo ante helium, a restoration of all conditions and lemtories as they
stood prior to the war. Thus, while officers and agents in North America such as
McDouall, Bulger, Dickson, and others all recognized the familial ties that the Indians
believed morally bound the British to the Chain of Friendship, the home government.
Wellmg on to t.ord I .vcrpool, 9 November 1814. quoted .n Ihckey. 295. Wellington's concerns were
well founded; the naval struggle on the I,akes would have made ,t difficult for e.thef side to gam
supremacy. By war's end. the naval race on Lake Ontario alone entailed the construction oflhe world's
largest sailing vessels at the time. For an excellent essay on this struggle, see C. P. Stacey, "Naval Power
on the Lakes. I «12-I8I4." in Afkr Tippecanoe: Some Aspects of th. w.r »f . « i . ed. Philip P Mason(Last^Lansmg & roronto: The Michigan State University Press & The Ryerson Press, respectively, 1963),
^"
Harold D. Langley. 'The Quest for Peace," in War on the Great Lakes: Rssavs romm.mnr...nf,
1 75 Anniversary of the Battle of Lake Frie
.
eds. William Jeffrey Welsh and David Curtis Skaggs (Kent
Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1991), 73.
" Wilbur Devereux Jones, ed., "A British View of the War of 1 8 1 2 and the Peace Negotiations " The




.0 help .he Indians, in ,he end shaped Bn,a,„'s fore.gn policy to confo™
to its European geo-political interests.
By all conventional standards, the Americans had lost the war but won the peace.
The United States had f.led m all of its objectives, mcludmg
.ts attempt to conquer
Canada. At Ghent Amencan comissioners never compelled the Bntish peace delegation
to address Britam's violation of mantime nghts for which the war was supposedly
declared, and at the war's end Bnt.h troops occupied much more American territoi-y than
vice-versa. Fmally, the Americans held naval domination only on Lake Erie, albeit the
most vital of all the Great Lakes. Yet the American diplomatic tnumph in gaining a
stalemate at Ghent, coupled with Andrew Jackson's brilliant postwar victor>' over a
seasoned Bntish amiy at New Orieans in January 1815, left Amencans with the false
impression that they had won the war and had compelled Bntain to agree to favorable
terms. In a sense, it was the myth of victory in 1783 all over again; Jeffersoman
Americans even regarded it as a second war of independence.^^
As in 1783, the Crown's Indian allies were once again left vulnerable to American
expansion. This time, however, Bntish leaders had at least attempted to address Native
concerns at the peace negotiations, and in place of the ill-fated buffer state proposal,
Goulbum and his associates managed to persuade the American commissioners to add an
article to the Treaty as a token attempt to protect Native interests. In keeping with the
principle of status quo ante bellum. Article DC of the Treaty of Ghent theoretically
restored all Indian "possessions, rights, and privileges" to which they had been entitled in




.0 prevent the continuat.on of a proeess of rehnquish.ng the.r lands to the Untted
States through a rapid succession of treaties. Furthermore, Tecumseh and other
significant leaders of resistance were now gone, and the Bnt.sh no longer attempted to
intervene, so nothing hindered the accelerated process ofAmencan land acquisition.
Short of continuing the war for many years ,n what prom.sed to be a bloody, fotile
struggle for Lake Erie and northen, Ohio, Article IX in the Ghent agreement was the best
that the British could do for the Indians. g,ven the circumstances and American
temperament.
In spite of the broken promises and the drastically reduced British h.dian budgets
that followed the war, traces of the old Chain of Friendship remained, hidians living in
the North still received gifts and provisions at Drummond and Manitoulm Islands well
into the 1840s, and a number of those who remained in the vicinity of Detroit continued
to cross over each year in order to visit their British Father at Maiden, a practice that
continued to amioy Governor Lewis Cass of Michigan." And during the Mackenzie
Rebellion of Upper Canada m 1837-1838, Ojibwas from Lake Huron and neariy one
hundred warriors from the Grand River turned out to assist in putting down the revolt.^
Even Black Hawk, after having survived the bloody war that bears his name, by 1833 had
seemingly forgotten about his harsh words and shouting sprees with British agents
sixteen years earlier. In his autobiography, the Sauk leader recalled that "the British
made but few [promises]
-but we could always rely upon their word! [italicized by
Cass to John Calhoun, Secretary of War, 3 August 1819, and same to same, 8 October 1819, Bentley
Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Lewis Cass Collection, Vol. 3, 99-102 and 122-25, resepective'ly.
^ Allen, His Majesty's Indian Allies . 1 84.
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editor] Nevertheless, in spi.e of the memories, the yea. of frontier warfare, mUitary
alliances, council frres. Indian revitali^ation movements, and fur trade ,n the Great Lakes
liad all passed. A new era in the annals of Canadian-hdian relations had begun.
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